The many worlds. — Haglund

I am fine with you not subscribing to it.

Your assessment is accurate — Jackson

That's the usual reaction of people who don't like to admit defeat.

I am fine with you not subscribing to it. — Jackson

Like I am with you not believing in god. But where is the evidence of these many worlds?

That's the usual reaction of people who don't like to admit defeat. — Haglund

Rude. As has been said, we are done.

You take my comment seriously? About being defeated. You do exactly the same as theists. Claiming without evidence.

Saying “change is something” is a human conceptualization, which is, metaphisics. — Angelo Cannata

Not really. To recognize anything whatsoever is not metaphysics. We see the world in terms of entities in that world. Beings. That’s simply consciousness, awareness, perception, experience, etc.

We can call it a conceptualization…but in that case everything is conceptualized. Not just a particular being, like change, but any being whatsoever. The world then becomes “conceptualized.” And here we’re back to an idealism.

As such, it is exposed to criticism. It is humanly impossible to guarantee that our reasonings are true and correct: we never know if tomorrow we might discover an error in our reasoning. — Angelo Cannata

But I’m not referring to “reasoning.”

I don’t understand what you’re arguing against — that things exist at all? Or that change is not a thing?

If neither, then fine — because both are absurdities. But it seems as if there’s disagreement somehow…yet if you truly understand what I’m saying, it’s not at all controversial. It’s essentially truism:

1) there is.
2) There is something.
3) Change is something.

Where does the disagreement lie?

So, you have no way to guarantee that your statement “change is something” is true or correct — Angelo Cannata

That there is something is a given, prior to (and assumed before) truth or falsity in the sense you’re using (viz., propositional logic).

The notion of truth you’re using, yes any statement whatsoever can be analyzed as true in terms of “correctness,” and so can be doubted. We can doubt the existence of everything we think and experience— as Descartes famously did. This already presupposes an ontology, a notion of truth, a subject/object distinction, and a notion of correctness.

It’s a ploy often used when one wants to get out of an otherwise weak argument or misunderstanding. Better to attempt to undermine truth, fact, and reality rather than “lose.” It’s an unhealthy habit— I’ve done it myself. Worth losing.

ust wonderin’.....if a base a priori intuition informs unavoidably, how might it be altered? Wouldn’t experiential consistency be questionable? — Mww

I think experiential consistency is questionable. That's why we have difference of intuitions, differences of preference, and so on. These are the peculiarities of the individual. We can see that in standardized moral training, and standardized education in general, we attempt to create consistency. I believe this tendency to produce conformity is itself deeply intuitive. It's the reason why evolving living beings exist as distinct species, rather than just a whole bunch of different varieties.

That there is something is a given — Xtrix

This is exactly the problem of metaphysics: how can you say that something is a given, since, in order to say it, you need to use your brain?

This is exactly the problem of metaphysics: how can you say that something is a given, since, in order to say it, you need to use your brain? — Angelo Cannata

Your position sounds similar to the ancient philosopher Cratylus, "you cannot step in the same river once."

This is exactly the problem of metaphysics: how can you say that something is a given, since, in order to say it, you need to use your brain? — Angelo Cannata

No— in order to say it, or think it, you have to be. Anything we think, say, feel, or do presupposes existence.

I’ll repeat: unless change is nothing, it “has” being.

So again:

1) there is.
2) There is something.
3) Change is something.

Where does the disagreement lie? — Xtrix

If you’re arguing that nothing exists— or knowledge of any kind, or statements of any kind are impossible, which is what it sounds like, then that’s your own business. I can’t argue with absurdities.

If change is a thing, it’s part of existence. This is logic— this is truism.

This is exactly the problem of metaphysics: how can you say that something is a given, since, in order to say it, you need to use your brain?
— Angelo Cannata

No— in order to say it, or think it, you have to be. Anything we think, say, feel, or do presupposes existence.

I’ll repeat: unless change is nothing, it “has” being.

So again:

1) there is.
2) There is something.
3) Change is something.

