Nor am I suggesting it is, but I can build a model of a car out of cars. these four cars represent the wheels, these two cars are the doors, this car is the engine...and so on. There's no problem with building a model using that which is being modelled. — Isaac

A car is not it's engine. It is a car. Models are typically a smaller scale than what is being modeled and typically less complex. You can't sit in or drive model cars. As such you shouldn't be able to use models of language-use because it wouldn't be an actual language. You would be simply using language, not models of language, and using language is using scribbles and sounds to refer to some state-of-affairs, which could be how someone uses language, or how someone plays chess, or how the sun sets in the sky.

Likewise with "that stone is iron", it's contingent on the human activity of us classifying elements by their proton number. The moment we stop doing that, its status as iron is called into question. — Isaac

...which is a different state-of-affairs than that stone's properties independent of our naming conventions. You're confusing one state-of-affairs with another.

Joe Biden doesn't stop being President of the United States if he changes his name. — Michael

No, but he does if we change what it means to hold that office.

That stone (A) is a bishop (B).

That rock (A) is iron (B).

Joe Biden (A) is the president (B).

In all cases, A counting as B is contingent on the human activity of how we count things as cases of B.

With bishops it's using them as such in a chess game, with iron it's classifying elements by proton number, with presidents is assigning office on the basis of votes.

Your example of Joe Biden changing his name would be the equivalent of us no longer referring to 'that stone' or 'that rock', changes in our A component, not our B component. We're talking about claims of the form "A is B" and whether they are always dependent on the human activity of classifying B.

No, but he does if we change what it means to hold that office.

That stone (A) is a bishop (B).

That rock (A) is iron (B).

Joe Biden (A) is the president (B).

In all cases, A counting as B is contingent on the human activity of how we count things as cases of B. — Isaac

And still a use-mention error.

That we determine what "iron" means isn't that we determine what is or isn't iron. The number of protons an element has determines what is or isn't iron, and the number of protons an element has isn't a human institution.

But Status Functions allow this. We collectively "declare" today Wednesday, and repeat this each week, resulting in the social fact of week days, which you and I can use to make plans, but which are unavailable to Fido. — Banno

Doesn’t everything have a status?

This piece counts as a bishop in chess.
This cord counts as a leash in walking.
A circle counts as a o in English.
A circle counts as a zero in math.
A circle counts as a o in tic tac toe.

Pretty much.

I don't see anything here that is not in keeping with (what I understand as) Searle's analysis.

To say "that's a tree" is jointly a mere assertion, but also a method by which I keep my model of what-sort-of-thing-a-tree-is similar enough to your model of what-sort-of-thing-a-tree-is that we can get along and do stuff cooperatively (such as harvest apples from the tree), and so in that sense it's a word-to-world fit because other models were possible, but I want yours similar to mine and you want mine similar to yours - we have a mutual interest in each other's model. — Isaac

There are ambiguities to be sorted out here, but I'm not convinced that it's worth the effort.

First we might reintroduce Austin's term "locution" for the utterance considered without an illocutionary force.

Then we might note that the locution "That's a tree" might in different speech acts be given different forces. So it may be that it is treated as an assertion: "That's not a statue, that's a tree"; Or as a question, "That's a tree?"; or as a declaration "That is a 'tree'". The same group of words, with the same extension, can have differing illocutionary force in different circumstances. Indeed, it is possible for the same utterance to have different forces at the same time. The point of developing this nomenclature is to be able to discuss these complexities.

So there is a sense in which the assertion "that is a tree" is simultaneously, in virtue of it's using English, the declarative "We will divide the world up such that 'tree' counts as a reference".

I don't see this as problematic.

Notice that if you are using the locution "This is a 'tree'" , then you are indeed mentioning the word "tree" and not using it - as can be seen by the quote marks.

So again, it looks to me as if both you and @Michael are correct. And further, that you are working within Searle's scheme, not disagreeing with it.

Thanks for your contribution, Dawnstorm.

Almost all other institutions will involve langauge in some capacity, but it's not central. — Dawnstorm

Well, we can have institutional facts without language, but language allows us to compound and iterate institutional facts. So you may well be able to pay chess without language but can you plan to play chess in a competition starting at ten o'clock tomorrow without language?

And further, your example of playing chess with a Chinese speaker is dependent on their already knowing how to play chess, which is in turn dependent on their already having a language.

