He does not say that the world is linguistic in form. He says that the world is LOGICAL in form. It is this logical form that makes it possible for language to REPRESENT things in the world. — Fooloso4

I'm going off the SEP article right now. I'm reading the text as well. I'm actually going to get a collection of essays on the multiple interpretations. I'm just curious because I picked up the Schopenhauerian backdrop just from a few sentences out of the Tractacus, so I'm curious to know what he has to say.

Yet he mentions none of them, not even a “See Russell. See Schopenhauer. See Kant for the foundations of what I mean by object”. Objects are just assumed. Not even an “IFF objects are the basis for the world”..Why are you doing more work than him at his own argument? — schopenhauer1

I mean, the SEP says the Tractacus was influenced by Schopenhauer. It also says that contemporary scholarship rejects the sharp divide between the Tractacus and the PI.

Interesting stuff.

I mean, the SEP says the Tractacus was influenced by Schopenhauer. It also says that contemporary scholarship rejects the sharp divide between the Tractacus and the PI.

Interesting stuff. — Tate

He doesn't make any explicit connections, so again, why are you doing more legwork than himself? Schopenhauer's writing is clear and ties his thinking to all sorts of other sources explicitly, right there, in the text.

The Tractatus is wrong if it fails to prove the very foundation it stands on. — schopenhauer1

Does his failure to prove the assumption that there are elemental building blocks mean that it is wrong?

Physicists have identified 12 building blocks that are the fundamental constituents of matter. Our everyday world is made of just three of these building blocks: the up quark, the down quark and the electron. This set of particles is all that's needed to make protons and neutrons and to form atoms and molecules. — Fermilab

The larger problem is not the ontological assumptions but the linguistic ones, that is, the elemental names that name the elemental objects and combine to form propositions. More precisely, the ontological is the linguistic - what is said and thought about what is. When all is said and done, what stands outside the limits of what can be said, what shows itself experientially remains. The problems of life, the aesthetic and ethical.

He doesn't make any explicit connections, so again, why are you doing more legwork than himself? — schopenhauer1

What specifically are you talking about?

The larger problem is not the ontological assumptions but the linguistic ones, that is, the elemental names that name the elemental objects and combine to form propositions. More precisely, the ontological is the linguistic - what is said and thought about what is. When all is said and done, what stands outside the limits of what can be said, what shows itself experientially remains. The problems of life, the aesthetic and ethical. — Fooloso4

Does his failure to prove the assumption that there are elemental building blocks mean that it is wrong? — Fooloso4

It means it is a sort of lame-duck theory. If he is trying to explain something about the world, then he better be prepared to explain the very foundation of his edifice.

I'm going to also answer with what I said to Banno earlier:

But this is the stuff of philosophy proper, not to be glossed over. His argument ONLY works if you believe the ontological framework. If anyone else just "started" and didn't explain why they started there, they would be called out. I don't see why he should get a pass.

I can predict a sort of response whereby you mention that he was demonstrating his own values whereby philosophy cannot speak of things that can't be pictured.. But BECAUSE it is the very basis for which the picture theory "hangs" (get what I did there).. it MUST be discussed otherwise, Witty garners himself right by way of never having to prove anything outside of what he himself is claiming. How convenient that works.. "I make a claim, but it would be 'nonsense' to refute its very basis". Again, real convenient. — schopenhauer1

Right, that's what he is trying to claim, but his claim rests on a sort of existence that takes for granted "objects" and with it allusions like "scientific conceptions", but none of that is discussed. It would be prone to attack (which I would probably do on it), but it is worse than that.. He doesn't even posit anything. He just starts with this assumptions and hopes you fall for it.. Again, I will point you back to here:

But this is the stuff of philosophy proper, not to be glossed over. His argument ONLY works if you believe the ontological framework. If anyone else just "started" and didn't explain why they started there, they would be called out. I don't see why he should get a pass.

No that's not how that works Witty.. You POSITED something of the WORLD (objects)... — schopenhauer1

This is how the SEP puts it:

"The logical structure of the picture, whether in thought or in language, is isomorphic with the logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures."

