Not necessarily; it depends on whether the observational evidence is relevant to the metaphysical perspective in question and it is never the bare observation that is relevant in any case, but some interpretation of it, which rather begs the question. — Janus
It seems to me that any science relies on there being some inter-subjectively determinable reality to warrant the veracity of its observations. I have no argument against the free-flowing associations and insights of postmodern thought; they may indeed be illuminating and open new avenues for contemplation and research, but they can never command the kind of inter-subjective corroborability that science or everyday empirical observation can, as far as I can see — Janus
Niches are constantly changing and being rebuilt , and as a result what is at stake and at issue in a scientific practice changes along with it. — Joshs
You missed the point of the ontological consideration
— creativesoul
Could you perhaps repeat it for me? — Isaac
...to understand how to make sense of a scientific conception of nature as itself part of nature...
↪Joshs
mistakes a copy-and-paste for an argument. — Banno
Seeing the wavelengths we've named "red" is a meaningful experience that consists, in part, of those wavelengths. They are being emitted/reflected by something other than our own biological structures. Thus, the meaningful experience of seeing red leaves requires leaves that reflect/emit those wavelengths. Leaves are external to the individual host of biological machinery. As is the light being emitted/reflected from the leaves. The experience also consists of things that are internal, such as the biological machinery itself. So, the leaves and light are external, and the biological machinery is internal. It takes both(and more) to have a meaningful experience of seeing red. If we remove either, what's left doesn't have what it takes to produce a meaningful experience of seeing red. This tells us that both are necessary elements of the experience. The experience consists of all the necessary elements. If some of it is internal and some is external, then the experience can rightly be called neither, for it is not the sort of thing that has such spatiotemporal location. — creativesoul
I thought all along that our views dovetailed nicely. — creativesoul
If you think that what is apparent to us constitutes evidence either way, then it is the case that the vast bulk of observational evidence suggests the existence of a mind-independent world. — Janus
If what is apparent to us does not constitute evidence one way or the other regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, then QM like the rest of science and empirical observation and investigation, is neither here not there in that connection. You can't have it both ways. — Janus
Could you think all the thoughts (or any) in the CPR without language, for example? — Janus
My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language. — Janus
But they are contributions from philosophy to cognitive science, they are not discoveries of cognitive science, those are made by cognitive scientists. I had a paper once published in a Political Science journal. I'm not a political scientist. It was, in that case, a contribution from my work in Psychology, to the political scientists, it was not research in political science. — Isaac
Arent you defining ‘cognitive science’ in conveniently narrow terms such that it preemptively shuts out precisely the kinds of challenges to its methods and assumptions that non-realist enactivists like Gallagher are presenting? — Joshs
So why don’t you help me out here. I’m sure you can provide a name or two from
within the enactivist research community. Then we can see what, if anything, they say about realism, pro or con. — Joshs
do you consider Lisa Barrett to be more of a ‘real’ cognitive scientist than Gallagher? — Joshs
Yes. I mean I can't believe there's any debate about this. Lisa Feldman-Barrett is a professor of psychology. Gallagher is a professor of philosophy. That means that Professor Feldman-Barrett has demonstrated that she's familiar with all the background research in psychology and can conduct research of her own in the field of a standard suitable to obtain a doctorate. Professor Gallagher has made no such demonstration. How is this remotely controversial? — Isaac
↪Joshs
Turns out I prefer the copy paste.
Your view on Gallagher and Feldman-Barrett's relative merits is noted. Not sure what to do with it... but noted anyway. — Isaac
My point is only that complex thought is impossible without language.
— Janus
Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words? — Mww
Waaaay too much man reading man, that I leave for books or exchanges with people here, a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;) — Manuel
a simple definition shouldn't be hard to give. ;) — Manuel
Ok, maybe. What is a complex thought, such that that kind of thought is impossible without words, but carries the implication that simple thoughts are possible without words? — Mww
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