How to parse it? — Banno
Is "aRb" being used or mentioned (in your sentence)? — bongo fury
So you want to put into words how a relation pictures the world. — Banno
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things wil express the sense of the proposition.
3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’
That does not appear to be about what you asked.3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another. A propositional sign is a fact.
You asked how a relation pictures the world, — Banno
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno
To which I replied.How are we to parse,
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world,
— Banno — bongo fury
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, it is not a part of the world in the way RussellA is asking... — Banno
The purpose here is to move beyond seeing the Tractatus in terms of idealism and empiricism. The world is all that is the case. The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. Thinking of the world as either mind-dependent or mind-independent will not allow one to see that the picture shows the world.
As far as I can see, 3.14 and what follows concerns the structure of propositions rather than how they might picture the world. — Banno
I don't see why that is so painful to address. — bongo fury
An external relation is a relation between two items that can be conceived independently of one another; an external relation is in its nature a matter of discovery or hypothesis. Thus, the idea that the relation of depicting that holds between language and the world depends upon a linguistic sign's standing in an external relation to something that can be conceived as independent of language, or to something that is not essentially linked with language, must, Wittgenstein claims, be recognized as an illusion. The relation between language and the world that it depicts is not a hypothetical relation between items that we grasp independently of one another. Rather, the relation between language and the world, between a propositional sign and the state of affairs that it represents, is essential or internal; it is a relation that is constituted by the rules of projection in virtue of which we use language - i.e. a propositional sign - to say how things are in reality. Thus, although we see the items as separate - the propositional sign, 'p', is distinct from the fact that p - we also recognize them as internally linked, insofar as we use the propositional sign, 'p', to represent the fact that p is the case. Thus, a propositional sign can be used to represent a fact, and any fact can be represented by means of a propositional sign. The relation between the propositional sign and the fact that it can be used to represent does not depend upon a correlation between two items, but upon a rule that enables us to construct one from the other. We come to see the relation between language and the world it represents more clearly, not by discovering something, but by clarifying the rules of projection in virtue of which we use propositional signs to say how things are in reality.
Thus, Wittgenstein's claim is that the relation of depicting that holds between language and the world does not depend upon a hypothetical link between linguistic signs and something outside language, which is in its nature a matter of discovery. Rather, it depends upon the existence of a rule of projection whereby we can derive one thing (a representation of a possible state of affairs) from another (a propositional sign). The internal relation of depicting which holds between language and the world, consists in the fact that to understand a proposition is to know how things stand in reality if the proposition is true. The rule of projection that constitutes the internal relation between language and the world it depicts is the rule whereby we determine, on the basis of the constituents of a propositional sign and how they are put together, the situation that it represents, that is to say, the circumstances in which the proposition it expresses is true and the circumstances in which it is false. It is in virtue of this rule of projection that a propositional sign expresses a proposition that represents a possible state of affairs; it is in virtue of this rule of projection that we can derive knowledge of what is the case from knowledge that a given proposition is true. The logical investigation of how a proposition expresses its sense is the investigation of the internal relation between a proposition and the situation that it represents, that is, of the rules of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign can be compared with reality for truth or falsity. There must, Wittgenstein believes, be no attempt to explain how language's ability to represent the world came about; the internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world is the starting point for our investigation. The aim of the investigation is to make the internal relation - i.e. the rules of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign represents a possible state of affairs - perspicuous. — Marie McGinn. Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Language and Logic
Why are you raising the issue of Bradley and external relations?...I don't see how C can be independent (external) of A or B when it is the relation between A and B; what relates A to B. — Luke
The right way to think of a relation is that "a stands to b in a certain relation"...I don't see Wittgenstein as arguing for external relations. — Luke
You're assuming that there is something called C — RussellA
Either way, C cannot ontologically exist, and if doesn't, cannot be "what relates A to B". — RussellA
In modern usage, an internal relation is not an ontological addition — RussellA
aRb leads into an infinite regress
Russell in his introduction gives an example of aRb: "If we say “Plato loves Socrates”, the word “loves” which occurs between the word “Plato” and the word “Socrates” establishes a certain relation between these two words, and it is owing to this fact that our sentence is able to assert a relation between the persons named by the words “Plato” and “Socrates”.
