The question for me is not to do with pursuing practical reasons. Not even in the Kantian sense; I never found the idea that we are warranted in believing in Freedom, Immortality and God for practical (in this context meaning 'moral') reasons convincing. — John

I wasn't saying that; my use of "practical reasons" was a quote of you, and the use of the term was negative in both contexts (your use and mine).

It's more to do with whether it is valuable to believe (in the sense of 'live according to') what is genuinely believed to be true just on account of the fact that we do genuinely believe it is true, or is it just that we cannot help believing what we genuinely believe to be true. — John

Your language here is hard to parse; are you saying "is earnest belief valuable, or can we just not help being earnest?" That's how I read it. As such, it doesn't make a lot of sense, so I must be misreading it.

Is it more important to be authentic than it is to be happy in, for example, believing what we know to be comforting but quite likely false (given that we are capable of doing that)? — John

I'll take a weird side-road here and say that I think both are true. Authenticity is the ultimate reality, in a way...right? Inauthenticity is reproachable; it's the worst. It's disgusting. But...I think back to what I said recently in another thread, when quoting Dostoevsky: "I admit that twice two makes four is an excellent thing, but if we are to give everything its due, twice two makes five is sometimes a very charming thing too." My interpretation of Dostoevsky here is that the free will of the individual trumps rationality. Rationality has nothing to say in the face of blithe free thought, other than "you're an idiot!". And in this sense, irrationality wins. Free thought ultimately is not specifically rational. Rationality is a component of free thought, not it's predicate.

Also, John, you didn't address this:

Why are practical reasons things we should try to pursue? I don't understand these sorts of questions and arguments because I don't understand how you can use language to predicate things you think are significant and then afterwards ask questions about the word "truth". — Noble Dust

Hopefully this, quoted from here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1469/discussion-three-types-of-atheism#Item_31

Even if you could know (per impossibile) that religion is false, and yet you were nonetheless able (per impossibile) to believe that it is true, and to do so would greatly enhance your joy of living, would it then be wrong somehow to believe? — John

will help to clarify what I meant.

I'll take a weird side-road here and say that I think both are true. Authenticity is the ultimate reality, in a way...right? Inauthenticity is reproachable; it's the worst. It's disgusting. But...I think back to what I said recently in another thread, when quoting Dostoevsky: "I admit that twice two makes four is an excellent thing, but if we are to give everything its due, twice two makes five is sometimes a very charming thing too." My interpretation of Dostoevsky here is that the free will of the individual trumps rationality. Rationality has nothing to say in the face of blithe free thought, other than "you're an idiot!". And in this sense, irrationality wins. Free thought ultimately is not specifically rational. Rationality is a component of free thought, not it's predicate. — Noble Dust

Yes, is not much of what we take to be "rational" precisely the inauthentic voice of "das Man", or 'the they" to quote Heidegger. The second part of your passage here seems to be reflecting that idea somewhat.

Sorry, I wasn't saying that practical reasons, in themselves, are things we should try to pursue, so I didn't understand the relevance of the question.

Even if you could know (per impossibile) that religion is false, and yet you were nonetheless able (per impossibile) to believe that it is true, and to do so would greatly enhance your joy of living, would it then be wrong somehow to believe? — John

Now, I have a problem with these theoretical posits. You say "per impossible", and I say, "yes, it's all impossible, the things you describe". So, I don't see how this is even an argument. Forgive me, I don't mean it to sound so harsh, because this is something I see a lot in philosophy in general. But, basically, why make an argument that's actually impossible? What does it achieve?

Yes, is not much of what we take to be "rational" precisely the inauthentic voice of "das Man", or 'the they" to quote Heidegger. The second part of your passage here seems to be reflecting that idea somewhat. — John

I don't know Heidegger, but I'll got with it. The bits I've read of him weren't disagreeable for me.

