:up:

The argument you've adopted is that physics in the eighteenth century did not rely on conservation laws therefore they are not essential to physics. — Banno

No, that wasn't the argument. That was one example of the argument.

Yet another example was how future physics might not rely on conservation laws and yet remain physics - (adding to what was previously said) this in a more advanced format via some novel paradigm shift.

But I won't be repeating everything I previous said.

But this discussion is a bit of a sideline to my main point, which is that what have been characterised as metaphysical assumptions or presumptions are better understood as methodological or social characteristics of physics. — Banno

Holding the "methodological characteristics of physics" as its rules of operation would presume that modern physics in all its complexity "just is" as a grouping of methods - this in manners devoid of a background in which these methods developed, and might yet develop still. On the other hand, presuming that the "social characteristics of physics" are its rules of operation appears to be, as you might say, language gone on holiday?

Though I hold very different views, I'll do my best to leave you to your own.

Because it is due to physicists that we hold our modern notions of causality and identity on which modern physics is contingent? — javra

I think physicists are struggling with that issue right now. Where best to look to look for progress, philosophers arguing the definition of words? Do you really think that whether the universe is deterministic or not can be solved by philosophers - not scientists - debating?

The various interpretations of QM are metaphysics by physicists. String theory is metaphysical until such time it is suitably altered to prove or disprove, at which time it becomes physics.

Do you really think that whether the universe is deterministic or not can be solved by philosophers - not scientists - debating? — jgill

What I think is that the issue can neither be resolved by philosophers ignorant of science nor by scientists ignorant of philosophy.

But, place a whole bunch of philosophers knowledgeable of science and scientists knowledgeable of philosophy in the same room, and one might stand a chance.

... at any rate, not an issue strictly applicable to physicists.

But, place a whole bunch of philosophers knowledgeable of science and scientists knowledgeable of philosophy in the same room, and one might stand a chance — javra

:up:

You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent? — ucarr

Yes, that's what I am saying. Baking a cake is an activity. And, we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. They claim that activity is fundamental and there is no need to assume any ingredients

Your parents conceived you. Does process philosophy say that, before your birth, your parents and your conception were non-existent? If this is the position of process philosophy, I claim it has done away with much of (if not all of) causation (and causality). Following from this, how can objects come into existence in the terms of process philosophy if the means of creation of objects are non-existent? — ucarr

This, I can't make any sense of. You are not distinguishing between the act referred to with "conceived", and the objects , "your parents" which are supposed to have been involved in that act. Until you start to separate these concepts discussion on this issue is pointless.

I have the impression process philosophy assigns premium value to motion_dynamism_change. Regarding these three, I don't care if they're physical or metaphysical, in either case they populate a continuum of existence. — ucarr

Yes, but the question is whether essence is prior to existence.

Cite me an example of consciousness in the absence of existence. You're the one trapped in contradiction. The reasons for this I've already articulated in my post above yours. — ucarr

I'm not talking about consciousness, I'm talking about essence. You brought up consciousness as a way to support your claims. But your attempt at justification is only a vicious circle. We cannot replace "essence" with "consciousness".

Throughout our conversation, you've been acting in violation of your dictum above. Notice how you ascribe highest logical priority to "existence." When you deny existence-in-process ( a denial of existence itself), you destroy the individuals to whom you try to make reference. — ucarr

I didn't ascribe "highest logical priority" to existence. I simply stopped there in my example of logical priorities.

This is exactly the point. If you want to understand process philosophy pay close attention to this very point. When we proceed forward in our attempt at substantiation, there is a need to validate "individuals", because reference to individuals is what substantiates all the other logical categories. Process philosophy claims that we find the supposed individuals to be nothing but processes. The reality of individuals, as separate independent units, needs to be supported, and only processes are found to be there. This implies that we must assign logical priority to something which is prior to the existence of individuals, and this is what I called essence. There is no contradiction here, just a resolution to the incoherency and contradiction which arises if we stop at "existence" and claim it to be the first principle.

Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics. — Banno

Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics? — ucarr

This is like asking if physics masquerades as linguistic conceptualization, or if linguistic conceptualization shares fundamentals with physics. Of course, the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

You and Banno are telling me Kant, no less than Einstein, was a physicist. From this we understand language is an integral component of physics, and thus our thoughts possess materiality no less than the mountains and rivers surrounding us. Experimental results showing inescapable entanglement of observer and observed, with macro-scale dimensions of super-atomic universe stabilizing super-position of the wave function into discreteness, confirm the interweave. This is simultaneously confirmation of Logos in the Neo-Platonic and Christian senses. Thus the miracles of Jesus, sinless practitioner of Logos, are scientifically verifiable phenomena.