Wittgenstein introduces First Order Logic in an explanation of aRb
4.1252 Similarly the series of propositions aRb (∃x): aRx. xRb
In the case of Plato and Socrates there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates, where x is "love". X is an individual, is independent of either Plato or Socrates and is an external relation
We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. Again we have the situation of a relation relating, which as Bradley pointed out, leads to an infinite regress — RussellA
No. It's more like, I'm accusing you of being intellectually dishonest due to your inconsistency and hypocrisy. Contradictions and hypocrisy do not allow an understanding of your interpretation. You're right. I don't understand an interpretation that is contradictory.You accuse me of being intellectually dishonest and yet expect me to help you understand what you clearly do not. — Fooloso4
I gave an example of what I was saying in using you interpreting Witt's writings requires that Witt wrote something down. If it is necessary that Witt write something down for you to later interpret it then this example is a problem for your interpretation. You seem to be focused on future events that you have no knowledge of (hence my point that you are talking about your ignorance of what is necessary), while I am pointing out that present events (you interpreting Witt's writings) are necessarily dependent on prior events (Witt writing something). So if I have shown that present events are necessarily dependent on specific causes (prior events), then why would it be a different relation between present events and future events?Here is what you said, emphasis added:
The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.
— Harry Hindu
I am not going to point out the ways in which this differs from what you say now. — Fooloso4
Intellectual dishonesty. I provided an answer to why I think they do but you ignored it just like you ignored my question and didn't answer it. If you are unable to answer my question and you are not satisfied with mine, then where does that leave us? To think that you hold the higher ground in this instance when you weren't even able to attempt to answer my question just shows that you are unwilling to be intellectually honest.I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered.
— Harry Hindu
And in return I asked you why you think they do. — Fooloso4
Only as a result of other necessary conditions, which you seem to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently.Let me ask you a few related questions:
Do you think that things could have turned out differently? — Fooloso4
Yes. Prior conditions determine subsequent events which you seemed to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently than was predicted.Is there some necessity that things can only turn out as they do? — Fooloso4
No, which you seemed to agree with because you never were able to point out an outcome that didn't have a necessary cause. All you did was point out that there could be other outcomes but ignored the fact that for there to be other outcomes there would need to be other necessary causes.Can the same conditions support different outcomes? — Fooloso4
"Showing" is something that happens in live language use, which is what he's focusing on in the Tractacus — Tate
We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. — RussellA
.As aRb requires a relation, aRb is not a fact, but is part of the picture. — RussellA
However, these relations cannot be shown in a picture using aRb — RussellA
3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.Facts and states of affairs are much the same. Relations, not so much. Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12) — Banno
Probably. But then is he saying we think in scribbles and sounds? How is that any different than a language-less entity that thinks in colors, shapes, and sounds? A scribble is a colored shape.Have a look a 3.1 and thereafter. What you call a "scribble" may be what Wittgenstein calls a "propositional sign". — Banno
Because some of the marks on the screen refer to me and the marks I remember having made earlier.Harry, despite this sentence being marks on a screen, you are aware that it is addressed to you. How is that? — Banno
Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. — RussellA
If you apply this to the word, "word", then it makes the whole argument nonsensical."Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. Look up the meaning of those words. You get more words. Since the dictionary is finite, and since word is defined in terms of other words, the definitions must be circular". — RussellA
Words are used for communicating what is the case to someone that lacks the knowledge of what is the case — Harry Hindu
Contradictions and hypocrisy do not allow an understanding of your interpretation. — Harry Hindu
If it is necessary that Witt write something down for you to later interpret it then this example is a problem for your interpretation. — Harry Hindu
Possibilities stem from our ignorance of the conditions between now and a particular future event. — Harry Hindu
Which is the same as saying that something must be written (cause) for that writing to be commented on (effect). What reason do you have to think that something must be written for it to be commented on? Logical necessity is a type of causal necessity. Certain premises necessarily cause a certain conclusion to be true or false.It is tautological that something must be written in order for that writing to be commented on. That is an example of logical necessity. — Fooloso4
