Words are used for communicating what is the case to someone that lacks the knowledge of what is the case — Harry Hindu

I agree, language needs both description and acquaintance. Neither is sufficient by itself.

The Rosetta Stone couldn't be deciphered without there being something external to it. As Wittgenstein wrote 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits, We cannot say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.

This is so confused. It implies that no two things can ever be related — Luke

There are two types of relations, those in the mind and those in the mind-independent world.

I agree and believe that relations exist in the mind, but have not been persuaded that relations exist in a mind-independent world.

As regards the ontological existence of relations in a mind-independent world, I have two questions.

Q1: If relations exist in a mind-independent world, how can the mere fact of a relation between a rock on Earth and a rock on Alpha Centauri cause changes to either ?
Q2: If relations don't cause changes in the world, then why do we think that relations exist in the world ?

Q1: If relations exist in a mind-independent world, how can the mere fact of a relation between a rock on Earth and a rock on Alpha Centauri cause changes to either ? — RussellA

What is the relation between them?

Q2: If relations don't cause changes in the world, then why do we think that relations exist in the world ? — RussellA

Why must the existence of relations cause changes in the world?

The difference between a predicate and an individual is clear in Wittgenstein's aRb, which makes use of Frege's logic — Banno

Not lost interest, but busy as off to Vienna tomorrow for a Schnitzel and Apfelstrudel.

Did Wittgenstein treat relations as objects
In the Preface, Wittgenstein wrote "I will only mention that to the great works of Frege and the writings of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of my thoughts". In 4.1252 he includes examples of First Order Logic.

Traditionally, relations are internal and classes are considered as universals, but Frege treats relations and universals as objects. For Frege, a property, a special kind of function, is not part of the object possessing it, but forms together with the object a "complete whole", having as constituents the object and property.

The SEP article "Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism" sets out alternate readings to the Tractatus as to whether relations can be considered as objects or not. Anscombe argues that relations are not Tractarian objects, whilst Srenius, Merrill and Hintikka argue that they are.

Wittgenstein refers to Frege directly and includes examples of First Order Logic. As Frege treated relations as objects, this makes it plausible that Wittgenstein also treated relations as objects.

the incidental truth in RussellA's analysis is that predicates do not exist...RussellA's picture is perhaps a form of Platonism............Holding to such a picture would make understanding the Tractatus impossible.. — Banno

Relations
3.1431 The essential nature of the propositional sign becomes very clear when we imagine it made up of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written signs. The mutual spatial position of these things then expresses the sense of the proposition.

I know there is a world in my mind and I believe there is also a world that is mind-independent. I know relations exist in the world in my mind, and I believe that relations don't exist in a mind-independent world.

Badley argues that a relation C cannot exist as a particular individual in a mind-independent world, to which I agree. It would follow that if a relation cannot exist as a particular in a mind-independent world, then relations as universals cannot either, a position in opposition to Platonism.

Relations cannot exist as universals in a mind-independent world
The question is, is the statement "the relation C is an individual" true or false. The subject "the relation C" is a particular, and the predicate "is an individual" is a universal.

You wrote "predicates do not exist", in the sense that Platonic Forms don't exist and have no ontological existence in a mind-independent world

The statement "the relation C is an individual" may be compared to "the King of France is bald", whereby there is something x - such that x is the King of France (false) - and x is bald, in that there is something x - such that x is the relation C (false) and x is an individual.

Reading of the Tractatus
@Banno "The purpose here is to move beyond seeing the Tractatus in terms of idealism and empiricism. The world is all that is the case. The picture is of the world, and hence in an important sense distinct from it. Thinking of the world as either mind-dependent or mind-independent will not allow one to see that the picture shows the world."

Even though I may believe that relations don't ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, as the Tractatus may be understood independently of idealism and empiricism, my belief need not impact on my reading of the Tractatus.

What is the relation between them? — Luke

Exactly, what is it ?

Why must the existence of relations cause changes in the world? — Luke

Exactly, if relations don't cause changes in the world then how do we know about them ?

That it is written is a condition for me to comment not a cause that leads necessarily to me commenting. — Fooloso4

That I was born is by change. The ability to comment is a necessary condition for me to do so, but my being born is not the cause of me commenting. — Fooloso4

Intellectual dishonesty and cherry-picking. All of this ignores what I said in the same post you are replying to:

You seem to think that a single distant cause must necessarily determine a single effect in the future. The further back in time you go from some effect, the more causes become necessary for that effect to occur, not just one. If you want to talk about the cause that directly precedes you leaving a comment on this forum, then we'd be pointing to the last step in the process which would be something like the software the forum is running on working correctly in displaying your comment after you clicked the submit button. — Harry Hindu

So you are arguing with a straw-man.