Much hinges upon the interweave positing language as physics and vice versa.

...the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs

It could be that the differential between your perception and mine is the time element. Let's remove the time differential from your perception> the former is the pre -condition of the latter. No. Metaphysics is neither existentially nor temporally prior to physics. Priority herein is an artificial separation caused by the (apparent) stabilization effect of super-atomic physical scale.

Maybe I'm herein looking at an essential function of time> spatial separation such that a four-dimensional matrix, acted upon by time, gets its dimensional extensions segregated into the discrete physical_material objects of our three-dimensional reality.

Existence and Essence entangle each other. Soul is the integral of their co-functionality.

If you're not interested in QM, then your lens for viewing physicalism is probably Newtonian, and thus your POV predates the 20th century.
— ucarr

I hold no particular views on physics as I have no qualifications in the area nor is it a particular interest of mine. I just find it amusing that QM is used by so many woo peddlers to assert idealism or that some quasi-spiritual metaphysics is true. I'm generally the "I don't know guy" and am constantly surprised by how many people with no qualifications and flawed reasoning think they can explain reality after reading some shit on line, or watching youtube. :wink: — Tom Storm

↪ucarr Isn't the issue here that no one really avoids metaphysics, no matter what position you hold? If you are making paradigmatic and presuppositional claims about the fundamental nature of reality you're doing it, right? The claim that reality is described by the 'laws of physics' is itself a metaphysical claim. — Tom Storm

You said it yourself. No one really avoids metaphysics. "I'm generally the 'I don't know guy.'" This is your shield. You hold it up to protect yourself from possible blunders. If beer, football and racetrack odds were your only interests, you wouldn't be posting here.

Laughing at

...people with no qualifications and flawed reasoning think they can explain reality after reading some shit on line, or watching youtube. :wink: — Tom Storm

is like laughing at an infant learning to walk. I try to cheer on the commoner who dares talk back to a snotty academic who, aside from stopping to get his shoes shined, refuses to make eye contact with anyone lacking advanced degrees from an Ivy League school. Leonard Susskind, a brilliant physicist who won an important debate with Stephen Hawking, worked for years as a plumber.

I'm an example of a no-degree commoner who scours Wikipedia, speed-reads shit online, watches YouTube videos and then makes postings here.

The general public's absorption of top-flight thinking and ideas does lead to some whacky theories and diatribes and I, too, laugh. I don't dismiss.

I allow myself to be terrible in public.

Glad to hear you appreciate the funny side of life.

You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent?
— ucarr

Yes, that's what I am saying. Baking a cake is an activity. And, we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. They claim that activity is fundamental and there is no need to assume any ingredients — Metaphysician Undercover

My takeaway from your claims is, presently, that Process Philosophy is kinda like metaphysics of fluid dynamics -- without the practicality of the quantitative equations -- wherein the practitioner puts on, as it were, a pair of QM glasses, subsequently viewing life as a movie, except it's a movie stuck in a state of super-position, wherein no discrete individualities are distilled. We're inside the cloud of probabilities that plays like lightning in a bottle. Thus, parent_child_grandchild are as one within an indivisible conglomerate of activity, with heads, arms, legs etc., (mere evanescences, not material realities) showing themselves more illusion than individualities.

...we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's the rub. Somewhere down the line, even process philosophy has to talk about something that exists discretely, otherwise there's nothing intelligible or linguistic to talk about.

So, activity is a discrete thing, although ambiguously so.

All of this puts me in mind of what I wrote to Joshs. Could it be the time element, at low resolution on the super-atomic scale, parses the flow mechanics of super-position into apparently discrete individualities? Furthermore, does this tell us that logic, in its syntax, if not in its semantics, is temporal? If 3D logic of the everyday world is semantically atemporal, then that's a strong indication 4D logic exists. As such, 4D logic "parses" atemporal semantics of logic. What does atemporal grammar look like? How does it shape physical things? Does it tell us the super-position digit in a quantum computer is a physical thing? What might be the behavior of a super-position sentient being?

My OP or the conversation?

