That's your interpretation and you're sticking to it it seems. I don't read it that way. To me he seems to be saying that the whole of what we call existence or reality is an 'empirical simulation". The notions *reality* and *existence* have their genesis, and derive their sense from within that "simulation", so it appears that he is trying to make the point that since that whole simulation is a "convenient fiction" we should not impute reality or existence in any imagined "absolute" sense to the entities that are therein encountered.

Except he is imputing reality or existence to such things by suggesting them to be a useful fiction, your interpretation doesn't follow from his words. The only conclusion he is getting at is others aren't real hence why regarding their existence is a useful fiction. You're reading what isn't there into his words.

Then there is stuff on quantum monism that he clearly doesn't understand (in fact I don't think he even understands it at all) since quantum monism is a form of quantum realism not either or. Though thats all I understood from the bottom link.

https://platofootnote.wordpress.com/2016/10/11/the-problem-of-wave-function-ontology/#:~:text=There%20are%20two%20types%20of,level%20is%20a%20field%20in

It should also be noted that the many worlds view of QM he seems to be favoring is a minority view.

The notions *reality* and *existence* have their genesis, and derive their sense from within that "simulation", — Janus

Yes. We are all in this story together.

Except he is imputing reality or existence to such things by suggesting them to be a useful fiction, your interpretation doesn't follow from his words. — Darkneos

OK, I disagree, but I can't be bothered arguing with you, since it seems obvious you lack subtlety, and like to opine on subjects you know little about (QM).

Yes. We are all in this story together. — T Clark

Exactly!

How do simulations help explain what is real?

One argument might go: "it's all simulation, therefore nothing is real"; but then, the simulation would be what is real...

So that's no use.

The suggestion that we live in a simulation is surely facile...?

I don't lack subtlety but there is nothing in his quote to imply what you're suggesting. How can referring to other people as a useful fiction for purposes of navigation mean anything other than implying that they aren't real. When you call something a fiction you either imply it's not real or are pretending as such for some other purpose. But in either instance it's acknowledging that it isn't real hence calling it fiction.

By no definition of the word fiction is your interpretation supported. It's tacking on too many things that aren't supported by it.

Yes. We are all in this story together. — T Clark

Not according to him.

:up:
If "it's all simulation and therefore nothing is real", then the simulation is also not real. :smirk:

A simulation isn't reality so if everything is a simulation then it therefor would not be real and by extension not matter.

It's why I dont get why folks would refer to others as a useful ficiton.

If "it's all simulation and therefore nothing is real", then the simulation is also not real. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Yeah, an inconsistency that shows the logic of the argument to be fundamentally flawed. That there is stuff - reality - is fundamental to any discussion.

A simulation isn't reality so if everything is a simulation then it therefor would not be real and by extension not matter. — Darkneos

It's a real simulation, not a pretend one...:wink:

Are you arguing that there are no real simulations...?

Back to the incoherence in the title: if nothing is real, then this very discussion, about what is or isn't real, cannot get going. Universal scepticism undermines itself.

The suggestion that we live in a simulation is surely facile...? — Banno

I think it's arguable, I would even say obvious, that we do live in a collective representation that we have all been inducted into since birth via socialization. It doesn't follow that nothing real is going on, or that there is nothing "outside" of that collective representation, but it does follow that anything we can say, propositionally speaking, can only be in the terms of that collective representation and only finds its relevance within that context.

On the other hand. in terms of our perceptual lives, we all live outside of that representation (even if we never notice it); whatever we can say propositionally is always in terms of collectively generated abstractions which are hopelessly inadequate to the complexity and subtlety of living perception. Anyone who has ever practiced meditation, consumed psychedelics or seriously practices (for example) the discipline of writing poetry or painting notices that this is immediately evident.

I don't lack subtlety but there is nothing in his quote to imply what you're suggesting. — Darkneos

Have a read of this by the same author and see what you think.

A potted summation of Wittgenstein's distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown.

To which we might add Davidson's point that if we never leave the representation then the notion that it is a representation is pointless. As with universal scepticism, the very idea of ubiquitous representation undermines itself.

