How to parse it? — Banno

Semantically. Make sense of it. For example,

Is "aRb" being used or mentioned (in your sentence)? — bongo fury

So you want to put into words how a relation pictures the world.

But whereof one cannot speak...

It's not something to be addressed semantically. It's something shown, something one does. Explaining this is what led to Philosophical investigations...

But you know this. So it seems I've missed your point.

So you want to put into words how a relation pictures the world. — Banno

No, W does that perfectly well.

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things wil express the sense of the proposition.

3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’

Using quote marks in the usual way to clarify between use and mention.

You asked how a relation pictures the world, then presented quotes in support of:

3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another. A propositional sign is a fact.

That does not appear to be about what you asked.

Since 3.144 is supporting what I said, I'm nonplussed.

You asked how a relation pictures the world, — Banno

No, I asked what you meant by

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno

and offered a reasonable paraphrase consistent with the text in question, where the author / translators / editors used quote marks in the usual way to clarify between use and mention. (Crucial in the context.)

You asked

How are we to parse,

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world,
— Banno — bongo fury

To which I replied.

As far as I can see, 3.14 and what follows concerns the structure of propositions rather than how they might picture the world.

I remain nonplussed. Your example does not relate to the question you asked of me.

SO perhaps we can go back to the context of what I have sad:

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, it is not a part of the world in the way RussellA is asking... — Banno

Imedaitly before that, in response to RussellA I made the point

The purpose here is to move beyond seeing the Tractatus in terms of idealism and empiricism. The world is all that is the case. The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. Thinking of the world as either mind-dependent or mind-independent will not allow one to see that the picture shows the world.

Can you clarify, in this context, what you are asking?

As far as I can see, 3.14 and what follows concerns the structure of propositions rather than how they might picture the world. — Banno

What I quoted clearly concerns both, but I'm grateful for reassurance that you appreciate the difference between the two. Notice how W puts quote marks around the a-R-b string when referring to (mentioning) the proposition and/or its associated sign, and deliberately leaves it unadorned when using it (the string) as a proposition to refer to (show, if only hypothetically and generally) the relation itself, i.e. the fact.

I don't see why that is so painful to address.

I need it clarified to see if you are saying something of interest to me (and @RussellA?) about the showing. Yes, W does seem passionate about it, in a way that raises the question whether he would approve of glossing it simply as an "isomorphism". Does he have (perhaps nascent) nominalist scruples about granting the existence of relations as such?

But there doesn't seem much point in such a discussion if you can't bear to clarify between use and mention, using the usual convention of quote marks. Why is that so difficult? (Always.)

I don't see why that is so painful to address. — bongo fury

What is painful is the lack of clarity as to the topic of this conversation. It's not the distinction between use and mention that is obscure, so much as what you wish to do with it.

If I had been mentioning "aRb" I would have put it in quotes. I am surprised that was not apparent from the context.

, perhaps if you gave your own reply to , your point might become apparent.

For Wittgenstein, is there a mind-independent world ? — RussellA

~~

An external relation is a relation between two items that can be conceived independently of one another; an external relation is in its nature a matter of discovery or hypothesis. Thus, the idea that the relation of depicting that holds between language and the world depends upon a linguistic sign's standing in an external relation to something that can be conceived as independent of language, or to something that is not essentially linked with language, must, Wittgenstein claims, be recognized as an illusion. The relation between language and the world that it depicts is not a hypothetical relation between items that we grasp independently of one another. Rather, the relation between language and the world, between a propositional sign and the state of affairs that it represents, is essential or internal; it is a relation that is constituted by the rules of projection in virtue of which we use language - i.e. a propositional sign - to say how things are in reality. Thus, although we see the items as separate - the propositional sign, 'p', is distinct from the fact that p - we also recognize them as internally linked, insofar as we use the propositional sign, 'p', to represent the fact that p is the case. Thus, a propositional sign can be used to represent a fact, and any fact can be represented by means of a propositional sign. The relation between the propositional sign and the fact that it can be used to represent does not depend upon a correlation between two items, but upon a rule that enables us to construct one from the other. We come to see the relation between language and the world it represents more clearly, not by discovering something, but by clarifying the rules of projection in virtue of which we use propositional signs to say how things are in reality.

