Only truth telling can support language, and habitual liars are not worth listening to as their speech has no meaning. Thus to the extent that we live in a world of language, we live in a moral social world in which the truth has value and falsehood is destructive of meaning of society and of our world. — unenlightened
If talking about the potential for something to happen based on conditions.. everyone is on board, yay! If it is talking about a possible person, that would be imposed upon had it been born, boo! And the proverbial crowds throw their rotten tomatoes... — schopenhauer1
Truth, one might say is redundant just as long as it is adhered to, but what is needed is an account of falsehood, which is parasitic on a community of truth tellers. — unenlightened
Does the concept of a belief depend on the concept of a truth in the same way ? Is "seems" a parasite on "is"? — Pie
The propensity to believe is the exact same thing as understanding the language. — unenlightened
The culture is literally being destroyed as we speak because meaning is use, and language is useless unless it tells the truth. Cue Orwell, cue Kant. — unenlightened
The culture is literally being destroyed as we speak because meaning is use, and language is useless unless it tells the truth. Cue Orwell, cue Kant.
— unenlightened
I'm on a nearby wavelength. Rationality is normative. Truthtelling is fundamental. Irrationality is antisocial. — Pie
Put differently, isn’t one person’s irrationality simply another’s rationality? — Joshs
If falsehood is the opposite of truth telling, isn’t a lie motivated by a prior breakdown in communication that it is an attempt to rationally cope with? — Joshs
It has been said that postmodernism plays into the human predilection to give into irrationalism. — Joshs
postmodernists assert that it is not irrationality that leads to fascisms and totalitarianisms but rigid or one-dimensional notions of the rational and the true. — Joshs
I think we can try to take a god's perspective on the great stage of fools and say so.
But does this not cut back against itself ? Aren't I just as rational as you then ? From what lofty perch can you criticize or instruct me ? If not from one implicitly higher and better ? — Pie
I believe all worldviews are equally valid , moral and rational. — Joshs
i don’t think this development should be understood via binaries like truth-nontruth and rational-irrational but along an axis of anticipatory sense-making. — Joshs
What I am saying is that language has social utility, but only to the extent that meaning is retained, and meaning is only retained as long as most people tell the truth most of the time. — unenlightened
The only people who don't worry about being taken for a fool, are fools. — Tate
Why would basic judgments like right/wrong and good/bad not be crucial to such sense-making ? Are we not beings who desire and fear? — Pie
There's an industry of criminals who trick the elderly out their money posing as IT. Is it not safe to assume that they are motivated by greed? Perhaps also by envy ? — Pie
We can’t fathom why the other chose to act in the way they acted , because we don’t know how to step out of our world into theirs. — Joshs
So we assume the problem lies not with a difference in sense-making but with a difference in motivation, which we treat as separate from cognition. — Joshs
That is, they blame wayward behavior on intransigent, irrational, arbitrary, pathological motives. — Joshs
The content of thought doesn’t really have very much to do with either ethics or rational cognition, except as a place mark for the anticipatory organizational processes of sense-making. — Joshs
‘Greed’ is a convenient label we slap on others ( and sometimes ourselves) as a way of blaming them for our own failure to understand their behavior more insightfully. — Joshs
FWIW, there's a passage in Aurelius about barking dogs. The godlike man does not judge, does not get caught in up in merely human notions of good and evil.
Such notions are toys for mere monkeys ? — Pie
It's been argued -- by a certain Comte-Sponville, specialist of Spinoza -- that one's moral sense is like one's sense of equilibrium: you can apply it to yourself, but not to others. — Olivier5
... the reason I was born and came into the world is to testify to the truth. Everyone on the side of truth [or, according to Young's literal translation, everyone who is of the truth] listens to me.
I think the point is that reality, the one we (can) talk about, is 'already' linguistic — Pie
is Hegel really an idealist? What is idealism, for Hegel? — Banno
17: In my view … everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance [*] but just as much as subject.
17: ... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.
17: However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved.
18: Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
18: The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. (Ethics , Part One, Definitions, III)
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