As Zahavi puts it, phenomenology and deconstruction “dismiss the kind of skepticism that would argue that the way the world appears to us is compatible with the world really being completely different.” — Joshs

I think that's a good approximation on general skepticism -- the radical skeptic claiming the world could be radically otherwise, Humean skeptic denying causation as knowledge (instead its animal habit), Kantian skepticism of things-in-themselves (which could be otherwise, but we wouldn't know, tho it seems like Kant believes we should believe it's otherwise for moral reasons)

What made sense to me was Hume's arguments regarding causation -- on the conceptual side you have the necessary connection between events, and on the experiential side you have habituation and the belief that what we experience is necessary, but only because of human habit. So necessity, at least, must be conceptually distinguishable from the world we experience. — Moliere

Hume refers to causation as "constant correspondence." He denies the concept of necessary connection.

I see this as being in agreement with what I said, so I'll just ask the question again: How would you interpret the Husserl quotation? Is it just wrong?

What for? At this point I'm only parsing theories from one another, making distinctions, that sort of thing -- attempting to come up with something of a shared usage of language, given the many places we all come from and the way categorical nouns tend to make us misunderstand one another.

How would you interpret the Husserl quotation? Is it just wrong? — Moliere

I do not know why you're asking me about Husserl, nor do I know what quote you're referring to. But, okay, I'm game.

“Unremittingly, skepticism insists on the validity of the factually experienced world, that of actual experience,
and finds in it nothing of reason or its ideas.”( Crisis of European Sciences) — Joshs

No worries. Cross-posting between different posters is all. This is where it's from.

factually experienced world — Joshs

This needs to be explained. I do not know what this means.

I read it as "the world experienced" -- as in, the world I experience, in fact.

I read it as "the world experienced" -- as in, the world I experience, in fact. — Moliere

Okay. I never experienced the world as a fact. Not even sure what it means.
Reminds me of the 'myth of the given,' by Sellars.

Is it not a fact that you experience? A little simpler than The World of Facts or something phenomenological, just the world I experience, and "I experience the world" is a fact.

Is it not a fact that you experience? A little simpler than The World of Facts or something phenomenological, just the world I experience, and "I experience the world" is a fact. — Moliere

Okay, I experience the world. Good so far.

Cool.

"skepticism insists on the validity of the factually experienced world, that of actual experience,
and finds in it nothing of reason or its ideas."

So, moving over to "and finds in it nothing of reason or its ideas" -- for me, necessity -- in Hume -- is the concept that makes the most sense of the quote, because necessity is the concept that definitely isn't part of our experience: our experience is the constant correspondence of events, and through habit we assign said necessity, but it is nowhere to be found in experience, ala Hume's argument.

and through habit we assign said necessity, but it is nowhere to be found in experience, ala Hume's argument. — Moliere

I think for Hume there really is not that necessity. It is not just about human experience.

Perhaps for Hume there isn't really that necessity (I mean, if I were to talk strictly of Kant, I wouldn't call him a skeptic -- since he squarely denies being a skeptic! -- but for the purposes of this conversation, I can see him being included, when thinking on Derrida). If we start to zoom in on Hume I'm sure I'd have more to say -- but it does seem to make sense of the quote to me, which is all I was going for. This bit of Hume made sense of that bit of Husserl -- and so a pattern of sorts is established between us, some points of reference for beginning to talk among one another.

But I'm willing to hear another interpretation, or perhaps Husserl's sentence is so off that it really should be dismissed out of hand? However, given that this is at least something we've shared together, I'd rather not do that. I'm hoping to come up with some kind of shared understanding.

Perhaps for Hume there isn't really that necessity — Moliere

The irony is that Hume calls himself a skeptic but I think he is providing a solution to skepticism. Hume is critical of the later Kantian "thing in itself."

I think this is a different sort of reading than what I'm giving. Can you see the difference? Or is there a real reading to which you're referring, a reading of Hume that is the right reading of Hume?

I think this is a different sort of reading than what I'm giving. Can you see the difference? Or is there a real reading to which you're referring, a reading of Hume that is the right reading of Hume? — Moliere

I read philosophy to maximize the meaning of the text, and to see how it helps my own understanding.

To me--and it is in the Treatise--Hume solves the problem of the inner world, outer world dichotomy. What does that have to do with skepticism? There is no world other than the one we think about and experience; there is no true world. This is why I think Kant ends up with a problem Hume already showed how to solve.

My definition of skepticism: The knowledge we seek cannot be had.

I sometimes read philosophy in that mode, and sometimes I read philosophy in another mode. With respect to Derrida I'd say that I'm attempting to maximize the meaning of the text -- basically when I'm attempting to understanding something I'm trying to be as charitable as I can be, hence my introducing the hard/soft distinction earlier for interpretation (which obviously could go by other names too).

I don't think there's a correct reading of a text, there are just correct readings. There are erroneous readings of various degrees or kinds, and then there's some good readings -- some more creative than others, but mostly good and within bounds of the texts I read.

'Here is what I think. Here are the reasons.'

Basically what philosophy is.

Heh. Funnily enough, at least with where I'm at now with Derrida, I'd still agree that he's a skeptic here :D -- at least, because of my understanding of having knowledge.

Heh. Funnily enough, at least with where I'm at now with Derrida, I'd still agree that he's a skeptic here :D -- at least, because of my understanding of having knowledge. — Moliere

Okay, then.

"But here it may be objected,that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy," Hume, Treatise

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm#link2H_4_0041


Judged by imagination, not reason.

I don't think there's a correct reading of a text, there are just correct readings. There are erroneous readings of various degrees or kinds, and then there's some good readings -- some more creative than others, but mostly good and within bounds of the texts I read. — Moliere

Derrida would agree with you that there are better and worse readings of texts.

Derrida would agree with you that there are better and worse readings of texts. — Joshs

Makes sense to me.

My definition of skepticism: The knowledge we seek cannot be had. — Jackson

What is it we are seeking when we seek knowledge? A true correspondence between our maps and the actual territory? Or ways of seeing the world in more and more harmoniously ordered ways that we can anticipate more and more intimately? Popper advanced the former goal and. relived we could asymptotically approach absolute scientific truth. Others believe matching our representations to an independently existing world is not the goal of knowledge,but instead we ‘ produce’ worlds with knowledge, and we can progressively produce more and more intricately orderly worlds through repeated trial and error.
Does having knowledge mean having a truth that is forever unchanging? What if the knowledge we attain is an improvement over the knowledge we seek?

we ‘ produce’ worlds with knowledge, — Joshs

That is what I think, yes.

So you are not a skeptic, right?

So you are not a skeptic, right? — Joshs

Correct.

His deconstruction theory alone is a poster child for this. So don't ask for a passage -- ask someone to explain the deconstruction theory and you get your answers. — L'éléphant

I don't need anyone to explain it to me because I know it very well. I just find it interesting that many who like to talk about deconstruction can't substantiate much of what they say. Very often it seems to me they simply make things up. Pretty cynical if you ask me. Skeptical, even.