Thus, Wittgenstein's claim is that the relation of depicting that holds between language and the world does not depend upon a hypothetical link between linguistic signs and something outside language, which is in its nature a matter of discovery. Rather, it depends upon the existence of a rule of projection whereby we can derive one thing (a representation of a possible state of affairs) from another (a propositional sign). The internal relation of depicting which holds between language and the world, consists in the fact that to understand a proposition is to know how things stand in reality if the proposition is true. The rule of projection that constitutes the internal relation between language and the world it depicts is the rule whereby we determine, on the basis of the constituents of a propositional sign and how they are put together, the situation that it represents, that is to say, the circumstances in which the proposition it expresses is true and the circumstances in which it is false. It is in virtue of this rule of projection that a propositional sign expresses a proposition that represents a possible state of affairs; it is in virtue of this rule of projection that we can derive knowledge of what is the case from knowledge that a given proposition is true. The logical investigation of how a proposition expresses its sense is the investigation of the internal relation between a proposition and the situation that it represents, that is, of the rules of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign can be compared with reality for truth or falsity. There must, Wittgenstein believes, be no attempt to explain how language's ability to represent the world came about; the internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world is the starting point for our investigation. The aim of the investigation is to make the internal relation - i.e. the rules of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign represents a possible state of affairs - perspicuous. — Marie McGinn. Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy of Language and Logic

Why are you raising the issue of Bradley and external relations?...I don't see how C can be independent (external) of A or B when it is the relation between A and B; what relates A to B. — Luke

You're assuming that there is something called C

That's the question. Is there a something C that relates A to B. What is C ?

Either C is grounded in its relata or it isn't.

If C is grounded in its relata, then C doesn't exist because it is just a property.

If C isn't grounded in its relata, then it is independent of its relata, and is an individual. Bradley presents this as a problem, in that somehow the relation C needs to be related to its relata. This leads to the problem of infinite regress, meaning that C cannot exist.

Either way, C cannot ontologically exist, and if doesn't, cannot be "what relates A to B".

The right way to think of a relation is that "a stands to b in a certain relation"...I don't see Wittgenstein as arguing for external relations. — Luke

Relations may be the weak point in Wittgenstein's theory of showing

aRb leads into an infinite regress
Russell in his introduction gives an example of aRb: "If we say “Plato loves Socrates”, the word “loves” which occurs between the word “Plato” and the word “Socrates” establishes a certain relation between these two words, and it is owing to this fact that our sentence is able to assert a relation between the persons named by the words “Plato” and “Socrates”.

Wittgenstein introduces First Order Logic in an explanation of aRb
4.1252 Similarly the series of propositions aRb (∃x): aRx. xRb
In the case of Plato and Socrates there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates, where x is "love". X is an individual, is independent of either Plato or Socrates and is an external relation

We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. Again we have the situation of a relation relating, which as Bradley pointed out, leads to an infinite regress

3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought
4.121 The propositions show the logical form of reality
4.461 "Propositions show what they say"
As I understand it, the picture is of the world but distinct from the world, the world consists of facts and a thought is a logical picture of the facts. It follows that the thought is the proposition, the logical picture is the propositional sign and the propositional sign has the form aRb.
3.1431 The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.

As aRb requires a relation, aRb is not a fact, but is part of the picture. However, if a was related to b, such that aRb, this would lead to an infinite regress. Therefore, a cannot be related to b. Therefore, propositions cannot show the logical form of reality.

Showing is a problem of inference
But we know that in our thoughts, we do relate object a to b, in that we do perceive an apple on a table. We do have thoughts of relations between objects. However, these relations cannot be shown in a picture using aRb, in that if there was relation between a and b, an infinite regress would follow, Therefore our thought that a is related to b cannot be by showing, but by another mechanism.