My takeaway from your claims is, presently, that Process Philosophy is kinda like metaphysics of fluid dynamics -- without the practicality of the quantitative equations -- wherein the practitioner puts on, as it were, a pair of QM glasses, subsequently viewing life as a movie, except it's a movie stuck in a state of super-position, wherein no discrete individualities are distilled. We're inside the cloud of probabilities that plays like lightning in a bottle. Thus, parent_child_grandchild are as one within an indivisible conglomerate of activity, with heads, arms, legs etc., (mere evanescences, not material realities) showing themselves more illusion than individualities. — ucarr

If you say so... But I really can't decipher this. Doesn't a movie exist as a succession of distinct still-frames?

Here's the rub. Somewhere down the line, even process philosophy has to talk about something that exists discretely, otherwise there's nothing intelligible or linguistic to talk about. — ucarr

I tend to agree with this, but in process philosophy it's an event which 'exists' discretely. Now, my question would be, do these discrete events really have true existence as discrete entities, distinct from other events, or do we just artificially conceive of them in this way, so that we can talk about them? Do you see what I mean? You say there must be discrete things because that's all we can talk about, but I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily (meaning not absolutely random or arbitrary, but for various different purposes) proposing boundaries within something continuous. So I am saying that in reality it may be that there is just one big continuous event, and depending on what our purpose is, we'll artificially project boundaries into this continuity, boundaries which are completely imaginary and fictitious creations, and this allows us to talk about distinct parts, and do our thing. So it's true that we can only talk about discrete existents, as you say, but this doesn't imply that discrete existents are actually real, because they might all be imaginary fictions, created by us for a variety of purposes.

Could it be the time element, at low resolution on the super-atomic scale, parses the flow mechanics of super-position into apparently discrete individualities? — ucarr

The problem again, is the question of whether such individualities are true or fictional. Currently we use the Planck scale, to individuate distinct, fundamental space-time units. But I would argue this is completely fictitious, and such individualities have no real existence. Until we discover the real basis for any such division of the assumed continuous substratum, into discrete units, any such proposed individualities will remain completely fictitious.

Currently we use the Planck scale, to individuate distinct, fundamental space-time units. But I would argue this is completely fictitious ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Such an argument would suffer from your faulty premise, MU. Planck units are approximative metrics and are no more "ficticious" than e.g. yards, inches or light seconds. Besides, account for Einstein's model of the photoelectric effect – from which Planck's constant is derived IIRC – without them.

Yards and inches are based on human decided lengths, perhaps coming from some original object with no exact size, but used to create the measure. IOW they don't correspond to the things they measure now. Like a tradition. Planck length and light seconds are based on (or if one doesn't accept that intended to be based on) taken from constants that are still their to measure again and again. They are not arbritary of based on tradition.

And your point is?

Doesn't a movie exist as a succession of distinct still-frames? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. A movie is a movie; a still frame is a still frame. Two different states: strip of celluloid stationary; strip of celluloid in motion. Is one more fictitious than the other?

...in process philosophy it's an event which 'exists' discretely. Now, my question would be, do these discrete events really have true existence as discrete entities, distinct from other events, or do we just artificially conceive of them in this way, so that we can talk about them? — Metaphysician Undercover

In parallel to this, we can look at three different states of H2O: steam, water, ice. Does H2O changing between three possible states lead us to conclude each state is a non-existent fiction? In general, if a given state is impermanent, does its impermanence eject it from existence?

I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily (meaning not absolutely random or arbitrary, but for various different purposes) proposing boundaries within something continuous — Metaphysician Undercover

If I conceive of H2O as a continuum event comprised of steam_water_ice, does that lead me to conclude my action last night of drinking a perceived glass of water was a non-existent fiction?

...it may be that there is just one big continuous event, and depending on what our purpose is, we'll artificially project boundaries into this continuity... — Metaphysician Undercover

If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions?

Does process philosophy exclude transitory existence from its list of possible existences?

When I walk down the street, I move through a sequence of transitory positions while I remain in motion. Does process philosophy claim that while in motion, I'm an event-cloud of probable positions, none of which holds possession of discrete boundaries?

What's the effect of applying process philosophy to your everyday experiences?

Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?

Until we discover the real basis for any such division of the assumed continuous substratum, into discrete units, any such proposed individualities will remain completely fictitious. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?

Neoplatonic philosophy is a strict form of principle-monism that strives to understand everything on the basis of a single cause that they considered divine, and indiscriminately referred to as “the First”, “the One”, or “the Good”.Jan 11, 2016

Neoplatonism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
https://plato.stanford.edu › entries › neoplatonism

How is Neoplatonism different from Platonism?

