The argument you've adopted is that physics in the eighteenth century did not rely on conservation laws therefore they are not essential to physics. — Banno
But this discussion is a bit of a sideline to my main point, which is that what have been characterised as metaphysical assumptions or presumptions are better understood as methodological or social characteristics of physics. — Banno
Because it is due to physicists that we hold our modern notions of causality and identity on which modern physics is contingent? — javra
Do you really think that whether the universe is deterministic or not can be solved by philosophers - not scientists - debating? — jgill
You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent? — ucarr
Your parents conceived you. Does process philosophy say that, before your birth, your parents and your conception were non-existent? If this is the position of process philosophy, I claim it has done away with much of (if not all of) causation (and causality). Following from this, how can objects come into existence in the terms of process philosophy if the means of creation of objects are non-existent? — ucarr
I have the impression process philosophy assigns premium value to motion_dynamism_change. Regarding these three, I don't care if they're physical or metaphysical, in either case they populate a continuum of existence. — ucarr
Cite me an example of consciousness in the absence of existence. You're the one trapped in contradiction. The reasons for this I've already articulated in my post above yours. — ucarr
Throughout our conversation, you've been acting in violation of your dictum above. Notice how you ascribe highest logical priority to "existence." When you deny existence-in-process ( a denial of existence itself), you destroy the individuals to whom you try to make reference. — ucarr
Some of what is called metaphysics is integral to physics. — Banno
Is the above an example of physics masquerading as metaphysics, or is it an example of authentic metaphysics sharing fundamentals with physics? — ucarr
This is like asking if physics masquerades as linguistic conceptualization, or if linguistic conceptualization shares fundamentals with physics. Of course, the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs
...the answer is that these are not separate, potentially overlapping domains. Rather, the former is the pre -condition for the latter. There can be no physics without linguistic conceptualization, and there can be no physics without metaphysics as its condition of possibility. — Joshs
If you're not interested in QM, then your lens for viewing physicalism is probably Newtonian, and thus your POV predates the 20th century.
— ucarr
I hold no particular views on physics as I have no qualifications in the area nor is it a particular interest of mine. I just find it amusing that QM is used by so many woo peddlers to assert idealism or that some quasi-spiritual metaphysics is true. I'm generally the "I don't know guy" and am constantly surprised by how many people with no qualifications and flawed reasoning think they can explain reality after reading some shit on line, or watching youtube. :wink: — Tom Storm
↪ucarr Isn't the issue here that no one really avoids metaphysics, no matter what position you hold? If you are making paradigmatic and presuppositional claims about the fundamental nature of reality you're doing it, right? The claim that reality is described by the 'laws of physics' is itself a metaphysical claim. — Tom Storm
...people with no qualifications and flawed reasoning think they can explain reality after reading some shit on line, or watching youtube. :wink: — Tom Storm
You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent?
— ucarr
Yes, that's what I am saying. Baking a cake is an activity. And, we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. They claim that activity is fundamental and there is no need to assume any ingredients — Metaphysician Undercover
...we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. — Metaphysician Undercover
My takeaway from your claims is, presently, that Process Philosophy is kinda like metaphysics of fluid dynamics -- without the practicality of the quantitative equations -- wherein the practitioner puts on, as it were, a pair of QM glasses, subsequently viewing life as a movie, except it's a movie stuck in a state of super-position, wherein no discrete individualities are distilled. We're inside the cloud of probabilities that plays like lightning in a bottle. Thus, parent_child_grandchild are as one within an indivisible conglomerate of activity, with heads, arms, legs etc., (mere evanescences, not material realities) showing themselves more illusion than individualities. — ucarr
Here's the rub. Somewhere down the line, even process philosophy has to talk about something that exists discretely, otherwise there's nothing intelligible or linguistic to talk about. — ucarr
Could it be the time element, at low resolution on the super-atomic scale, parses the flow mechanics of super-position into apparently discrete individualities? — ucarr
Such an argument would suffer from your faulty premise, MU. Planck units are approximative metrics and are no more "ficticious" than e.g. yards, inches or light seconds. Besides, account for Einstein's model of the photoelectric effect – from which Planck's constant is derived IIRC – without them.Currently we use the Planck scale, to individuate distinct, fundamental space-time units. But I would argue this is completely fictitious ... — Metaphysician Undercover
Doesn't a movie exist as a succession of distinct still-frames? — Metaphysician Undercover
...in process philosophy it's an event which 'exists' discretely. Now, my question would be, do these discrete events really have true existence as discrete entities, distinct from other events, or do we just artificially conceive of them in this way, so that we can talk about them? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily (meaning not absolutely random or arbitrary, but for various different purposes) proposing boundaries within something continuous — Metaphysician Undercover
...it may be that there is just one big continuous event, and depending on what our purpose is, we'll artificially project boundaries into this continuity... — Metaphysician Undercover
Until we discover the real basis for any such division of the assumed continuous substratum, into discrete units, any such proposed individualities will remain completely fictitious. — Metaphysician Undercover
I allow myself to be terrible in public. — ucarr
Such an argument would suffer from your faulty premise, MU. Planck units are approximative metrics and are no more "ficticious" than e.g. yards, inches or light seconds. Besides, account for Einstein's model of the photoelectric effect – from which Planck's constant is derived IIRC – without them. — 180 Proof
In parallel to this, we can look at three different states of H2O: steam, water, ice. — ucarr
If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions? — ucarr
When I walk down the street, I move through a sequence of transitory positions while I remain in motion. — ucarr
Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine? — ucarr
Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?
