There are all kinds of reasons for joining NATO. — Mikie

Please give ONE.

There was no Russian imperialist threat before the 2008 summit. No one claimed that. — Mikie

I quite precisely claimed that, otherwise you would not be arguing against it. Logic, anyone?

There was Hungary, Tchekcoslovakia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia...

There was no Russian imperialist threat before the 2008 summit. No one claimed that. — Mikie

I quite precisely claimed that, otherwise you would not be arguing against it. — Olivier5

Then you'll have to prove it.

Then you'll have to prove it. — Tzeentch

I did already, but you failed to understand it.

:rofl:

:yawn:

A Russian journalist propagandist went a bit too far, even for Russia Today, and was sacked as a result:


RT Host Suspended for Calls to ‘Drown, Burn’ Ukrainian Children
The Moscow Times

Anton Krasovsky, a host at Russia’s state-funded broadcaster RT, was suspended Sunday after he made calls on the air to “drown or burn” Ukrainian children who viewed Russia as an occupier.

Anton Krasovsky’s remarks on his RT show broadcast Thursday sparked widespread outrage over the weekend. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba accused the Kremlin-controlled channel of “aggressive genocide incitement” and advocated for a global ban of RT.

Krasovsky, a pro-war presenter under EU sanctions, said Ukrainian children should be “thrown straight into a river with a strong current” or “burned in a hut” for calling Russians occupiers.

His comments came in response to an account by his guest, Russian science fiction author Sergei Lukyanenko, of his encounter with anti-Russian children during his visit to Ukraine in the 1980s.

The segment containing Krasovsky’s remarks has since been deleted from RT’s social media accounts.

RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan distanced the broadcaster from Krasovsky’s “disgusting” comments and said she was “stopping our collaboration for the moment.”

“Perhaps Anton will explain what temporary insanity caused” the controversial statement, Simonyan wrote on the Telegram messaging app.

Krasovsky later issued an apology, saying early Monday that he “got carried away on the air.”

“I apologize to everyone who was freaked out, I apologize to Margarita, to everyone who thought [the comments] wild, unthinkable and insurmountable,” he wrote on Russia’s VKontakte social network.

Simonyan’s rare punishment of an on-air personality for remarks on Ukraine stands in contrast to regular anti-Ukrainian rhetoric on Russian state television.

Kremlin-controlled broadcasters including RT actively support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and echo the Kremlin’s denials of war crime allegations.

Russia’s top investigative body, the Investigative Committee, said Monday that its chairman Alexander Bastrykin has ordered a report into Krasovsky’s statements after receiving a complaint from an online user.

In a since-deleted post, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova denounced what she called a “targeted information attack” against Krasovsky, calling the RT host a “fantastically talented” commentator of “obvious and truthful” information.

I'm talking about a very specific military threat (i.e. nuclear bombs), not about demilitarization, NATO membership, Ukrainian annexations (Crimea or Donbas). But as far as I know Putin requests didn't focus specifically and primarily on weapon systems, nor clarified what the existential threats those requests were supposed to address.

Not only is your premise here false — boethius

What premise is false?

If it was clear to everyone in the West that Ukraine would never join NATO ... then talking about it, giving some little NATO crumbs of equipment and training and so on, has no moral justification, it is purely a provocation to start a war. — boethius

Why would it be clear that Ukraine would never join NATO? Neither NATO open policy nor the Ukrainian willingness to gain its membership, nor the NATO/US administration was against it, but geopolitical concerns were interfering and Ukrainians were well aware of it. One might find this predicament regrettable for the Ukrainians and certain Western reluctance blameful. However your blunt moral accusations suggest a take on world affairs devoid of any realistic geopolitical expectations.

Russian propaganda is lazily reusing old material in its latest campaign. "Russian propagandists can't even be bothered to put any effort into their propaganda anymore, they're just phoning it in." Well, why bother when they aren't trying to convince anyone? What they actually want to broadcast is: "We are going to use nukes in Ukraine! Yes we are! We really are that crazy, so you better back off!"

This is not the first such accusations in this war. Earlier they were announcing imminent chemical and biological attacks.

It would help if you quoted the entirety of my response:

“Only”? I blame Putin for the war. NATO was a reason given for invasion — one that was given for years, clearly and consistently. The conclusion? That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.


There is no evidence that the was an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. The answer given is about Crimea as evidence. This has been addressed before as well. — Mikie

No it doesn't help. What is an "imperialist bent"? What kind of evidence proves an "imperialist bent"?