Where does the disagreement lie?
— Xtrix

If you’re arguing that nothing exists— or knowledge of any kind, or statements of any kind are impossible, which is what it sounds like, then that’s your own business. I can’t argue with absurdities.

If change is a thing, it’s part of existence. This is logic— this is truism. — Xtrix

Makes sense to me. Not sure what Angelo is objecting to.

I’m not sure either, frankly.

Your position sounds similar to the ancient philosopher Cratylus, "you cannot step in the same river once." — Jackson

Sure you can. But not twice. :roll:

It seems pretty clear to me. He says that in order to say anything is given you have to use your brain to say it's given. So the given is always a mental construction. Which overlooks the fact that there is a connection between the mental construction and the given. There are two mental constructions for change. It's us changing along a static reality, our particles moving along thee static pre-established solid iron worldlines in spacetime, or there is a dynamic reality of which we are part.

So from the Kantian perspective for example, we should see that these fundamental limitations are described as the a priori intuitions of space and time. These base intuitions inform the way that we see and apprehend things, in a way which we cannot avoid. When we come to understand this basic reality, we can move beyond these intuitions, to a deeper level, to see how these intuitions themselves, might be altered toward something more real, by locating the basic limitations at an even deeper level. — Metaphysician Undercover

Grant, for the moment, that the notion of the a priori base intuitions space and time is the case for the way we see and apprehend things, which is, after all, just the same as experience itself. It follows necessarily that if the base intuitions might be altered, the way things are seen and apprehended must also be altered. If the way things are seen and apprehended change, the experience of those things must change. If the experience of things change, and I have experience of a thing at one time and place, what am I to experience in another time and place, when presented with exactly the same thing? And if it is the case I am not presented with exactly the same thing because the base intuitions might be altered, then how am I to explain, e.g., my experience of a pencil that is subsequently, merely as a condition by some other time and place, experienced as something not a pencil?
———-

ust wonderin’.....if a base a priori intuition informs unavoidably, how might it be altered? Wouldn’t experiential consistency be questionable?
— Mww

I think experiential consistency is questionable....... — Metaphysician Undercover

But it isn’t; the human intelligence is experientially consistent. For any individual, a pencil apprehended today is apprehended as a pencil tomorrow, all else being given. It must be that either the Kantian notions of a priori intuitions as the unavoidable way we see and apprehend things is false, or, such notion is the case but rather, the idea that alteration of those intuitions into something deeper and more real, is false.

.......That's why we have difference of intuitions, differences of preference, and so on. These are the peculiarities of the individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

You and I will have a difference of intuitions upon being presented with things not in common between us, yes. But that is not because we have deeper levels of our basic intuitions of space and time, but because we have not been presented with the same object. This merely represents a difference in intuitive quantity, not an altered deeper level of quality.

Yes, there are indeed peculiarities of the individual, but these are judgements made on things, as a consequence of intuitions of them. It still must be considered, how it is that you and I, and humanity in general, no matter the particular word used to represent it, see and apprehend this one thing, say, a pencil, and agree that it is an experience common to all of us. That cannot be the case if the basic conditions common to all humans, those being intuition of space and time, are susceptible to alteration toward something more real, or reducible to a deeper level. In other words, if your base intuitions were altered to a deeper level but mine were not, what would each of us see and apprehend upon perception of any one object?

I’m surprised that you, of most participants herein, would advocate the alteration to a deeper level, of that which is already given as a basic foundational conception. To suggest the reduction of a fundamental is self-contradictory, is it not? Furthermore, and possibly even more surprising, is what could space or time be altered to, such that there is a deeper level to them?

Then, too, if basic a priori intuitions are given as limits for seeing and apprehending things, which does seem to be the case, then to alter them to a deeper level implies the possibility for removing such limitations, which is also self-contradictory, insofar as we are certainly limited.

All that to say this: space and time do set the limits to what we see and apprehend, but we do not have the capacity to move beyond them, they are not alterable to deeper levels, and we cannot make them more real than they already are.

Still....I’d be interested in an exposition that suggests otherwise, or that I misunderstood what you meant.

