Not necessarily; it depends on whether the observational evidence is relevant to the metaphysical perspective in question and it is never the bare observation that is relevant in any case, but some interpretation of it, which rather begs the question. — Janus

The point was that since metaphysics concerns being, or existence, in the most general sense, all observational evidence is relevant to any metaphysical perspective. To dismiss the evidence as "unsupportive" rather than "undermining", and insist that it is not relevant, is simply denial.

If you think that what is apparent to us constitutes evidence either way, then it is the case that the vast bulk of observational evidence suggests the existence of a mind-independent world. If what is apparent to us does not constitute evidence one way or the other regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, then QM like the rest of science and empirical observation and investigation, is neither here not there in that connection. You can't have it both ways.

And, anyway, as I said it is not the mere findings of QM that could have bearing on the question, but the various interpretations of their relevance.

It seems to me that any science relies on there being some inter-subjectively determinable reality to warrant the veracity of its observations. I have no argument against the free-flowing associations and insights of postmodern thought; they may indeed be illuminating and open new avenues for contemplation and research, but they can never command the kind of inter-subjective corroborability that science or everyday empirical observation can, as far as I can see — Janus

I highly recommend Joseph Rouse’s ‘Articulating the World’. His postmodern rejection of realism , rather than being based on “free-flowing associations” , is grounded in evolutionary biology. He uses the model of biological niche construction to characterize the intersubjective discursive practices that create scientific communities, tracing their origin to the communicative practices of non-linguistic animals. Intersubjective corroborability requires a shared set of practices. Only within that ‘niche’ does the notion of observation , agreement , and truth and falsity, make any sense. Niches are constantly changing and being rebuilt , and as a result what is at stake and at issue in a scientific practice changes along with it.

In other words, a thoroughgoing naturalism leads one to reject realism.

Niches are constantly changing and being rebuilt , and as a result what is at stake and at issue in a scientific practice changes along with it. — Joshs

I'm not convinced that it generally changes that much. I find Kuhn's idea of radical paradigm shifts to be somewhat overblown.

:ok: I'll try to find time to take a look at it...

We discuss Rouse’s book in a 2 hour meetup every other Sunday beginning at 6 pm London time. You’re welcome to join.

https://www.meetup.com/the-toronto-philosophy-meetup/events/286979563/?_xtd=gqFyqTIxNzgyMzQ2OKFwo2FwaQ&from=ref

You missed the point of the ontological consideration
— creativesoul

Could you perhaps repeat it for me? — Isaac

In all fairness, I haven't made it clear. That's one of my personality flaws... assuming others are already on the same page as myself, so to speak. Put differently, I assume others have interpreted the bulk of the conversation the same way I have. Mea Culpa. In retrospect, that was the exact opposite of what was warranted.

A common phrasing concerning forests and trees comes to mind. As it applies here, I'm rendering the forest, as a general outline with ambiguous enough edges to do both, effectively set out the basics(of all meaningful experience) in as simple a manner as possible and subsequently extrapolate with and/or in terms of evolutionary progression in such a way as to be capable of taking account of meaningful human experience as well. Whereas, on the other hand, you're rendering the biological structures of the individual trees within the forest, doing so at the micro level - with respectable precision.

It's that pesky little notion of internal/external that's the problem.

Simply put:Seeing the wavelengths we've named "red" is a meaningful experience that consists, in part, of those wavelengths. They are being emitted/reflected by something other than our own biological structures. Thus, the meaningful experience of seeing red leaves requires leaves that reflect/emit those wavelengths. Leaves are external to the individual host of biological machinery. As is the light being emitted/reflected from the leaves. The experience also consists of things that are internal, such as the biological machinery itself. So, the leaves and light are external, and the biological machinery is internal. It takes both(and more) to have a meaningful experience of seeing red. If we remove either, what's left doesn't have what it takes to produce a meaningful experience of seeing red. This tells us that both are necessary elements of the experience. The experience consists of all the necessary elements. If some of it is internal and some is external, then the experience can rightly be called neither, for it is not the sort of thing that has such spatiotemporal location.

How those wavelengths become meaningful is imperative as well. However, the above is enough for now...

Thank you for bringing Rouse's book to attention. A see that a review is available at NDPR.

Interesting book summary. Seems right up my alley, so to speak. Wish I had more time...

...to understand how to make sense of a scientific conception of nature as itself part of nature...

...for that quote is worthy of attention.

I didn't deny those academics made contributions to cognitive science. I've found some of their contributions to be insightful and useful (though I'm not generally persuaded).