I will just quote Mearsheimer, an expert on these matters, who puts it more succinctly than I could: — Mikie

Mearsheimer hinges on his own version of realism and on what he takes to be evidence for geopolitical theory to be assessed. I find his position problematic for reasons I'm lazy to summarise. I already mentioned a few of them in my earliest posts in this thread. I might add some more later on.

Excuse me, but you're changing the words. You didn't say "threat," and neither did I. You said "Russian concerns." Your assertion is that "Russian concerns were taken seriously." They were not. — Mikie

Right, I changed the word without realising it and your objection as well as our equivocation are understandable. I can grant you that much. But my claims preserve their value once we deal with the terminological quibble I failed to remove: when concerns are expressed in resentful and intimidatory terms (like NATO expanded despite their promise! Ukraine inside NATO is our red line! An existential threat! Don’t do it otherwise you will regret the consequences! etc.) by a nuclear power claimed to have the second strongest army in the world at the expense of Ukrainians who, coincidentally, were historically oppressed by the Russians. So the expression “Russian concerns” looks to me just as an euphemism for “Russian threats” good for the narrative that presents Russia as a victim.
Besides one should account for the Western (European allies included) caution in providing military support to Ukraine that certainly benefited Russia more than Ukraine.

So it's very strange that suddenly you say you're not interested in what we find "desirable or moral." I'm not interested in it either, which was the point. It doesn't matter if we prefer democracy or authoritarianism -- as you stated. What matters are the actions. We should react the same, not according to what we "prefer" (again, your words). — Mikie

You are conflating objections meant to address different issues. The first one was designed to address your China-Canada alliance thought experiment (where you concluded “How would that scenario play out? Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not”), and it can be rendered like this: take a chess game between D and A. If I know the game enough I can understand how the game is plaid on both sides. Yet I might prefer D to win because D is my beloved brother. So understanding the geopolitical game from both players perspectives, doesn’t commit anybody to impartiality as your China-Canada alliance thought experiment seemed to suggest (if US invaded a China-allied Canada, we wouldn’t excuse it as much as we do not excuse Russia for invading a Western-allied Ukraine, I would - using your terminology not mine - “excuse” the US, I would be biased toward the US, so not impartial, and fine with that).
The second one can be rendered like this: I’m interested in talking about the geopolitical game and moves, not in listening to scores based on how morally attractive you find players' behaviour, even more understandably so after having made clear I have a different moral compass from yours.

That's simply not the case. That wasn't the US's or NATO's position in 2008. I asked what was the Russian threat in 2008 -- because it was in April of 2008 that the Bucharest summit declared that Ukraine and Georgia would be admitted to NATO. Claiming the war in Georgia was a threat, and thus a reason for membership of NATO, is anachronistic. The war in Georgia did not break out until August of 2008. So that claim is nonsense. — Mikie

I wasn’t after a chronological recollection of events, so for me a Russian war in August of 2008 is a Russian threat in 2008. But if you are looking for a chronological recollection of events then wikipedia may help:
Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation in 2000, which had a profound impact on Russo-Georgian relations. The conflict between Russia and Georgia began to escalate in December 2000, when Georgia became the first and sole member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on which the Russian visa regime was enforced. Eduard Kokoity, an alleged member of the mob, became the de facto president of South Ossetia in December 2001; he was endorsed by Russia since he would subvert the peaceful reunification of South Ossetia with Georgia. The Russian government began massive allocation of Russian passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2002 without Georgia's permission; this "passportization" policy laid the foundation for Russia's future claim to these territories. In 2003, President Putin began to consider the possibility of a military solution to the conflict with Georgia.
After Georgia deported four suspected Russian spies in 2006, Russia began a full-scale diplomatic and economic war against Georgia, followed by the persecution of ethnic Georgians living in Russia.
By 2008, most residents of South Ossetia had obtained Russian passports. According to Reuters, Russia supplied two-thirds of South Ossetia's yearly budget before the war.[74] South Ossetia's de facto government predominantly employed Russian citizens, who had occupied similar government posts in Russia, and Russian officers dominated South Ossetia's security organisations.[75]
[…]
In early March 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia submitted formal requests for their recognition to Russia's parliament shortly after the West's recognition of Kosovo which Russia had been resisting. Dmitry Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO, hinted that Georgia's aspiration to become a NATO member would cause Russia to support the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian State Duma adopted a resolution on 21 March, in which it called on the President of Russia and the government to consider the recognition.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement

