What would? What you're calling "the disquoted part"?

Some state of the world is a disquoted part? Part of what? Part of the world?

So "part" didn't mean "part of the T schema"? — bongo fury

This is Aristotle's formulation of the correspondence theory of truth:

"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true."


This is the t-sentence rule:

"P" is true IFF P.

If you wanted the t-sentence to express correspondence theory, how would you work it out? I'd say the quoted part is some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion.

My question is: how does (the meaning of ) a true statement depict reality ? What is this representational, optical metaphor doing or trying to do ? — Pie

I seem to recall, someone had a theory about that.

I seem to recall, someone had a theory about that. — bongo fury

:up:

Which one, right ?

Rorty was maybe the first analytic philosopher I got into...bad influence, right ? Of course he challenged (as you prob. know) the 'mirror' or lens' or 'truth-o-scope' framework generally. Words are just paws for coping.

I hope this is not too tangential. I think it applies to the implicit ocular metaphor in the correspondence theory (languagemeaning as picture to be held up and check for congruence with ...nonlanguage reality? 'The Absolute In Itself' ?

It is natural to suppose that, before philosophy enters upon its subject proper — namely, the actual knowledge of what truly is — it is necessary to come first to an understanding concerning knowledge, which is looked upon as the instrument by which to take possession of the Absolute, or as the means through which to get a sight of it. The apprehension seems legitimate, on the one hand that there may be various kinds of knowledge, among which one might be better adapted than another for the attainment of our purpose — and thus a wrong choice is possible: on the other hand again that, since knowing is a faculty of a definite kind and with a determinate range, without the more precise determination of its nature and limits we might take hold on clouds of error instead of the heaven of truth.

This apprehensiveness is sure to pass even into the conviction that the whole enterprise which sets out to secure for consciousness by means of knowledge what exists per se, is in its very nature absurd; and that between knowledge and the Absolute there lies a boundary which completely cuts off the one from the other. For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the process, and has in view, a moulding and alteration of it. Or, again, if knowledge is not an instrument which we actively employ, but a kind of passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us, then here, too, we do not receive it as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. In either case we employ a means which immediately brings about the very opposite of its own end; or, rather, the absurdity lies in making use of any means at all. It seems indeed open to us to find in the knowledge of the way in which the instrument operates, a remedy for this parlous state; for thereby it becomes possible to remove from the result the part which, in our idea of the Absolute received through that instrument, belongs to the instrument, and thus to get the truth in its purity. But this improvement would, as a matter of fact, only bring us back to the point where we were before. If we take away again from a definitely formed thing that which the instrument has done in the shaping of it, then the thing (in this case the Absolute) stands before us once more just as it was previous to all this trouble, which, as we now see, was superfluous. ...
Meanwhile, if the fear of falling into error introduces an element of distrust into science, which without any scruples of that sort goes to work and actually does know, it is not easy to understand why, conversely, a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust, and why we should not take care lest the fear of error is not just the initial error. As a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed a great deal, as truth, and supports its scruples and consequences on what should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth. It starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a medium; and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. More especially it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side, and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute, is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which, by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true — a position which, while calling itself fear of error, makes itself known rather as fear of the truth. — Hegel, from Intro to Phen

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm

I'd say the quoted part is some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion. — Tate

Still? You're still saying the disquoted part of a sentence is a disquoted part of the world, whatever that means?

Still? You're still saying the disquoted part of a sentence is a disquoted part of the world, whatever that means? — bongo fury

Lol. I'm not sure why this seems mysterious to you. I don't think anyone is well advised to use the t-sentence rule as correspondence theory, but it happens. If that boggles you, just ignore them.

Which one, right ? — Pie

Might be the day before you came here that everyone was quoting

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition. — the big W

at each other.

Does he mean reading the furniture in a room ?

This is one of my favorites:

Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege's ideas could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any propositions: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems clear that no adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the conclusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs.

But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we have to say that it is its use.
If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the sign, then first let us adopt the method we just described of replacing this mental image by some outward object seen, e.g. a painted or modelled image. Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the written sign alone was dead? -- In fact, as soon as you think of replacing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image thereby loses its occult character, it ceased to seem to impart any life to the sentence at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the mental process which you needed for your purposes.)