Covering old ground.

To which we might add Davidson's point that if we never leave the representation — Banno

But we do "leave the representation" all the time, as I noted, in our perceptual lives. It is necessary to remember that, lest a sense of the importance of the inner lives of individuals be lost. Looks like the so-called "old ground" has not been sufficiently excavated and examined.

...in our perceptual lives... — Janus

...as if this were a distinction that could be made firm. You yourself point out that it "only finds its relevance within that context".

Don't both you and @Darkneos start at individual phenomena, and so never escape solipsism? It's not a representation that is collective, but the world; Perhaps there is no "inner" life, any more than there is an "uninterpreted" reality.

But at least now the tread has moved from physics to metaphysics.

I don't start at solipsism, I don't believe it. I'm just saying what words like that lead to.

...as if this were a distinction that could be made firm. You yourself point out that it "only finds its relevance within that context".

Don't both you and Darkneos start at individual phenomena, and so never escape solipsism? It's not a representation that is collective, but the world; Perhaps there is no "inner" life, any more than there is an "uninterpreted" reality.

But at last now the tread has moved from physics to metaphysics. — Banno

It's a distinction which is self-evident. When I say it only finds its relevance within that context, I am speaking strictly of propositional discourse. I would not say that about the arts and the inner lives of individuals in general. Why you apparently would want to deny or eliminate the inner lives of individuals or deny their significance is beyond my understanding.

Yes, the so-called "external world" is a collective representation, but the internal world is not. I don't deny that our common culture may enrich, and certainly mediates, at least in "ordinary" states of consciousness, the inner lives of individuals, but it seems to me it goes both ways; the inner lives of individuals also enrich our common culture, in fact without those inner lives and imaginations there would be no common culture of any value to speak about.

Still supports my original point of view as what he is arguing for is still essentially solipsism.

Even arguing that your phenomena are noumena is just wrong. All you have is sense experience with no way to truly verify it thus making the external world (or the lack of one) belief only. It's the one thing I despise about it.

But again it's still just more misunderstandings about quantum physics and in the end trying to cop out of solipsism which his words support with an argument that is just wrong.

So no, his words still back that he is suggesting others aren't real. If you read through it all you'll see he doesn't really say otherwise, just mentions "under this view X would be wrong" but that doesn't make the view true nor does that invalidate his previous points or post.

You say I lack subtlety but I think at this point you're just digging and running into the same issues of trying to get him to say other that what he is clearly implying. Sometimes things just are what they appear.

I don't start at solipsism — Darkneos

When you take first-person phenomena - observation - as your starting point, including others becomes problematic, as it seems you have found.

But instead, if one starts with the world as a collaborative construction from its contents, that there are other folk is not problematic.

So i'm suggesting that a reliance on phenomenology leads to solipsism.

It's a distinction which is self-evident. — Janus

Never a good place to start.

Why you apparently would want to deny or eliminate the inner lives of individuals or deny their significance is beyond my understanding. — Janus

I'm not. I'm asking why the posited inner life could not be as much a social construction as the self.

So i'm suggesting that a reliance on phenomenology leads to solipsism. — Banno

No, paying attention to your perceptual life and practicing phenomenology are just alternative approaches to knowledge; nothing to do with solipsism or dogma of any kind except perhaps in your feverish imagination.

It's a distinction which is self-evident. — Janus


Never a good place to start. — Banno

Not for you apparently. Do you consider yourself an authority to speak on behalf of others?

I'm not. I'm asking why the posited inner life could not be as much a social construction as the self. — Banno

Social construction is too strong. Just as the real (what would still be if there were no humans) is not entirely socially constructed (a point which you as a realist must surely agree with) so our perceptual and inner lives (what would be in the absence of other humans) are not entirely socially constructed. "Constructed" is an unhelpful and even misleading term: 'mediated' is better.

When you take first-person phenomena - observation - as your starting point, including others becomes problematic, as it seems you have found.

But instead, if one starts with the world as a collaborative construction from its contents, that there are other folk is not problematic.

