The question for me is not to do with pursuing practical reasons. Not even in the Kantian sense; I never found the idea that we are warranted in believing in Freedom, Immortality and God for practical (in this context meaning 'moral') reasons convincing. — John
It's more to do with whether it is valuable to believe (in the sense of 'live according to') what is genuinely believed to be true just on account of the fact that we do genuinely believe it is true, or is it just that we cannot help believing what we genuinely believe to be true. — John
Is it more important to be authentic than it is to be happy in, for example, believing what we know to be comforting but quite likely false (given that we are capable of doing that)? — John
Why are practical reasons things we should try to pursue? I don't understand these sorts of questions and arguments because I don't understand how you can use language to predicate things you think are significant and then afterwards ask questions about the word "truth". — Noble Dust
Even if you could know (per impossibile) that religion is false, and yet you were nonetheless able (per impossibile) to believe that it is true, and to do so would greatly enhance your joy of living, would it then be wrong somehow to believe? — John
I'll take a weird side-road here and say that I think both are true. Authenticity is the ultimate reality, in a way...right? Inauthenticity is reproachable; it's the worst. It's disgusting. But...I think back to what I said recently in another thread, when quoting Dostoevsky: "I admit that twice two makes four is an excellent thing, but if we are to give everything its due, twice two makes five is sometimes a very charming thing too." My interpretation of Dostoevsky here is that the free will of the individual trumps rationality. Rationality has nothing to say in the face of blithe free thought, other than "you're an idiot!". And in this sense, irrationality wins. Free thought ultimately is not specifically rational. Rationality is a component of free thought, not it's predicate. — Noble Dust
Even if you could know (per impossibile) that religion is false, and yet you were nonetheless able (per impossibile) to believe that it is true, and to do so would greatly enhance your joy of living, would it then be wrong somehow to believe? — John
Yes, is not much of what we take to be "rational" precisely the inauthentic voice of "das Man", or 'the they" to quote Heidegger. The second part of your passage here seems to be reflecting that idea somewhat. — John
The point of the thought experiment is to focus on the question of whether it could be somehow in itself wrong to believe what we really feel deep down in our hearts is false, despite the fact that believing gives great comfort and even enhances life. I — John
This sounds like the Buddhist or Hindu idea of going for satchitananda over transient worldly pleasure or merely comforting belief. How many, if any, actually achieve it, though? — John
I would say that the hardships of discipline require unwavering belief and also offer their own kinds of comfort. — John
.I say it requires belief because if you are not already there, then how do you know it is a real possibility and not a mere chimera? How could you know you are not merely wasting your life? — John
These kinds of things can never be confirmed intersubjectively, though. What one chooses to believe and why one chooses to believe it are deeply personal matters. — John
But, the whole business about belief being deeply personal always leaves me cold. Belief is just the basic framework of how we all see the world we live in. Sure, it's personal. But that aspect of it that relates to our personality doesn't avail itself to any value. The personal nature of humanity obtains it's own value, if that makes sense. The particular beliefs of individuals has no value; value exists in the person, not in the belief. — Noble Dust
"How we all see"; that is intersubjectivity. — John
I agree with you that what is deeply personally believed acquires its vale by virtue of its being deeply personally believed. But then the troubling question is; did Hitler deeply personally believe in his worldview? — John
I don't really see why the idea of belief being deeply personal should leave you cold. It is through personality that belief acquires its warmth, I would say. To believe something on account of intersubjective pressure is what sucks the warmth, the viscerality out of believing, as I see it. — John
This is an important point, and it signifies exactly this: belief is neutral, and not inherently positive. — Noble Dust
The particular beliefs of individuals has no value; value exists in the person, not in the belief. — Noble Dust
what people are is determined by what they believe. — John
I'm not sure what you mean by "definition of the person". — John
It's common enough to say that people are defined by what they do. — John
It corresponded to your phrase "what people are". — Noble Dust
I'm not sure I buy this notion. So it's common; so what? Defined in what way? Sometimes actions aren't visible; it may be true philosophically that actions determine motives, but only visible actions determine how someone is defined by the community or the society. Actions not seen (or "non-actions") can reveal just as much about a person...except for the fact that those actions aren't seen. — Noble Dust
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