Are you serious or sarcastic right now? I think solipsism being true would be the end of any sort of science.

You don't just have my word, you have my argument, which I've made over my past posts on this thread. The heart of that argument is that the question of what reality is and whether or not objective reality exists is not a scientific question, it is a metaphysical, i.e. a philosophical, one. The answer to the question is in philosophy, not science. Scientists are not generally very good metaphysicians.

There's not much more I can say. If you don't get it or you disagree, there's no place else for this conversation to go.

Also - note the poster in the second Quora link you provided agrees with my position, although Quora is not generally considered an authoritative source. You'll find all sorts of inconsistencies and disagreements there. — T Clark

Which link was that one?

Are you serious or sarcastic right now? I think solipsism being true would be the end of any sort of science. — Darkneos

There aren't any quantum theories that assert solipsism afaik.

Are you serious or sarcastic right now? I think solipsism being true would be the end of any sort of science. — Darkneos

I think many people see in the speculative work of QM an opening for idealism (which some people interpret as solipsism).

Philosopher Bernardo Kastrup says something like QM demonstrates that materialism is incoherent - all which exists is mind (consciousness), held and made coherent by a form of cosmic consciousness ( - not the god of traditional theism, closer to Schopenhauer's notion of pure will).

From his blog:

In quantum mechanics we have the idea of the wave function – Schrödinger’s equation – which is an expression of all the states that are possible, and when we take a measurement, we say that it collapses – this is a bad term, I know, but it is ubiquitous, so I shall use it – into a particular state. But a measurement is already a representation – an appearance. It is what happens when the world as it is interacts with us. What we can measure is never going to be the world as it is in itself.

So what quantum physics is telling us is that matter has no stand-alone reality. Matter is how the world appears to us when we measure it, when we interact with it, when we observe it – whatever word you prefer to use. As to what is behind that appearance, we cannot visualise it as anything material or physical because all the parameters used to exhaustively describe what we call material things are observables. The best we can know about the world as it is, is the quantum wave function, which is a statistical thing – a wave of possibilities.

This is what we have to get through our heads. Quantum mechanics has been around since the early 20th century, but we have been stubbornly refusing to accept what it is showing us. If we abandon the need to preserve the intuition that matter has a stand-alone existence, then everything that we consider a great puzzle in quantum mechanics – the great paradoxes of non-locality and indeterminacy, etc. – immediately resolve. There is no great mystery here. The mystery is our stubbornness in trying to hold on to a failed intuition.

I read through his stuff and all his thoughts inevitably lead to solipsism the same way that idealism does. Like you have to have MAJOR cognitive dissonance to say idealism doesn't lead to solipsism.

Not really. Kastrup is very clear it is not solipsism and it certainly doesn't read this way to me. But you need to read the full account. I know some people share your view, but I don't see solipsism at all - just as others can't see anything but solipsism.

The clue is in the notion of universal mind. All of reality is held by this mind and you and all beings are 'dissociated alters' of this one great cosmic consciousness. Solipsism by contrast is the argument that only you exist. For Kastrup and perhaps Schopenhauer, it would be closer to say you don't really exist, so solipsism isn't even on the table.

the notion of universal mind — Tom Storm

Brains-in-vat / simulation hypothesis.

Which link was that one? — Darkneos

https://qr.ae/pveiQo — Darkneos

Yes, I think the simulation hypothesis is a techno-idealism for the current era. Certainly how Donald Hoffman reads to me.

I've not immersed myself in this world but would you know off hand just who are the candidates supposedly behind these notions of simulation? Is it generally some kind of organic programmer, or are we part of an endless recursion of IT simulations?

So what about the Wigner's friend experiment.

https://qr.ae/pveiQl

Not really. Kastrup is very clear it is not solipsism and it certainly doesn't read this way to me. But you need to read the full account. I know some people share your view, but I don't see solipsism at all - just as others can't see anything but solipsism.

The clue is in the notion of universal mind. All of reality is held by this mind and you and all beings are 'dissociated alters' of this one great cosmic consciousness. Solipsism by contrast is the argument that only you exist. For Kastrup and perhaps Schopenhauer, it would be closer to say you don't really exist, so solipsism isn't even on the table. — Tom Storm

I'm aware of his argument. I join the forum that was linked from his website, but when I started arguing how their line of reasoning inevitably leads to solipsism none of them could give a good argument as to why it's not. IMO the guy is too stupid to really understand the conclusions his view leads to.

Kastrup just speculates something he cannot validate, a universal mind. Not to mention badly butchering quantum mechanics by thinking consciousness is involved at all.

Idealism inevitably leads to solipsism. Berkley couldn't escape it and neither did Kastrup.

So what about the Wigner's friend experiment. — Darkneos

There are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. It is my understanding that there is no empirical way to determine which, if any, are correct, even in principle. Questions which can't be answered empirically are not science.

It is my understanding that there is no empirical way to determine which, if any, are correct, even in principle — T Clark

That's not true.

Did you read what he said about the experiment and how it invites questions about our reality.

That's not true. — frank

From the August 2022 edition of "Skeptical Inquirer." Thanks to @Gnomon for the quote.

Let that sink in : there is no way to empirically tell apart different interpretations of quantum mechanics. One might even suspect that this isn't really science. It smells more like . . . metaphysics. — Massimo Pigliucci

Pigliucci is a philosopher of science at City College of New York.

Did you read what he said about the experiment and how it invites questions about our reality. — Darkneos

I've said it before. I'll say it again. Questions about the nature of our reality are not science.