So i'm suggesting that a reliance on phenomenology leads to solipsism. — Banno

Again you misunderstand just like with the Wigner's friend experiment.

I'm not saying I start from solipsism because I don't believe in it. Solipsism is pure belief, not fact. Starting from first-person phenomenon doesn't make including others problematic. Quite the opposite in fact as it's a more expedient explanation than why everything is the way it is and why others like you are around, etc etc. In short NO, starting from a first person perspective including others doesn't become problematic, and no I didn't find that. Where did I ever say that?

But like I said that's not my starting point, I'm just about about what the guy I linked to's logic leads to.

Oui, QM does imply, given some necessary logical connections are established, that nothing is real. The seed for the following is ever-present in QM:

Nothing exists.

Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it.

Even if something can be known about it, it cannot be communicated.

Even if it can be communicated, it cannot be understood. — Gorgias

:sparkle: :victory:

Hey! A dead cat from QM sings"nothing is real" ...

Living is easy with eyes closed
Misunderstanding
all you see

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5lUZvNljHU8

:up:

You're making it more complex than it needs to be. To refer to something as fiction is by definition to say it's not real. So when he's saying that the notion of other people is a useful fiction is implying that they aren't real. Read what he said. — Darkneos

I’m not arguing against the implication that ‘other people’ aren’t ‘real’ as such, because I don’t think it’s as important as you might think. I’m arguing that what IS ‘real’ with regard to the notion of ‘other people’ is merely evidence or measurements of their existence in potentiality: ‘other people’ exist and are useful (different to convenient) in this non-real, non-verifiable, conceptual or fictional structure in terms of how we interact with the world.

Real does not necessarily determine existence. This is outdated thinking. Energy and other people are far more complex than mere measurement/observation would suggest. Recognising this enables us to manage our uncertainty and prediction error.

By no definition of the word fiction is your interpretation supported. It's tacking on too many things that aren't supported by it. — Darkneos

You’re oversimplifying. If I write a biography based on limited information I have about someone long dead, gleaned from multiple second and third-hand sources, we would call it ‘non-fiction’, but is it therefore ‘real’?

I'm not saying I start from solipsism — Darkneos

Nor am I saying that you presume solipsism, but that it is a consequence of the presumed primacy of experience.

Not for you apparently. Do you consider yourself an authority to speak on behalf of others? — Janus

Is that what they call a rhetorical question? :smile:

It could certainly be interpreted that way. :wink:

To be serious, I consider all approaches to be semiotic, either explicitly or implicitly or even despite themselves, just in virtue of the fact that they all work with signs and symbols. Each approach yields its own set of possible results, or in a dialectic key, its own set of theses, antitheses and syntheses. I don't tend to think in terms of one size fits all, but that said, for any given aim, it certainly seems some approaches will work better than others.

To be serious, I consider all approaches to be semiotic — Janus

The advantage lies in making explicit that truth or reality are what the process of inquiry arrives at in its asymptotic limit. True is true, and real is real, once any further quibbling ceases to make a pragmatic difference. Once we cease to want to act differently.

Applying that to the OP, you could say the purpose of quantum theory is to recover Newtonian mechanics in its classical limit. That is what guides the framing of the maths.

So it is not about which is true - that Newtonian mechanics is true, or that quantum field theory is true.

It is about the dialectical certainty of being able to define how one is to be found in the dichotomous limit of the other.

Reality is both local and nonlocal. Or as is better put these days, it is local and contextual. Quantum theory takes us forward in being able to treat these two as opposing limits on ontological being - something we can concretely measure, and indeed recover from each other as measurable limits.

Of course, QFT still needs to be united with GR – as the dichotomy of the contents and the container – under QG. Or a quantum gravity theory of everything.

So the bottom of quantum theory has yet to be reached. We can recover the Newtonian classical limit from both QFT and GR, but not – in a way that yet satisfies folk – in a full QG sense.

Anyway, if classical physics appears to deny nonlocality, and quantum physics appears to demand it, then this is just a dialectical metaphysics in action. And Peircean semiotics – like any systems approach – is designed to live in that precise intellectual space.