I like elusiveness of meaning but prefer some kind of possibly humanesque organ weirdly represented in the visual art I admire. — ZzzoneiroCosm

In my heart of hearts, I'm a sucker for presentations of the human form and face. But I found a nice quote relevant to Ad's black paintings. As I see it, this sums up the implicit negative monotheism involved.

For at the stage of romantic art the spirit knows that its truth does not consist in its immersion in corporeality; on the contrary, it only becomes sure of its truth by withdrawing from the external into its own intimacy with itself and positing external reality as an existence inadequate to itself. Even if, therefore this new content too comprises in itself the task of making itself beautiful, still beauty in the sense hitherto expounded remains for it something subordinate, and beauty becomes the spiritual beauty of the absolute inner life as inherently infinite spiritual subjectivity....

The true content of romantic art is absolute inwardness, and its corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity with its grasp of its independence and freedom. This inherently infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular, the simple unity with itself which has dissipated all external relations, all processes of nature and their periodicity of birth, passing away, and rebirth, all the restrictedness in spiritual existence, and dissolved all particular gods into a pure and infinite self-identity. In this Pantheon all the gods are dethroned, the flame of subjectivity has destroyed them, and instead of plastic polytheism art knows now only one God, one spirit, one absolute independence which, as the absolute knowing and willing of itself, remains in free unity with itself and no longer falls apart into those particular characters and functions whose one and only cohesion was due to the compulsion of a dark necessity...
— Hegel

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm#s1

Since this is a Derrida thread, I should add a nearby quote that seems relevant.

...the determinate being of God is not the natural and sensuous as such but the sensuous elevated to non-sensuousness, to spiritual subjectivity which instead of losing in its external appearance the certainty of itself as the Absolute, only acquires precisely through its embodiment a present actual certainty of itself. God in his truth is therefore no bare ideal generated by imagination; on the contrary, he puts himself into the very heart of the finitude and external contingency of existence, and yet knows himself there as a divine subject who remains infinite in himself and makes this infinity explicit to himself....

If we compare this vocation of romantic art with the task of classical art, fulfilled in the most adequate way by Greek sculpture, the plastic shape of the gods does not express the movement and activity of the spirit which has retired into itself out of its corporeal reality and made its way to inner self-awareness. The mutability and contingency of empirical individuality is indeed expunged in those lofty figures of the gods, but what they lack is the actuality of self-aware subjectivity in the knowing and willing of itself. This defect is shown externally in the fact that the expression of the soul in its simplicity, namely the light of the eye, is absent from the sculptures.[2] The supreme works of beautiful sculpture are sightless, and their inner being does not look out of them as self-knowing inwardness in this spiritual concentration which the eye discloses. This light of the soul falls outside them and belongs to the spectator alone; when he looks at these shapes, soul cannot meet soul nor eye eye. But the God of romantic art appears seeing, self-knowing, inwardly subjective, and disclosing his inner being to man’s inner being. For infinite negativity, the withdrawal of the spirit into itself, cancels effusion into the corporeal; subjectivity is the spiritual light which shines in itself, in its hitherto obscure place, and, while natural light can only illumine an object, the spiritual light is itself the ground and object on which it shines and which it knows as itself. But this absolute inner expresses itself at the same time in its actual determinate existence as an appearance in the human mode, and the human being stands in connection with the entire world, and this implies at the same time a wide variety in both the spiritually subjective sphere and also the external to which the spirit relates itself as something its own. — Hegel

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part2-section3.htm#s1

So instead of a preexisting world of Platonic essences, we have the mess of the world (neither mental nor physical yet in this time before distinctions) as primary, and it's within that mess that some of that mess develops a system of signs that slowly attains a self-referentiality which prefers to understand itself (deceive itself) as truly independent of its medium. As Feuerbach put, Christianity ('the Platonism of the masses') is essentially the fantasy that man is radically distinct from nature. The goal is a transcendence of nature, of all limitations. It's as if nature is created as that which is not yet under control. The self is that which one is socially responsible for. Nature is the shit in the way of our projects, and yet also their condition of possibility and value (sort of like our filthy inherited thought system, in some ways a prison, is also our only hope of a relative escape...we are the system trying to slide out of itself.)

