I'm afraid Socrates/Plato rejects the JTB definition. Check out the Theaetetus.I hear it's a 2.5k year old definition attributed to Socrates, no less. :chin: — Agent Smith
The target proposition in the farmer example is "There is a cow in the field" and the story tells us that there is a cow in the field. How is that false? However, it is true that the farmer is not justified in believing it. But Gettier has an argument that he is justified in believing it nonetheless, so you need to show that argument is invalid. You are advocating a version of the "no False Lemmas" reply, which I agree with. I'm not clear whether you agree with my argument for that reply and it would be interesting to know whether you agree or have a different argument to refute Gettier's argument.The target proposition is always false, one of which the believer cannot possibly be justified in believing. — creativesoul
How to determine whether you were or were not "really" justified in believing P1 then? — Janus
In this case, it's the cow that he saw that establishes his conclusion that there's a cow in the field. He is mistaken about which cow he saw, but that doesn't undermine his conclusion. — Andrew M
In the presented case, the farmer does misidentify the cow as Daisy, and so thinks that Daisy was the cause of his perception. — Andrew M
In this case, it's the cow that he saw that establishes his conclusion that there's a cow in the field. He is mistaken about which cow he saw, but that doesn't undermine his conclusion. — Andrew M
So you could get it wrong and still be justified. That makes Gettier cases possible. — Ludwig V
(Actually, the doctor is almost certainly in the same situation, that the tests and evidence will only give their answer on the balance of probability.) — Ludwig V
In this case, it's the cow that he saw that establishes his conclusion that there's a cow in the field. He is mistaken about which cow he saw, but that doesn't undermine his conclusion. — Andrew M
(1) I believe that's Daisy out there.
(2) I know Daisy to be a cow. — Srap Tasmaner
The target proposition in the farmer example is "There is a cow in the field" and the story tells us that there is a cow in the field. How is that false? However, it is true that the farmer is not justified in believing it... — Ludwig V
...But Gettier has an argument that he is justified in believing it nonetheless, so you need to show that argument is invalid... — Ludwig V
...You are advocating a version of the "no False Lemmas" reply, which I agree with. I'm not clear whether you agree with my argument for that reply and it would be interesting to know whether you agree or have a different argument to refute Gettier's argument. — Ludwig V
That's why I think that talking about partial justification makes more sense in ordinary contexts as a way to acknowledge some limits in our cognitive competence. — neomac
One point about the analysis I was offering is that it is deductively more palatable. Whenever we've talked about Gettier on the forum, or introduction is a real sticking point, and thus existential generalization is. — Srap Tasmaner
all justification is conclusive would result in two senses of "justification" — Ludwig V
Let’s distinguish two intellectual tasks: the first one is to assess whether JTB is an acceptable definition for the notion of “knowledge”. I think that deductive reasoning offers a study case to clarify the alternatives wrt the notion of “justification”: if “justification” amounts to “sound deduction” then knowledge=JTB is still plausible (this view is in line with the NFL assumption). If “justification” amounts to “valid deduction” then knowledge=JTB is not plausible (this view is not in line with the NFL assumption). — neomac
There's no alternative to gathering as much information as you can and then deciding whether the failures were few enough to count as exceptions. There could not be a determinate answer to this, so the justification would be partial. So you could get it wrong and still be justified. That makes Gettier cases possible. (Actually, the doctor is almost certainly in the same situation, that the tests and evidence will only give their answer on the balance of probability.) — Ludwig V
Most knowledge claims it seems, apart from purely logical or mathematical results, are based on observation and inductive reasoning, so I am not sure where you see deduction fitting in the picture. — Janus
I suggested that one would only be justified in believing that one had seen a sheep rather than a cloth if one got close enough to be absolutely sure — Janus
adoption of some arbitrary standard of what should be thought to constitute evidence and hence justification for empirical claims. — Janus
In any case Gettier’s examples do not seem to relate to deductions nor induction. They concern particular perceptual beliefs. — neomac
And if deduction is a form of justification, then we can easily see how our acceptance of knowledge=JTB or its rejection can be rendered in terms of valid/sound deductions. In other cases of knowledge, it’s less clear, how to distinguish valid from sound information processing. — neomac
They concern particular perceptual beliefs. — neomac
Constructing Gettier Problems.
