You can be a little tricksy Mr Jackson. I was not saying science had a shallow view of nature but I accept the old switcheroo attempt. — universeness

Sorry, I did not understand your post.

Particle in a field. Same thing, isn't it? — Jackson

No, because the particle and the field are not separable in the way that a drop is separable from water.
At least I think that's the case in QFT

At least I think that's the case in QFT — universeness

What is QFT?

Sorry, I did not understand your post — Jackson

Perhaps we just have some crossed lines. I was not suggesting that I personally consider science to be shallow. I was typing that I thought you were suggesting that with.

For science, it is only the movement of particles — Jackson

I was suggesting that science is not shallow.

What is QFT? — Jackson

Quantum field theory.

I was suggesting that science is not shallow. — universeness

Yes, I see now.

Yes, I see now. — Jackson

Sorry about the misunderstanding and my suspicion that you were being tricksy and throwing a switcheroo at me. :naughty:

The role of emotions in contrast to metaphysics is an interesting aspect. It may be that people strive to come up with ideas and conceptual thought, but that emotions lurk behind the scenes more than many would care to admit. Likes and dislikes as attitudes and values may have such a strong power and influence in the development of rational thought. This may be about conditioned ideas but also in relation to emotional aspects of life experiences. There may be conflict between rationality and emotion, on a subconscious or conscious level and it may be a question which has the biggest influence and this can vary at different times.

House of Theory — Jack Cummins

I don't have a copy, and it is not readily available online. The reviews I've seen indicate that it was written for a collection concerning socialism in the early 50's, (a time of self-reflection for British socialism as a conservative government achieved a growing majority in parliament), analysing the demise of metaphysical and ethical theorising and a move towards nihilism or existentialism in left-leaning thought. So it would seem that it is to be read as describing the demise of metaphysics as an historical face, rather than as advocating the rejection of metaphysical thought as it relates to ethics.

ht is, she is setting out what had in fact happened, whole advocating a different approach.

Yes, Murdoch does initially speak of the void in British politics. I do see her as describing what is happening rather than advocating for the elimination of metaphysics. Perhaps, I did not make this clear in my outpost. I guess that the point I was trying to make was that Murdoch was describing a process of elimination of metaphysics in the last century. I was connecting this with where philosophy is going in the twentieth first century, thinking that this may have developed further. She is describing a process which goes back to Kant and Hume. However, I was suggesting that it may be that in the context of the twentieth first century philosophy, especially where science is seen as such an important source of understanding. So, I may have not clarified the difference in her basic description of what is happening and my own comparison or reflection on this in the current philosophical climate.

The reason I resisted using the phrase "two inseparable poles" is that I don't see science and metaphysics in opposition to each other. Metaphysics is the canvas and the frame. Science is the picture. They are certainly related. They need each other. But they shouldn't interfere with each other.

The noetic side contributes memory and anticipation, the reaching out into the event with a framing expectation, the seeing, knowing aspect. But the noematic object that is seen , known , experienced, fills out the expectation but never completely fulfills it. Thus the metaphysical is a pole , a subjective contribution to the act of seeing and experiencing. But it can never subsist in itself as its own ‘context’. — Joshs

I got lost here. For me, metaphysics is context.

Good thread.

Metaphysics, to me, is about how you think about the world. Not in terms of truth, but what kind of thing it is.

may be that people strive to come up with ideas and conceptual thought, but that emotions lurk behind the scenes more than many would care to admit. Likes and dislikes as attitudes and values may have such a strong power and influence in the development of rational thought. — Jack Cummins

I think this is true. If you think about your own metaphysical leanings, do you detect emotion? What are they? What are they connected to?

I was comparing Rupert Sheldrake's 'morphic resonance' with Richard Dawkings coining and use of the term meme from his book 'The Selfish Gene.' — universeness

Dawkins and Sheldrake are poles apart. Read about this encounter between them. (I'm a Sheldrake admirer, actually had the good fortune to meet him and hear him speak in the early 90's. Of course he's regarded by establishment science as a maverick and crank, as many of those who argue against scientific materialism are.)