Platonism is characterized by its method of abstracting the finite world of Forms (humans, animals, objects) from the infinite world of the Ideal, or One.

Neoplatonism, on the other hand, seeks to locate the One, or God in Christian Neoplatonism, in the finite world and human experience.

Yards and inches are based on human decided lengths, perhaps coming from some original object with no exact size, — Bylaw

Does the measurement of a material object ever have an irrational number?

That Planck units are less fictitious.

I allow myself to be terrible in public. — ucarr

:up:
“Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.”
― Ludwig Wittgenstein

There are some here among us whose main concern seems to be maintaining correctness at all costs as if that were the way out of the bottle. They seem to think the main aim of philosophy is to cure us of any propensity to speak nonsense. Just imagination the stagnation if this aim were to become universal law!

I can only hope we are not witnessing the invincible rise of the "machine men" to whom rigid normativity and correctness are the new gods.

Such an argument would suffer from your faulty premise, MU. Planck units are approximative metrics and are no more "ficticious" than e.g. yards, inches or light seconds. Besides, account for Einstein's model of the photoelectric effect – from which Planck's constant is derived IIRC – without them. — 180 Proof

The issue is whether there is a real discrete unit within the continuum of space-time, independent from human existence. Neither yards, nor inches exist as independent units either, so you are just making my argument for me.

In parallel to this, we can look at three different states of H2O: steam, water, ice. — ucarr

Your example confuses "different" with "distinct". We are talking about distinct, discrete individual units, not differences within the same thing. That is the issue, how to place a boundary within something which appears as a continuous change, to say that it consists of discrete units. I am different today from what I was yesterday, just like the ice is different this morning, from the liquid it was yesterday, but these differences do not make me a distinct thing from what I was yesterday. So your example is not relevant to what we were talking about.

If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions? — ucarr

I will address this when you show me how you will place an exact boundary between each colour. If you show me the exact division, where each colour ends, and the next starts such that there is no ambiguity, and you base your boundaries on principles which are independent from one's which are arbitrarily chosen by human beings, then you will have an example for me to address. Otherwise, your example just hands me a continuum without any real boundaries, with you insisting that there are boundaries.

When I walk down the street, I move through a sequence of transitory positions while I remain in motion. — ucarr

Are you claiming that the activity of walking consists of a series of static positions? Come on ucarr, get real. Each of those "positions" would be an instance of standing, and any activity of walking would occur between the instance of standing.

But clearly, walking does not consist of a series of static positions. If it did, then what would we call what happens between these static positions? How would the person get from one static position to the next? They couldn't walk from one static position to the next because that would just imply more static positions.

Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine? — ucarr

The fact that we are sharing words, conversing, indicates that there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation. This is an illusion which you seem to believe in.

Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?

Neoplatonic philosophy is a strict form of principle-monism that strives to understand everything on the basis of a single cause that they considered divine, and indiscriminately referred to as “the First”, “the One”, or “the Good”.Jan 11, 2016 — ucarr

I always understood Platinism and Neo-Platonism as dualist philosophies, not monist. So you'd have to better explain your interpretation before I could address your question here.

How is Neoplatonism different from Platonism?

Platonism is characterized by its method of abstracting the finite world of Forms (humans, animals, objects) from the infinite world of the Ideal, or One.

Neoplatonism, on the other hand, seeks to locate the One, or God in Christian Neoplatonism, in the finite world and human experience. — ucarr

You've left out "the good" of Platonism here, which is not the same as "the One" of Neo-Platonism. For Plato, the ideal is "the good", but it is distinct from "the One". "The One", for Plato is a mathematical Form, a fundamental unity, as explained by Aristotle, yet "the good" is an unknown, as explained in "The Republic" which falls into the class of "Many" as implied by the arguments in "The Sophist". Therefore "the One" cannot be the same as "the good".

Your example confuses "different" with "distinct". — Metaphysician Undercover

dif·fer·ent | ˈdif(ə)rənt |
adjective
1 not the same as another or each other; unlike in nature, form, or quality: you can play this game in different ways | the car is different from anything else on the market | this land seemed different than the rest.
• informal novel and unusual: try something deliciously different.
2 distinct; separate: on two different occasions.

dis·tinct | dəˈstiNG(k)t |
adjective
1 recognizably different in nature from something else of a similar type: the patterns of spoken language are distinct from those of writing | there are two distinct types of sickle cell disease.
• physically separate: the gallery is divided into five distinct spaces.
2 readily distinguishable by the senses: a distinct smell of nicotine.
• [attributive] (used for emphasis) so clearly apparent as to be unmistakable; definite: he got the distinct impression that Melissa wasn't pleased.