But they are contributions from philosophy to cognitive science, they are not discoveries of cognitive science, those are made by cognitive scientists. I had a paper once published in a Political Science journal. I'm not a political scientist. It was, in that case, a contribution from my work in Psychology, to the political scientists, it was not research in political science.

The relevant point here is that philosophy's contribution to philosophy is already taken as given, we were talking about the contribution from other sciences, to which your comments don't appear to be addressed.

↪Joshs
mistakes a copy-and-paste for an argument. — Banno

Odd in one usually so verbose.

Seeing the wavelengths we've named "red" is a meaningful experience that consists, in part, of those wavelengths. They are being emitted/reflected by something other than our own biological structures. Thus, the meaningful experience of seeing red leaves requires leaves that reflect/emit those wavelengths. Leaves are external to the individual host of biological machinery. As is the light being emitted/reflected from the leaves. The experience also consists of things that are internal, such as the biological machinery itself. So, the leaves and light are external, and the biological machinery is internal. It takes both(and more) to have a meaningful experience of seeing red. If we remove either, what's left doesn't have what it takes to produce a meaningful experience of seeing red. This tells us that both are necessary elements of the experience. The experience consists of all the necessary elements. If some of it is internal and some is external, then the experience can rightly be called neither, for it is not the sort of thing that has such spatiotemporal location. — creativesoul

I don't find anything to disagree with in the above. Do you think it opposes something I've said, or are you just providing your own (welcome) way of seeing it? If the former I'm still lost as it doesn't seem in opposition. If the latter, then simply, yes, that seems to me to be an accurate summary of how I understand matters to be too.

I thought all along that our views dovetailed nicely.

I thought all along that our views dovetailed nicely. — creativesoul

Well, that's nice to hear. Good summary.

If you think that what is apparent to us constitutes evidence either way, then it is the case that the vast bulk of observational evidence suggests the existence of a mind-independent world. — Janus

The issue I pointed to earlier in the thread, is the nature of the assumed "mind-independent world". This world is not necessarily external, it might be internal, and we simply model it as being external.

If what is apparent to us does not constitute evidence one way or the other regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, then QM like the rest of science and empirical observation and investigation, is neither here not there in that connection. You can't have it both ways. — Janus

I can\t imagine how "what is apparent to us" could possibly not constitute evidence regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, in one way or another. It appears to me, like such a claim would be the result of not interpreting "what is apparent to us" in relation to the issue.

Could you think all the thoughts (or any) in the CPR without language, for example? — Janus

CPR is all language representing Kant’s thoughts, so no, I cannot think Kant’s thoughts. But I can, and have, represent(ed) Kant’s words, thus indirectly his thought, with objects of my own imagination. Like.....you know those new-fangled downspouts on fancy houses these days, that are just painted plastic chains, where rain water travels down them without falling off? The rain all over the roof is objects out there; the gutters are the sense organs, collecting and directing all the objects where they need to go, rather than just overflowing and falling all over the place; the chains are the nerves that transport the collected stuff to the only destination appropriate for that stuff. The collected stuff traveling down the chains is.....of course......phenomena.

Yes, words are tools.
—————

My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language. — Janus

Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words?

But they are contributions from philosophy to cognitive science, they are not discoveries of cognitive science, those are made by cognitive scientists. I had a paper once published in a Political Science journal. I'm not a political scientist. It was, in that case, a contribution from my work in Psychology, to the political scientists, it was not research in political science. — Isaac

How is this not research in cognitive science?

Arntzen,E.C.,Normann,B.Øberg,G.K.andGallagher,S.2019.Perceived bodily changes individualized, group-based exercises are a source of strengthening self in individuals with MS: A qualitative interview study. Physiotherapy Theory and Practice

Vincini,S.Jhang,Y.,Buder,E.H.andGallagher,S.2017.Neonatal imitation:Theory,experimental
design and significance for the field of social cognition. Frontiers in Psychology – Cognitive Science.

