Anything can be not good for anyone. Can you say any source that is good for you and shows that what I said is wrong? — Angelo Cannata
Along history metaphysics was criticized by historicists, because, by trying to understand how things are, it looses sight of the fact that things, rather than being, are becoming (Heraclitus). — Angelo Cannata
I think we need to shake the traditional views of Parmenides and Heraclitus. This "being versus becoming" is a false one. Why should we presume that "being" means something opposed to "becoming"? This essentially equates being to permanence.
Beings exist. Beings change. Change -- becoming -- itself is a being. Not a "physical object," of course, but a process. Processes exist. Change exists. Thus, change is "in" being as much as permanence is "in" being. — Xtrix
Many scholars say Aristotle did not name his text "Metaphysics." Or that it simply referred to what he wrote after the Physics.
In the Metaphysics Aristotle describes the project as "first philosophy." Or, analysis of basic concepts. — Jackson
I was not aware metaphysics had to be about grounding science. Not a definition I would abide by. — Jackson
As a postmodernist, I tend to think of metaphysics as synonymous with worldview, and worldviews are inclusive frames that address all aspects of culture , from the r winces to the arts to ethics and politics. — Joshs
My own understanding is that it addresses the question, What kind of thing is the world?
Does the universe have a beginning? Did it come from somewhere?
Metaphysics overlaps with epistemology--and aesthetics--so the clear delineation is not useful to make — Jackson
This sounds to me more like meta-science , a questioning approach that takes for granted the main methodological assumptions operating within the sciences of its day. It seekes only to organize , categorize and clarify within a given set of overarching normative conventions. This is different from what the major continental philosophers throughout history have done, which is overturn these accepted assumptions. For instance, the shift from hypothetical inductive to deductive method as we move from Bacon to Popper. In order to embrace this definition of metaphysics one has to first recognize that there is no fixed definition of what science does or how it does it. — Joshs
I know there is a physical world. I hardly think that explains reality. — Jackson
But do you think positing non-physical stuff will help? — bongo fury
Even Bertrand Russell admitted that the very definition of matter was incoherent. — Jackson
I don't think he meant to posit the existence of non-physical stuff. Do you? — bongo fury
If you consider change as a kind of being — Angelo Cannata
I think this is not really consistent, because, if you really want to be consistent with a perspective based on change, you must consider change also about your idea of change. In other words, if I say “everything changes”, I must admit that this very statement and its meaning must be included in the set of things subject to change. — Angelo Cannata
If you think about change as a way of being, then you are assuming that, along the change, being remains being. But, if it remains being, then you are excluding it from change, you are excluding your statement from the field of things that change. — Angelo Cannata
Heidegger was able to include change in the category of being because he actually modified the meaning of being: being in Heidegger is not absolute, but conditioned by time, by the human condition. — Angelo Cannata
This way Heidegger forced the meaning of “being” to something that actually means human condition, subject to time and death. In this context we cannot say that change is an expression of being, because being itself hasn’t any stable meaning. — Angelo Cannata
I think it is obvious that metaphysics has different meanings in different times and different authors. As a consequence, the question in the title of the thread “What is metaphysics?” has not much meaning. How do you think to deal with the plurality of positions about the question? — Angelo Cannata
If you consider “being” as "something”, but not permanent, how are you able to give it a name, which is, the word “being”? It seems to me that we can use names only if we consider that something remains unchanged over time. For example, if what I call “sky” today is a “horse” tomorrow, it is completely impossible to me to give it a name, I cannot even figure what I am thinking about. But you call it “being”, which means that, in this something that you call “being”, something remains the same over time, so that today and tomorrow you can still call it “being”. This seems to me that actually you are not conceiving “being” as something really completely changing, really not permanent. — Angelo Cannata
Briefly this is Russell's way of saying that science does not even define what physicality is: — Jackson
If all my thoughts are physical, — Jackson
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