The Apple Dictionary

As you see above in the definitions of "different" and "distinct," the two words are synonyms, thus your claim I "identify wrongly; mistake" "different" as "distinct" is false.

Check for them as synonyms in a thesaurus and you'll find "different" under "distinct" and vice versa.

...I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily... proposing boundaries within something continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I understand the above, you're claiming humans insert partitions that break up a continuum into (artificial) parts. In line with this configuration, you're fusing three different states: steam, water, ice into one continuum, H2O. Breaking up H2O into three different states or fusing three different states into H2O, either way, human performs a cognitive operation. Share with me the logic you follow to the conclusion that the fusion operation is more valid than the separation operation.

I am different today from what I was yesterday, — Metaphysician Undercover

but these differences do not make me a distinct thing from what I was yesterday. — Metaphysician Undercover

In having it both ways, as you do above, you confirm the equal validity of the partition and fusion operations.

If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions?
— ucarr

I will address this when you show me how you will place an exact boundary between each colour. If you show me the exact division, where each colour ends, and the next starts such that there is no ambiguity, and you base your boundaries on principles which are independent from one's which are arbitrarily chosen by human beings, then you will have an example for me to address. Otherwise, your example just hands me a continuum without any real boundaries, with you insisting that there are boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

You misrepresent my position. I don't deny overlapping transitions between boundaries. I'm not at war with ambiguity. I've already asked you,

Does process philosophy exclude transitory existence from its list of possible existences? — ucarr

I see now, from your argument above, the answer is "No. Process philosophy does not exclude transitory existence, and thus does not exclude transitions from existence." This means, at the very least, that process philosophy does acknowledge fluid partitions between different states of existence. This renders false your claim individuals, per process philosophy, don't exist.

In your own words, cited in my previous post, you establish your understanding of yourself as a consistent POV who transitions through different states of being across a continuum of time. This is a confirmation of human individuality - yours - not a refutation.

Are you claiming that the activity of walking consists of a series of static positions? Come on ucarr, get real. Each of those "positions" would be an instance of standing, and any activity of walking would occur between the instance of standing.

But clearly, walking does not consist of a series of static positions. If it did, then what would we call what happens between these static positions? How would the person get from one static position to the next? They couldn't walk from one static position to the next because that would just imply more static positions. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a classic puzzle questioning how humans move through the real world since any line is infinitely divisible into an endless sequence of points. If math savvy folks are following our conversation, perhaps they can weigh-in with an explanation of how the puzzle was solved.

I can, however, say the following: regarding the separation operation, when you locate yourself at a definite position, say, the address of your home, that separation is valid and real by your own acknowledgment of transitional states of being. These imply movement between discrete positions, even if they're other transitional states!

Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?
— ucarr

The fact that we are sharing words, conversing, indicates that there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation. This is an illusion which you seem to believe in. — Metaphysician Undercover

An example of a pertinent answer to my question "How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?" would have you telling me what I'm thinking based upon your ability to read my mind. Your ability to read my mind follows logically from your claim "there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation..."

You've left out "the good" of Platonism here, which is not the same as "the One" of Neo-Platonism. For Plato, the ideal is "the good", but it is distinct from "the One". "The One", for Plato is a mathematical Form, a fundamental unity, as explained by Aristotle, yet "the good" is an unknown, as explained in "The Republic" which falls into the class of "Many" as implied by the arguments in "The Sophist". Therefore "the One" cannot be the same as "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover

This argument is irrelevant to the question I posed. "Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?" You acknowledge both philosophies posit oneness as foundational. Your arguments for process philosophy mostly tend towards a foundational oneness obscured by artificial partitioning. I conclude the answer is "Yes. Process philosophy borrows heavily from Plato."

So it's your position then, MU, that the Planck constant is not (and any other constants derived from it e.g. Dirac constant), in fact, a fundamental physical constant? And therefore that quantum mechanics does not work (i.e. likewise is "ficticious", extreme precision notwithstanding, instead of approximative)? Because, so to speak, this theoretical map is not identical with the phenomenal territory?