Rode,G.,Lacour,S.,Jacquin-Courtois,S.,Pisella,L.,Michel,C.,Revol,P.,Luauté,J.,Gallagher,S., P., Pélisson, D. & Rossetti, Y. 2015. Long-term sensorimotor and therapeutical effects of a mild regime of prism adaptation in spatial neglect. A double-blind RCT essay / Effets sensori-moteurs et fonctionnels à long terme d’un traitement hebdomadaire par adaptation prismatique dans la négligence : un essai randomisé et contrôlé en double insu [in English and French]. Annals of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine 58

But this begs the question. Arent you defining ‘cognitive science’ in conveniently narrow terms such that it preemptively shuts out precisely the kinds of challenges to its methods and assumptions that non-realist enactivists like Gallagher are presenting? Haven’t you set up a catch-22? Galagher rejects reductive, representational realist approaches to cognitive science. You work within a community of scientists who define cognitive science in those terms. Therefore, Gallagher can’t be a cognitive scientist. 60 years ago, when behaviorism reigned supreme, given the methods you embrace, you yourself would not have been considered a scientist by that psychological community , only a speculating philosopher. It would be an interesting study to track how long it took for cogntivists like Ulrich Neisser to be accepted as scientists by the larger research community. It’s a classic situation, described by Thomas Kuhn , of newer paradigmatic communities having their methods delegitimized by the older community as non-scientific.

I’m guessing that enactivism has been around long enough that a mature community of active scientific researchers has by now formed around it. If Gallagher doesn’t fit the bill , then certainly you can agree that a list can be pulled together from repeatedly cited references in the journals they publish in. Unless you want to insist thar, by definition , none of these people are real cognitive scientists. So why don’t you help me out here. I’m sure you can provide a name or two from
within the enactivist research community. Then we can see what, if anything, they say about realism, pro or con.

I’m curious , do you consider Lisa Barrett to be more of a ‘real’ cognitive scientist than Gallagher?

The co authors on those papers are cognitive scientists or psychologists. Again I'm not questioning the contribution, I'm questioning the origin. What the philosophers brought to each of those papers was philosophy.

Arent you defining ‘cognitive science’ in conveniently narrow terms such that it preemptively shuts out precisely the kinds of challenges to its methods and assumptions that non-realist enactivists like Gallagher are presenting? — Joshs

I feel like I'm defining cognitive science quite uncontroversially. One is a cognitive scientist if one has trained, and does research, in cognitive science. doctoral students, post docs, professors, researchers, etc. It seems like a pretty normal delineation based on where they're likely to gain their insights. Someone sitting in an armchair just 'having a bit of reckon' is not going gain insights into cognitive science without testing them somehow (hence the collaborations). No university in the world is going to open their labs to a bunch of philosophers who've 'got an idea' about cognition.

So why don’t you help me out here. I’m sure you can provide a name or two from
within the enactivist research community. Then we can see what, if anything, they say about realism, pro or con. — Joshs

Well Francisco Varela was trained in Neuroscience and Eleanor Rosch is a psychologist. You can't get much more pedigree in enactivism than those two.

do you consider Lisa Barrett to be more of a ‘real’ cognitive scientist than Gallagher? — Joshs

Yes. I mean I can't believe there's any debate about this. Lisa Feldman-Barrett is a professor of psychology. Gallagher is a professor of philosophy. That means that Professor Feldman-Barrett has demonstrated that she's familiar with all the background research in psychology and can conduct research of her own in the field of a standard suitable to obtain a doctorate. Professor Gallagher has made no such demonstration. How is this remotely controversial?

Yes. I mean I can't believe there's any debate about this. Lisa Feldman-Barrett is a professor of psychology. Gallagher is a professor of philosophy. That means that Professor Feldman-Barrett has demonstrated that she's familiar with all the background research in psychology and can conduct research of her own in the field of a standard suitable to obtain a doctorate. Professor Gallagher has made no such demonstration. How is this remotely controversial? — Isaac

You have to be kidding me. You’re right about one thing, there should be no debate here. My undergraduate degree is in biopsychology. My graduate degree
degree is in experimental psychology. Well before I read any works on philosophy, I familiarized myself
with much background research in psychology. Almost all of it is the ‘normal science’ type stuff which attempts to discover new variations within a framework which is itself accepted implicitly and unquestioningly.

Shaun Gallagher is one of a rare few thinkers existing in a given era who moves effortlessly and expertly among schools of thought, synthesizing their conclusions. I have found very few writing today , especially outside of Europe, who have delved in scholarly fashion into philosophical hermeneutics , phenomenology , poststructuralism, pragmatism, integrated their contributions, and applied them to a renewed understanding of the psychological sciences. I can assure your that in any conversation concerning the intellectual foundations of cognitive science Gallagher would run circles around Barrett, who does a competent job of contributing to and summarizing the results obtained from within the PP framework but has nowhere near Gallagher’s breadth of understanding. Let me make it clear. To write and think at the level that Gallagher does on these issues requires much much more than your cliched impression of what a philosopher does ( sitting in an armchair having a bit of reckon). I’m not simply arguing that Gallagher can babble philosophy better than Barrett can. I am claiming that the elements of training in your field that you consider most essential to making valid scientific discovery are directly in the crosshairs of Gallagher’s research, and the proof of it is that you don’t even understand the presuppositions of your field , or of the recent history of science, well enough to realize it.