Exactly: this is the radical problem of metaphysics: it doesn’t draw the consequences of its own statements, it doesn’t follow its own methods, its own procedures, preferring, instead, to stop in the middle of the reasoning. This is what happens:

1) metaphysics make statements that are universal, or we can say “a priori”, such as

1) there is.
2) There is something.
3) Change is something. — Xtrix

2) Since they are a priori, universal, they must be able to take into account everything, they must be able to face any other consideration.

3) Taking into account everything means taking into account also the consideration that all the statements have been made by using a brain, a human mind, we can call it “subjectivity”.

4) The consequence of taking into account the subjectivity that has been inevitably involved to produce the statements is that the statements cease to be universal, because they are implicated in the non universality of subjectivity.

5) The conclusion is that kind of reasoning:

• if something is universal, it must be able to take into account subjectivity
• taking into account subjectivity creates the consequence that it is not universal

In other words: if something is universal, then it is not universal.

Even in shorter way: if being is, then it is not.

This is the radical contradiction that metaphysics tries to avoid, because it is too disturbing, too uncomfortable, destabilizing, not reassuring at all.

I have just described in a structured way what has already been noticed by Heidegger, nothing new.

But he went on with the idea of changing the meaning of metaphysics, keeping himself in the mental frame of “being” and forcing the meaning of “being” into a human context, implicated in time and death, while instead I, like postmodern philosophy does, consider clearer to admit that metaphysics is just contradictory, as well as the concept of “being”, as well as Parmenide’s principle of non contradiction.

The consequence of taking into account the subjectivity that has been inevitably involved to produce the statements is that the statements cease to be universal, because they are implicated in the non universality of subjectivity. — Angelo Cannata

In a post-modernist style of reasoning, we could consider the universals to be universal for the ones applying them.

In a post-modernist style of reasoning, we could consider the universals to be universal for the ones applying them. — Haglund

I think this is contradictory. Saying “In my opinion this is universal” means “In my opinion I think that this is not just my opinion”. I understand that such statements can easily be found in everyday conversations, and in everyday conversation we can accept a lot of things that, instead, in the strict context of philosophy would be unacceptable because of being contradictory: they are just two different languages, the everyday language and the philosophical language.
In a philosophical context: how can you think that something is your opinion (“In my opinion I think...”) and at the same time think that it is not your opinion (“...I think that it is not just my opinion”).
You can state it in a context of research, as to say “I am making the hypothesis that this thing is not my opinion”; in this case you are keeping two things, one is what you believe is the fact (“In my opinion I think...”) and the other one is the hypothesis that it might be universal. Facts and hypotheses can coexist together without contradition.

In a philosophical context: how can you think that something is your opinion (“In my opinion I think...”) and at the same time think that it is not your opinion (“...I think that it is not just my opinion”). — Angelo Cannata

By changing the definition of absolute, universal, independent reality. Connecting it to our mind. So to me absolute reality holds for me. For you, for you. I can declare my absolute reality be the one for all, the universal one, and so can you.

If the way things are seen and apprehended change, the experience of those things must change. — Mww

This is not necessarily the case. We just need to accept what Plato tells us, that the senses deceive us, and we obey reason instead of the senses. So we do not alter the experience, we simply accept with our minds, that the experience doesn't give us the truth, and we base our logic in something other than what sense experience gives us.

In a different thread I am discussing a good example of this, the heliocentric model of the solar system. Sensation gives us the experience of the sun coming up and going down, rising and setting. But we must move beyond this sense experience and accept that the earth is really spinning, and the sun is not revolving around the earth. To accept this, it is not required that we change our fundamental experience of the sun coming up and going down, we just need to accept that this fundamental intuition is actually wrong, discard it as a premise for our logic, and move along toward a better understanding. The better understanding is provided for by the fundamental assumption that our sense experience misleads us, but changing that experience is unnecessary.