Neoplatonic philosophy is a strict form of principle-monism that strives to understand everything on the basis of a single cause that they considered divine, and indiscriminately referred to as “the First”, “the One”, or “the Good”.Jan 11, 2016 — ucarr
How is Neoplatonism different from Platonism?
Platonism is characterized by its method of abstracting the finite world of Forms (humans, animals, objects) from the infinite world of the Ideal, or One.
Neoplatonism, on the other hand, seeks to locate the One, or God in Christian Neoplatonism, in the finite world and human experience. — ucarr
Your example confuses "different" with "distinct". — Metaphysician Undercover
...I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily... proposing boundaries within something continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am different today from what I was yesterday, — Metaphysician Undercover
but these differences do not make me a distinct thing from what I was yesterday. — Metaphysician Undercover
If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions?
— ucarr
I will address this when you show me how you will place an exact boundary between each colour. If you show me the exact division, where each colour ends, and the next starts such that there is no ambiguity, and you base your boundaries on principles which are independent from one's which are arbitrarily chosen by human beings, then you will have an example for me to address. Otherwise, your example just hands me a continuum without any real boundaries, with you insisting that there are boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover
Does process philosophy exclude transitory existence from its list of possible existences? — ucarr
Are you claiming that the activity of walking consists of a series of static positions? Come on ucarr, get real. Each of those "positions" would be an instance of standing, and any activity of walking would occur between the instance of standing.
But clearly, walking does not consist of a series of static positions. If it did, then what would we call what happens between these static positions? How would the person get from one static position to the next? They couldn't walk from one static position to the next because that would just imply more static positions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?
— ucarr
The fact that we are sharing words, conversing, indicates that there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation. This is an illusion which you seem to believe in. — Metaphysician Undercover
You've left out "the good" of Platonism here, which is not the same as "the One" of Neo-Platonism. For Plato, the ideal is "the good", but it is distinct from "the One". "The One", for Plato is a mathematical Form, a fundamental unity, as explained by Aristotle, yet "the good" is an unknown, as explained in "The Republic" which falls into the class of "Many" as implied by the arguments in "The Sophist". Therefore "the One" cannot be the same as "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover
In attempts to clarify the underlying issue of the role metaphysics (as a philosophical study) plays in physics (as the study of that which is physical):
How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts? — javra
As you see above in the definitions of "different" and "distinct," the two words are synonyms, thus your claim I "identify wrongly; mistake" "different" as "distinct" is false. — ucarr
As I understand the above, you're claiming humans insert partitions that break up a continuum into (artificial) parts. In line with this configuration, you're fusing three different states: steam, water, ice into one continuum, H2O. Breaking up H2O into three different states or fusing three different states into H2O, either way, human performs a cognitive operation. Share with me the logic you follow to the conclusion that the fusion operation is more valid than the separation operation. — ucarr
In your own words, cited in my previous post, you establish your understanding of yourself as a consistent POV who transitions through different states of being across a continuum of time. This is a confirmation of human individuality - yours - not a refutation. — ucarr
An example of a pertinent answer to my question "How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine?" would have you telling me what I'm thinking based upon your ability to read my mind. Your ability to read my mind follows logically from your claim "there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation..." — ucarr
So it's your position then, MU, that the Planck constant is not (and any other constants derived from it e.g. Dirac constant), in fact, a fundamental physical constant? And therefore that quantum mechanics does not work (i.e. likewise is "ficticious", extreme precision notwithstanding, instead of approximative)? Because, so to speak, this theoretical map is not identical with the real territory? — 180 Proof
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