Barrett articulates and adds to the contributions of pp to modeling such concepts as emotion, motivation and perception. Gallagher articulates and adds to the contributions of a radically embodied enactivism that questions her conclusions and methodology. You don’t recognize his methods as properly scientific. In your mind they cannot securely add to objective empirical knowledge or effectively critique her results, so you privilege a moderately talented scientist like Barrett over a more original thinker
like Gallagher because she is a proper scientist and he is not. For you there is a clear separation between science and philosophy in this regard. At the heart of your assumption is your embrace of realism. If realism
is successfully critiqued, then the science-philosophy-art boundaries fall.

It is your belief in realism that makes it utterly inconceivable to you that someone sitting in a armchair could invalidate the results of properly replicated empirical knowledge.

Btw, Gallagher is far and away not my favorite philosopher. If you were to ask me , for instance , who offers the most advance and insightful understanding of the nature of emotion, I would say that Heidegger’s account of affect towers over Barrett’s. But that can’t be, right? He’s an armchair reckoner and she’s a bonified scientist. How could an armchair reckoner’s fantasies cause a hard-nosed scientist to have to go back to the drawing board?

Turns out I prefer the copy paste.

Your view on Gallagher and Feldman-Barrett's relative merits is noted. Not sure what to do with it... but noted anyway.

↪Joshs

Turns out I prefer the copy paste.

Your view on Gallagher and Feldman-Barrett's relative merits is noted. Not sure what to do with it... but noted anyway. — Isaac

Let’s get back to the larger topic of realism and cognitive science. I want to shift tone here; I think a bit of nuance is in order. Anthony Chemero wrote a book titled Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Although he is also a philosopher, you may be more impressed with his credentials as a researcher than you were with Gallagher. At any rate , he asks the question as to whether a radical embodied cognitive science necessarily requires an abandonment of realism. After discussing some
of the many varieties of realism he concludes that, no, one does not have to follow Varela and some others in insisting on this. Chemero thinks that Ian Hacking’s
brand of realism is a more than adequate fit for enactivist embodied cognition.

So I should amend my original claim to read that , to the extent that we can consider enactivism as a definable
category, identifying with its premises no more requires a rejection of all forms of realism than does the embrace of quantum physics. We can, however, locate a subgroup within the larger enactivist community that considers rejection of realism as a requirement for membership in their club.

Perhaps we can agree that in general theoretical empirical orientations do impact on metaphysical
positions. While quantum physics doesn’t necessarily threaten realism as a whole , it does seem to be incompatible with naive (direct) realism.

My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language.
— Janus

Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words? — Mww

Roughly: Complex thoughts consist of correlations including words by a creature so capable. Simple thoughts would be correlations drawn or being drawn between things not including words.

Thinking that a mouse ran behind a tree requires no language. Thinking that "a mouse ran behind a tree" is true does.

The only notable difference seems to be that you divorce the biological machinery from the experience of seeing red when you claim that the machinery "mediates" the experience. The summary you just agreed with does not. Rather, it talks about it as a necessary component thereof; the machinery is a part of the experience, not a mediator thereof.

Mouse running behind a tree....wordless image....united schematicized conceptions......simple thought.

“Mouse running behind a tree”....construction of a proposition.....united schematized conceptions.....discursive judgement....complex thought.

Gold star????

What the heck is meant by realism here?

HA!!!! It’s only 51 pages. You haven’t found a definition in there anywhere? What ever happened to due diligence, huh???

Kidding.

:rofl:

Waaaay too much man reading man, that I leave for books or exchanges with people here, a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;)

Best guess: pick somebody, ask ‘em. “Meant by” is always a subjective judgement, so.....be ready.

Waaaay too much man reading man, that I leave for books or exchanges with people here, a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;) — Manuel

Most definitely the wise move. This thread should be renamed "sophistry in action".

a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;) — Manuel

I think the main problem is that different philosophical schools have incompatible definitions, and there has been an attempt here to somehow reconcile those definitions with little success.

Yes. This happens a lot, but then the individual arguing for or against this position should merely state what they mean by the debated term.

If it's not defined, confusions will arise much more frequently.

Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words? — Mww

As an initial attempt I would say that simple thoughts involve images of concrete objects and actions, whereas complex thoughts involve logical relations between generalized abstract notions such as "logical", "involve", "thought", "relations", "between","generalized", "abstract" and ideas like "being", "time", "space", "number".