What moral implications does this fact have, according to you? — baker

That's the problem with a lot of what posters are doing here. Let's analyze this a bit by discussing three things that humans can do:

1) Needing water.
2) Needing to take a shit
3) Wanting to procreate.

For 1, if a human goes without water for too long, humans will die. Maybe you can last 3 days or so. Presumably, if the person finds water in a state of severe hydration (even if dirty) that person will immediately want to drink it to slake their extreme thirst. This might be considered a sort of instinct for hydration.. Probably less deliberative in this scenario. Under normal circumstances though, it would be pretty easy to decide not to drink water for short periods of time.. Maybe there's only hose water, and you decide that later on, you will go to the faucet to get a drink... Either way, even though you can usually control your thirst, you can control when and where you get your water. But you definitely NEED water, or at least hydration of some sort (technically you can live on little water, and on liquids like soda, tea, coffee, juice, alcohol, etc. as it has some measure of water in it.. even some foods).

For 2, if a human doesn't take a shit for too long, they will eventually die (after a while). But a human can control when and where they shit.. However, the need to shit is usually a very immediate need and will be very uncomfortable if you don't do it soon after you feel the pangs of needing to take a shit. So, this is another thing you can control, but is also very much something that makes one uncomfortable if one doesn't do.. but can control to some measure.

For 3, there is nothing that makes it such that if you don't do it, you will die. There is no immediate physical pain or discomfort.. If anything it is psychological for people who prefer to have a child. And sex itself can be controlled and certainly people exist who don't engage with it at all. It is not necessary for survival.. As I stated earlier, in humans, it is much more to do with existential notions, cultural practices, and personal preference.

A preacher doesn't make arguments. I make arguments. — Bartricks

:pray: :rofl:

:clap: :up:

@schopenhauer1 – Big whup! The already born suffer yet almost always do not suffer continuously or so acutely that they cannot also thrive (vide Laozi, Buddha, Epicurus-Lucretius, Seneca-Epictetus, Spinoza). If the already-born sufferers can thrive, then so can 'unborn sufferers'. :flower: Ethical concern, therefore, begins at birth – not before conception. As I've pointed out elsewhere, schop1, anti-natalism unnecessarily harms those already born who are compelled by their (socio)biology – drives – insofar as the 'doctrine' is used to prevent or pressure them to not procreate. The anti-natalist, after all, is the fraternal twin of the anti-abortionist: both are pro-unborn – the latter is not pro-child, however, whereas the former is not pro-already born. :death:

None. People are able to do immoral things. Like I say, you don't seem to be appreciating that this is a normative issue. You can't refute antinatalism by having a baby.

sufferers can thrive — 180 Proof

You think this is a justification for doing for unnecessarily putting people in harms way? And you can reference by what I mean by unnecessary.. but I'll give you it again..
1) It has to be on behalf of others...
2) Does not ameliorate a greater harm for a lesser harm (for that person being affected).

those already born — 180 Proof

Already refuted that idea. There is a difference between something never being able to happen, and something that can definitely happen.

compelled by their (socio)biology — 180 Proof

Sociobiology here is a squishy term.. If you mean some sort of strict instinct, then you can reference my earlier post here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/717447

Tell me what you think warrants ethical concern.

To my mind, only an EXISTING sufferer warrants ethical concern.

Tell me what you think warrants ethical concern.

To my mind, only an ACTUAL sufferer warrants ethical concern. — 180 Proof

If you know at time X present, a person does not suffer Y, and at time X1 in the future, a person will suffer Y, I do not see why ethical concerns don't count for X1 in the future.

If you know at time X present, a person does not suffer Y, and at time X1 in the future, a person will suffer Y, I do not see why ethical concerns don't count for X1 in the future. — schopenhauer1

I don't see why either if what you mean by "a person" is an existing person.

I don't see why either if what you mean by "a person" is an actual person. — 180 Proof

I don't see what you don't see. A person does not exist at X time for Y suffering. But they will exist at X1 time for Y suffering. You know that Y suffering can be avoided at X1.