In attempts to clarify the underlying issue of the role metaphysics (as a philosophical study) plays in physics (as the study of that which is physical):

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts? — javra

jus·ti·fy | ˈjəstəˌfī |
verb (justifies, justifying, justified) [with object]
1 show or prove to be right or reasonable: the person appointed has fully justified our confidence.
• be a good reason for: the situation was grave enough to justify further investigation.

The Apple Dictionary

A foundational plank in the edifice of my concept of ontology says, "Material objects cannot be justified." No loquacious metaphysical treatise on material objects (that I know of) can justify (arrive at) the basic fact of a material object's existence. When science looks at the (physical) world, subsequently making claims about said world, it assumes, axiomatically, that such (physical) world is there, with or without an observer. This is not a denial of QM entanglement. Yes, the observer is physically entangled with the observed. This entanglement shows that the observer (even in relation to him_her-self), no less than the observed, proceeds on the axiomatic assumption of existence of self.

Descartes, in saying, "I think therefore I am." goes wrong in an interesting way. Are there a lot of people who think they think themselves into existence? There is no "I think therefore I am." There is only "I am." Likewise, there is no "I've reasoned the world of material objects into existence." There is only, "The world of material objects exists."

Like Michaelangelo's painting of God pointing his finger to the finger of man, analysis (metaphysics) makes a close approach to physics (existence), but there is a gap. Science, when commencing to proceed forth towards making a claim about the world, axiomatically fills the gap with "I am." and "World is." I know of no metaphysical treatise that adds anything further to this.

In the effort to make metaphysics anything other than coordinate and contemporary with physics, the reasoning claimant slams against a logical conundrum: in order for metaphysics to be a ground of physics not coordinate and contemporary with physics, it would have to be greater than (outside of) “I am.” However, “I am.” = existence, which encompasses metaphysics. Problematically, metaphysics cannot be greater than “I am.” because that means it’s greater than itself, a logical impossibility. This tells us that, because “I am.” encompasses metaphysics no less than material objects of the physical world, metaphysics is physical. This lets us claim metaphysics = physics, a tricky way of saying metaphysics and physics, although distinguishable, nevertheless are coordinate and contemporary with each other.

I can only hope we are not witnessing the invincible rise of the "machine men" to whom rigid normativity and correctness are the new gods. — Janus

:up:

As you see above in the definitions of "different" and "distinct," the two words are synonyms, thus your claim I "identify wrongly; mistake" "different" as "distinct" is false. — ucarr

Wow! Now I've seen everything in an attempt to argue a point. Equivocation at it's worst, right here.

As I understand the above, you're claiming humans insert partitions that break up a continuum into (artificial) parts. In line with this configuration, you're fusing three different states: steam, water, ice into one continuum, H2O. Breaking up H2O into three different states or fusing three different states into H2O, either way, human performs a cognitive operation. Share with me the logic you follow to the conclusion that the fusion operation is more valid than the separation operation. — ucarr

Sorry, I don't understand what you claim I am saying. I just can't place your reference to fusion. You clearly haven't undertsood me, or else you are intentionally creating a straw man. So be it.

In your own words, cited in my previous post, you establish your understanding of yourself as a consistent POV who transitions through different states of being across a continuum of time. This is a confirmation of human individuality - yours - not a refutation. — ucarr

I'm finding you very difficult to communicate with. It seems you willfully misrepresent what I say. That's a shame, it makes discussion pointless.

An example of a pertinent answer to my question "How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?" would have you telling me what I'm thinking based upon your ability to read my mind. Your ability to read my mind follows logically from your claim "there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation..." — ucarr

Again, I just cannot follow what you are trying to say here. Sorry, but your misuse of words is just annoying and I am unable to pay attention to drivel, it grosses me out.. Even though I am apparently reading your mind, communication with you is impossible because your mind is just so confused. Surely you must find yourself to be incorrigible.

So it's your position then, MU, that the Planck constant is not (and any other constants derived from it e.g. Dirac constant), in fact, a fundamental physical constant? And therefore that quantum mechanics does not work (i.e. likewise is "ficticious", extreme precision notwithstanding, instead of approximative)? Because, so to speak, this theoretical map is not identical with the real territory? — 180 Proof

I don't see what being a "physical constant" has to do with this. Being, a constant of physics, which works in its application, doesn't mean that it says something true about the world. It just means that it's a useful principle. Falsity often works very well, as you seem fully aware of.