The main idea behind Gettier's examples is that the justification for the belief is flawed or incorrect, but the belief turns out to be true by sheer luck. Linda Zagzebski shows that any analysis of knowledge in terms of true belief and some other element of justification that is independent from truth, will be liable to Gettier cases. She offers a formula for generating Gettier cases:
(1) start with a case of justified false belief;
(2) amend the example, making the element of justification strong enough for knowledge, but the belief false by sheer chance;
(3) amend the example again, adding another element of chance such that the belief is true, but which leaves the element of justification unchanged;
This will generate an example of a belief that is sufficiently justified (on some analysis of knowledge) to be knowledge, which is true, and which is intuitively not an example of knowledge. In other words, Gettier cases can be generated for any analysis of knowledge that involves a justification criterion and a truth criterion, which are highly correlated but have some degree of independence. — Wikipedia
If I see a cloth and I think it is a cow, is that not based on induction? I've seen cows before and that looks like a cow so I conclude that it is a cow. — Janus
This presupposes that there is more than one kind of belief. — creativesoul
↪neomac
I used to think like you, but then I looked it up in a dictionary which clearly suggested two senses of justification. — Ludwig V
If something is 95% likely to happen, most people would consider themselves justified in predicting that it will happen, and most people will agree. — Ludwig V
The standard format for establishing who committed a crime is means, motive, opportunity. Suppose I establish means and motive beyond doubt and establish that there is no evidence against opportunity. Not quite conclusive, but enough to justify belief - or so many people would say. — Ludwig V
It's true that further investigations can involve mistakes. But if we are being strict about what we will accept as believable then we should investigate as far as, and in every more thorough way imaginable, and only commit to believing when all those possibilities are exhausted. It's also true that even then we can be mistaken, but at least our beliefs would then be properly justified.
We can always resort to entertaining something for pragmatic reasons without committing to belief if we realize that our investigations have not been or cannot be, for practical reasons, adequate. So, for example, I see something moving which I think is a sheep, but there is a boundary fence that prevents me from getting close enough to definitely confirm it. — Janus
Gettier cases rely on the various circumstances not being known to anyone, and so will in real life always exist unknown to anyone. As soon as they become known, they can be resolved, so I can’t see that they can be very important. Some people worry about this, but that's only because they can imagine something that's not known to anyone. That's not real life. — Ludwig V
I'm going to take a break, but I really think we should be able to construct a clear case, roughly along the lines above, of Gettier case without a false lemma. — Srap Tasmaner
There certainly seems to be a problem about the farmer’s belief that a piece of cloth is a cow. You seem to be assuming that in reporting the farmer’s beliefs, you need to use words that he would have done, and he certainly wouldn’t have said that a piece of cloth was in the field. The tricky bit is that that is exactly how we would formulate his belief and we can’t say that there’s a cow in the field (unless we are referring to the cow that is in the field, which would be very misleading.)
First off, “see” is a factive verb. In reporting what people see, we need to report what they actually see, not what they think they see. When we report what they think they see, we have to make it clear, so we need to report, not that he sees a cow in the field, but that he believes he sees a cow in the field, or that he sees what he believes is a cow in the field.
We focus too much, in these discussions, on what people say in reporting their own beliefs. But that is only one way that people show what they believe. Their beliefs also show in what they do and in other things that they say. That’s how we know that he believes that a piece of cloth is a cow. But I would use that way of putting it only to other people, not to the farmer himself. Curiously, if I was telling the farmer about his mistake, I would say “you know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” Or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth”. — Ludwig V
Everything can be identified under many descriptions. We use the one that is most appropriate for the context, including the method of identification that works for our audience. When we come to reporting the belief (and knowledge) of other people, we do not stick to the reference that they are using or would use; we use the reference that works for the audience we are reporting to. After all, the point is to enable our audience to understand.
It is complicated, so I hope this is reasonably clear.
The expression "perceptual belief", as I use it, it's simply pointing to the genesis of that belief. If a belief is processed out of perceptual evidences, it's perceptual, if it's processed out of other propositions through reasoning it can be deductive or inductive belief, if it's processed out of a communicative channel it's a transmitted belief, etc.
This is at least part of my background assumptions while thinking about justification. — neomac
If we are going to go with what the farmer would say, upon what grounds are we claiming that the best time to do that(to go with what the farmer says) is when the farmer is wrong about their own belief, rather than when they become aware that they had once believed that a piece of cloth was a cow(rather than go with what the farmer would say when they're right about what they saw and what they believed about what they saw)? — creativesoul
Strange answers to very straightforward questions. — creativesoul
I was hopeful that there was a bridge when you mentioned "perceptual beliefs", but that notion turned out to be rather empty it seems. All belief is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological machinery), including those that are arrived at in the 'other' ways you mentioned. Thus, I found that rather unhelpful for adding any clarity. — creativesoul
Here is a more straightforward answer: we all learnt to report S’belief at t1 based on what S says at t1. That’s the practice. — neomac
Is that what counts as a valid reply/answer these days? That may count as an answer to some people, but others can plainly see that it does not answer the questions that it should. — creativesoul
I've shown how that practice has been found wanting, lacking, and begging for truth about the farmer's belief at time t1. — creativesoul
Upon what ground do you accept the farmer's self-report at time t1, when he was wrong about what he saw and believed about that, and reject his report at time t2, when he is correct about what he saw and believed at time t1? — creativesoul
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