The Petri dish isn't a boundary of the appropriate type. With single-celled organisms, the boundary is the cell wall.

Individual bacteria have non-conscious sensory mechanisms.

I wonder if your "integration" is another way of talking about the boundary, about the way the organism is separate from its environment?

What is "integration" in the sense in which you are using it?

I wonder if your "integration" is another way of talking about the boundary, about the way the organism is separate from its environment? — Daemon

It is, but it refers to internally organised limits in particular, not just any boundary. The organism is not really separate from its environment, it’s just set certain limits of interaction as a whole by its internal configuration.

What is "integration" in the sense in which you are using it? — Daemon

To integrate is to “bring (entities or groups with particular characteristics or needs) into equal participation in or membership of a group or institution.”

The sea sponge demonstrates an intermediate level of integration, similar to a hive or ant colony. There’s an internally organised (weak) upper limit, but the lower limit is a single cell looking for fellow members of... something...

‘Non-conscious sensory mechanisms’ are just members with particularly useful awareness characteristics, like the cell wall. It’s likely that earlier cells had systems with variable awareness characteristics making up their cell wall, allowing too much or too little interaction. We see only the structures that survived this long, not the potential diversity of failure.

The organism is not really separate from its environment, — Possibility

My contention is that it is separate from its environment in a particular, crucial way. Non-living things are not separated in the same way.

Integration seems to me the prerequisite here for consciousness. — Possibility

Can you say more about why?

‘Non-conscious sensory mechanisms’ are just members with particularly useful awareness characteristics, like the cell wall. — Possibility

The non-conscious mechanism I am using as an example, chemotaxis in bacteria, is a series of chemical reactions resulting in swimming behaviour that tends to take the bacterium closer to an attractant. There is no awareness. The behaviour does look like it involves awareness (how can the bacterium swim towards the attractant if it isn't aware of its location?) but we know about the chemical process in exquisite detail, and we can see that the process is non-conscious.

And before p, q and r can be conscious? — Daemon

a,b,c, and d,e,f, and g,h,i, that constitute p, q and r must be conscious. :)

The regress stops when we get to some foundation, like the quantum field, or space, or some such concept. I'm agnostic about exactly what this is.

The usual idea is that consciousness emerges from the non-conscious, e.g. x doing such-and-such (say, modelling its environment, or integrating information, or some other functionalist theory) constitutes x being conscious. Whereas I'm proposing that consciousness is not a function at all but a property, a bit like mass perhaps. So for x to have mass, x must be composed of other things that have mass (I don't know if that's always true with mass, but you get the idea). If you start with things that don't have mass, it doesn't matter how you arrange them or what they do, the result still won't have mass. I'm suggesting consciousness is like that. If this seems rather primitive and uncomplicated, it is.

Neuroscience describes how we as agents produce meaning and identify intention and purpose in other agents. We are driven by stimuli that arouse our emotions that we reason in to feelings, concepts thoughts. — Nickolasgaspar

I'd love for you to expand on this if you have time. How does a brain generate an emotion?

To be aware of what exist to be aware of stimuli environmental or organic. — Nickolasgaspar

Thank you. To be clear, would you consider a thermostat to be aware of temperature in this sense?

Well what it matter is what it tells to experts, not to us. Our brain has the hardware that allows it to be conscious, it is hooked on a sensory system that provides information about the world and the organism, it has centers that process meaning,memory, symbolic language, pattern recognition. — Nickolasgaspar

But how does all of that result in consciousness? Why can't all of that happen without consciousness?

My contention is that it is separate from its environment — Daemon

Don't you think we find ourselves in the middle? I mean, between the environment and our brain? So we are not separated from both? If we truly would be separated from the environment we would get diluted in space.

Has anyone said laziness yet? Because the answer is almost certainly laziness. Why bother explaining anything about consciousness when you can just impute it everywhere and save yourself the trouble? It's the same laziness that motivates people who dabble in multiverse theories or simulation theories of the universe. Lowest of the low hanging fruits of philosophy.

People just wanna keep their silly jobs in trying to work on something that just can't be explained. Keep up the myth that consciousness can be explained and that it's even important, and your work will be subsidized.

When you're unconscious Bert1, is it like anything? It isn't for me. I'm pretty sure that's the same for everybody.

I have been unconscious when asleep, when I hit myself on the head with a pickaxe, and when I had a general anaesthetic. I am confidently expecting to be unconscious when I'm dead.