The isomorphic part is what's astonishing.

He just starts with this assumptions and hopes you fall for it. — schopenhauer1

We are in agreement regarding his a priori assumptions. The idea of something fundamental, however, is as old as western philosophy itself. It persists in modern science. That is not to say it is correct, but do we know it is incorrect? What are the alternatives?

We are in agreement regarding his a priori assumptions. The idea of something fundamental, however, is as old as western philosophy itself. It persists in modern science. That is not to say it is correct, but do we know it is incorrect? What are the alternatives? — Fooloso4

I’m not against the idea of something fundamental but rather that Witty isn’t doing anything to defend his claim. Just assuming it with no further explanation. Objects, next. Isn’t enough. Not in philosophy when making claims about the works.

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. Any object has inherent properties of relatability: it can relate in logical ways to other objects.

Why are there objects and relations without justification? He is exempt because he said something about nonsense? See my above quote used several times.

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate

There can be no states of affairs without the objects that combine to create those states of affairs:

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

2.0121 If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world.That is why they cannot be composite.

2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

The world is the totality of facts. — Ludwig Wittgenstein

Facts are truths about the world and abso-f**cking-lutely that's all there is to the world. I don't see anything fancy/weird going on! :chin:

I’m not against the idea of something fundamental but rather that Witty isn’t doing anything to defend his claim. — schopenhauer1

In the absence of a cogent argument against simples does this need to be defended? Can simples be denied without also denying complexes?

In the absence of a cogent argument against simples does this need to be defended? Can simples be denied without also denying complexes? — Fooloso4

So we can make ontological claims without defense in philosophy now? Yes, any ontological claim can be denied and not just taken as fact. That is what needs to be defended.

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are.
— Tate

There can be no states of affairs without the objects that combine to create those states of affairs: — Fooloso4

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to being made of objects.

Per the SEP:

"Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein sees the world as consisting of facts (1), rather than the traditional, atomistic conception of a world made up of objects."

At first glance it looks like W is justifying correspondence theory by saying the world is linguistic in form — Tate

The world is not linguistic in form.

Public language and private experience

When looking at the public objects such as post box, a sunset, a strawberry, a tomato, I notice that I have a common private subjective experience X.

Also, when looking at the same public objects, I notice that alongside them is the public word object "red".

I link my private subjective experience X with the public word object "red".

Similarly, someone else will link their private subjective experience Z with the public word object "red".

I can have a sensible discussion with the other person about the public word object "red", even though my private subjective experience X may be different to their private subjective experience Z.

The public word object "red" is part of a language common between me and someone else.

For Wittgenstein, Language doesn't represent reality, it mirrors it

4.121 Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions. That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent. That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language. The propositions show the logical form of reality. They exhibit it.

For Wittgenstein, language contains irreducible "atomic propositions" that picture reality, mirror the world, because they both have the same structure, the same logical form. Language doesn't represent reality (it cannot be said), it mirrors it (it must be shown).

The term "logical form" itself was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1914.
Argument = All humans are mortal - Socrates is human - therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Logical form of argument = All H are M - S is H - therefore, S is M.
Proposition = Socrates is mortal
Logical form = S is M
S represents Socrates

Private experiences and public objects

When looking at a public object such as a red postbox, I notice that I have the private subjective experience of X associated with the public object red and the private subjective experience of Y associated with the public object postbox.

When looking at the public object red, I notice alongside is the public word object "red", and when looking at the public object postbox, I notice alongside is the public word object "postbox".

My private subjective experiences X and Y show the logical form of reality, ie, the public objects red and postbox. My private subjective experiences X and Y are represented by the public word objects "red" and "postbox".

In other words, the proposition "the postbox is red" represents my private subjective experiences X and Y, and X and Y show the logical form of reality, ie, the public objects red and postbox

Conclusion
It is not as Wittgenstein said that propositions show the logical form of reality, rather propositions represent private subjective experiences, and it is these private subjective experiences that show the logical form of reality.