Murdoch does initially speak of the void in British politics. I do see her as describing what is happening rather than advocating for the elimination of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

There is an Iris Murdoch book called Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals which was recommended to me by a lecturer. I bought a copy for a relative for Christmas but have never read more than a few snippets, it seems a rather discursive if not rambling text. But she is, broadly speaking, situated within the Platonist tradition of Western philosophy, as is evidenced by another book of hers, The Sovereignity of the Good, taken from lectures, in which

Murdoch describes a "progressive education in the virtues" which involves engaging in practices that turn our attention away from ourselves toward valuable objects in the real world. Citing Plato's Phaedrus, she identifies the experience of beauty as the most accessible and the easiest to understand. She attributes the "unselfing" power of beauty both to nature and to art. Also following Plato, she locates the next and more difficult practice in intellectual disciplines. She uses the example of learning a foreign language as the occasion to practice virtues such as honesty and humility while increasing one's knowledge of "an authoritative structure which commands my respect". She says that the same quality of outward objective attention to the particular is needed for developing and practicing virtues in ordinary human relations.

Murdoch argues that Plato's concept of the Good applies to and unifies all these ways of learning and practicing the virtues. In her discussion of the concept, she refers to three sections from Plato's Republic: the Analogy of the Sun, the Analogy of the Divided Line, and the Allegory of the Cave. The concept of Good, Murdoch says, involves perfection, hierarchy, and transcendence, and is both unifying and indefinable. She suggests that "a sort of contemplation of the Good" in the sense of "a turning away from the particular" is possible and "may be the thing that helps most when difficulties seem insoluble". However, this practice is difficult and carries with it the danger that the object of attention might revert to the self. — Wiki

The problem, Jack, is that modern culture generally cannot accomodate any this kind of metaphysic, because it is always associated with the idea of there being a qualitative dimension to existence, an actual good. In liberal culture, individual judgement and social consensus are the only arbiters of what is good, and all opinions on the matter are treated as being more or less equal, given that those voicing them don't stray too far from social norms. So traditional metaphysics can't be accomodated within that framework, as it's like trying to fit a three-dimensional form into a two-dimensional plane.


Alexander Koyré

Kant critiqued metaphysics. But he reduces metaphysics to epistemology.

I'll add that I've noticed a book by Lloyd Gerson, Platonism and Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy.

Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism. From Aristotle to Plotinus to Proclus, Gerson clearly links the construction of the Platonic system well beyond simply Plato's dialogues, providing strong evidence of the vast impact of Platonism on philosophy throughout history. Platonism and Naturalism concludes that attempts to seek a rapprochement between Platonism and Naturalism are unstable and likely indefensible.

But then, reading Lloyd Gerson is often wading through the molasses of 2,000 years of Plato scholarship, dense with footnotes and discussions of arguments from centuries ago and liberally sprinkled with ancient Greek sentences and phrases. And Plato himself requires huge erudition to read and interpret. So all in all, it means the philistines are winning, and philosophy, according to Lloyd Gerson, is heading for extinction, outside the antiquities. :groan:

What would be great would be a contemporary scholar who is learned enough to carry Gerson's style of argument forward, without all the scholastic minutiea. I've tried Peter Kingsley, but am about to return my last hardback purchase to Amazon as it's too breezily written. So, still looking, probably for something that doesn't exist.

And Plato himself requires huge erudition to read and interpret. — Wayfarer

Not having erudition and insufficient interest in Plato, I can see why it's a tradition fading away. But the philistines always win, whether you're talking good cinema or classical music. Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the welfare of some aspects of the Western tradition. Platonism is a recondite subject and in my time I have seen grown men (academics) nearly coming to blows over their interpretation of Plato's theory of forms. They were in their 50's when I was 20, so they are likely gone now and replaced by people who bicker over readings of Deleuze.

Are you saying it's hard to find robust Plato scholars who can write from a perspective located somewhere between recherché and accessible pap?