We've got all this complex machinery in our heads, the most complex thing we know about, and it can be switched off with a pickaxe or anaesthetic.

If it isn't like anything to be you, when you're unconscious, so you understand what unconsciousness is, and you understand the effects of anaesthetics and suchlike, and their relationship to the complex mechanisms, then why would you think that consciousness would be found in the absence of those mechanisms? — Daemon

When I'm unconscious, say from an anaesthetic, of being knocked out, or in a very deep sleep, I guess there are few possibilities as to what is going on:

1) I have moved from being in a conscious condition to being in an unconscious condition. The structure hasn't changed, but the function has. My brain isn't doing the things that constitute consciousness, so it is no longer modelling its environment, or no longer integrating as much information, or whatever your particular functionalist theory of consciousness is. This is not consistent with panpsychism.

2) I, as a functional unity, cease to exist. This is subtly different from (1), and is consistent with panpsychism. In this case, modelling my environment, or integrating information is not what makes me conscious, it's what makes me me. Identity is a function, not a property, I suggest. Things are what they are because of what they do. Whereas consciousess is a property, not a function. So when an anaesthetic stops some of my brain function, it disrupts that functional unity that makes me me. Everything that composes my brain is still conscious (just as it still has mass) but there is no overarching identity that unifies them. This leaves the big problem for panpsychism: the combination problem.

3) Another possibility that my consciousness actually remains, but I'm not really aware of anything much except perhaps the vaguest of fuzzy experiences, and I don't remember it anyway, so it seems as if I haven't experienced anything at all.

4) Another possibility is that I'm still conscious, just not conscious of anything. And this would perhaps be indistinguishable (not conceptually but practically) from not being conscious at all, as there is no difference in terms of content of consciousness. Some on this forum think this is a logical absurdity - they say that it is necessarily part f the concept of consciousness that we are aware of something. Consciousness must have content to be consciousness. I'm not convinced of that. Consider an ocean with waves, and consider the ocean to be consciousness and the waves to be the content. It is not a contradiction to suppose that the ocean is still, with no waves on it. And it is not a contradiction to suppose that there can be consciousness, just nothing in it. Like an empty box. Boxes don't necessarily have to have anything in them. Whether this state actually ever obtains is doubtful, but that's a matter of empirical possibility, not of logical, or conceptual possibility.

The only one of these I think is definitely false is (1). The other three are consistent with panpsychism, and I'm not totally sure which I prefer. Maybe all of them have some truth. All of them allow functional theories a role to play.
(1) Consciousness is a function
(2) Identity is a function
(3) and (4) Content is determined by function

Has anyone said laziness yet? — StreetlightX

I suspect the OP was asking for theoretical motivations, not psychological ones. I say this because this is a philosophy forum, not a psychology forum.

My brain isn't doing the things that constitute consciousness, so it is no longer modelling its environment, or no longer integrating as much information, or whatever your particular functionalist theory of consciousness is. This is not consistent with panpsychism. — bert1

Why not? You being unconscious doesn't mean the psyche has left the material.

There is no sharp cut-off point between being bald and non-bald
— bert1
of course there is. You just choose not to admit it. Here are the extremes for both cases(Again)
A. a head without hair b. a head with hair.
A a unconscious state b. a conscious state.
Both extremes in both cases display many stages in between. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, lets write it out:

[bald] .... [1 hair, 2 hairs.....501 hairs....100,001 hairs]... [not bald]
[seven] ... [???] ... [not-seven]
[spatial] ... [???] ... [not spatial]
[unconscious] .... [what do we write here???]... [conscious]

Please tell me what goes in between unconscious and conscious?

I have included the concepts of seven and space as these are arguably binary as well, with no middle ground, just to illustrate the point. I'm suggesting consciousness is like that.

Why not? You being unconscious doesn't mean the psyche has left the material. — Haglund

I'm talking about functionalist theories of consciousness that say that consciousness just is brain function. If consciousness brain function, and that ceases, then psyche (consciousness) has indeed left the material. I don't think that, I'm just characterising the functionalist view.

Can you tell me what's false about that? — Daemon

Most starkly, I think that's impossible because the formation of an identity is always a vague matter, there is no absolutely sharp cut-off point between being non-individuated and being individuated. Indeed a cell may never be totally individuated, as it is always in a transactional relationship with its environment, exchanging material etc. And as consciousness is not a vague concept, it seems impossible to get it to plausibly fit anywhere.

