I like elusiveness of meaning but prefer some kind of possibly humanesque organ weirdly represented in the visual art I admire. — ZzzoneiroCosm
For at the stage of romantic art the spirit knows that its truth does not consist in its immersion in corporeality; on the contrary, it only becomes sure of its truth by withdrawing from the external into its own intimacy with itself and positing external reality as an existence inadequate to itself. Even if, therefore this new content too comprises in itself the task of making itself beautiful, still beauty in the sense hitherto expounded remains for it something subordinate, and beauty becomes the spiritual beauty of the absolute inner life as inherently infinite spiritual subjectivity....
The true content of romantic art is absolute inwardness, and its corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity with its grasp of its independence and freedom. This inherently infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular, the simple unity with itself which has dissipated all external relations, all processes of nature and their periodicity of birth, passing away, and rebirth, all the restrictedness in spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular gods into a pure and infinite self-identity. In this Pantheon all the gods are dethroned, the flame of subjectivity has destroyed them, and instead of plastic polytheism art knows now only one God, one spirit, one absolute independence which, as the absolute knowing and willing of itself, remains in free unity with itself and no longer falls apart into those particular characters and functions whose one and only cohesion was due to the compulsion of a dark necessity...
— Hegel
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm#s1...the determinate being of God is not the natural and sensuous as such but the sensuous elevated to non-sensuousness, to spiritual subjectivity which instead of losing in its external appearance the certainty of itself as the Absolute, only acquires precisely through its embodiment a present actual certainty of itself. God in his truth is therefore no bare ideal generated by imagination; on the contrary, he puts himself into the very heart of the finitude and external contingency of existence, and yet knows himself there as a divine subject who remains infinite in himself and makes this infinity explicit to himself....
If we compare this vocation of romantic art with the task of classical art, fulfilled in the most adequate way by Greek sculpture, the plastic shape of the gods does not express the movement and activity of the spirit which has retired into itself out of its corporeal reality and made its way to inner self-awareness. The mutability and contingency of empirical individuality is indeed expunged in those lofty figures of the gods, but what they lack is the actuality of self-aware subjectivity in the knowing and willing of itself. This defect is shown externally in the fact that the expression of the soul in its simplicity, namely the light of the eye, is absent from the sculptures.[2] The supreme works of beautiful sculpture are sightless, and their inner being does not look out of them as self-knowing inwardness in this spiritual concentration which the eye discloses. This light of the soul falls outside them and belongs to the spectator alone; when he looks at these shapes, soul cannot meet soul nor eye eye. But the God of romantic art appears seeing, self-knowing, inwardly subjective, and disclosing his inner being to man’s inner being. For infinite negativity, the withdrawal of the spirit into itself, cancels effusion into the corporeal; subjectivity is the spiritual light which shines in itself, in its hitherto obscure place, and, while natural light can only illumine an object, the spiritual light is itself the ground and object on which it shines and which it knows as itself. But this absolute inner expresses itself at the same time in its actual determinate existence as an appearance in the human mode, and the human being stands in connection with the entire world, and this implies at the same time a wide variety in both the spiritually subjective sphere and also the external to which the spirit relates itself as something its own. — Hegel
Personally, I hold Wittgenstein as a fake, an imposter. A very sad clown. I'd rather read from a funny one. — Olivier5
In any case even a dry text seemingly avoiding any rhetorical effects... is itself using dryness for rhetorical effect! — Olivier5
Purity from what? If nothing human is foreign to philosophy, sin is philosophical, and as many holy men have told us, philosophy is sin. — Olivier5
He's got all the looks of a true philosopher, so aesthetic is apt in this way. — Olivier5
that of the guy who points to the inherent vagueness of things. Things, such as concepts, are often more vague than scolars think. — Olivier5
I haven’t read much on this aspect of Derrida’s life. Can you say more?He was a womanizer like Sartre, but with better hygiene. — igjugarjuk
that of the guy who points to the inherent vagueness of things. Things, such as concepts, are often more vague than scolars think.
— Olivier5
Again...the kind of point I find in Derrida. — igjugarjuk
The 'sin' for humanism and rationality is the unjustified assumption, the incomplete achievement of autonomy, etc. The battle against superstition and puerility/slavishness is endless. — igjugarjuk
↪Olivier5 I'm honestly at a stage where I cannot tell if deconstruction is algorithmic or not, though I do see it as a method. In the same way that analysis is a method, though not algorithmic (you can begin an analysis anywhere, and an analysis relies upon the interpretive machinery being brought to the material, which varies depending on the analyzer) — Moliere
Okay. And what does that have to do with method? — Jackson
Ok, but remember, the mark is undecidable(because it is split into two equivocal aspects), not indeterminate, so he would probably bristle at the term ‘vague’. In its own way it is very precise. — Joshs
But as Collingwood implies, there is no thought without premises. Without at its root some absolute unprovable presuppositions. An axiomatique is always there somewhere, often unconscious. Think of it as an operating system, without which no computer can function. The operating system provides a creed, a credo based on which computing can happen. — Olivier5
I haven’t read much on this aspect of Derrida’s life. Can you say more? — Joshs
But I can't help thinking my irreverent style of paraphrase might offer something that yours doesn't, maybe because of the fidelity of your approach (which can be just as hard to decipher as the original text.) — igjugarjuk
Your writing is a lot more entertaining than mine. — Joshs
His affection for writing was probably connected to its partial or temporary escape from time. — igjugarjuk
But this same system makes 'pure' rationality impossible. — igjugarjuk
And I appreciate your even tone and good manners. — igjugarjuk
But no, monseiur, writing IS time. ( you know, the repetition that alters ) — Joshs
The essence of rationality is a ghost. Essences are always ghostly. We can barely watch them, let alone catch them. — Olivier5
OK but the concept of alteration depends on the endurance of the same. — igjugarjuk
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0034Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.
Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.
Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.
Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.
Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.
Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.
Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.
Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue. — Hobbes
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.