The point of the thought experiment is to focus on the question of whether it could be somehow in itself wrong to believe what we really feel deep down in our hearts is false, despite the fact that believing gives great comfort and even enhances life. I believe that many people are able to compartmentalize their minds in such ways as to do exactly that. But if you are not interested in pursuing this line of inquiry, that's no problem.

The point of the thought experiment is to focus on the question of whether it could be somehow in itself wrong to believe what we really feel deep down in our hearts is false, despite the fact that believing gives great comfort and even enhances life. I — John

Ok, so, comfort over truth? I vote truth. But I vote truth because I think something as basic as "comfort" is a mild form of the various experiences and states of possible consciousness that are subsumed under "truth". I realize that's some arcane language. Basically, truth is the hierarchical primary thing, and "comfort" would be somewhere down on the scale.

This sounds like the Buddhist or Hindu idea of going for satchitananda over transient worldly pleasure or merely comforting belief. How many, if any, actually achieve it, though? I would say that the hardships of discipline require unwavering belief and also offer their own kinds of comfort.I say it requires belief because if you are not already there, then how do you know it is a real possibility and not a mere chimera? How could you know you are not merely wasting your life?

These kinds of things can never be confirmed intersubjectively, though. What one chooses to believe and why one chooses to believe it are deeply personal matters.

This sounds like the Buddhist or Hindu idea of going for satchitananda over transient worldly pleasure or merely comforting belief. How many, if any, actually achieve it, though? — John

Well, again, my autodidactic stance shows itself. I don't know anything about that. But the question of how many can achieve a state of devotion to truth, and truth only, is a hard question. Even for myself, I adhere to the idea intellectually, but not often in my every day life. I routinely indulge in pleasures and distractions that add no value to my life, even to a detrimental effect.

I would say that the hardships of discipline require unwavering belief and also offer their own kinds of comfort. — John

Eh, I agree to some extent, but I also think discipline comes with personality. I have a personality of not being disciplined; my older brother, for instance, is way more disciplined. This is a typical meme, if not scientifically backed; the older sibling is the disciplined one. In any case, I don't think discipline is just something spiritual; I think discipline is something many people seem to innately possess, and it's use is far-ranging, not just for spiritual discipline.

.I say it requires belief because if you are not already there, then how do you know it is a real possibility and not a mere chimera? How could you know you are not merely wasting your life? — John

Well, I don't know, you can't really say one way or another. This doesn't particularly bother me.

These kinds of things can never be confirmed intersubjectively, though. What one chooses to believe and why one chooses to believe it are deeply personal matters. — John

You've used the word "intersubjective" before, and I'm not sure what you mean by it. I'd like to know.

But, the whole business about belief being deeply personal always leaves me cold. Belief is just the basic framework of how we all see the world we live in. Sure, it's personal. But that aspect of it that relates to our personality doesn't avail itself to any value. The personal nature of humanity obtains it's own value, if that makes sense. The particular beliefs of individuals has no value; value exists in the person, not in the belief.

But, the whole business about belief being deeply personal always leaves me cold. Belief is just the basic framework of how we all see the world we live in. Sure, it's personal. But that aspect of it that relates to our personality doesn't avail itself to any value. The personal nature of humanity obtains it's own value, if that makes sense. The particular beliefs of individuals has no value; value exists in the person, not in the belief. — Noble Dust

"How we all see"; that is intersubjectivity. How I see, or how you see; that is subjectivity, or personailty. I agree with you that what is deeply personally believed acquires its vale by virtue of its being deeply personally believed. But then the troubling question is; did Hitler deeply personally believe in his worldview?

I don't really see why the idea of belief being deeply personal should leave you cold. It is through personality that belief acquires its warmth, I would say. To believe something on account of intersubjective pressure is what sucks the warmth, the viscerality out of believing, as I see it. This is just the question of authenticity and inauthenticity in a different guise.

"How we all see"; that is intersubjectivity. — John

Ok. I can at least go with that for now.