Also, whatever stage you want to put the emergence of consciousness, the question remains, "OK, but why can't all that happen without consciousness?" What that question indicates is the conceptual gulf between our concept of consciousness and our other concepts based on structure and function. I think this is what Chalmers was probably getting at with his conceivability argument.

I suspect the OP was asking for theoretical motivations, not psychological ones. — bert1

I don't see them as distinguishable, in the case of panpsychcism.

I see, but still. Why should psyche, according to functionalists, be absent if the brain is in sleep mode? How can a material process, which according to them contains no psyche in it's base (dead, psycheless particles interacting), give rise to, say, consciousness of heat or cold? Say you know the complete pattern of material processes involved, and the environment they are situated in, how would this constitute an explanation?

I don't see them as distinguishable, in the case of panpsychcism. — StreetlightX

Just out of interest, at what point, in the attempt to explain consciousness in terms of brain function, would giving up be justified, and not be lazy?

'Giving up' does not constitute a position but a lack of one. Hence it being a matter of laziness and psychology through and through.

'Giving up' does not constitute a position but a lack of one. — StreetlightX

Indeed. I don't regard panpsychism as giving up, but you do. And giving up on explaining consciousness in terms of brain function may not necessarily entail becoming a panpsychist anyway.

So, my question remains.

I don't think it needs to be explained in terms of brain function. But I do think it needs to be explained in some terms other than tautology.

Thank you. :) EDIT: I infer from your response that you think we just keep going until we have a good theory that you don't perceive as a tautology.

Please tell me what goes in between unconscious and conscious? — bert1

Er, semi-conscious?

Yes, but you don't say "ouch" because of the experience. You say "ouch" because of a completely physical and traceable series of neural molecular and electrical reactions. You would say "ouch" even if you were a robot programmed to say "ouch" every time you stub your toe. — Isaac

This is helpful and clearly expressed. I think I do say 'ouch' because of the experience, although this is questionable as there may be times when I say 'ouch' in a sort of reflexive, automatic way, before I actually experience any pain. In fact, I think I've sometimes said 'ouch' and the pain never actually arrived, I was just expecting it. Anyway, maybe hunger would be a better example as reflex plays less of a role. I believe I eat because I feel hungry. Intuitively, experiences do generally seem to play a causal role in what we do. But maybe you don't agree with me. Perhaps you are an epiphenomenalist, or even an eliminativist, as your use of scare quotes around 'experience' might suggest?

The 'experience' you claim is private is not physically connected to saying "ouch" in any way (if it was, it would be a physical phenomenon). So the fact that your friend doesn't say "ouch" can't possibly stand as evidence either for or against the type of experience he's having - if experiences are private. He might have exactly the same experience as you do when you say "ouch" alongside watching someone say "ouch"... Or not...

Yes, I think your logic makes sense. I just think that experiences, feelings, etc, do play a causal role in what physically happens. That's what one would expect of a panpsychist.

So presumably your next query would be about the causal closure of the physical - there's no need, nor indeed room, for psychological explanations when the physical explanations are both necessary and sufficient? Would that be right?

Er, semi-conscious? — bongo fury

That might be it! Depending on what you mean exactly. Can you give an example of a semi-conscious state?

Browsing TPF?

Browsing TPF? — bongo fury

Could be! :)

So presumably your next query would be about the causal closure of the physical — bert1

Indeed. If there's a causal relationship that's an immutable fact about our shared reality (ie, not just a narrative we create to navigate it), then there'd be something missing in the causal explanations we have. But there's nothing missing. I can (theoretically) trace all the electrical and chemical reactions from the nerve endings of your tos through to the muscle fibres of your larynx and at no point is there a gap where I'd have to think "hey, where did that come from?". So causally, there's just no need for such an explanation.

Narratively, however, there's obviously a need for one. I too feel like I eat because I'm hungry, it's part of how we use the word 'because' in the context of human behaviour. But narratively, there are no right or wrong answers, whatever floats your boat.

So, personally, I don't have a problem with the 'story' of consciousness (as in our experiences) just being a façon de parler. A piece of magic we made up for plot reasons. As such, it can arise out of nowhere if it wants. It can supervene, it can be possessed by rock if you want. It really doesn't matter, whatever makes a good story.

Thank you, that's very interesting, and clearly put.

My own position on causal closure is that physical explanations must be reducible to psychological ones.

What you have said is consistent with both epiphenomenalism and eliminativism. So what do you think of experiences then? Do we have them at all?