This may also be too breezy, but there's a Neo-Platonist Catholic philosopher on Youtube who who often recommends books on Plato. Check out Pat Flynn and Jim Madden (Benedictine College) - they love Gerson and various others.

science studies nature from the macro to the subatomic. — universeness

Good point.

Are you saying it's hard to find robust Plato scholars who can write from a perspective located somewhere between recherché and accessible pap? — Tom Storm

I guess that's what I am saying. Despite my enthusiasm for Buddhism, I seem to have a kind of culturally-instilled Platonism - I sometimes think it might be a past-life memory. (Hey, both Buddhists and Platonists can say that, but Christians can't ;-) )

This may also be too breezy, but there's a Neo-Platonist Catholic philosopher on Youtube who who often recommends books on Plato. Check out Pat Flynn and Jim Madden (Benedictine College) - they love Gerson and various others.

:up: For some reason, I find neo-Thomism and Thomism appealing, even though I have little affinity for the Catholic religion. I guess it's because it's practically the last iteration of the perennial philosophy in the Western tradition. But then, that appeals to a lot of ultra-conservatives, and I don't want to identify with that. Perplexing.

@Wayfarer

Are you saying it's hard to find robust Plato scholars who can write from a perspective located somewhere between recherché and accessible pap? — Tom Storm

What about Alain Badiou and Max Tegmark – not "robust Plato scholars" but nevertheless contemporary, rigorous 'platonists' in their own rights, respectively?

I've read a little of Max Tegmark, after an OP of his about his neo-Pythagorean philosophy. But as I understand it, he nevertheless remains committed to a physicalist (or a kind of physicalist-panpsychist) account of consciousness (e.g. here) where matter still remains fundamental (opposite of Pierce’s ‘matter as effete mind’). Alain Badiou I've encountered mainly via this forum but haven't read anything about him, he wasn't on the radar at the time I did undergraduate studies.

Tegmark is not a "physicalist", Wayf; his day job consists of theoretical physics & cosmology and he moonlights as a philosopher, promoting a radical form of mathematical platonism called mathematicism (re: MUH, CUH, abstract object theory).

Dawkins and Sheldrake are poles apart. Read about this encounter between them. (I'm a Sheldrake admirer, actually had the good fortune to meet him and hear him speak in the early 90's. Of course he's regarded by establishment science as a maverick and crank, as many of those who argue against scientific materialism are. — Wayfarer

I read the article and yes, it's a report on that particular encounter with Dawkins, but its his report, his interpretation of what the motivations of Dawkings and his crew were. I would be interested in Dawkins report of the encounter. It may be quite different than Sheldrakes. I know very little about Sheldrake but I did see common ground between his 'morphic resonance' label and Dawkins's' memes' label, both in functionality and proposed final result. Do you see any connection between the two?
Overall, I am more in the Dawkins camp than Sheldrake's if Sheldrake is searching for empirical evidence that humans have inherent telephathic or telekinetic abilities and they are just 'untapped.'

Good point — igjugarjuk

:up:

Tegmark is not a "physicalist" — 180 Proof

He says consciousness is a state of matter - how could he not be? Anyway, whatever you say, not a point I can be bothered going into bat for.

I know very little about Sheldrake but I did see common ground between his 'morphic resonance' label and Dawkins's' memes' label, both in functionality and proposed final result. Do you see any connection between the two? — universeness

The two characters are worlds apart. Sheldrake’s original book on morphic resonance was considered so ‘heretical’ by the then-editor of Nature, that he said that, even though he knows book-burning is a bad thing, Sheldrake’s book should be burned for heresy. Why? Because he’s arguing for an a-causal connecting principle. He’s saying that once some new process in nature has happened in a particular way, there’s more likelihood of it adopting a similar form in future - but without any specific connection, other than that ‘nature forms habits’. John Lennox said it amounted to magic as well as being a scientific heresy. But one thing to know about Sheldrake is that at the time he was a plant biologist, who claimed to have evidential support for this theory based on science. Not just an armchair philosopher. It’s important to understand that he claims to support his arguments with evidence. You may not believe the evidence, but that’s different from believing there could be no evidence, as a matter of principle.