Personally, I hold Wittgenstein as a fake, an imposter. A very sad clown. I'd rather read from a funny one. — Olivier5

You are of course entitled to such a view, but I rate Wittgenstein highly. Given the general reputation of Wittgenstein among scholars, I think it's just not that plausible that Wittgenstein was a 'sad clown' and 'fake.' For that to be true, many experts in the field, who almost certainly have studied the work more carefully than you, have to be (self-)deceived in a way that somehow you were not. Is it not just as likely or more likely, from a neutral perspective, than you are yourself conveniently self-deceived in a way that conveniently exempts you from having to read difficult texts?

To be sure, it's of very little practical relevance whether you are right or wrong about Wittgenstein. No one cares. Only on obscure stages like a philosophy forum can such gestures signify. In my view, it's almost always a bad move to play the 'he's a fraud' card. Only by providing an immanent critique, demonstrating genuine familiarity along the way, can such an accuser differentiate himself from what is almost the default anti-intellectual position...that there's nothing to all these fancy words ... Without such proof, it's reasonable to write off the accuser as another fox who can't or won't reach the grapes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fox_and_the_Grapes

In any case even a dry text seemingly avoiding any rhetorical effects... is itself using dryness for rhetorical effect! — Olivier5

A Derridean point maybe, and I agree. There's always some notion of the proper in effect, something that got there before we did, a background against which our performance will be judged. Along these lines, I also don't find pure concepts available. I find words entangled in histories with connotations and 'irrational' overtones. I find hieroglyphs like 'clarity' or 'foundation,' dead metaphors that somehow signify beyond the pictures at their root.

Purity from what? If nothing human is foreign to philosophy, sin is philosophical, and as many holy men have told us, philosophy is sin. — Olivier5

Purity from irrationality, from prejudice. Philosophy is sin to the holy men precisely in its "Satanic" humanism. We humans decide what is true and good, for ourselves. That's the Enlightenment, in the eyes of which religious superstition is impure.

The Left Hegelians are useful here. They would criticize various secular philosophers (one another, often enough) for being still-too-theological, still insufficiently rational or critical. The 'sin' for humanism and rationality is the unjustified assumption, the incomplete achievement of autonomy, etc. The battle against superstition and puerility/slavishness is endless. Derrida fits pretty nicely into this project. He just added some worthy targets. Sometimes husk is mistaken for kernel.

He's got all the looks of a true philosopher, so aesthetic is apt in this way. — Olivier5

Wittgenstein and Derrida were both beautiful men. That probably helped them and hurt them at the same time. Derrida was especially annoyingly attractive. It doesn't annoy me, but I think it annoyed others. It was as if he was taking the liberties of a good looking person, fucking around where ugly men had to be serious and earnest to get any respect. The fantasy might be that academics are above such petty responses, but we are primates. And Derrida's fame in literary departments was probably dependent on both a cartoon misunderstanding of him and the T-shirt readiness of his pleasant face and hair. He was a womanizer like Sartre, but with better hygiene. (I really enjoy the persona of Sartre. He was virtuous in some ways but a creep in others, and I think being a little wicked helps with access to unpleasant truths about human nature. It may be that saints don't make the best philosophers.)

that of the guy who points to the inherent vagueness of things. Things, such as concepts, are often more vague than scolars think. — Olivier5

Again...the kind of point I find in Derrida.

He was a womanizer like Sartre, but with better hygiene. — igjugarjuk

I haven’t read much on this aspect of Derrida’s life. Can you say more?

that of the guy who points to the inherent vagueness of things. Things, such as concepts, are often more vague than scolars think.
— Olivier5

Again...the kind of point I find in Derrida. — igjugarjuk

Ok, but remember, the mark is undecidable(because it is split into two equivocal aspects), not indeterminate, so he would probably bristle at the term ‘vague’. In its own way it is very precise.

The 'sin' for humanism and rationality is the unjustified assumption, the incomplete achievement of autonomy, etc. The battle against superstition and puerility/slavishness is endless. — igjugarjuk

But as Collingwood implies, there is no thought without premises. Without at its root some absolute unprovable presuppositions. An axiomatique is always there somewhere, often unconscious. Think of it as an operating system, without which no computer can function. The operating system provides a creed, a credo based on which computing can happen.