The actions in Chechnya was the threat? Problems there had been occurring for years, internal to Russia. — Mikie

Precisely, the unresolved ethnic tensions within ex-soviet republics were perceivable as a source of political instability and revanchist urges. And the way Russia under Putin handled it in Chechnya provided a precedent for other ex-Soviet Republics’ strategic minds to digest.
There is where the link between NATO and ex-Soviet Republics could have more likely been perceived as beneficial for both sides: “Ethnic conflict in Russia: Implications for the United States” (Jan 2008)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109308435930?journalCode=uter20

It's quite true that if the US/NATO felt that Russian revanchism was threatening, that this should be taken seriously as well -- even if we believe it unjustified. But that was not the case. Neither the US, nor NATO, believed this was true in 2008. — Mikie

Have you considered the prospect that you are not looking in the right place? Read more Brezinski, if you want to get deeper insight into US/NATO’s strategy.

Sorry, but you simply declaring that one thing is more threatening than another is not interesting. Ask the Russians if they felt it was threatening. It is their opinion that matters, not yours. And they've been quite clear, for over decade.

This distinction between "lethal weapons" and "defensive weapons" is kind of ridiculous. Everything the US has ever done, accordion to them, is "defensive." When we invade Iraq, we're "defending" Iraq. So that's already a sign of repeating propaganda. But think about it for a minute: what do you think "defensive" weapons are? They're all completely non-lethal? So machine guns are for "defense," therefore they can't kill? Are the FGM-148 Javelins simply "defensive"? Because those have been supplied as well. They certainly seem lethal to me. They're called "anti-tank missiles."

Furthermore, "lethal weapons" had already been deployed in Ukraine prior to December. Russia troops had already begun mobilizing at this point as well. — Mikie

You may find ridiculous whatever you want, but there are unquestionable evidences that the history of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations wrt Russian aggression is marked by their reluctance to send lethal weapons to Ukraine (“How successive U.S. administrations resisted arming Ukraine” https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/obama-trump-biden-ukraine-military-aid-1.6371378) because - as it is evident now - the American offensive weaponry would have made the difference on the battlefield. The first package of lethal weapons actually released by the US in Sep 2021, didn't come from Biden’s administration, but from Trump’s administration, and its release was ironically the side effect of the Trump Ukraine scandal, as I said. Knowing from his intel that might have strengthened Putin's resolve to wage war, Biden held the second package of lethal weapons in late December likely as a diplomatic leverage. But it turned out to be too late, it just gave more time to Putin to finalize the military build-up before the war declaration.

Everything that NATO/US does is "defensive" and meant merely as "deterrents." Right. Unfortunately, the Russians see it quite differently. They view anti-tank missiles and military drills with NATO -- including Operation Sea Breeze -- as a threat. — Mikie

As I said, we are in a strategic dilemma whereby every player reads aggressive intentions in others’ deterring moves, so it’s an ineffective argumentative retortion to remind me what I already expressly and repeatedly acknowledged before you ever did. Both rival geopolitical agents can plausibly denounce threats from their opponents and plausibly deny their own threats, especially when there is historical mistrust on top of conflicting strategic interests. But I’m not the one who is clinging that much on “who started first” issue as you seem to do. Nor am I clinging on picturing the US/NATO/Ukraine as a victim of Putin as much you seem to cling on picturing Putin as a victim of US/NATO/Ukraine to show off your moral impartiality.
In any case, acknowledging the strategic dilemma is not enough good reason to refuse the distinction between lethal and defensive weaponry: indeed, even if technically vague or inappropriate, that distinction is understandably related to the type of weaponry that is capable of making a difference in undermining the Russian aggression (here you can find some reactions from Russian officials: https://medium.com/dfrlab/much-ado-about-javelins-525055175d75). In other words, the distinction between lethal/defensive is less related to the nature of geopolitical strategic dilemmas and more to the designed function and operational performance of the weapon systems in strictly military terms.

Retreat from what? — neomac
From NATO expansion. — Mikie

And what does it mean to retreat from NATO expansion (in Sovereign States other then Russia and acknowledged as independent by Russia), if we exclude NATO invasion of Russian territories (from Sovereign States other then Russia and acknowledged as independent by Russia)?

