I've read a little of Max Tegmark, after an OP of his about his neo-Pythagorean philosophy. But as I understand it, he nevertheless remains committed to a physicalist (or a kind of physicalist-panpsychist) account of consciousness (e.g. here) where matter still remains fundamental (opposite of Pierce’s ‘matter as effete mind’). Alain Badiou I've encountered mainly via this forum but haven't read anything about him, he wasn't on the radar at the time I did undergraduate studies. — Wayfarer

This is the problem with the physicalist approach. When adhered to, it leads to some form of panpsychism by logical necessity, because ultimately, matter cannot be given logical priority. But placing the principles of life, experience, consciousness, intention, as inherent within matter leaves them as fundamentally unintelligible because "matter" is the concept devised by Aristotle to account for the reality of the unintelligible aspect of the universe. So consciousness is rendered as unintelligible in this way.

:ok:

Science explains nature.

History interprets science.

Metaphysics describes – makes explicit – the horizon encompassing both 'all histories' and 'all sciences'.

Mysticism pantomimes metaphysics. — Mere Foolosophy

Hey Spinoza was a mystic. :grimace:

Says who?

It is interesting to think of the idea of metaphysics in relation to the good and evil. It would seem that at certain points in history these were seen as metaphysical realities as opposed to the way in which they are seen more as values. In Christianity there was an idea of a battle between good and evil; this lead to real battles in the form of wars to eliminate evil.

However, there was a lot of dispute about the nature of good and evil within Christianity. One aspect of theology was the idea of the privatio boni, which involved the idea of evil being the absence of good. This was explored by Victor White, a theologian who had dialogue with Carl Jung, in White's book, 'God and the Unconscious'. Part of this debate was about whether the doctrine glossed over the reality of evil.

However, this does come down to how reality is seen in the first place, and does come down to how the underlying nature of symbolic reality is viewed. In considering the way in which evi had not been seen as a source in it's own right Jung was developing a metaphysics which saw symbolic reality as fundamental. This was more in line with that of Plato, who saw the archetypes as symbolic, but with this symbolic aspect as the primary metaphysical reality. This is such a contrast to the present dominant paradigm, based on empirical science, which sees the physical world as the basic structure and the symbolic dimensions as secondary. It is linked to the question over the foundation of metaphysics being based on idealism or materialism.

Going back to the issue of Murdoch though, there is an essay in the volume 'Existentialists and Mystics', on the idea of perfection. I only looked at this briefly because the volume of writings is large and was pretty intense. So, I will have a reread of the essay on perfection, to see what light this throws on her understanding, because it does seem that she was seeing an important relationship between metaphysics and ethics.

And do you see very different 'connotations' or emphasis if you associate the term metaphysics with 'after' physics compared to 'beyond' physics? — universeness

The term "metaphysics" really has nothing to do with the term "physics." This definition would imply there is something fundamental about physics.

So why combine them? Is that not like saying metadata has nothing to do with data or metacognition has nothing to do with cognition? I think the scientific method employed by physics is fundamental as the most reliable way of pursuing new knowledge and testing its validity.

So why combine them? — universeness

Why indeed. The error began by calling Aristotle's work on "first philosophy" with the title, "Metaphysics." Of course, the name stuck, but like a lot of the Latinized Greek terms, it misstated what Aristotle's text was about.

I think the scientific method employed by physics is fundamental as the most reliable way of pursuing new knowledge and testing its validity. — universeness

I always find it amusing when people come to a philosophy forum to say physics is really where truth lays.

I always find it amusing when people come to a philosophy forum to say physics is really where truth lays — Jackson

I didn't come to TPF with that particular goal in mind, nor am I suggesting that the scientific method is the only way to gain new knowledge. I stated that it is, imo, the most reliable way.
I have experienced amusement as well, on many discussion forums, including this one.

I stated that it is, imo, the most reliable way. — universeness

I would not use "reliable" as a test for truth. There are many trivial and reliable facts.

It seems to me that the term 'metaphysics,' is, to say the least, 'overburdened.' — universeness

This is definitely true, although I don't see that any of the posts you've quoted are necessarily inconsistent with each other. I think we're all, more or less, coloring inside the lines that @Jack Cummins laid out for us at the beginning.

Is there any aspect of your personal interpretation of the term that you associate with the supernatural? And do you see very different 'connotations' or emphasis if you associate the term metaphysics with 'after' physics compared to 'beyond' physics? — universeness

Keeping in mind that Aristotle called it "metaphysics" because it came after physics in his publications, not because it was beyond physics in subject matter or an addition to physics. I tend to see it as the framework for knowledge and understanding, which I guess is what you mean by "beyond" in this context. I had a strong feel for what I thought metaphysics means, or at least what I wanted it to mean or what I thought was needed. Then someone recommended "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. It really helped me tighten up my thinking about it.

As for the supernatural, that's always given me pause when the subject is metaphysics. One of the most important ideas for Collingwood, one that I strongly endorse, is that metaphysical principles are not true or false. That works fine for talking about God or gods in general, but when you get specific, it falls apart. Clearly, although talk of God fits squarely into ontology, specific religions deal with matters of fact too, e.g. the existence of the Christian God and his son Jesus.