Showing is a problem of inference, in that what a picture shows depends on who is doing the observing. I can look at a picture and see a duck, whereas my neighbour may see a rabbit. The problem of inference can be illustrated by the chess game between a Tortoise and Achilles, where Achilles tells the Tortoise that if the Tortoise wins the next game, then Achilles will pay for the Tortoise to go on a holiday in the Seychelles. The Tortoise is obviously and wisely dubious about inferring anything from such a hypothetical offer.


How is the relationship between language and reality to be understood
If showing is inadequate in enabling us to understand the relationship between language and reality because of the problem with inference, then where is the solution.

As an aside, my belief is that the solution may be found in a triumvirate combining Wittgenstein's Tractatus which establishes the gaining of knowledge by acquaintance, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations which establishes the gaining of belief by description and Kant's a priori intuition which ties both of these together.

You're assuming that there is something called C — RussellA

I was actually just following your usage.

Either way, C cannot ontologically exist, and if doesn't, cannot be "what relates A to B". — RussellA

This is a false dilemma. C does not need to ontologically exist in order to relate A to B. Take an internal relation, for example.

In modern usage, an internal relation is not an ontological addition — RussellA

aRb leads into an infinite regress
Russell in his introduction gives an example of aRb: "If we say “Plato loves Socrates”, the word “loves” which occurs between the word “Plato” and the word “Socrates” establishes a certain relation between these two words, and it is owing to this fact that our sentence is able to assert a relation between the persons named by the words “Plato” and “Socrates”.

Wittgenstein introduces First Order Logic in an explanation of aRb
4.1252 Similarly the series of propositions aRb (∃x): aRx. xRb
In the case of Plato and Socrates there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates, where x is "love". X is an individual, is independent of either Plato or Socrates and is an external relation

We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. Again we have the situation of a relation relating, which as Bradley pointed out, leads to an infinite regress — RussellA

This is raised an an objection to Russell's 'aquaintance' theory of meaning. It's not considered to be a problem for Wittgenstein because he emphasized context-based understanding of propositions. In other words, Wittgenstein won't allow you to understand P just by breaking it down into partial references. You're going to have to be involved in the conversation. "Showing" is something that happens in live language use, which is what he's focusing on in the Tractacus (according to the references I'm reading.)

You accuse me of being intellectually dishonest and yet expect me to help you understand what you clearly do not. — Fooloso4

No. It's more like, I'm accusing you of being intellectually dishonest due to your inconsistency and hypocrisy. Contradictions and hypocrisy do not allow an understanding of your interpretation. You're right. I don't understand an interpretation that is contradictory.

Here is what you said, emphasis added:

The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.
— Harry Hindu


I am not going to point out the ways in which this differs from what you say now. — Fooloso4

I gave an example of what I was saying in using you interpreting Witt's writings requires that Witt wrote something down. If it is necessary that Witt write something down for you to later interpret it then this example is a problem for your interpretation. You seem to be focused on future events that you have no knowledge of (hence my point that you are talking about your ignorance of what is necessary), while I am pointing out that present events (you interpreting Witt's writings) are necessarily dependent on prior events (Witt writing something). So if I have shown that present events are necessarily dependent on specific causes (prior events), then why would it be a different relation between present events and future events?

All you have been able to do is show that there are many possible future events based on current conditions, but you're talking about your ignorance, not what is necessary. Possibilities stem from our ignorance of the conditions between now and a particular future event. You are simply pointing out that we are ignorant of other necessary factors that would lead to a different future event than what we predicted. All you did was point out necessary causes for alternate futures, thereby undermining your own argument.

I have even asked you twice (now is my third) what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do, and you haven't answered.
— Harry Hindu

And in return I asked you why you think they do. — Fooloso4

Intellectual dishonesty. I provided an answer to why I think they do but you ignored it just like you ignored my question and didn't answer it. If you are unable to answer my question and you are not satisfied with mine, then where does that leave us? To think that you hold the higher ground in this instance when you weren't even able to attempt to answer my question just shows that you are unwilling to be intellectually honest.

Let me ask you a few related questions:

Do you think that things could have turned out differently? — Fooloso4

Only as a result of other necessary conditions, which you seem to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently.

Is there some necessity that things can only turn out as they do? — Fooloso4

Yes. Prior conditions determine subsequent events which you seemed to agree with because you pointed out other necessary conditions for it to turn out differently than was predicted.

