Do you mean the word-string "snow being green" or something else? — bongo fury
Something else.
Snow being green isn't a sentence. Snow being white isn't a sentence. Vampires being immortal isn't a sentence. — Michael
Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequentisdoes correspond to a fact, — Michael
Do you mean that some alleged (truth-making) non-word-string corresponding to or referred to by the word-string "snow being white", or indeed by the word-string "snow is white", isn't a sentence? — bongo fury
So you would clarify thus:
Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequentisdoes correspond to a fact, — bongo fury
I wouldn't say that the subject of the sentence corresponds to a person. — Michael
I mean exactly what I said; that snow being green isn't a sentence. — Michael
If you don't see how my clarification might prevent people from thinking you were talking about the word string "snow being green" not being a sentence... — bongo fury
That should be obvious to any competent English speaker. Most of us understand the difference between use and mention. — Michael
Perhaps the consequent of (b) is a fact, similar to how the subject of (a) is a person. — Michael
I don't think it correct to say that the proposition is the fact. — Michael
It is not a fact that snow is green. — Michael
For the reasons given in the preceding section I now abandon the attempt to solve our problem for the language of everyday life and restrict myself henceforth entirely to formalized languages. These can be roughly characterized as artificially constructed languages in which the sense of every expression is unambiguously determined by its form.
In fact, the semantic definition of truth implies nothing regarding the conditions under which a sentence like (1):
(1) snow is white
can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence (2):
(2) the sentence "snow is white" is true.
Thus, we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain naive realists, critical realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians – whatever we were before. The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues.
You present an account of institutional facts, in which the direction of fit is word-to-world. and then jump to the non sequitur that all utterances are of this sort. They are not. — Banno
You present an argument that language is arbitrary, which in a sense it is, then jump to the non sequitur that truth is relative — Banno
Something else worth mentioning from The Semantic Conception of Truth:
In fact, the semantic definition of truth implies nothing regarding the conditions under which a sentence like (1):
(1) snow is white
can be asserted. It implies only that, whenever we assert or reject this sentence, we must be ready to assert or reject the correlated sentence (2):
(2) the sentence "snow is white" is true.
Thus, we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain naive realists, critical realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians – whatever we were before. The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues. — Michael
An interesting puzzle, though, is how, relative to a language game, truth can be absolute as well as relative. — bongo fury
It doesn't seem that either (3) or (5) can fully account for self-referential sentences. — Michael
A heap is defined as "a large number of". Large is defined as considerable. Considerable is defined as large. Definitions become circular. — RussellA
I suggest that the brain's ability to fix a single name to something that is variable is fundamentally statistical. — RussellA
Such statistically-based concepts could be readily programmed into a computer. — RussellA
I don't quite understand your use of "contingent" here. If you ask someone to tell the truth about something that happened, and the person gives you an honest reply, there is no necessity which would allow you to conclude that the person's reply is an accurate portrayal of what happened. The person might have a faulty memory, as we all do to some extent. This produces the need to allow for all sorts of varying degrees of what you call accuracy, depending on what features of the particular occurrence you are asking the person to describe. — Metaphysician Undercover
"The whole is greater than the sum of the parts" is true ≡ The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
To what does this correspond?
"Frodo walked in to Mordor" is true ≡ Frodo walked in to Mordor.
To what does this correspond?
"Frodo walked in to Sydney" is true ≡ Frodo walked in to Sydney.
To what does this correspond?
"No bachelor is married" is true ≡ No bachelor is married.
To what does this correspond?
"All bachelors are married" is true ≡ all bachelors are married.
To what does this correspond?
"This sentence is false" is true ≡ this sentence is false
To what does this correspond?
Ands so on. By the time you give an account of correspondence, there is nothing left. — Banno
P is true is just fancy talk for P. — Pie
When we talk about truth, we're referring to what people believe. Some theories provide a better answer to the question of truth than other theories. I happen to think the correspondence theory works well.
Usually when people agree that a particular statement is true, they agree on some fact of the matter. In some cases we're just speculating about the truth, or we are just giving an opinion about what we think is true. In still more cases we may express a theory that X is true, as Einstein did with the general theory of relativity. It wasn't until Eddington verified Einstein's theory that we knew the truth of the matter. Here of course truth is connected with knowledge, not just an opinion or speculation.
If you want to learn what truth is, then study how the concept is used in a wide variety of situations, i.e., in our forms of life. Think about people disagreeing about political or economic views, they're disagreeing about the facts associated with these views. Most don't know enough to recognize what facts make their belief true or false, so their disagreeing over opinions, and some are willing to kill over their opinions, but I digress.
What's true can also refer to possible worlds, and to works of fiction. So, there can be facts associated with things that aren't even real. Anything we do is associated with some fact, and as such it can be associated with what we believe.
There is definitely the concept of truth, so it's not as though the concept doesn't exist, or that it doesn't have a place within our various linguistic contexts.
Insight is gained by looking carefully at the various uses of these concepts. The problem is that many people want exactness where there is none, at least not in some absolute across the board sense. There are some absolutes when it comes to truth, but those absolutes are relative to a particular context. — Sam26
Not exactly. — Michael
We have material adequacy:
For any sentence p, p is true if and only if ϕ
and we tie meaning down by sticking to one sentence, so that the meaning cannot be ambiguous. We name the sentence on one side, and use it on the other.
"p" is true if and only if p
...and hey, presto, we have a definition of truth. — Banno
"Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact.
— Banno
So this is what you now say.
"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing on the right is a fact.
— Banno
In light of your new reflections, then, do you endorse the following clarification?
"The cat is on the mat" is true ≡ The cat is on the mat
The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact. — bongo fury
The thing represented by the sentence on the right is a fact. — bongo fury
I. "Snow is white" is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while "snow is white" represents a fact, it is not a fact.
II. That snow is white is not a fact, because facts are things in the world, and so while that snow is white represents a fact, it is not a fact. — Banno
I didn't want to reply in your thread, since it's an exegesis, so I replied here. — Sam26
That should be obvious to any competent English speaker. Most of us understand the difference between use and mention.
— Michael
I disagree. Never mind. — bongo fury
(T) X is true if, and only if, p.
We shall call any such equivalence (with 'p' replaced by any sentence of the language to which the word "true" refers, and 'X' replaced by a name of this sentence) an "equivalence of the form (T)."
Now at last we are able to put into a precise form the conditions under which we will consider the usage and the definition of the term "true" as adequate from the material point of view: we wish to use the term "true" in such a way that all equivalences of the form (T) can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth "adequate" if all these equivalences follow from it.
It should be emphasized that neither the expression (T) itself (which is not a sentence, but only a schema of a sentence) nor any particular instance of the form (T) can be regarded as a definition of truth. We can only say that every equivalence of the form (T) obtained by replacing 'p' by a particular sentence, and 'X' by a name of this sentence, may be considered a partial definition of truth, which explains wherein the truth of this one individual sentence consists. The general definition has to be, in a certain sense, a logical conjunction of all these partial definitions. — The Semantic Conception of Truth
"p" is true ≡ p
(5) for all p, 'p' is a true sentence if and only if p.
But the above sentence could not serve as a general definition of the expression 'x is a true sentence' because the totality of possible substitutions for the symbol 'x' is here restricted to quotation-mark names.
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