Did Putin have evidence that Ukraine or NATO wanted to invade Russia? Or are we always talking about perceived strategic threats? — neomac
Suddenly evidence is important, and not "myopic"? Interesting.
Putin didn't have evidence, because that's not what Putin was claiming. Putin never claimed NATO wanted to "invade" Russia. Your failure to even minimally understand Russia's position here is telling. — Mikie

Evidence is important for rational assessment of course, “myopic” can be one’s way of assessing it. Now, asking for evidence that triggered support of Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership (as you did) was as legitimate as asking for evidence that triggered Putin anti-NATO reaction. And, as far as I’m concerned, the lesson here is twofold: threat perception is neither always grounded on actual direct threats but also on perceived strategic threats, nor is always voiced in clear/reiterated terms in public speeches (coz even vagueness - like the Russian nuclear threats - or offline diplomacy - like private negotiations e.g. “not one inch” eastward alleged promise - play their role). So e.g. Putin never specified what NATO existential threat is, nor what Russia was supposed to retreat from once Ukraine entered NATO. One can however guess what he might have meant in many ways based on geopolitical and historical considerations, along with experts’ feedback and public news/reports of course: e.g. in the case of Russia concerns about Ukraine threats might be persecution of Russian minorities, the Black sea fleet in Crimea, nuclear or long-range missile systems at the border, weaponry that could frustrate Russian land grab attempts, etc.

I've not once suggested that we let Ukraine "fall prey to Russia." I support US helping Ukrainians defend their country. — Mikie

Encourage and facilitate peace negotiations. The most immediate action would be a ceasefire. — Mikie

Right, where did I hear that already? You are claiming that facilitating peace negotiations and ceasefire can be more effective strategy in helping Ukrainians defend their country and its territorial integrity than by providing NATO membership, military training, or weapons to Ukraine? How so? Where are the evidence to support your claim from within your perspective? The conditions of peace negotiations by the Russians are unacceptable to Ukrainians, that’s why negotiations have failed. And if facilitating peace negotiations means to refuse the military support necessary to possibly conquer back their territorial integrity or preserve what is left, then that fails the strategic objective of helping Ukrainians defend their country. It sounds like saying: surrendering to terrorists' demands is the most effective way to fight terrorism, because if you do what they want they don't fight you back and you live in peace.
Besides once again, you are missing the big picture: the Ukrainian war is of global geopolitical significance, even more understandably so given how Putin framed the war in explicit defiance of the pro-Western global order (you didn’t miss his declarations right?). The US/NATO front while supporting Ukrainians is pursuing its strategic geopolitical goals as any great power is expected to do, because that’s the game I and Mearsheimer are talking about (despite the divergences which remain).

No, I'm not blaming the US and NATO for the war. The US and NATO were primarily responsible for escalating the war. That's a crucial difference. The blame for invasion is Putin's. — Mikie

Then I can’t follow your reasoning. If Putin is claimed to have started a war in response to the US/NATO/Biden administration attitude which didn't take Russian concerns seriously as Putin expected, and you believe this narrative to be enough supported by facts (given your line of reasoning “do you think Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training?”) then the US/NATO/Biden administration conduct is a one major causal factor (along with Putin) in the genesis of the Ukrainian crisis that dragged until beginning 2022 and led to this war. So unless you deny agency to US/NATO/Biden administration you logically have to attribute them some responsibility for the genesis of the war without denying Russian agency in directly starting the war, and if you disapprove of US/NATO/Biden administration conduct then you must consider US/NATO/Biden administration to some extent blameful. Indeed that’s in line with Mearsheimer’s argument in “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault”.

I have indeed mentioned peace. For good reason. — Mikie

Geopolitical reason or moral compass reason? Again I’m interested in listening the first kind of reasons.

That doesn't answer any of my questions.

You claimed Russia made no attempts at negotiating about their red line, despite the fact that Ukraine has been a hot topic for decades.

How do you know there have been no negotiations? Countries contact each other through unofficial, non-public channels all the time. The fact that you claim this implies you have some insight into these.

Second, you blame the Russians for a lack of negotiations (if such a lack there is). Do you not see a clear role for the United States, in the fact that they have made statements and carried out actions that imply they have no desire to negotiate?

Putin speaks of missiles on the other side of their borders.

In this connection, we have made it clear that any further movement of NATO to the East is unacceptable. [...] Are we deploying missiles near the US border? No, we are not. It is the United States that has come to our home with its missiles and is already standing at our doorstep. Is it going too far to demand that no strike systems be placed near our home? — Putin (Dec 23, 2021)

I think he meant nuclear implicitly. (Something substantial at any rate.) Surely he knows there aren't any though (that we know of), at least not on Russia's western side, which is also where Ukraine is. Doesn't seem like he's referring to Germany Italy Turkey (or China India for that matter). It's possible he's including (defensive) missile intercept systems, those intended to take down missiles, but now it's getting further off from his statements.