And if it is the case I am not presented with exactly the same thing because the base intuitions might be altered, then how am I to explain, e.g., my experience of a pencil that is subsequently, merely as a condition by some other time and place, experienced as something not a pencil? — Mww

So it's not at all a matter of learning how to experience something like a pencil as something other than a pencil, its a matter of recognizing that the empirical representation is fundamentally misleading. This is what modern science shows us very clearly. The thing you experience as a pencil is really molecules, or atoms, or protons, neutrons, and electrons, or fields, or whatever, which is way different from your sense experience of a pencil. When the reality of the heliocentric model was revealed to us, it opened our minds very widely to the fact that the way things appear through sensation is not at all like the way things really are. And the Platonic mantra "the senses deceive us" was given real credence allowing for philosophy like Descartes' "Meditations" to be taken seriously.

But it isn’t; the human intelligence is experientially consistent. For any individual, a pencil apprehended today is apprehended as a pencil tomorrow, all else being given. It must be that either the Kantian notions of a priori intuitions as the unavoidable way we see and apprehend things is false, or, such notion is the case but rather, the idea that alteration of those intuitions into something deeper and more real, is false. — Mww

So this is not an acceptable dichotomy. There is some degree of consistency in experience, and as I said, consistency is cultured, propagated. However, there is also some degree of inconsistency, and even a small degree of inconsistency is evidence of something faulty within experience. The fact that there is inconsistency is evidence that intuitions can change over generations. And evolutionary theory supports this as well.

It still must be considered, how it is that you and I, and humanity in general, no matter the particular word used to represent it, see and apprehend this one thing, say, a pencil, and agree that it is an experience common to all of us. — Mww

But I don't agree with this. I focus on the differences between individuals, and I argue that these differences are very clear evidence that the fact that there are similarities between us does not justify the claim that we have "the same" experience. And because we cannot say that we all have "the same" experience, we also cannot assert as you do, that there "is an experience common to all of us". That's a false assumption, so no inquiry as to how it is possible is warranted. The appropriate inquiry is as to why we have similar experience. And my answer to this, is as I said, it is propagated, and cultured, intuitively. So the true "deeper" intuition which is common to living beings, is the tendency to create sameness, similarity, within unique and particular individuals, whose true essence is to be different from each other.

I’m surprised that you, of most participants herein, would advocate the alteration to a deeper level, of that which is already given as a basic foundational conception. To suggest the reduction of a fundamental is self-contradictory, is it not? Furthermore, and possibly even more surprising, is what could space or time be altered to, such that there is a deeper level to them? — Mww

The problem is that the "basic foundational conception" is wrong in a very fundamental way, as described above, "the senses deceive us", as described above. Therefore we must go to the deeper level to get a true understanding, a level deeper than sensation itself to get beyond the deceptive intuitions produced by sensation.

Then, too, if basic a priori intuitions are given as limits for seeing and apprehending things, which does seem to be the case, then to alter them to a deeper level implies the possibility for removing such limitations, which is also self-contradictory, insofar as we are certainly limited. — Mww

It's not contradictory, it's a matter of seeing these intuitions as wrong, and overriding them with the conscious mind, as described above. It's only if you subscribe to some form of naturalism, within which you would say that what "nature" provides us with is what is good, or correct, then you would say that the will to override these intuitions would be contradictory. But Plato thoroughly demonstrated the failing of such a naturalism. The natural tendencies are bodily tendencies, and we must use reason and will to get beyond these faulty tendencies.

Changing the meaning of words sometimes is inevitable, necessary, but it also creates a lot of difficulties. This is one reason of a lot of messages here and everywhere: just because a lot of philosophers have been changing the meaning of “metaphysics”, or the meaning of “being”, and now we are here struggling and debating in the forest of different and even contradictory meanings that they have created. In this forest I make my choices and I try to clarify them.
“Absolute” means disconnected, independent, 100% free, unbound. What is the advantage of making a new meaning that contradicts this independence, this unboundness, the moment you decide to enclose it into the subjectivity of your thoughts?

I can declare my absolute reality be the one for all, the universal one, and so can you — Haglund

This is what dictators do. The difference between this example and dictators is that dictators do not admit that what they think belongs to their subjectivity.

Perhaps your attempt comes from the everyday human experience that makes us think “I think that there is a stone out there”. Our everyday experience is so strong, we feel it so natural, so working and obvious, that it is difficult to us to realize that it contains a contradiction. This is the reason why a lot of metaphysicians find so difficult to realize the issues, the flaws of their reasoning: because nature has structured our brain to ignore our subjectivity: this has made possible survival, strength, conquering, dominating, it has made possible the human history that we all know.

The process seems natural and logical:
1) there is a stone there
2) I think that a stone is there.

These two points seem simple, until we start reflecting on them:

ok, there is a stone there. Now I think there is a stone there.
But...... how much can I trust this thought of mine? Why should I trust it? Why should I think that my thoughts are correct? What’s the point, the advantage, of thinking that I am correct?

I can declare my absolute reality be the one for all, the universal one, and so can you
— Haglund

This is what dictators do. The difference between this example and dictators is that dictators do not admit that what they think belongs to their subjectivity. — Angelo Cannata

Dictators do not admit other absolute realities by institutionalized force and try to make everyone part of their objective reality. That's the real difference. I don't know what they think is part of their subjectivity.

So the given is always a mental construction. — Haglund

A king of cheap skepticism, I suppose. Maybe life is a dream! Etc. Descartes dealt with this years ago— and Kant, in his own way, after him.

That we “exist” is a given. If it’s a mental construction, then the mental construction exists.

And what’s the argument, exactly? That nothing exists, that everything is a mental construction, or that any proposition or truth is impossible?

Seems utterly ridiculous to me.



For the third time you failed to answer my question. Instead opting to apparently talk to yourself.

There’s no contradiction whatsoever in what is said, beyond what you’ve made up. Yes, thinking and talking is something done by the human being — no one denies that. Thinking and talking are beings.

You’re mistaking being for an object. It’s not. It’s also not permanence, which you seemed to indicate early on. It’s also not change.

Denying anything exists is worth doing — in high school. You can go on doing so it your please. I have no interest in it.

If it’s a mental construction, then the mental construction exists. — Xtrix

This is Descartes, “I think, then I am”. There have been other philosophers after Descartes.

Yeah, and also people who think it witty to subjectivize everything, and claim nothing exists.

No wonder post modernism is a laughingstock.

Everything is a mental construction. Everything subjective. There’s no such thing as truth. Nothing exists. Everything changes— but change isn’t a thing.

“Philosophy,” folks.

I have just described in a structured way what has already been noticed by Heidegger, nothing new. — Angelo Cannata

Heidegger never ONCE made anything remotely like this claim. Either cite your source or stop with the fabrication.

Martin Heidegger, What is metaphysics? (1929)

“First, each metaphysical question always encompasses the whole problematic of metaphysics and in fact is the whole of metaphysics. Secondly, to ask any metaphysical question, the questioner as such must also be present in the question, i.e., must be put in question. From this we conclude that metaphysical questions must be posed (1) in terms of the whole and (2) always from the essential situation of the existence that asks the question.”

Sure you can. But not twice. — jgill

Not three times.

Here's the first article I've seen that discusses the possibility of determining whether alternate universes might exist. It still seems a reach.

In mathematics, a dynamical system might proceed to evolve along alternate paths at points of bifurcation. But what happens in math may be mere fiction in the physical world. — jgill

Mathematical physics are dynamical systems where anything that is mathematically possible is also physically possible until the theory is shown to violate some physical law. This leads to some harebrained ideas that can be expressed less expensively by other mathematics. For example, actual multiple universes, where fictional characters can hop back and forth, can also be expressed as mere possible universes of which only one needs be actual at any one place and time.

“First, each metaphysical question always encompasses the whole problematic of metaphysics and in fact is the whole of metaphysics. Secondly, to ask any metaphysical question, the questioner as such must also be present in the question, i.e., must be put in question. From this we conclude that metaphysical questions must be posed (1) in terms of the whole and (2) always from the essential situation of the existence that asks the question.” — Angelo Cannata

Sure, agree. Nothing controversial there.