Can the same conditions support different outcomes? — Fooloso4

No, which you seemed to agree with because you never were able to point out an outcome that didn't have a necessary cause. All you did was point out that there could be other outcomes but ignored the fact that for there to be other outcomes there would need to be other necessary causes.

"Showing" is something that happens in live language use, which is what he's focusing on in the Tractacus — Tate

If aRb cannot be shown in a picture of the world because it may lead into an infinite regress, being shown the meaning of "tufaa liko mezani" will equally lead into an infinite regress, in that "Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. Look up the meaning of those words. You get more words. Since the dictionary is finite, and since word is defined in terms of other words, the definitions must be circular".

We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. — RussellA

This is what Wittgenstein is objecting to. Objects relate to each other. x is not an object. Plato does not relate to x, he relates to Socrates. a (Plato) R (loves) b Socrates.

There is no infinite regress here because the relation is not a relation to a relation.

As aRb requires a relation, aRb is not a fact, but is part of the picture. — RussellA

.

aRb does not require a relation, it is a proposition that points to a relation between a and b. aRb is a fact that is pictured in the proposition.

However, these relations cannot be shown in a picture using aRb — RussellA

They can. The apple (a) is on (R) the table (b). The relation between the apple and the table is that one is on they other. You can say it. You can show it.

Facts and states of affairs are much the same. Relations, not so much. Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12) — Banno

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"?

What is a proposition without the sign? Where is this projective relation if not part of the totality of the world as a fact?

Have a look a 3.1 and thereafter. What you call a "scribble" may be what Wittgenstein calls a "propositional sign". — Banno

Probably. But then is he saying we think in scribbles and sounds? How is that any different than a language-less entity that thinks in colors, shapes, and sounds? A scribble is a colored shape.

Harry, despite this sentence being marks on a screen, you are aware that it is addressed to you. How is that? — Banno

Because some of the marks on the screen refer to me and the marks I remember having made earlier.

Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. — RussellA

Yes. Russell's acquaintance theory says that you know what "blue" means from direct acquaintance with it, not from looking it up in a dictionary, so even Russell is immune to that problem.

The issue about love indicates a need for intensional rather than extensional definition. That's what I thought were focusing on

"Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. Look up the meaning of those words. You get more words. Since the dictionary is finite, and since word is defined in terms of other words, the definitions must be circular". — RussellA

If you apply this to the word, "word", then it makes the whole argument nonsensical.

Words are used for communicating what is the case to someone that lacks the knowledge of what is the case (which could be knowing that it is raining or what some scribble or utterance means)- meaning that words refer to things that are not necessarily other words.

If I am aware that it is raining outside, then me hearing you say it is raining outside would be redundant and not useful. That useless redundancy shows that words do not refer to other words, but what is the case that isn't necessarily another use of words.

If I hear you say it is raining outside, and I don't know what "raining" means, I might look it up in the dictionary. I would find something like this:
Water condensed from atmospheric vapor and falling in drops.

I would only continue to look up words if I didn't already know what they referred to. If I know what "Water condensed from atmospheric vapor and falling in drops" refers to and it's not just another use of scribbles or utterances, then I don't need to look up any more words. I would then know what you are saying is the case, which isn't you using more words, but would be about the weather conditions outside.

Words are used for communicating what is the case to someone that lacks the knowledge of what is the case — Harry Hindu

Exactly.

Contradictions and hypocrisy do not allow an understanding of your interpretation. — Harry Hindu

It is, rather, the case that your lack of understanding leads you to assume intellectual dishonesty, contradiction, and hypocrisy on my part.

If it is necessary that Witt write something down for you to later interpret it then this example is a problem for your interpretation. — Harry Hindu

It is tautological that something must be written in order for that writing to be commented on. That is an example of logical necessity. There is no necessity that I would comment. Since it is not by necessity, and the only necessity he recognizes is logical necessity, that I interpret his work is Zufall, "a sort of accident" (2.0121). The German term also means 'chance'. Now if you believe that nothing happens by chance then we have a fundamental disagreement.