I'm honestly at a stage where I cannot tell if deconstruction is algorithmic or not, though I do see it as a method. In the same way that analysis is a method, though not algorithmic (you can begin an analysis anywhere, and an analysis relies upon the interpretive machinery being brought to the material, which varies depending on the analyzer)

I see patterns, though -- something is going on. And, much to my relief, it seems some others here are able to corroborate, and disentangle, some of my impressions and wonderings

However, in line with what I've been saying about how one reads a text, I was only able to begin to tease out what was going on by doing a soft reading, and reading what others who had read were saying. And I was intrinsically motivated to do so just because I like philosophy on the whole -- like a nerd who just likes things and starts to learn about them on his own because the nerd likes them.

So for me the whole idea of defending a philosopher is already something I'm not really doing. It's easy to refute philosophy -- all you need to do is say "Nope!" , and insofar that you or your audience are satisfied your refutation is complete. I've long ago given up on proselytizing philosophy to others -- if they have the interest then great! And if not, then I don't know how to impart the bug. It's just a matter of preference, as far as I can tell. Or maybe accident.

↪Olivier5 I'm honestly at a stage where I cannot tell if deconstruction is algorithmic or not, though I do see it as a method. In the same way that analysis is a method, though not algorithmic (you can begin an analysis anywhere, and an analysis relies upon the interpretive machinery being brought to the material, which varies depending on the analyzer) — Moliere

Derrida’s notion of deconstruction is not a method but a way of understanding the basis of all methods. And it not an algorithm but a way of understanding how all algorithms deconstruct themselves.

Derrida’s notion of deconstruction is not a method but a way of understanding the basis of all methods. — Joshs

What is the "basis of all methods?"

What is the "basis of all methods?" — Jackson

The structure of temporality is the basis of all methods , in that it throws us into a world that is already intelligible to us in some way. This familiarity with the world is the basis of method.

This familiarity with the world is the basis of method — Joshs

Okay. And what does that have to do with method?

Okay. And what does that have to do with method? — Jackson

A method is a way of proceeding in the world , a way of organizing particular meanings according to a larger scheme or totality of relevance. In that sense , method cannot be separated from value system, of which it forms a subspecies.

A method is a way of proceeding in the world , a way of organizing particular meanings according to a larger scheme or totality of relevance. In that sense , method cannot be separated from value system, of which it forms a subspecies. — Joshs

Okay, agree.

OK, this is interesting.

So, it is safe to say deconstruction is not a way of proceeding in the world. And it's larger than what I was imputing -- a way of reading a philosophical work.

Ok, but remember, the mark is undecidable(because it is split into two equivocal aspects), not indeterminate, so he would probably bristle at the term ‘vague’. In its own way it is very precise. — Joshs

Oh I recall Derrida avoiding 'ambiguity' somewhere for some sanctified synonym, but that's a point for insiders. I'm probably just the right amount of insider (as in not too much of one) to play a Derrida whisperer, but it doesn't bother me to translate 62 bits into the most relative 32 bits. The metaphor here is unsupervised machine learning, a bottlenecked autoencoder. For what it's worth, I acknowledge the possibility that you may be better read in Derrida. But I can't help thinking my irreverent style of paraphrase might offer something that yours doesn't, maybe because of the fidelity of your approach (which can be just as hard to decipher as the original text.)

But as Collingwood implies, there is no thought without premises. Without at its root some absolute unprovable presuppositions. An axiomatique is always there somewhere, often unconscious. Think of it as an operating system, without which no computer can function. The operating system provides a creed, a credo based on which computing can happen. — Olivier5

Exactly, and this is a Heideggerian/Derridean point too. What makes rationality possible is a system of inherited concepts. But this same system makes 'pure' rationality impossible...or always 'to come' as a sort of point at infinity, a hope, a mere direction of travel. This is epistemological Geworfenheit. It's what endangers modern philosophy's Kantian project while making it enticing in the first place. This project might be framed as the automation of critical thinking. If a philosopher could once and for all articulate the essence of rationality and lay down rules that would remain genuinely binding, that'd be the end of a particular story. It'd be a machine because that philosopher would die and leave his signs behind, somehow true and binding and intelligible in his absence, a 'bone machine' that reveals what it means to be a 'bone machine' in a way that governs inferences about inference, etc. (The philosophical dream is of 'the system' of traces/signs that somehow nets the truth about truth. 'Bone' refers to the endurance of these traces, and their having been stripped of all contingent flesh.) What would be left would just be empirical. We would have at least have grasped our essence as scientific beings. The science of science's essence would be complete.