So not an existing person. No moral concern. No moral justification for antinatalism. Thanks, schop1. :up:

I am grateful to you for your excessively kind words. However, as I have said before, I have a lot to learn. Nevertheless, I remain convinced that universal antinatalism is not a tenable position.

I've seen other people make similar arguments.

If an innocent person deserves to avoid suffering, they also deserve to experience happiness. Causing unnecessary harms to existing innocent sentient beings is indeed problematic (unless you can show that your actions were required for a greater good). However, considering that non-existent beings aren't in a state of affairs they prefer, if creating harms is bad, then bestowing positives can also be good.

Psychological pain can be quite severe.

People have needs, but people also experience satisfaction that has significant value.

The gulf between "will" and "do" can be quite wide ;)

However, if they will experience harms that must be prevented, they can also experience positives. I don't wish to start a train of repetition, so I shall stop here. I hope that you and the others here have been doing well.

So not an actual person. No moral concern. No moral justification for antinatalism. Thanks, schop1. :up: — 180 Proof

You have not connected "no actual person" with "no moral concern". There will be an actual person. Yet, you never address that important point.

However, if they will experience harms that must be prevented, they can also experience positives. I don't wish to start a train of repetition, so I shall stop here. I hope that you and the others here have been doing well. — DA671

Yeah I know your position, and yeah lets not make this a repetition. You can at least teach your adherent over there a lesson in how to debate without flying off the (fuckn) handle.

There could be other things to consider, such as the impact an action could have on existing people. But yes, if preventing the positives isn't bad because there isn't anybody in the void who needs them, then neither is there a need to prevent harms whose absence wouldn't satisfy anybody.

I am not worthy or capable of having any adherents. Still, I think I would have to slightly disagree with my friend universeness on a couple of things:

1. Banning people or ideas isn't a solution and makes it seem like one doesn't have an adequate response to the position being put forward—and I firmly believe that there is a more than plausible response.

2. I don't think that your view is "vile". If the world had more people who cared more about reducing harms instead of being apathetic or inflicting it, perhaps we wouldn't even have to discuss this stuff. Progress can only occur if people are willing to work together.

Also, I hope that you have a nice day!

"An innocent person also deserves happiness and fulfillment, which the world offers, would you deny them this?"

That's a good point.

Forgiveness should be sought for inflicting harms. However, it can also be sought for removing/preventing all positives.

Forgiveness should be sought for inflicting harms. However, it can also be sought for removing/preventing all positives. — DA671

:ok:

:pray:

There will be an actual person. — schopenhauer1

So there is not now an existing person who warrants moral concern, but only some hypothetical / imaginary – inexistent – person like e.g. Frodo Baggins. :roll:

So there is not now an actual person who warrants moral concern, but only some hypothetical / imaginary – nonactual – person like e.g. Frodo Baggins. :roll: — 180 Proof

So it looks like you are not making the distinction that I put forward earlier. See here again:

Already refuted that idea. There is a difference between something never being able to happen, and something that can definitely happen. — schopenhauer1

Can vs is—therein lies the real distinction. But those who care about one aspect of the former (suffering), cannot ignore the other (happiness).

I don't see the relevance of the distinction.

You've lost me.

Perhaps. Yet, even if it's true, the future/potential positives are also worth thinking about—they always will be.

I was agreeing with you that non-existent beings cannot be benefitted or harmed (presuming that is what you meant). However, if one thinks that it is good to prevent suffering for inexistent people, then it is also problematic to prevent all happiness.

I am sorry for being a bit unclear.

I wasn't sure. I agree with you but I'm arguing that there isn't any morsl concern warranted by inexistent persons.

I think that I would be inclined to agree with you. I would only add that an action (or the lack thereof) could still have a positive/negative effect on those who do exist. My cardinal point, howbeit, was that if there is a moral concern, it cannot be one-sided.

My point was that if there is a moral concern, it cannot be one-sided. — DA671

Yes. That's good. :up: