To be a genius is the only the intellect can surpass the will, when for most it merely serves it. — TimeLine

No, the intellect surpasses the will in saints, where the will completely denies itself. In artistic geniuses this happens only momentarily, via glimpses obtained through Platonic Ideas.

I've read this:

As in Kant's aesthetics, genuine art on Schopenhauer's view is the product of a genius or someone who has been “momentarily inspired to the point of genius” (WWR I, 261). But he construes the creative process of the genius rather differently from Kant. For all of the fine arts save for music—which constitutes an important exception treated below—the genius produces art first by contemplating an Idea in nature or from human affairs. Sometimes the genius is aided by her imagination which allows her to perceive Ideas in possible as well as in actual experience. Then, with technical skill she embodies the Ideas she has perceived into a form (be it in marble, paint or words on the printed page) that enables the Ideas to be perceived by others. In this way, the genius lends her superlative ability to perceive Ideas in actual or imagined things to the ordinary person, who can less readily perceive Ideas from the phenomenal world.

Schopenhauer sees a relationship between genius and madness. He believes that “every increase in intellect beyond the ordinary measure is an abnormality that disposes one to madness” (WWR I, 215); since the genius is distinctive for her superfluity of intellect (WWR I, 211), which allows her to withdraw from mundane concerns more often and more sustainedly in order to perceive the Ideas in things and in the patterns of human life, she is thus disposed to madness. Also, geniuses resemble madmen insofar as they are often so engrossed in perceiving the essential in life that they pay little attention to particulars, and are generally terrible in practical affairs. But the real distinguishing factor between the “madman” and the genius has to do with memory. From his “frequent visits to madhouses” and his reflections on the symptoms of these real inmates as well as on those of characters in literature who have gone insane (e.g., Ophelia, King Lear, Ajax), Schopenhauer hypothesizes that the mad lack reliable interconnections between past and present events, and in many cases this is due to some traumatic event they have suffered in their past. By contrast, the genius has a memory that functions normally.

But I still don't see what this has to do with what we were talking about. We weren't discussing Platonic Ideas.

Also the main trait of the genius isn't intellect, but perception/imagination. The genius SEES what others can't see.

But I still don't see what this has to do with what we were talking about. We weren't discussing Platonic Ideas — Agustino

Let's go back to the problem I had initially, the notion that there is no free-will but there is free-choice and the latter purports an intellect or capacity to distinguish between the subject and an object, a person who can experience space and time superior to the independence of this will. As you say Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes, but to reach that level of transcendence, to actually be capable of giving 'eyes to the will' manifests itself in what Schop. refers as 'genius' or in his aesthetic argument and corresponds to Platonic Ideas as being the instigator of this capacity to become independent of the principle of sufficient reason. You can see it here:

"According to Schopenhauer, corresponding to the level of the universal subject-object distinction, Will is immediately objectified into a set of universal objects or Platonic Ideas. These constitute the timeless patterns for each of the individual things that we experience in space and time. There are different Platonic Ideas, and although this multiplicity of Ideas implies that some measure of individuation is present within this realm, each Idea nonetheless contains no plurality within itself and is said to be “one.” Since the Platonic Ideas are in neither space nor time, they lack the qualities of individuation that would follow from the introduction of spatial and temporal qualifications. In these respects, the Platonic Ideas are independent of the specific fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, even though it would be misleading to say that there is no individuation whatsoever at this universal level, for there are many different Platonic Ideas that are individuated from one another. Schopenhauer refers to the Platonic Ideas as the direct objectifications of Will, and as the immediate objectivity of Will.

Will’s indirect objectifications appear when our minds continue to apply the principle of sufficient reason beyond its general root such as to introduce the forms of time, space and causality, not to mention logic, mathematics, geometry and moral reasoning. When Will is objectified at this level of determination, the world of everyday life emerges, whose objects are, in effect, kaleidoscopically multiplied manifestations of the Platonic forms, endlessly dispersed throughout space and time.

Since the principle of sufficient reason is — given Schopenhauer’s inspiration from Kant — the epistemological form of the human mind, the spatio-temporal world is the world of our own reflection. To that extent, Schopenhauer says that life is like a dream. As a condition of our knowledge, Schopenhauer believes that the laws of nature, along with the sets of objects that we experience, we ourselves create in way that is not unlike the way the constitution of our tongues invokes the taste of sugar. As Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) states in “The Assayer” (1623), if ears tongues and noses were removed from the world, then odors, tastes, and sounds would be removed as well."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/#4


This goes back to my original post and why I said

The freedom we assume - the 'choice' - is actually illusory. — TimeLine

Let's go back to the problem I had initially, the notion that there is no free-will but there is free-choice and the latter purports an intellect or capacity to distinguish between the subject and an object, a person who can experience space and time superior to the independence of this will. As you say Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes, but to reach that level of transcendence, to actually be capable of giving 'eyes to the will' manifests itself in what Schop. refers as 'genius' or in his aesthetic argument and corresponds to Platonic Ideas as being the instigator of this capacity to become independent of the principle of sufficient reason. — TimeLine

Schopenhauer's conception of genius seems different:

Mere men of talent always come at the right time; for, as they are roused by the spirit of their age and are called into being by its needs, they are only just capable of satisfying them. They therefore go hand in hand with the advancing culture of their contemporaries, or with the gradual advancement of a special science; for this they reap reward and approbation. But to the next generation their works are no longer enjoyable; they must be replaced by others; and these do not fail to appear.

The genius, on the other hand, lights on his age like a comet into the paths of the planets, to whose well-regulated and comprehensible arrangement its wholly eccentric course is foreign. Accordingly, he cannot go hand in hand with the regular course of the culture of the times as found; on the contrary, he casts his works far out on to the path in front (just as the emperor, giving himself up to death, flings his spear among the enemy), on which time has first to overtake them… Talent is able to achieve what is beyond other people’s capacity to achieve, yet not what is beyond their capacity of apprehension; therefore it at once finds its appreciators. The achievement of genius, on the other hand, transcends not only others’ capacity of achievement, but also their capacity of apprehension; therefore they do not become immediately aware of it. Talent is like the marksman who hits a target which others cannot reach; genius is like the marksman who hits a target … which others cannot even see. — WWR Vol II Chapter XXXI

As you say Intellect is what gives eyes to the will and makes it see - stops it from being blind, and hence makes it able to choose based on the material the intellect furnishes, but to reach that level of transcendence, to actually be capable of giving 'eyes to the will' manifests itself in what Schop. refers as 'genius' or in his aesthetic argument and corresponds to Platonic Ideas as being the instigator of this capacity to become independent of the principle of sufficient reason. — TimeLine

No level of transcendence is required at all. Even a person with a weak intellect - his will is still guided by that intellect - only that the intellect isn't powerful enough to see all the choices that are available, to see the advantages/disadvantages they entail, etc. So the weak intellect is almost as if the will was blind.

No level of transcendence is required at all. Even a person with a weak intellect - his will is still guided by that intellect - only that the intellect isn't powerful enough to see all the choices that are available, to see the advantages/disadvantages they entail, etc. So the weak intellect is almost as if the will was blind. — Agustino

I understand what you are trying to say, but when you say "his will is still guided by that intellect" only it lacks 'power' that this grading of the objectification of the will (and I assume lower phenomenon) lacks this so-called power because it is unable to perceive Ideas and is thus subsumed. It becomes irrelevant; you either are, or you are not and when the latter, the intellect is subject to the will.

I understand what you are trying to say, but when you say "his will is still guided by that intellect" only it lacks 'power' that this grading of the objectification of the will (and I assume lower phenomenon) lacks this so-called power because it is unable to perceive Ideas and is thus subsumed. It becomes irrelevant; you either are, or you are not and when the latter, the intellect is subject to the will. — TimeLine

That the intellect guides the will presupposes that the intellect is subservient to the will already. The will wants X. The intellect tells the will how to get X. Will it take road A or B? That's the choice.

That's why this has nothing to do with genius or sainthood, but with our natural way of functioning.

That the intellect guides the will presupposes that the intellect is subservient to the will already. The will wants X. The intellect tells the will how to get X. Will it take road A or B? That's the choice.

That's why this has nothing to do with genius or sainthood, but with our natural way of functioning. — Agustino

No, it doesn't, which is where the spatiotemporal argument becomes relevant, that these grades of objectification of the will did not develop by our experience of physical or bodily awareness, but it is distinctly through innerste or the representation of that innermost will, hence the will in itself. The intellect is subservient to the will independent of our cognition. To become conscious of this force does not deny this fundamental feature but merely an awareness that the intellect itself is able to access Ideas that individuates our experience or representation of the world.

Free will is the obverse of determinism. Each requires the other to have any meaning, and we cannot make sense of one in the absence of the other. The attempts to divide this pair and say that this half is "what is true/exists" while the other is "an illusion" are, all of them, illusions :D.

I think the point is the guide of the intellect is also the Will itself in action. Intellect cannot guide the Will, that is define a direction of the Will, because intellect is already movement of the Will.

Intellect cannot guide the Will, that is define a direction of the Will, because intellect is already movement of the Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, intellect doesn't define direction, you're quite right about that. Intellect only tells the Will how to get to where it wants to get. I wouldn't say intellect is movement of the Will though. Intellect is separate from the activity of willing - at least in principle. It's similar to the distinction Hume made between reason and the passions.

However - if we are considering "normally" functioning individuals, then the intellect is subservient to the will, and ONLY works when the will works - so in that sense, yes, the intellect is already movement of the Will. But it doesn't have to be like that - hence Schopenhauer's denial of the will.

intellect only tells the will how to get to where it wants to get — Agustino

the intellect is subservient to the will — Agustino

?

But it doesn't have to be like that - hence Schopenhauer's denial of the will. — Agustino

He denies the illusory will, the representations that individuate. The will in-itself stands outside of this intellect or cognitive faculty and is the force behind everything.

He denies the illusory will, the representations that individuate. The will in-itself stands outside of this intellect or cognitive faculty and is the force behind everything. — TimeLine

Schopenhauer in the second Volume of WWR pulls back from the complete identification of thing-in-itself with Will. Therefore what is left after the complete abolition of the Will is nothing from the perspective of us - those still full of Will.

To reiterate, how is your argument relatable to Schopenhauer with whom you have incorrectly associated it with? — TimeLine

I'm sorry, cupcake, but you haven't shown this at all.

And, please, I have no time to waste on a series of superfluous straw-mans; intentionally substituting the argument by pulling focus on something unreasonable and irrelevant undermines your own intelligence. — TimeLine

You're really spoiling for a fight here. Such exaggerated hostility looks feigned to me, I must say, as if you were trying to appear ridiculous.

I'm sorry, cupcake, but you haven't shown this at all. — Thorongil

>:O >:O >:O "Ms. Granger, put that hand down!"

Schopenhauer in the second Volume of WWR pulls back from the complete identification of thing-in-itself with Will. Therefore what is left after the complete abolition of the Will is nothing from the perspective of us - those still full of Will. — Agustino

If the will is independent of cognition as the thing-in-itself, one cannot within the boundaries of the intellect confirm the existence of it, ergo it would be contradictory to state otherwise and hence why it is unknowable, an immanent metaphysic that defies an empirical answer just as much as one cannot claim freedom from the will. The result is that one is condemned to a paradox. There is a transcendence from this metaphysics, but that still remains an appearance that interprets the thing-in-itself. "I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts, and hence in time, which is the form of my body's appearing, as it is of every body. Therefore, the body is the condition of knowledge of my will." He is trying to strike down our cognitive limitations while at the same time acknowledge the essence of our nature, the key being conceptual knowledge hence Ideas.

I'm sorry, cupcake, but you haven't shown this at all. — Thorongil

Here we go. You are not suddenly right because I don't have a penis. Argument, please.

If the will is independent of cognition as the thing-in-itself, one cannot within the boundaries of the intellect confirm the existence of it, ergo it would be contradictory to state otherwise and hence why it is unknowable, an immanent metaphysic that defies an empirical answer just as much as one cannot claim freedom from the will. The result is that one is condemned to a paradox. There is a transcendence from this metaphysics, but that still remains an appearance that interprets the thing-in-itself. "I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts, and hence in time, which is the form of my body's appearing, as it is of every body. Therefore, the body is the condition of knowledge of my will." He is trying to strike down our cognitive limitations while at the same time acknowledge the essence of our nature, the key being conceptual knowledge hence Ideas. — TimeLine

Have you read this post (and the one quoted from Thorongil, and then followed the discussion)?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/52614#Post_52614

You're functioning under the wrong impression that the Will is thing-in-itself. If the Will is mediated through time (BUT not through space and causality), then the Will cannot be thing-in-itself. The Will is the ground of the Phenomenon, but there is something beyond this. That's the thing-in-itself.

You need to remember that you replied to me with a purported objection that I admitted I didn't understand. So why don't you reformulate that objection as clearly and precisely as you can, and I will respond to it. Otherwise, there's nothing more for me to say.

Why? Because X. Why? Because Y. Why? Because the Will. Why? There is no more why. PSR, time, space, and causality end with after the Will. Will is ground of the phenomenal world, and it has no reason for its existence. Will is one side - thing-in-itself is the other. That's how I'd see Schopenhauer's enterprise. Veil of Maya <-> Nirvana.

Timeline's argument seems to be going the other way to me. Not that Will is the thing-in-itself per se, but rather that Will is mediated through the thing-in-itself.

Something like: without the thing-in-itself, there would be no Will, without​ Will, there would be no phenomena. As such, any instance of phenomena and the Will may be considered of the thing-in-itself, as the thing-in-itself is ground of both (in the sense of "with"; neither Will nor phenomena can be given without the thing-in-itself).

So why don't you reformulate that objection as clearly and precisely as you can, and I will respond to it. — Thorongil

You said that humans possess 'free choice' and not 'free will' before comparatively stating that by Schopenhauers' "man can do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills" that implies freedom to be nothing but a compulsion, I am confused as to how you assume choice is not a compulsion. I am of the opinion that this 'choice' you purport is an illusory representation and though conceptualisation of the will through Ideas may enable a transcendence from the cognitive limitations through his aesthetic argument as it is no longer spatiotemporally individuated, it is only a conceptualisation of the thing in-itself. The intellect is always subservient to the will.

that implies freedom to be nothing but a compulsion — TimeLine

Uh, no. I said freedom was the absence of compulsion. This could not be more crucial to understanding what I and Schopenhauer mean by freedom in this context!

I am confused as to how you assume choice is not a compulsion — TimeLine

What does this mean? Are you saying we have no choice but to choose? I can agree with that, and I think Schopenhauer would, too. My point is that one is free to deliberate on a course of action until the cows come home, but that one can only will one definite action at a time, and this with complete necessity.

The intellect is always subservient to the will. — TimeLine

Indeed it is, according to Schopenhauer. But the subservience in question is ontological in nature, in that the intellect is a manifestation of the will. The intellect must still provide motives for the will to act upon in the individual.

Something like: without the thing-in-itself, there would be no Will, without​ Will, there would be no phenomena. As such, any instance of phenomena and the Will may be considered of the thing-in-itself, as the thing-in-itself is ground of both (in the sense of "with"; neither Will nor phenomena can be given without the thing-in-itself). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, but in S's system this is non-sensical because it would imply that the thing-in-itself is the ground of the Will - this would suggest that the PSR applies to the thing-in-itself as well, which is totally contrary to the position S would hold. Since the thing-in-itself is beyond space, time, causality and the PSR, it cannot stand as ground for the Phenomenon (or for the Will) for that matter.

I don't think so. The system seems to be treating the it-in-itself not as a ground in the sense of PSR, but rather as just as something, beyond representation, which is necessarily given with Will and phenomena. A sort of metaphysic of immanent presence, where the point is not how the thing-in-itself justified everything else (i.e.PSR), but that's mutually present with anything.

If the thing-in-itself is a necessary side of the reality coin (Will being the other), how does it make sense to speak of the thing-in-itself like a realm which has no significance in relation to Will or phenomena?

While we may not be able to say exactly what the thing-in-itself is, we do know it is a necessary presence given with Will and phenomena. Though not Will or phenomena, we know the thing-in-itself is given with any instance of Will and phenomena.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the last sentence. Could you please explain? — Chany

The specific choice determinism causes the agent to choose, could change between different circumstances. Different scenarios prompt different decisions. Compatibilists believe this satisfies the ability to do otherwise. But the ability to do otherwise refers to doing otherwise, within one given circumstance.

Coercion is the use of physical force, threat or intimidation without regard for a person's desires or volition in order to obtain compliance. Using this definition, I suspect that, absent oppressive living conditions, choice coercion is more exception rather than rule. — Galuchat

Is the distinction between influence and coercion whether the agent agrees with the force's dictate? You've said that genetic disposition places limitations on the agent's choices -- much, I think, the same way that a coercive force would do, as far as efficacy is concerned. But you've identified genetic disposition as an influence, distinct from coercion.

Will is a type of choice. We make choices – but why do make choices? We are motivated, but what drives the motivation? Desire drives motivation – so what is desire? Desire is an appetite – a hunger – a predilection. An appetite can be visceral or cerebral or both. Appetites come in all shapes and sizes and various levels of intensity. Appetites as a metaphor live in our stomachs; however we also have appetites in our intellect – mind’s eye – emotions – genitals – wardrobes - etc. We sniff at something before we are ready to taste it. The sniff is the priming of the pump for our choice. Our choice is our hearts desire. We are free to will a choice, but our choices are largely determined and somewhat finite. Infinite is an abstraction we dance with, but really do not know. Our nose leads us towards a predilection, but we don’t develop an appetite until we taste. Our nose sparks our desire – that’s why pheromones are so important. We usually choose between a limited set of options. So there is freedom – but only to a degree. We have a constrained freedom amongst limited choices. Kind of like words and ideas.

Belief in free will as it is understood by libertarians (for example, Kant) consists in believing, inter alia, that whatever we have done in the past, we really could have done otherwise, even though all the conditions were just the same.

If you don't believe that, then you don't believe in free will in any sense that could justify a coherent account of moral responsibility.

The following paper deals with choice blindness (i.e., the lack of meta-awareness with regard to decision-making):

Johansson, P; Hall, L; Sikström, S; Tärning, B; Lind, A (2006). "How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection" (PDF). Consciousness and Cognition. Elsevier. 15 (4): 673–692. https://web.archive.org/web/20160605003648/https://www.lucs.lu.se/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Johansson_et_al-2006-How_Something_Can_Be_Said.pdf

What sort of free will is necessary for moral responsibility, and does ours satisfy the criterion (thus making us morally responsible)? — Sineview

This is the wrong question to ask with regard to the relationship between choice and responsibility. It presupposes responsibility and asks for a definition of free choice which provides it. I agree with presupposing responsibility (as this satisfies a fundamental human need for justice), but a better question would be: given a scientifically derived notion of human choice, how can we formulate responsibility to meet the need for justice?

Belief in free will as it is understood by libertarians (for example, Kant) consists in believing, inter alia, that whatever we have done in the past, we really could have done otherwise, even though all the conditions were just the same. — John

Has any scientific research been conducted which supports libertarian free will (the ability to do otherwise)?

Has any scientific research been conducted which supports libertarian free will (the ability to do otherwise)? — Galuchat

The past is past, so it's not something which can be scientifically tested.

I don't think so. The system seems to be treating the it-in-itself not as a ground in the sense of PSR, but rather as just as something, beyond representation, which is necessarily given with Will and phenomena. A sort of metaphysic of immanent presence, where the point is not how the thing-in-itself justified everything else (i.e.PSR), but that's mutually present with anything.

If the thing-in-itself is a necessary side of the reality coin (Will being the other), how does it make sense to speak of the thing-in-itself like a realm which has no significance in relation to Will or phenomena?

While we may not be able to say exactly what the thing-in-itself is, we do know it is a necessary presence given with Will and phenomena. Though not Will or phenomena, we know the thing-in-itself is given with any instance of Will and phenomena. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, I can agree with this.