Dawkins ‘memes’ is rather a good metaphor, I use it myself for describing things like ‘the new atheist meme’. But it’s strictly pop culture.

For me, metaphysics is context. — Clarky

Metaphysics, to me, is about how you think about the world. Not in terms of truth, but what kind of thing it is. — Jackson

If you think about your own metaphysical leanings, do you detect emotion? What are they? What are they connected to? — Tate

Kant critiqued metaphysics. But he reduces metaphysics to epistemology. — Jackson

So traditional metaphysics can't be accomodated within that framework, as it's like trying to fit a three-dimensional form into a two-dimensional plane. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that the term 'metaphysics,' is, to say the least, 'overburdened.'
In Computing the term metadata means data about data. So for a website, the metadata will include 'keywords' from the site to be matched via search engines.
Meta can be self-referential, so metaphysics could also be a self-referential term. 'extra data to help in the understanding and pursuit of new knowledge of physics.' A projection of the idea that metadata helps you access the information on a website in a more efficient manner.
I suppose such a redefinition would remove the power and appeal of the traditional use of the term metaphysics but I would ask those I have quoted above. Is there any aspect of your personal interpretation of the term that you associate with the supernatural? And do you see very different 'connotations' or emphasis if you associate the term metaphysics with 'after' physics compared to 'beyond' physics?

Smart observations. Meta-physics is to physics as meta-data is to data. Take for example a letter. The contents of the letter is the data. The facts about the letter - who it is from, who to, date sent, etc - are meta-data. So physics refers to the behaviour of the observable universe and the physically measurable and observeable entities which comprise it. Meta-physics is reflection on what it means, or what must be the case for it to have the meaning it does, and so on. So for example in current physics, the metaphysical debates revolve around the meaning of quantum physics - what the quanitifiable observations and predictive theories mean about the larger reality, what is implied by the theory. So too many of the debates about evolutionary biology. I for one would never debate the empirical facts of evolution disclosed by research and exploration - but what does evolution mean? Is it directional, or is it the consequence of chance? and so on. They're also metaphysical questions. You can't escape them. So the attempt to declare metaphysics unknowable or out-of-bounds on account of definitional inconsistencies, and so on, always end up failing, because they too are metaphysical ideas, positivism being the classic example.

Something I could add is the notion of meta-cognition. That too has various connotations depending on context, but as the term implies, it is 'knowing about knowing'. As soon as you begin to reflect deeply on the nature of knowing - something which I think philosophy uniquely does - then you are in some sense engaged in a meta-cognitive exercise. And that also rears its head in contemporary science and philosophy debates, in the form of the argument about hard problem of consciousness, which is precisely an argument about the nature of first-person knowledge.

But I would add that metaphysics requires metacognition - that you can't really have one without entertaining the other.

And I end up being able to agree with all those snippets you quoted to greater or lesser extent. :grin:

I think your post above contains a very good level of clarity and reason.
I think too many terms like metaphysical, supernatural, spiritual etc can be and have been 'claimed' by those with theosophist leanings and I think philosophers and scientists should work hard to combat this by making the context within which such a term is used, very very clear.
I like the old greek definition of spiritual as 'animated,' such as used in a phrase like 'it was a high spirited attempt at reaching the top of the mountain.' Or in the case of the term supernatural, 'The amount of effort scientists have made to understand the workings and structure of the universe is almost supernatural in its intensity.' :grin: Ok, I admit, I find my attempt at removing the 'sting' from the term 'supernatural' harder to do.

Ought to be remembered that ‘supernatural’ is the Latin equivalent of the Greek ‘Metaphysical’. (There’s also a Buddhist equivalent, ‘lokuttara’ usually translated as ‘world-transcending’ or ‘transmundane’.)