So even if we grant that there are institutions that do not requirer language, it is language that both forms the most persuasive social institution and is basic to all but a very few social facts.

There is no end to this. It is horrifically beautiful! It is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’. — I like sushi

Yes, the analysis becomes ubiquitous.

So pity poor @Harry Hindu, who sees all language as mere assertion, and hence can't begin along the path.

The more you think about it the more it seems that, besides our own experiences, all fact are social or institutional (patterns of organization) facts.

Many, but not all. Brute facts remain. See 's quote from Searle.

But we still need to agree on brute facts. I may doubt my own experiences but in the absence of others there’s no one to agree or disagree with. Indeed in many occasions people may disregard brute facts in favor of “alternative facts”. Maybe the only true brute facts are our own experiences.

Realism is assumed here.

So brute facts are true regardless of our representations of them - treat this as a definition of brute fact.

They are true regardless of our asserting them, knowing them, believing them, demonstrating them, sharing them, doubting them.

Regardless of any role they might have in our speech acts.

The realism arguments go on around our posts in this very thread, between @Isaac and @Michael and @StreetlightX and various others; it is ubiquitous and all-consuming, And mostly irrelevant.

The only person who brought up realism was you, friend. Which tells you something about the governing assumptions at work: if the distinction between institutional and non-institutional facts turns on some commitment - or not - to realism, then the distinction is a spurious or badly founded one from the beginning.

The only person who brought up realism was you, friend. — StreetlightX

Actually, it was Searle.

This is a thread about Searle.

Oh, and you raised the issue here: ; but did not seem to recognise it.

Oh, and you raised the issue here: ↪StreetlightX
; but did not seem to recognise it. — Banno

Funny. The post does not contain the word "real", let alone "realism". That you somehow recognized it nonetheless, speaks to the crappy assumptions built into the insitutional/non-institutional distinction. A recognition that has nothing to re-cognize is usually called projection.

...which lead me to puzzle over your understanding of realism. But I'll leave that to folk who are interested.

Realism means that the world is indifferent to us getting the concepts just-so or not. That all facts are institutional facts has no - zero - bearing on the truth or not of realism. That you think it does speaks to your idealism - indexing the world's existence to how we think or talk about the world. Terrible philosophy. And all the more disappointing because you were well aware of this not a few months ago. Such is the intellectual cancerousness of reading a Searle I suppose.

Sure. Whatever.

So the point of this thread was to just state the obvious?

The number of protons an element has determines what is or isn't iron, and the number of protons an element has isn't a human institution. — Michael

Of course it is. Same as the elements. What counts as a proton is determined by a human institution; if we ever find a fourth quark, we'll have to decide whether its presence makes a proton not a proton anymore and iron (yes even 'the-substance-we-currently-refer-to-with-the-word-"iron") may have 27 protons.

"Ah but the-thing-we-currently-refer-to-as-a-proton will always have three quarks" - again, not if we change what counts as a quark.

"Ah but the-thing-we-currently-refer-to with-the-word-'quark' will always measure X on the quark-o-meter" (my knowledge of physics is breaking down - can you tell?) - again, not if the responsible institutions change what counts as a measurement on the quark-o-meter...

Do I need to go on? At its base all facts are institutional facts, because all facts are built from classifications which are done by human institutions (language, science, culture). Absent those classifications, there's just stuff and happenings.

Analytic philosophers like Searle make careers off stating the obvious - where "the obvious" are just utterly contingent, totally arbitrary demarcations arrogated to concepts. And then they are read by people like @Banno who really ought to know better.

A quick intuition pump to see how incredibly facile the distinction is: is gender an institutional fact, or not?

I don't see anything here that is not in keeping with (what I understand as) Searle's analysis. — Banno

Well that may well be on me. My understanding of Searle is in your hands right now. My understanding of how facts arise is much broader and mostly derived from other sources. I'm just trying to apply the latter to the former.

There are ambiguities to be sorted out here, but I'm not convinced that it's worth the effort. — Banno

Well, don't let me keep you, if you're busy!

So there is a sense in which the assertion "that is a tree" is simultaneously, in virtue of it's using English, the declarative "We will divide the world up such that 'tree' counts as a reference".

I don't see this as problematic. — Banno

Well good. I thought it might be, on account of the division made between declarative and assertive statements. It seemed that the fact that all assertive statements are also declarative might have been a problem for the scheme, but if there's no problem with one category being wholly within another then sure. No problem.