The problem, as I see it, is not the claim that there are simples but naming them. If we cannot name them we cannot give an analysis of elementary propositions. The following is then nonsense:

4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.

The problem, as I see it, is not the claim that there are simples but naming them. If we cannot name them we cannot give an analysis of elementary propositions. The following is then nonsense: — Fooloso4

What does he or you mean by we cannot name them. What is it mean to name in this game?

I would say rather, if we cannot demonstrate them, we cannot…

The world is not linguistic in form. — RussellA

Per the Tractacus, states of affairs are isomorphic with thoughts and propositions. Thought is linguistic for Wittgenstein.

A major challenge to correspondence is explaining how exactly a true proposition "corresponds" to reality.

Wittgenstein just lays it out there that the world corresponds to true propositions because they have the same form.

This is not Kant. There is no a priori knowledge. It's all just a world put together with the same logic that is the backbone of language.

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate

Facts are composite. What is composite cannot be fundamental. The possibilities of objects occuring in states of affairs is in the objects themselves (2.0121)

Per the SEP — Tate

You left out the next sentence:

Facts are existent states of affairs and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects.

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts. The possibility of such combinations is in the objects themselves. This was discussed above: Here

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts — Fooloso4

I didn't say otherwise. ?

What does he or you mean by we cannot name them. — schopenhauer1

He does not claim that we cannot name them, but he does not name them. He claims that they are the elements of elementary propositions, but without naming them there can be no elementary propositions.

His next step is to declare that everything he just said about propositions and thoughts being like pictures is nonsense. This doesn't mean it's false. It means that what he just wrote literally has no sense.

Even the statement "There are objects" is nonsense.

:smirk:

He does not claim that we cannot name them, but he does not name them. — Fooloso4

Even the claim of objects unnamed is a claim to be justified. I keep having to repeat this quote:

I can predict a sort of response whereby you mention that he was demonstrating his own values whereby philosophy cannot speak of things that can't be pictured.. But BECAUSE it is the very basis for which the picture theory "hangs" (get what I did there).. it MUST be discussed otherwise, Witty garners himself right by way of never having to prove anything outside of what he himself is claiming. How convenient that works.. "I make a claim, but it would be 'nonsense' to refute its very basis". Again, real convenient. — schopenhauer1

You need to read the SEP article. Wittgenstein knew that his picture theory was literal nonsense, which means he knew it doesn't correspond to anything in the world.

You have to read the whole thing to get it. This book is a demonstration of philosophical nonsense. For a purpose.

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts
— Fooloso4

I didn't say otherwise? — Tate

You said:

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate

States of affairs are not opposed to objects, they are objects in actual as opposed to possible states of affairs. The possibility to combine to form states of affairs is in the objects themselves. But not all possibilities are what is actually the case.

Your prior claim:

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate

There are no states of affairs without objects. If the states of affairs are dependent then they cannot be fundamental.

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

Ok. But this debate seems inconsequential once you get the punchline.

It's all nonsense. :blush:

It means that what he just wrote literally has no sense. — Tate

And what does this mean? Hint: do not assume it means what you think it does based on how it is used elsewhere.

Per the SEP:

"It becomes clear that the notions used by the Tractatus—the logical-philosophical notions—do not belong to the world and hence cannot be used to express anything meaningful. Since language, thought, and the world, are all isomorphic, any attempt to say in logic (i.e., in language) “this and this there is in the world, that there is not” is doomed to be a failure, since it would mean that logic has got outside the limits of the world, i.e. of itself. That is to say, the Tractatus has gone over its own limits, and stands in danger of being nonsensical.

The “solution” to this tension is found in Wittgenstein’s final remarks,"

Wittgenstein emphasized that the ProTractacus contains the essence of the whole book: that when we try to define the limits of thought, we discover that we can't get there from here. Philosophy in general requires a vantage point that we don't have.

As he said, you probably need to have thought of this yourself prior to reading the Tractacus in order to get it.