I agree with you that what is deeply personally believed acquires its vale by virtue of its being deeply personally believed. But then the troubling question is; did Hitler deeply personally believe in his worldview? — John

Oh, of course he did. Absolutely. This is an important point, and it signifies exactly this: belief is neutral, and not inherently positive. So, if belief is neutral, this suggests that there could be "right" and "wrong" beliefs. It seems pretty simple to me; I've always felt that this doesn't need to be a complex philosophical issue. Hitler believed in his view; Churchill believed in his view. Now, who was "right"? How do you go about making your claim about who was right?

I don't really see why the idea of belief being deeply personal should leave you cold. It is through personality that belief acquires its warmth, I would say. To believe something on account of intersubjective pressure is what sucks the warmth, the viscerality out of believing, as I see it. — John

Ok, so what I mean is that the less philosophical jargon of "whatever you believe is your truth! That's the truth! For you!" Is what leaves me cold. I guess I was reading your post that way, but you probably didn't mean that. I have a tendency to be too intuitive with my posts.

Unfortunately I have to stop now ND, but I will return to this conversation as soon as I am able.

No problem, looking forward.

Why do you think you've challenged my beliefs? You think you've made me doubt them? — Agustino

No, it's not the same thing. Beliefs can be challenged only when the one holding them refuses to doubt them.

I'm just saying a gun is valuable because it's useful.

This is an important point, and it signifies exactly this: belief is neutral, and not inherently positive. — Noble Dust

That's true if you are referring to the fact of belief and not to the content of beliefs, and I haven't suggested otherwise.

The particular beliefs of individuals has no value; value exists in the person, not in the belief. — Noble Dust

I agree, as per above, that the fact of believing is neutral, but I don't think "the particular beliefs of individuals has no value" is right because "value exists in the person," and what people are is determined by what they believe. Of course I mean significant beliefs here; the kinds of beliefs that people base their lives upon.

what people are is determined by what they believe. — John

So the definition of the person is based on belief? (sorry, I thought I responded to this thread)

What is your picture of?

It's a hydra from a Captain America. Not a fan of Captain America, just that I liked the image.

it looks like Marchesk's picture

Indeed, never realized that haha.

Strange.

I'm not sure what you mean by "definition of the person". It's common enough to say that people are defined by what they do. What people do is determined by what they believe; but I'm not sure it follows that people are defined by what they believe. Maybe indirectly?

I'm not sure what you mean by "definition of the person". — John

It corresponded to your phrase "what people are".

It's common enough to say that people are defined by what they do. — John

I'm not sure I buy this notion. So it's common; so what? Defined in what way? Sometimes actions aren't visible; it may be true philosophically that actions determine motives, but only visible actions determine how someone is defined by the community or the society. Actions not seen (or "non-actions") can reveal just as much about a person...except for the fact that those actions aren't seen.

It corresponded to your phrase "what people are". — Noble Dust

What a person is and the "definition of the person" are not the same. A person may be defined in terms of what they are, but a person is not constituted by any definition of them. In other words you are not any definition of you.

I'm not sure I buy this notion. So it's common; so what? Defined in what way? Sometimes actions aren't visible; it may be true philosophically that actions determine motives, but only visible actions determine how someone is defined by the community or the society. Actions not seen (or "non-actions") can reveal just as much about a person...except for the fact that those actions aren't seen. — Noble Dust

Common ways of speaking reflect the logic of intersubjectivity. A person is defined as a spouse, a parent, a carpenter, a poet, an artist, a composer, a scientist, a philosopher or whatever only on the grounds of what they do and/or have done (although in the cases of marital and parental definitions sex also comes into it).

There seems to be a contradiction involved in saying that people could be defined in terms of unseen actions. I suppose one could define oneself, to some extent at least, in terms of what one merely aspires to, or dreams they will, become. But again that would be defining yourself in terms of your beliefs, because your beliefs determine what you aspire to, or dream you will, become.