Keeping in mind that Aristotle called it "metaphysics" — Clarky

Aristotle did not call it "Metaphysics."

Meta-physics is to physics as meta-data is to data. Take for example a letter. The contents of the letter is the data. The facts about the letter - who it is from, who to, date sent, etc - are meta-data. So physics refers to the behaviour of the observable universe and the physically measurable and observeable entities which comprise it. Meta-physics is reflection on what it means, or what must be the case for it to have the meaning it does, and so on. — Wayfarer

I think this is a good way of putting it, although I think a lot of people would not agree.

So for example in current physics, the metaphysical debates revolve around the meaning of quantum physics - what the quanitifiable observations and predictive theories mean about the larger reality, what is implied by the theory. So too many of the debates about evolutionary biology. I for one would never debate the empirical facts of evolution disclosed by research and exploration - but what does evolution mean? Is it directional, or is it the consequence of chance? and so on. They're also metaphysical questions. — Wayfarer

This is something I'm struggling with. My intuition tells me that most of the excitement about quantum mechanics is not metaphysics. In particular, unless the various interpretations of QM can be tested empirically, it seems to me the differences between them are not metaphysical, they're meaningless. At the very least they are not useful.

As I've said, this is at the top of my list of things to try to figure out.

Aristotle did not call it "Metaphysics." — Jackson

Subsequent to the arrangement of Aristotle's works by scholars at Alexandria in the first century CE, a number of his treatises were referred to as τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (ta meta ta physika; literally, "the [writings] after the Physics"). This is the origin of the title for collection of treatises now known as Aristotle's Metaphysics.

My intuition tells me that most of the excitement about quantum mechanics is not metaphysics. In particular, unless the various interpretations of QM can be tested empirically, it seems to me the differences between them are not metaphysical, they're meaningless. At the very least they are not useful. — Clarky

This may not be apropos of your comment. But I find Quantum Mechanics far closer to how I understand the world than classical, mechanistic physics.

Subsequent to the arrangement of Aristotle's works by scholars at Alexandria in the first century CE, a number of his treatises were referred to as τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (ta meta ta physika; literally, "the [writings] after the Physics"). This is the origin of the title for collection of treatises now known as Aristotle's Metaphysics. — Clarky

Yes, a term never used by Arisotle.

Yes, a term never used by Arisotle. — Jackson

Agreed.

This may not be apropos of your comment. But I find Quantum Mechanics far closer to how I understand the world than classical, mechanistic physics. — Jackson

I don't know if this is the same thing, but I don't find quantum mechanics weird or strange. After all, it's just the way things are. I'm comfortable with it. On the other hand, I'm definitely a Newtonian kind of guy.

I'm definitely a Newtonian kind of guy. — Clarky

God is the lawgiver of the universe. No thanks.

I think too many terms like metaphysical, supernatural, spiritual etc can be and have been 'claimed' by those with theosophist leanings and I think philosophers and scientists should work hard to combat this by making the context within which such a term is used, very very clear. — universeness

People with mystical leanings, of which I am one, have as much right to use the English language as anyone else. The way they use it is as legitimate as any other. I certainly don't want to leave language about spirituality in the sole hands of science. On the other hand, yes, we should be clear about what we mean by the words we use.

God is the lawgiver of the universe. No thanks. — Jackson

Yeah, but f = ma.

Yeah, but f = ma. — Clarky

Lots of things are true that still can be trivial.

Posted double

Mysticism pantomimes metaphysics. — Mere Foolosophy

I might say that mysticism and metaphysics mistake each other for themselves.

This is the problem with the physicalist approach. When adhered to, it leads to some form of panpsychism by logical necessity, because ultimately, matter cannot be given logical priority. But placing the principles of life, experience, consciousness, intention, as inherent within matter leaves them as fundamentally unintelligible because "matter" is the concept devised by Aristotle to account for the reality of the unintelligible aspect of the universe. So consciousness is rendered as unintelligible in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great post. Indeed.

Going back to the issue of Murdoch though, there is an essay in the volume 'Existentialists and Mystics', on the idea of perfection. I only looked at this briefly because the volume of writings is large and was pretty intense. So, I will have a reread of the essay on perfection, to see what light this throws on her understanding, because it does seem that she was seeing an important relationship between metaphysics and ethics. — Jack Cummins

Because of the conversation in this thread, I bought "Existentialists and Mystics." After reading one of her novels, I have been intending to read Murdoch's philosophy too.

I think the scientific method employed by physics is fundamental as the most reliable way of pursuing new knowledge and testing its validity.
— universeness

I always find it amusing when people come to a philosophy forum to say physics is really where truth lays. — Jackson

I'm with @universeness. The scientific method isn't science, it's metaphysics.

I'm with universeness. The scientific method isn't science, it's metaphysics. — Clarky

I am confused by that. His quote would seem to state the oppposite.

I am confused by that. His quote would seem to state the oppposite. — Jackson

Perhaps @universeness will tell us what he meant, but I stand behind what I wrote.