Notice that if you are using the locution "This is a 'tree'" , then you are indeed mentioning the word "tree" and not using it - as can be seen by the quote marks. — Banno

Indeed, but the same would be true of any continued use of the word. "I'll meet you behind that tree" serves the same function when I go to what I think of as a tree and find you there - "great, our model of trees seems to be consistent still". If, however, I find you behind what I thought was just a shrub, or worse a herb, ...

A quick intuition pump to see how incredibly facile the distinction is: is gender an institutional fact, or not? — StreetlightX

Gender is a grammatical category within a wider activity (language).
Gender use is deontic: "Tout vas bien ma fils?" would be an incorrect usage.

So yes, at first glance, gender does seem to fit the description of institutional fact given by banno in his opening post.

Well for the sake of argument I totally disagree and submit that gender is defined by your chromosomes such that "The bishop is made of wood" is no different to "George is a man". What now?

You can say the same for ‘race’. There is one human race yet the term can be used in a more general manner. ‘Gender’ can mean ‘sex’ and it can mean something else.

Man and woman are markers for ‘sex’ and used as ‘gender’. The problem is how language is put together over time - meaning how people USE the terms.

People adhering to more hard and fast rules will have issue with saying that ‘gender’ is anything but ‘sex’. The general social shifts recently don’t make this at all surprising.

All I know for sure is that a trans woman is a not a woman (that is why the term trans woman exists!), yet I have no issue with referring to a trans woman as she/her because it makes perfect sense to do so. If said person was to tell me they are a woman through and through and insisted that I except they are a woman … well, they cannot do this. It is impossible to make someone agree with you about anything. People can be presented with arguments and evidence, but really it is down to them to make the change or not.

I find all identity politics to be quite vile and oppressive. It is not really too surprising that something like this has surfaced in societies today given that everyone on the planet can more easily than ever before made their voice heard somewhere, find like minds somewhere and be exposed to things they would never normally be exposed to.

All the categories given as examples are in themselves ‘institutional facts’. There is a speck of black within white and vice versa. If not then there would be no possible distinction. Identity politics operates under the guise of ‘liberation’ but really it is about drawing starker and starker lines between people … which some people like either because they feel more ‘the same’ or ‘more different’ (ironically!).

We all die anyway so it doesn’t matter that much :D

Institutions

So now we have the groundwork for creating institutions. We have a language that can create declarations, we can use these declarations to create status functions, and we have collective intent to explain social actions.

A few examples. A small community builds a wall of stones around some area, perhaps the cemetery, such that certain activities are only performed inside the wall of stones. Over time the wall collapses, but folk still perform those activities only inside the old boundary. The boundary has taken on a certain status for the community. It has a status function.

Notice also that the status function might never be declared; but it is declarable. That is sufficient. Those activities count as improper within the boundary: hence the general form X counts as Y in C.

Anther example: filing the appropriate paperwork creates a corporate entity. Follow the rules and the company comes into existence. We make it the case by declaration that the company exists in the context of Australian Law.

There are variations on the general form, X counts as Y in C, which I will leave aside, since here I'm mostly concerned with showing how institutions and institutional facts come about.

Social institutions all come about in some way similar to this. Money, private property, legislatures; but also schools, clubs, partnerships, friendships. But not literature, not science, not eating. The test, according to Searle, for whether the given item is an institution is that it has deontic power; that some duty or obligation follows from the status of an institution. So CSIRO is an institution, with obligations and duties, but science is not.

Indeed, these deontic powers, these duties and obligations are the purpose of creating institutions. And they are created by status declarations assigning status functions.

Next: Language

Well for the sake of argument I totally disagree and submit that gender is defined by your chromosomes such that "The bishop is made of wood" is no different to "George is a man". What now? — StreetlightX

"Je vais prendre ma voiture."
Which chromosomes does my car have?

Oh ho ho, are you saying that what concepts track differ based on what we decide?

Shut up transphobe and don't talk to me.

Edit: attributed quote to wrong person, disastrously.

Going by Searle's definition, if gender is deontic then it is an institution.

That would be in line with feminist thinking.

Oh ho ho, are you saying that what concepts track differ based on what we decide? — StreetlightX

I would prefer to say that chromosomes track biological sex. Not gender.

Do you want to ask whether biological sex is an institutional fact?