I am not commenting because of what my parents did or their parents or what the first human did or because of life itself or that out of which life emerged. — Fooloso4

:rofl: You aren't even aware that you keep contradicting yourself. If causes are not necessary, then what your parents or their parents did or what the first humans did would have no necessary causal relation with your birth, but here you assumed that it does, or else why would you have mentioned these causes (which was not part of my list of causes) if they don't necessarily cause your birth? And you want to lecture me on logical necessity? :brow:

Right. We can in some grossly inadequate way trace what happened back to other things that happened. That is as far as we can go. That things did happen this way is not the same as claiming they necessarily had to happen this way. — Fooloso4

And if they didn't happen this way then we would find different reasons or causes as to why it happened differently.

Because those causes do not lead to a single necessary outcome. It is only after the fact that we can say what that outcome was. Again, the same conditions might have led to a different outcome. What happens is only one of the possibilities of what might have happened. — Fooloso4

And you have yet to show an example of the same event that follows different causes. The problem is that every event is unique and so are their causes, but that isn't to say that events and their causes cannot be similar and it is the similarity that allows us to make predictions in the first place.

The conclusion follows from the premises, the premises do not cause a certain conclusion. — Fooloso4

What does it mean to follow, if not to be caused?

Cause:
The producer of an effect, result, or consequence.
The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result.
A basis for an action or response; a reason.

So it sounds like we're saying the same thing, but using different terms.

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"? — Harry Hindu

This is why you have so much difficulty, Harry. A proposition is distinct from a propositional sign in that a proposition projects out into the world — Banno

:roll: Did I hit a nerve? So you're saying that Witt is contradicting himself? I wouldn't have so much difficulty if you weren't just pulling your assertions out of your nether regions.

So you remain stuck at "meaning is reference". — Banno

You certainly haven't been any help in freeing me from this position because you can't adequately answer questions you should be asking yourself, so you'll remain stuck at "meaning is scribble games".
.

I agree, language needs both description and acquaintance. Neither is sufficient by itself.

The Rosetta Stone couldn't be deciphered without there being something external to it. As Wittgenstein wrote 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits, We cannot say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. — RussellA

I really can't understand the need assert language as being external or distinct from the world or what it references. We can translate another language because it refers to the same world as the language we're translating to. It's a lame attempt to reject meaning as reference - a causal relation. Meaning is a causal relation. Language-use requires a medium and that medium is the world. Those the decipher languages exist in the world. The ideas that generate language use are in the world. You can't have it both ways. Language can't be part of the world AND external to it.

As part of our evolution, humans learned that causes lead to certain effects (tool-making, harnessing the power of fire, agriculture, etc.). We learned to harness that with language. All we are doing is participating in the same causal relations that are the world. Going from understanding that someone's behavior informs an observer of their inner thoughts to understanding that scribbles can inform a reader of the writer's inner thoughts seems like a logical/natural conclusion to reach. Effects inform us of their causes. The problem is in interpreting those relations as such, but our interpretation is subject to the same causal relations as everything else. How we interpret some observation is dependent upon prior observations.

I have attempted to do two things:

First, explain Wittgenstein's distinction between necessity and accident.
Second, make clear our fundamental differences regarding determinism.

Instead of accepting these differences and moving on you repeat the same things.

Sure, when you keep committing logical fallacies, I'll keep saying you've made a logical fallacy. Just admit that your are emotionally attached to Witt and what he wrote.

Q1: If relations exist in a mind-independent world, how can the mere fact of a relation between a rock on Earth and a rock on Alpha Centauri cause changes to either ?
— RussellA

What is the relation between them?
— Luke

Exactly, what is it ? — RussellA

You posited the relation to begin with, so you tell me.

Q2: If relations don't cause changes in the world, then why do we think that relations exist in the world ?
— RussellA

Why must the existence of relations cause changes in the world?
— Luke

Exactly, if relations don't cause changes in the world then how do we know about them ? — RussellA

Again, it was your presupposition that the existence of relations must cause changes in the world. I'm asking you why that must be.

Again, it was your presupposition that the existence of relations must cause changes in the world. I'm asking you why that must be. — Luke

Relations must cause changes in the world if we are to know about them

If relations ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, they either cause changes in the world or they don't.

I have seen no evidence that changes in the world have been caused by relations between things. I have seen evidence that changes in the world have been caused by forces between things, but forces are a different thing to relations.

Therefore, either relations exist and don't cause changes in the world or relations don't exist.

If relations exist, but don't cause changes in the world, then we cannot know about them, and are unknown unknowns.

I cannot prove that relations don't ontologically exist, although I can justify that they don't. It is up to those who propose the ontological existence of relations to prove that they do exist, or justify that they do.

I could say, as in 3.1432, "a stands in a certain relation to b", but then again I could say "the war was raging, the Evil White Witch led an attack against Aslan, and the Unicorns joined the great battle". Why should either of these two statements be more true than the other ?