Idealism inevitably leads to solipsism. Berkley couldn't escape it and neither did Kastrup. — Darkneos

Not sure how you are getting that. Can you describe how idealism leads to solipsism? For me idealism may lead to deism or theism.

There's no way yet. It hasn't been established that there's no way in principle.

Helpful video. I now "understand" the experiment Andrew M was trying to explain to me over in the truth thread, and it — sadly or happily — connects to the discussion I'm having with @Metaphysician Undercover about past, future, alethic modalities and determinateness. Was so hoping I could stay out of quantum stuff, but I guess I'll have to give up that dream. — Srap Tasmaner

:up:

I haven't watched all of this, because I try not to think about quantum mechanics, but Alastair Wilson has interesting things to say about the relation between physics and metaphysics as someone near the frontlines. — Srap Tasmaner

I see that Wilson combines Many Worlds and David Lewis' modal realism. Lewis gave a lecture on quantum mechanics in 2001 titled, "How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?" He discussed one possibility of evidence for Many Worlds (see also discussion here):

We noted that our various versions of quantum mechanics with collapse were, near
enough, empirically equivalent. But this equivalence does not extend to the no-collapse
hypothesis. If it is true, each of us will eventually gain evidence that supports it. When you
find yourself still alive after facing repeated danger, and you have far outlived the people
around you, that is just what you should have expected under no-collapse quantum
mechanics, according to the corrected intensity rule. However it is an enormously improbable occurrence under quantum mechanics with collapse. Thus no-collapse quantum
mechanics has enjoyed a predictive success which quantum mechanics with collapse fails
to match. Thus you have gained evidence against collapse.

Do you think the idea of a collapse is on the way out?

There's no way yet. It hasn't been established that there's no way in principle. — frank

It's seems clear to me from the quote that Pigliucci means it can't be done. Before I read that, I had thought it was still an open question. Perhaps that's true, but, to me, it's beside the point. You wrote "You're wrong." I showed you a credible opinion by a qualified person that says I'm right. Although I'm willing to acknowledge that the issue may not be resolved, I think I've established that the position I've advocated in this discussion is a reasonable one.

If someone claims we don't presently have the means to test theories, that's just an observation, and a correct one.

If someone wants to claim that no quantum theories can be tested even in principle, that's a positive claim and requires some support. It's a strong claim, so it needs strong support.

You just misunderstood the quote, that's all. No biggie.

If someone wants to claim that no quantum theories can be tested even in principle, that's a positive claim and requires some support. It's a strong claim, so it needs strong support.

You just misunderstood the quote, that's all. No biggie. — frank

It's clear to me I've made my point no matter how obstinate you are. Nuff said.

It's clear to me I've made my point no matter how obstinate you are. Nuff said. — T Clark

As Banno would say, you're unavailable for learning. :sad:

Can you describe how idealism leads to solipsism? — Tom Storm

Berkeley says "to be is to be perceived" and this seems to presuppose "self-perceived being" that cannot perceive other selves only ("ideas of") bodies, etc (i.e. as @Banno has said, IIRC, 'idealism implies that only what can be known (directly) is real and therefore solipsism – only oneself is real – because one only knows oneself as / to be a self'). Of course, subjective idealism is only one flavor ...

I think, in the Western tradition, idealism-solipsism goes back to, or starts with, Neoplatonism wherein only the One is real and all others are merely "emenations" (ideas) of One (nous) – in the Eastern tradition, Brahman-maya or Eternal Dao-ten thousand things or etc – the"ipse" is god ("the monad"), not an ego. Anyway, I gave 'solipsism presupposes idealism' a go here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/724292

I've not immersed myself in this world but would you know off hand just who are the candidates supposedly behind these notions of simulation? Is it generally some kind of organic programmer, or are we part of an endless recursion of IT simulations? — Tom Storm

I haven't a clue but I've recently speculated about that on a thread discussing 2001: A Spece Odyssey.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/741138

I've said it before. I'll say it again. Questions about our reality are not science. — T Clark

:fire:

Thanks. For idealism to avoid solipsism it needs to postulate an entity like mind-at-large, Will, (or in Berkeley's case, God) - who is the guarantor of external reality, providing coherence and predictability, which present, I imagine, as the laws of physics and stable material objects. Which for me seems that most versions invoke some kind of deity or even a Paul Tillich ground-of-being style theism.

Interesting. Though not fully versed with Berkeleys thought i get the general gist. But if you’re right in his representation of the idea of god then something needs to be said regarding coherence and predictability as you mentioned.

Coherence I take to as signifying meaning from the subjects point of view and where this falls short so does predictability as you put it.

Though meaning in terms of modern science can be subject to interpretation as per quantum mechanics or even relativity as postulated by Einstein but even this is not as strange as QM

Yep. Just noticed the SEP has this:

"Within modern philosophy there are sometimes taken to be two fundamental conceptions of idealism:

- something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
- although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

Idealism in sense (1) has been called “metaphysical” or “ontological idealism”, while idealism in sense (2) has been called “formal” or “epistemological idealism”. The modern paradigm of idealism in sense (1) might be considered to be George Berkeley’s “immaterialism”, according to which all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them."

I think, in the Western tradition, idealism-solipsism goes back to, or starts with, Neoplatonism wherein only the One is real and all others are merely "emenations" (ideas) of One (nous) — 180 Proof

The Nous is the first emanation of the One. It's along the lines of the divine mind. There's no solipsism in there.

That is your conclusion frank. But again it’s subject to interpretation if there is only divine mind and we’re all manifestations of it then solipsism has a case.

Should I elaborate ?