Possibilities stem from our ignorance of the conditions between now and a particular future event. — Harry Hindu

If you accept Laplace's demon then it is only by ignorance that we cannot determine a future that is determinate. This, however, is an assumption not an established fact.

If the necessary conditions underlie both A and B, then A is no more or less the necessary outcome than B. It is necessary that I know how to read and write and have a device I can use to respond to you on TPF, but whether or not I do respond and what I will say if I do respond is not determined by necessity.

You obviously do not agree and assume some hidden causal nexus that can only lead to a single outcome that is already determined by conditions that extend back to some state of initial conditions of the universe.

It is tautological that something must be written in order for that writing to be commented on. That is an example of logical necessity. — Fooloso4

Which is the same as saying that something must be written (cause) for that writing to be commented on (effect). What reason do you have to think that something must be written for it to be commented on? Logical necessity is a type of causal necessity. Certain premises necessarily cause a certain conclusion to be true or false.

There is no necessity that I would comment. Since it is not by necessity, and the only necessity he recognizes is logical necessity, that I interpret his work is Zufall, "a sort of accident" (2.0121). The German term also means 'chance'. Now if you believe that nothing happens by chance then we have a fundamental disagreement. — Fooloso4

But you did comment and Witt writing something is ONE of the many causes that led to your commenting. You had to be born, read Witt and become enamored by his writings, create an account on this forum, and intend to comment on it. If none of this happened, would we see your comments on this screen? Wouldn't all of those be necessary for us to see your comments on this screen? If we don't see comments of yours on this screen, then we assume that there was another necessary cause as to why we don't see any more comments of yours on the screen. Either you got bored with the conversation, real-life happened, etc.

2. an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4

Now, if what you're saying were the case, then comments of yours would just appear on this screen even though you were never born.

If you accept Laplace's demon then it is only by ignorance that we cannot determine a future that is determinate. This, however, is an assumption not an established fact. — Fooloso4

As I pointed out, the issue only applies to future events. We don't have this problem in laying out prior causes for present events. As you pointed out, it is logically (causally) necessary that Witt write something for you to comment on it. Why is that? Why are we ignorant of the future effects of present causes but not so with present effects of prior causes?

If the necessary conditions underlie both A and B, then A is no more or less the necessary outcome than B. It is necessary that I know how to read and write and have a device I can use to respond to you on TPF, but whether or not I do respond and what I will say if I do respond is not determined by necessity. — Fooloso4

But as we have shown different necessary conditions underlie both A and B. Witt writing something is a necessary condition, as well as all of the other conditions are necessary, for you to comment on it (A). Different necessary conditions would lead to B - you not commenting. Even though Witt wrote something, saying that doesn't necessarily mean you will comment on what he wrote is being disingenuous to the fact that there would be necessary conditions for you not doing so, such as you never being born.

You seem to think that a single distant cause must necessarily determine a single effect in the future. The further back in time you go from some effect, the more causes become necessary for that effect to occur, not just one. If you want to talk about the cause that directly precedes you leaving a comment on this forum, then we'd be pointing to the last step in the process which would be something like the software the forum is running on working correctly in displaying your comment after you clicked the submit button.

You obviously do not agree and assume some hidden causal nexus that can only lead to a single outcome that is already determined by conditions that extend back to some state of initial conditions of the universe. — Fooloso4

What is the nexus of logical necessity? What makes it hidden when it comes to causal necessity, but obvious when it comes to logical necessity?

Which is the same as saying that something must be written (cause) for that writing to be commented on (effect). — Harry Hindu

That it is written is a condition for me to comment not a cause that leads necessarily to me commenting.

Logical necessity is a type of causal necessity. Certain premises necessarily cause a certain conclusion to be true or false. — Harry Hindu

The conclusion follows from the premises, the premises do not cause a certain conclusion.

But you did comment and Witt writing something is ONE of the many causes that led to your commenting. — Harry Hindu

I am not commenting because of what my parents did or their parents or what the first human did or because of life itself or that out of which life emerged.

Now, if what you're saying were the case, then comments of yours would just appear on this screen even though you were never born. — Harry Hindu

That I was born is by change. The ability to comment is a necessary condition for me to do so, but my being born is not the cause of me commenting.