My reading: No missiles / nuclear weapons installed close to Russia's border, which might happen if Ukraine was to become a NATO member.

Other readings?

Was he talking about measures that were taken to prepare for Iranian aggression?

How do you know there have been no negotiations? Countries contact each other through unofficial, non-public channels all the time. The fact that you claim this implies you have some insight into these. — Tzeentch

No it implies that I couldn't find anything to support otherwise from the available resources.

Second, you blame the Russians for a lack of negotiations (if such a lack there is). Do you not see a clear role for the United States, in the fact that they have made statements and carried out actions that imply they have no desire to negotiate? — Tzeentch

The point I was making is simply that as long as the existential threats are generically formulated, the only thing that remains to address is what Russia demands to restore its sense of security. While if the threat was more specific one could propose solutions (other than the ones proposed by Russia) favorable to Russia.

Kremlin: No hope for positive shift in ties with Britain under Sunak (Reuters; Oct 25, 2022)

At the moment we see no grounds for hope that there will be any positive changes in the foreseeable future. Russia remains open and ready to discuss the most difficult issues at the negotiating table. But not to the detriment of our own interests. — Dmitry Peskov

No talks here, at least nothing initiated by the Kremlin.

As ssu suggests, Putin isn't exactly approachable here. Peskov? Lavrov? Medvedev? How might the diplomats get on with it?

, I'm guessing he's just reiterating a justification (perhaps preparation) for taking over Ukraine. Some of this stuff is about telling propagating selling a story in public. Going by (fallible) memory, his concerns over Iran go further back (years), and might also have included China. Maybe such concerns have been shelved for the time being? (politico, latimes, rferl, ft)

The point I was making is simply that as long as the existential threats are generically formulated, the only thing that remains to address is what Russian demands to restore its sense of security. While if the threat was more specific one could propose solutions (other than the ones proposed by Russia) favorable to Russia. — neomac

Ok, fair enough I suppose.

What is non-specific about no NATO membership for Ukraine?

Could be. When experts on Russia are a little confused by his statements and actions, I'm not going to put much weight on my own speculations. :grin:

What kind of evidence prove an "imperialist bent"? — neomac

Let me answer this one on behalf of the Putinistas. It's quite simple: an American imperialist bent is true by definition, without the need for any particular evidence. But a Russian imperialist bent cannot be true because anything Russian is holy.

When experts on Russia are a little confused by his statements and actions — frank

Over time, you can probably find a few conflicting statements from Putin + team. (And a lot of bullshit.) Not generally reliable as such. Expect more if Putin is sticking around for another 14 years (aljazeera, usatoday).

Over time, you can probably find a few conflicting statements from Putin + team. (And a lot of bullshit.) Not generally reliable as such. Expect more if Putin is sticking around for another 14 years — jorndoe

Yep.

According to Reuters, the US and Spain are looking into sending HAWK defense systems to Ukraine — reuters direct (Oct 25, 2022), via msn. Can save lives. :up: Resources/infrastructure, too.

Please give ONE. — Olivier5

"The benefits of NATO membership include more than just security benefits and collective defense but also disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and scientific collaboration through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program."

But we don't have to guess. All we have to do is look at what Ukraine and NATO were saying in 2008. There were all kinds of claims -- about "stability," etc. There was no one claiming Russian imperialism as a reason. Neither the US, nor NATO, nor Ukraine. Putin was invited to the Bucharest summit, in fact -- an odd move for an imperialist threat.

There was no Russian imperialist threat before the 2008 summit. No one claimed that.
— Mikie

I quite precisely claimed that, otherwise you would not be arguing against it. Logic, anyone? — Olivier5

Yes, you are claiming that now. Notice the past tense in the statement above. I'm referring to the 2008 summit. Note also that by "no one" I don't mean "no person on planet earth," but none of the relevant players: the US, NATO, and Ukraine. I will also be generous and include any expert on the subject or even credible journalists at that time -- feel free to cite any.

So yes, you've made the claim that Russia was an imperialist threat before 2008. That claim is incorrect.