I just sort of quietly told my dog to "stop" and she stopped and walked away. Isn't it funny how we never think much about how that kind of communication works, but propositional language is forever confusing? Why is that?

All objects exist in relation to others. There are no objects that we can know of that exist in isolation independent of all else.

I have seen evidence that changes in the world have been caused by forces between things, but forces are a different thing to relations. — RussellA

If there is no relation between objects a and b there can be no force acting between them.

Did I hit a nerve? — Harry Hindu

No. You again showed that you are a fool. Stay safe. .

...Frege treats relations and universals as objects. For Frege, a property, a special kind of function, is not part of the object possessing it... — RussellA

It's good to see you working on this, but have a close look at your argument.

First you assert that Frege treats relations and universals as objects, then say that a property is a special kind of function.

Functions are not objects.

First order logic clearly distinguishes between individuals, designated by a,b,c..., and predicates, designated by f, g, h... That's the point; that predicates, which include relations, are kept distinct from individuals, or objects.

You are correct that there are those who think that relations in the Tractatus are nameable. Notice that Anscombe, Wittgenstein's friend, student, translator and literary executor, disagrees. And even if one adopts that reading, that does not automatically lend support to Bradley's odd argument. To do that you still have to force there to be a second relation between an individual and a relation, a notion that is incongruous with the Tractatus. That is, even if relations can be treated as names, Bradley's argument does not follow. You might well be able to find a paper or two supporting such a view, but they would be controversial, at the least, and certainly a minority opinion.

While you are in the SEP, check out the article on Bradley's Regress. It will give you a better idea of the breadth of disagreement therewith.

I know there is a world in my mind and I believe there is also a world that is mind-independent. — RussellA

There's your basic issue in understanding the Tractatus, since you are trying to work in two worlds while the Tractaus has exactly one - the conjunction of facts.

You are simply disagreeing with the Tractatus. You are not showing it to be inconsistent.

The statement "the relation C is an individual" may be compared to "the King of France is bald", — RussellA

Well, no, since the latter has a parsing in first order logic, while "the relation C is an individual" cannot be parsed. Again, first order logic does not allow quantification over predicates. It only allows quantification over individual variables.

But I find myself repeating points previously made, so unless something new is on offer, thanks for the chat.

...propositional language is forever confusing? — Tate

It isn't. Logic sets it out clearly. People are confused. Especially those who try to do philosophy without an understanding of logic.

If there is no relation between objects a and b there can be no force acting between them. — Fooloso4

Yep.

It isn't. Logic sets it out clearly. People are confused. Especially those who try to do philosophy without an understanding of logic. — Banno

Wittgenstein said logic is nonsense.

Really? Where?

Tractacus?

Where?

Where — Banno

"2.2 Sense and Nonsense
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein’s logical construction of a philosophical system has a purpose—to find the limits of world, thought, and language; in other words, to distinguish between sense and nonsense. “The book will … draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts …. The limit can … only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense” (TLP Preface). The conditions for a proposition’s having sense have been explored and seen to rest on the possibility of representation or picturing. Names must have a bedeutung (reference/meaning), but they can only do so in the context of a proposition which is held together by logical form. It follows that only factual states of affairs which can be pictured can be represented by meaningful propositions. This means that what can be said are only propositions of natural science and leaves out of the realm of sense a daunting number of statements which are made and used in language.

"There are, first, the propositions of logic itself. These do not represent states of affairs, and the logical constants do not stand for objects. “My fundamental thought is that the logical constants do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be represented” (TLP 4.0312)."

-- SEP

Do you disagree with this interpretation?

Nothing there says that logic is nonsense.

Where does this occur?

Wittgenstein said logic is nonsense. — Tate

The propositions of logic are nonsense.

Is there some other logic?

It doesn't say anything like that.

The best you might get is that logic is senseless; that it has no meaning but sets out a grammatical structure.

This means that what can be said are only propositions of natural science and leaves out of the realm of sense a daunting number of statements which are made and used in language.

"There are, first, the propositions of logic itself. These do not represent states of affairs, and the logical constants do not stand for objects. “ — Tate

This says propositions of logic are nonsense per the Tractacus. They're tautological. They don't picture states of affairs.

This says propositions of logic are nonsense per the Tractacus. — Tate

No, it does not. At most it says logic is senseless. Logic shows the structure of propositions, some of which picture the world.

No, it does not. At most it says logic is senseless. Logic shows the structure of propositions, some of which picture the world. — Banno

It follows that only factual states of affairs which can be pictured can be represented by meaningful propositions. — SEP

There are, first, the propositions of logic itself. These do not represent states of affairs, — SEP

I think the SEP is saying that, per the Tractacus, propositions of logic are nonsense.

, think what you like. By using "nonsense" you run the danger of missing the point, misread the SEP article, thus forming an erroneous picture of the Tractatus.