The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a "thing corresponding to a substantive.")

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language.

As a part of the system of language, one may say, the sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever accompanied it would for us just be another sign.

:ok: haha I get it now

What is this representational, optical metaphor doing or trying to do ? — Pie

If you didn't know how it's done, you couldn't write a meaningful sentence on TPF, and since you clearly can write a meaningful sentence, I will assume you know how it is done. If you want a detailed analysis, you might wish to read about basic linguistics, eg Saussure, or I suppose Chomsky. I read that the recent progresses in automatic translation were based on modern linguistics à la Chomsky, with its concept of a universal grammar.

I know how to write. I'm not just making weird stuff up, friend. I'm far the first to gripe about the mysteries of the correspondence theory of truth. I'm just asking how you navigate or tolerate them (the traditional criticisms, and the one in particular that I tried to articulate.)

I'd say the quoted part is [about] some specific act of assertion, and the disquoted part is [about] a state of affairs that corresponds to the assertion. — Tate

Is this what you meant?

OK, hold up. Tell me what you think correspondence theory says.

Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats
Running over the fields.

Love that poem.

Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats
Running over the fields. — bongo fury

What?

I think his joke is that the correspondence theory doesn't make sense, so it's like answering 'the' question to present it so that it does.


What are days for?
Days are where we live.
They come, they wake us
Time and time over.
They are to be happy in:
Where can we live but days?

Ah, solving that question
Brings the priest and the doctor
In their long coats
Running over the fields.

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/48410/days-56d229a0c0c33

Ah, thanks for the indulgence but no, it was just, why should I answer yours if you won't answer mine.

I've only been arguing for avoiding the perennial equivocation re

1 truth-bearing sentence/proposition

2 truth-making event/state of affairs/proposition — bongo fury

How's this ? The meaning of the assertion, the sentence in use, seems to simply be the world(-as-understood). If we jettison apparent nonsense like the world-in-itself...the world is just that which is the case. To me this is not correspondence. There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.)

Ah, thanks for the indulgence but no, it was just, why should I answer yours if you won't answer mine. — bongo fury

Yea, I was just trying to figure out what the hell you're asking.

How's this ? The meaning of the assertion, the sentence in use, seems to simply be the world(-as-understood). If we jettison apparent nonsense like the world-in-itself...the world is just that which is the case. To me this is not correspondence. There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie

As I've said, you can do whatever you want.

As I've said, you can do whatever you want. — Tate

Isn't the point discussion ?

Isn't the point discussion ? — Pie

Sure. My point is: you can do whatever you want.

*flees over the field*

you might wish to read about basic linguistics, eg Saussure, — Olivier5

Saussure is one of my favorite thinkers. Good recommendation ! But bad social gesture.

There's just use/mention. 'P' is a string of letters. P is piece of a world, a truth (or an attempted truthery.) — Pie

Is this my fault? Have I lowered the tone?

It doesn't seem to make any sense. Are you joking?

It's not just me who thinks the correspondence theory is pretty close to being deflationary.

The correspondence theory is often traced back to Aristotle’s well-known definition of truth (Metaphysics 1011b25): “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”—but virtually identical formulations can be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b). It is noteworthy that this definition does not highlight the basic correspondence intuition. Although it does allude to a relation (saying something of something) to reality (what is), the relation is not made very explicit, and there is no specification of what on the part of reality is responsible for the truth of a saying. As such, the definition offers a muted, relatively minimal version of a correspondence theory. (For this reason it has also been claimed as a precursor of deflationary theories of truth.)

The disaster kicks in here ?

The metaphysical version presented by Thomas Aquinas is the best known: “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus” (Truth is the equation of thing and intellect), which he restates as: “A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality”

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/

It doesn't seem to make any sense. Are you joking? — bongo fury

Joking and not joking. If the world is all that is the case, a truth is a piece of the world.

I'm questioning the supposed gap between the meaning of a true assertion and the world it is true of.

Waxing phenomenological, I'd say that we, our world, and our language are fused.

We are being-in-the-world-with-others-in-language.

Ok. Will you be getting back to waxing analytical any time soon?