Funny that no one -- not the US, not NATO, not Ukraine -- was giving that reason at the time. I'm interested in their opinions, not yours. But feel free to supply evidence. You haven't yet. To be fair, I imagine it'll be difficult to -- since there is none.

But if I'm wrong and there is evidence, I have yet to see it -- and you certainly haven't provided it.

There is no evidence that the was an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. The answer given is about Crimea as evidence. This has been addressed before as well.
— Mikie

No it doesn't help. What is an "imperialist bent"? What kind of evidence proves an "imperialist bent"? — neomac

What doesn't help?

"imperialist bent" is meaningless. I said "an imperialist bent on expanding...". So do you mean, "What is an imperialist?" I think you know very well what that means.

If Putin was an imperialist, or had imperialist ambitions, as is now claimed -- why was that not stated as a reason for NATO membership in 2008? Where is the evidence of that prior to that summit? Can you cite any source whatsoever -- even a weak one -- where this was being claimed?

This must mean that you like Putin.

"imperialist bent" is meaningless. I said "an imperialist bent on expanding". So do you mean, "What is an imperialist?" I think you know very well what that means. — Mikie

Sure "expanding", also because "an imperialist bent on contracting" doesn't sound right, does it?
I'm asking you what constitutes evidence for "an imperialist bent on expanding". What would prove that concept?

why was that not stated as a reason for NATO membership in 2008? — Mikie

NATO (very well aware of Russian elites’ anti-NATO dispositions) never planned to take a confrontational attitude toward Russia. Some NATO advisers were prospecting the European Union as way to draw Russia toward a pro-Western attitude.

I'm asking you what constitutes evidence for "an imperialist bent on expanding". What would prove that concept? — neomac

If there were both statements and actions that demonstrate it. There were neither before the 2008 summit -- which is why "imperialist ambitions" weren't once mentioned.

That NATO needed to expand to ward off Putin's "imperialist ambitions" is nonsense. It's always been nonsense.

Relatedly, it is important to note that NATO expansion before February 2014 was not aimed at containing Russia. Given the sad state of Russian military power, Moscow was in no position to pursue revanchist policies in eastern Europe. Tellingly, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes that Putin’s seizure of the Crimea was not planned before the crisis broke out in 2014; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In short NATO enlargement was not intended to contain a Russian threat but was instead part of a broader policy to spread the liberal international order into eastern Europe and make the entire continent look like western Europe.

It was only when the Ukraine crisis broke out in February 2014 that the United States and its allies suddenly began describing Putin as a dangerous leader with imperial ambitions and Russia as a serious military threat that had to be contained. What caused this shift? This new rhetoric was designed to serve one essential purpose: to enable the West to blame Putin for the outbreak of trouble in Ukraine. And now that the crisis has turned into a full-scale war, it is imperative to make sure he alone is blamed for this disastrous turn of events. This blame game explains why Putin is now widely portrayed as an imperialist here in the West, even though there is hardly any evidence to support that perspective.

That's exactly right.

why was that not stated as a reason for NATO membership in 2008?
— Mikie

NATO (very well aware of Russian elites’ anti-NATO dispositions) never planned to take a confrontational attitude toward Russia. — neomac

Ah, so that's what everyone was secretly thinking, but it was never stated explicitly. And the evidence that would lend them to secretly believe this was what, exactly?

Anyway -- you admit it was never stated as a reason. That's a good start, I suppose. Feel free to cite any sources at or before the 2008 summit that support your other claim.

This is a Brookings Inst. essay about the history of Russo-American relations.

Republicans claimed that Putin was a bad actor, but didn't depict him as imperialistic. The only reason to suspect that he might become imperialistic would be that Russia has a long history of it.

But also note that the essay doesn't say Putin felt overly threatened by NATO, in fact he defended the placement of a transit hub on Russian soil.

So the tension we see now is a sign of the failure of Obama's "restart" of the relationship.

The arguments over who caused what is interesting but which part of the truth of that relates to a future of possible agreements?

Whatever was possible at the beginning of the invasion is not available now. If the Russians had any kind of discipline in their rules of engagement, they could have established a language of limited goals that could lead to negotiations. Threatening to kill people is all they have talked about so far. Which agreement or disagreement from the past can serve as a template for progress in the situation? That is not a rhetorical question. On the other hand, nothing discussed here has yet to approach it.

The response by the Ukrainians to the invasion was not expected by many. Their continued existence makes future negotiations not as simple as some kind of Partition of Poland, as advocated for by some. Nobody involved will be allowed to return to some glorious past.