We don't have this problem in laying out prior causes for present events. — Harry Hindu

Right. We can in some grossly inadequate way trace what happened back to other things that happened. That is as far as we can go. That things did happen this way is not the same as claiming they necessarily had to happen this way.

As you pointed out, it is logically (causally) necessary that Witt write something for you to comment on it. — Harry Hindu

That is not what I pointed out. What I pointed out is that logical necessity is not causal.

Why are we ignorant of the future effects of present causes but not so with present effects of prior causes? — Harry Hindu

Because those causes do not lead to a single necessary outcome. It is only after the fact that we can say what that outcome was. Again, the same conditions might have led to a different outcome. What happens is only one of the possibilities of what might have happened.

What is the nexus of logical necessity? — Harry Hindu

Tautologies and contradictions. 4.46-4.461.

If I had been mentioning "aRb" I would have put it in quotes. I am surprised that was not apparent from the context. — Banno

It was apparent, on the assumption that you were being deliberate in your use or omission of quote marks, but not on the assumption that you understood and were conveying W's meaning in 3.1432.

So, this,

Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world... — Banno

says,

Insofar as some relation aRb, which is itself the fact pictured by the proposition "aRb", is true in virtue of itself picturing a fact in the world... — Banno

?

I don't see why you wouldn't much rather accept,

Insofar as some true proposition "aRb" (and/or some spatial relation within its sign) pictures a fact, — bongo fury

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"? — Harry Hindu

This is why you have so much difficulty, Harry. A proposition is distinct from a propositional sign in that a proposition projects out into the world

Because some of the marks on the screen refer to me and the marks I remember having made earlier. — Harry Hindu

So you remain stuck at "meaning is reference".

Cheers.

I don't share your obsession with quote marks. But for what it's worth, in what I have written, "aRb" does not picture a fact. That aRb does that. That "aRb" being a propositional sign. aRb being a proposition.

It may have been clearer to you if I had preceded the aRb with "that", but I was writing for @RussellA, who now seems to have lost interest. Cheers.

,

You're assuming that there is something called C

That's the question. Is there a something C that relates A to B. What is C ?

Either C is grounded in its relata or it isn't.

If C is grounded in its relata, then C doesn't exist because it is just a property.

If C isn't grounded in its relata, then it is independent of its relata, and is an individual. Bradley presents this as a problem, in that somehow the relation C needs to be related to its relata. This leads to the problem of infinite regress, meaning that C cannot exist.

Either way, C cannot ontologically exist, and if doesn't, cannot be "what relates A to B". — RussellA

Previously I pointed out that this argument cannot be parsed in first order logic. In proposing that C relates A to B, Bradley and RussellA are treating predicates as individuals. The difference between a predicate and an individual is clear in Wittgenstein's aRb, which makes use of Frege's logic. Bradley did not have access to Frege's innovations, so was not able to see the error in his analysis of relations.

Amusingly, despite being mistaken overall, the incidental truth in RussellA's analysis is that predicates do not exist, if this is understood as that predicates are not the subjects of quantification. We can write U(x) f(x), ∃(x)f(x), but one cannot quantify over f.

RussellA's picture is perhaps a form of Platonism, in which ethereal predicates float around the world, waiting to be trapped by individuals. Holding to such a picture would make understanding the Tractatus impossible.

We can replace x by "relates", and get the situation there is something x such that Plato relates to x and x relates to Socrates. Again we have the situation of a relation relating, which as Bradley pointed out, leads to an infinite regress — RussellA

This is so confused. It implies that no two things can ever be related, and that Plato cannot love Socrates. Of course if a relation requires another relation then it will lead to an infinite regress. But why assume it in the first place?

aRb does not require a relation, it is a proposition that points to a relation between a and b. aRb is a fact that is pictured in the proposition. — Fooloso4

The apple (a) is on (R) the table (b). The relation between the apple and the table is that one is on they other. You can say it. You can show it. — Fooloso4

:up:

RussellA's picture is perhaps a form of Platonism — Banno

Yeah, I was thinking the same.