And what does it mean to "see something differently"? — Michael
It means to classify the same thing differently. — bongo fury
It means that we experience different sense-data. — Michael
I experience white and gold, you experience black and blue. — Michael
We have different sense-data, and this sense-data is the immediate object of perception. — Michael
That’s right. We experience light, air, glasses, apples, heat, gravity, pressure, the tree, the leaves and so on. We directly perceive the environment. There is no mediating factor between the environment you experience, and you the experiencer. I’ve said this a few times now. — NOS4A2
Deflecting by saying that we directly experience the light doesn't say anything about whether or not we directly see the apple. — Michael
One could instead argue that we directly see the environment, of which the apple is part of, and environments have lighting conditions. It's a mistake to just focus on the apple, as if it had independent existence from everything else. Of course there has to be physical relation between the object and the perceiver. — Marchesk
how can we experience a tree? — Art48
Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. — Michael
modern science has shown to be wrong. — Michael
If we were bats we might well describe walls as having a pitch. — Isaac
That we might say this isn't that, as a mind-independent fact, walls have a pitch. — Michael
I think you're conflating our model of the external world with the external world. — Michael
I have no direct access to the external world to conflate it with anything. I can't talk about it, can't even mention it without all I'm saying actually deriving only from a model of it. — Isaac
You can't say the only access we have to the real world is our models, and then go about apparently comparing our models to the real world and finding them to differ. We have no non-modelled access to the external world, so how is it featuring in your comparison? — Isaac
Are you just saying that we think of the external cause of one's perception as being a red apple? — Michael
assuming scientific realism the Standard Model does. — Michael
It's literally called a model. — Isaac
I'm saying that the term 'red apple' refers to the hidden state we model as a red apple. — Isaac
assuming scientific realism, the nature of the external world "matches" the model. — Michael
Which means what, exactly? That the hidden state resembles our model of a red apple, such that it is as a red apple appears to us? — Michael
But you just said above "I can't talk about [the external cause], can't even mention it."
So which is it? — Michael
I don't see why resembles even enters into reference. If I say "Jack, come over here!" when the man's name is John, I'm still referencing the man, I just got his name wrong. If I say "bring me that green cup", pointing to a red cup, I'm still referencing the cup, I just got its colour wrong.
We don't have to be right about something's properties in order to reference it. — Isaac
It attempts to explain observable phenomena, but it would be wrong to say that its terms – "strings", "branes", "the ninth spatial dimension" – refer to whatever "hidden states" explain observable phenomena. — Michael
If these hidden states don't "match" the models then these hidden states aren't strings, branes, or the ninth spatial dimension – they're something else. — Michael
Ordinary perception doesn't provide us access to the external world (outside our models), but assuming scientific realism the Standard Model does. — Michael
if these hidden states aren't strings, branes, or the ninth spatial dimension then it isn't that "strings", "branes", and "the ninth spatial dimension" are non-referring terms, it's that they refer only to the models. — Michael
If the hidden states don't "match" our model (or sense-data) of the colour red then they are not the colour red, they're something else, and colour terms like "red" refer only to the model (or sense-data). — Michael
You're not addressing the question. According to your account we don't directly see apples because air, light, and glasses are a mediating factor between the apple and you. Deflecting by saying that we directly experience the light doesn't say anything about whether or not we directly see the apple.
Do you think we directly perceive the light but indirectly perceive apples? — NOS4A2
But that's the thing - how did scientists show it to be wrong if they can only indirectly experience the environment? If you can show something to be wrong regardless of whether or not you have direct or indirect access, then what is the problem? It seems to me that you must directly experience something and by that direct experience you logically work your way back to the original cause which is an object reflecting light. What is missing with indirect access because either way you have access to accurate information? And if you can show what you're missing with indirect access when you only have indirect access, then again you are still able to show what is the case without anything missing.Another question: is there a fundamental difference between sight and echolocation? Obviously sight involves light and a visual experience whereas echolocation involves sound and an auditory experience, but in both cases it is just a case of some "foreign" force (light or sound) interacting with and being changed by some other object (a wall) and then this affected force stimulating some organism's sense receptors and producing the associated experience.
Does echolocation involve the "direct" perception of a wall? Are the features of the auditory experience mind-independent features of the wall? Presumably echolocation involves the experience of such things as pitch and tone and pace? Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. So why would sight be any different?
As I said in the other thread, I think people are just bewitched by the complexity of visual experiences. It confuses them into adopting the naive view of perception which modern science has shown to be wrong. — Michael
The distinction between direct vs. direct realism is non-sensical when you include the experience as part of the world your experiencing, and understand that effects carry information about their causes. — Harry Hindu
Do you not have direct access to your experience and isn't your experience part of the world as much as what your experience is of? — Harry Hindu
Then both direct and indirect realism are the case?We're directly aware of the effects and through that indirectly aware of their cause. — Michael
The part of the world that is the table is not the part of the world that is the apple. When the apple sits on top of the table, is it directly or indirectly accessing the table?Yes. But it doesn't follow from this that I am directly aware of the cause of my experience. The part of the world that is my experience isn't the part of the world that is the apple. I'm directly aware of the former, and through that indirectly aware of the latter. — Michael
"Common Kind Claim: veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences (as) of an F are fundamentally the same; they form a common kind.No, I think something like the Sense-Datum Theory of perception is correct. — Michael
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.