I haven’t read much on this aspect of Derrida’s life. Can you say more? — Joshs

He had an illegitimate child with a student (or ex-student, can't remember when the affair started.) And the Peeters bio suggests (gently, respectfully) that our world-traveling Derrida never exactly settled down. I got the impression that he was adulterous when traveling (when his wife stayed home) but careful to maintain his marriage and family life too. The Post Card is, I believe, addressed to the mother of his illegitimate child. Also noteworthy: he gave very long talks, suggesting an extraordinary narcissism, which, as you may know, was sometimes explicitly discussed, along with his related fear of death and the destruction/loss of his archive. His affection for writing was probably connected to its partial or temporary escape from the abyss of death. As Bloom said, the strong poet is more afraid of annihilation than most...and tries harder to be worth remembering.

But I can't help thinking my irreverent style of paraphrase might offer something that yours doesn't, maybe because of the fidelity of your approach (which can be just as hard to decipher as the original text.) — igjugarjuk

Your writing is a lot more entertaining than mine. ( that’s a compliment)

Your writing is a lot more entertaining than mine. — Joshs

A very generous comment, sir! For what's worth, I'm glad someone as clearly informed and enthusiastic about this stuff is here for me talk with. And I appreciate your even tone and good manners.

His affection for writing was probably connected to its partial or temporary escape from time. — igjugarjuk

But no, monseiur, writing IS time. ( you know, the repetition that alters )

But this same system makes 'pure' rationality impossible. — igjugarjuk

I see nothing intrinsically impure about faith. All this seems like a pointless direction of thought to me, in search of some sort of ghost, a thought without heart, a philosophical algorithm or as you say, the automation of critical thinking.

Granted that the positivists tried it, as well as the logical positivists genre circle of Vienna. But as Popper and Socrates before him have shown, they were on an unproductive track in search of positive, definite certainty.

The essence of rationality is a ghost. Essences are always ghostly. We can barely watch them, let alone catch them.

And I appreciate your even tone and good manners. — igjugarjuk

bitch.

( thought I’d keep you off guard)

But no, monseiur, writing IS time. ( you know, the repetition that alters ) — Joshs

OK but the concept of alteration depends on the endurance of the same. I've been mentioning the self that functions as a player on the great stage of fools known as the world, the one responsible for claims, subject to praise and sanctions. It's this thing that we identity with and whose destruction we fear. Why did Derrida (why did Milton?) want his text saved from the grave? To be seen is the ambition of ghosts. To be remembered is the ambition of the dead.

bitch.

( thought I’d keep you off guard) — Joshs

Well fucking played!

The essence of rationality is a ghost. Essences are always ghostly. We can barely watch them, let alone catch them. — Olivier5

Perhaps, but isn't this metaphor of a ghost precisely one more such attempt?

I don't see how Derrida isn't doing basically the same old song and dance or pointing out and trying to work around or epistemological throwness. If he's worthless or unnecessary (which is no doubt true for someone just trying to pay the rent), then so is Kant. It's arguably a weird, elitist interest. One doesn't need to think about this stuff...or about real analysis, which is not the source of our faith in applied mathematics, or only very secondarily so. The anti-intellectual attitude can always accurately point out that it's a lot of trouble for not much external reward.

OK but the concept of alteration depends on the endurance of the same. — igjugarjuk

What about the idea that the same endures by continuing to be itself differently? From this vantage, it is endurance of the same which depends on alteration. I would say that this is the essence of deconstruction. If by endure , you mean an empirical notion of duration as persisting self-identity over time, this was critiqued by Bergson, Husserl , Deleuze and Heidegger in different ways.

Continuing the thought above about the uselessness or Derrida (and Kant and Hume and calculus and ...), I offer a quote from Hobbes about power. The context is a catalogue of all the sources of power, while power itself is roughly the command of human effort (as in labor or war.)

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue. — Hobbes

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0034
(Hobbes is just great, by the way.)

I though about starting a thread on this, because it's such a killer line. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

A buffoon like Jordan Peterson (when he wanders from his actual field) is indistinguishable from a more serious and successful thinker on the same topics. In the same way, a math crank cannot be distinguished from the outside from a Field'e medalist, except by social indicators like that medal. At least a fake plumber is revealed by leaks. But the indirect path from science to the practical life gives the real thing a kind of temporary invisibility to outsiders, so that Derrida or Wittgenstein are easily called frauds. Note that Kant was a Derrida in his day. Check out Beiser on the history of this period. Such as The Fate of Reason. Kant was a nihilist, an idealist, etc. Folks don't like their proprieties fucked with.