But you did comment and Witt writing something is ONE of the many causes that led to your commenting. You had to be born, read Witt and become enamored by his writings, create an account on this forum, and intend to comment on it. If none of this happened, would we see your comments on this screen? Wouldn't all of those be necessary for us to see your comments on this screen? If we don't see comments of yours on this screen, then we assume that there was another necessary cause as to why we don't see any more comments of yours on the screen. Either you got bored with the conversation, real-life happened, etc.There is no necessity that I would comment. Since it is not by necessity, and the only necessity he recognizes is logical necessity, that I interpret his work is Zufall, "a sort of accident" (2.0121). The German term also means 'chance'. Now if you believe that nothing happens by chance then we have a fundamental disagreement. — Fooloso4
Now, if what you're saying were the case, then comments of yours would just appear on this screen even though you were never born.2. an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4
As I pointed out, the issue only applies to future events. We don't have this problem in laying out prior causes for present events. As you pointed out, it is logically (causally) necessary that Witt write something for you to comment on it. Why is that? Why are we ignorant of the future effects of present causes but not so with present effects of prior causes?If you accept Laplace's demon then it is only by ignorance that we cannot determine a future that is determinate. This, however, is an assumption not an established fact. — Fooloso4
But as we have shown different necessary conditions underlie both A and B. Witt writing something is a necessary condition, as well as all of the other conditions are necessary, for you to comment on it (A). Different necessary conditions would lead to B - you not commenting. Even though Witt wrote something, saying that doesn't necessarily mean you will comment on what he wrote is being disingenuous to the fact that there would be necessary conditions for you not doing so, such as you never being born.If the necessary conditions underlie both A and B, then A is no more or less the necessary outcome than B. It is necessary that I know how to read and write and have a device I can use to respond to you on TPF, but whether or not I do respond and what I will say if I do respond is not determined by necessity. — Fooloso4
What is the nexus of logical necessity? What makes it hidden when it comes to causal necessity, but obvious when it comes to logical necessity?You obviously do not agree and assume some hidden causal nexus that can only lead to a single outcome that is already determined by conditions that extend back to some state of initial conditions of the universe. — Fooloso4
Which is the same as saying that something must be written (cause) for that writing to be commented on (effect). — Harry Hindu
Logical necessity is a type of causal necessity. Certain premises necessarily cause a certain conclusion to be true or false. — Harry Hindu
But you did comment and Witt writing something is ONE of the many causes that led to your commenting. — Harry Hindu
Now, if what you're saying were the case, then comments of yours would just appear on this screen even though you were never born. — Harry Hindu
We don't have this problem in laying out prior causes for present events. — Harry Hindu
As you pointed out, it is logically (causally) necessary that Witt write something for you to comment on it. — Harry Hindu
Why are we ignorant of the future effects of present causes but not so with present effects of prior causes? — Harry Hindu
What is the nexus of logical necessity? — Harry Hindu
If I had been mentioning "aRb" I would have put it in quotes. I am surprised that was not apparent from the context. — Banno
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world... — Banno
Insofar as some relation aRb, which is itself the fact pictured by the proposition "aRb", is true in virtue of itself picturing a fact in the world... — Banno
Insofar as some true proposition "aRb" (and/or some spatial relation within its sign) pictures a fact, — bongo fury
3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"? — Harry Hindu
So you remain stuck at "meaning is reference".Because some of the marks on the screen refer to me and the marks I remember having made earlier. — Harry Hindu
You're assuming that there is something called C
That's the question. Is there a something C that relates A to B. What is C ?
Either C is grounded in its relata or it isn't.
If C is grounded in its relata, then C doesn't exist because it is just a property.
If C isn't grounded in its relata, then it is independent of its relata, and is an individual. Bradley presents this as a problem, in that somehow the relation C needs to be related to its relata. This leads to the problem of infinite regress, meaning that C cannot exist.
Either way, C cannot ontologically exist, and if doesn't, cannot be "what relates A to B". — RussellA
We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. Again we have the situation of a relation relating, which as Bradley pointed out, leads to an infinite regress — RussellA
aRb does not require a relation, it is a proposition that points to a relation between a and b. aRb is a fact that is pictured in the proposition. — Fooloso4
The apple (a) is on (R) the table (b). The relation between the apple and the table is that one is on they other. You can say it. You can show it. — Fooloso4
RussellA's picture is perhaps a form of Platonism — Banno
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