Yes.

What you refer to as "reasoning" is the bridge between experience and discourse; the origin is in experience, always in some experience, never in reasoning, nor in discourse.

"O taste and see that the Lord is good", said the psalmist. "Taste", here, is an index for intimate experience. One must taste before he sees; and as for "reasoning", it is not in the picture.

I thought that the mention of Shakespeare was clear enough, to the point that this is not what I'm talking about.

The intrinsic limits of language are not present only in deficient users. They are limits of language, not of language users. — Mariner

Why must you keep mistaking my input or criticism of what you're talking about for a misunderstanding of what you're talking about? In the last paragraph of one of my previous comments, I set the record straight on this:

And just because you're claiming that this is about intrinsic limits of language, that doesn't necessarily mean that it is in any given case. I'm raising alternative possibilities for consideration. It's entirely possible that there are cases that you'd count as an example of the limits of language which could better be explained [in other ways] — Sapientia

And this is quite on-topic if you ask me. Remember, my first intervention is the thread was to point out that atheists are defined by disagreement with a given linguistic expression (for example, "God exists"). Another point made in that first post was that there are theistic, orthodox expressions (apophatic theology) which deny, just as atheists do, that "God exists".

Which goes to show that there's more going on here than what can be expressed linguistically. When a traditional Christian (like me) says "Yes, God does not exist, not as other things which we call 'existents' ", we are not suddenly turned into atheists. — Mariner

But you're wrong on that point. Atheists don't just disagree with a linguistic expression, they disagree with what it means, what it stands for. I'm aware that there are those who deny that God exists because they think that God transcends existence. But that's a difference that makes little difference. To all intents and purposes, and despite what they say, they believe that God exists. They believe that there's a God. Hence, they're not atheists.

Yep. Though I emphasized that "certain experiences" and "stuff" are far from being esoteric activities; I mentioned that they are accessible to toddlers, and, in reply to Agustino, I mentioned clear and methodical reasoning as part of the "stuff". — Mariner

Details? Examples?

Why is it "vague"? — Mariner

Oh, come on, Mariner. You can't be serious. In your reply to me, you mentioned doing "stuff", which could mean just about anything, and you didn't specifically name or describe anything or go into any further detail. Ridiculous.

Is it not obvious that, barring bad faith or plain stupidity, both parties are talking about different referents (though they are using the same word)? — Mariner

No, not obvious, but certainly possible and perhaps in some cases likely. But I know that you claim to be Catholic, so to get an idea of what you mean, I can appeal to my knowledge of Catholicism.

To put some flesh in the scenario. In many occasions in my PF experience, I've seen people dispute that "God exists" based on a materialist notion. It may be Daddy-in-the-sky, which is silly, or it may be the infinitely complex God of Dawkins, which is not silly (though it is wrong). I would dispute that those gods, exist, too. But that does not mean I'm an atheist; because, when I say "God exists", I'm talking about something else. — Mariner

Yes, I agree that that sort of thing can complicate matters, and that to deny certain conceptions of God doesn't necessarily make one an atheist, if that term is being used in a broad and general sense, rather than a specific and relative sense. But the word "God" is rather like the word "game", in that there will likely be a family resemblance amongst all the variations, despite any differences, some of which can be stark

"What is this something else", you ask?

Well, to begin with the God of the Philosophers that has been brought up in the thread -- it is whatever sustains the natural framework, it is the link between our reason and the external world, it is the root of beauty, it is love, it is the Agathon. Etc. (An infinite etc.). — Mariner

It is vague, it is waxing poetic, it is a list of various different things which you are equating with God, as traditionally understood.

I think it [where "it" points at everything up there in that paragraph] exists. This is why I'm not an atheist. Can an atheist believe in that with me and still call himself an atheist? Sure. What matters is not what people call themselves, it is whether or not they understand what is being said, and whether or not they are talking about the same thing. — Mariner

I don't think much of self-identified theists who can only vaguely list things which aren't even controversial to a typical atheist and merely stick onto them the label "God".

I don't think much of self-identified theists who can only vaguely list things which aren't even controversial to a typical atheist and merely stick onto them the label "God". — Sapientia

While to me, what is interesting is how people can react so strongly to the belief in things "which aren't even controversial".

While to me, what is interesting is how people can react so strongly to the belief in things "which aren't even controversial". — Mariner

It's not the belief that's the problem, it's how you wear it. It's the pretence and the equivocation. It's like if I claimed to be a Communist, and then explained, oh no, to me, to be a Communist means love, reason, beauty, respect, the world, humanity, romanticism, perfection and nature. I don't know why so many people think that that kind of thing is perfectly acceptable when it comes to the word "God". Strikes me as wrongheaded.

I'm telling you that I, a Christian, believe in God exactly as was explained above. And I'm 100% Christian, quite traditional in my beliefs. I pray everyday, I try to go to Mass weekly, etc.

Where is the equivocation, if not between what I am saying and some independent notion of yours, about "what Christians believe in". Place it in the open and we can examine whether there is equivocation and pretense. As your post stands, to complain with your interlocutor that what he presents is not consistent with your private, unexpressed notions strikes me as wrongheaded.

Everyone agrees, I assume, that there is nonverbal experience, and nonverbal communication. It is also common for philosophers to claim that we have knowledge that we are not expected to be able to verbalize. (Knowledge-how is an example. Some theories of language attribute such knowledge too.)

The first question would be whether there is experience or knowledge that cannot in principle be verbalized.

The first question would be whether there is experience or knowledge that cannot in principle be verbalized. — Srap Tasmaner

Maps and territories come to mind.

Can you elaborate?

I'm telling you that I, a Christian, believe in God exactly as was explained above. And I'm 100% Christian, quite traditional in my beliefs. I pray everyday, I try to go to Mass weekly, etc.

Where is the equivocation, if not between what I am saying and some independent notion of yours, about "what Christians believe in". Place it in the open and we can examine whether there is equivocation and pretense. As your post stands, to complain with your interlocutor that what he presents is not consistent with your private, unexpressed notions strikes me as wrongheaded. — Mariner

You didn't mention an eternal being, a creator, the omni-attributes, the trinity, oneness... I find that odd for someone who claims to be 100% Christian, and quite traditional. We're not talking about practice here, which is irrelevant, so I don't know why you brought that up.

As for equivocation, you equivocate, for example, when you claim that God is love. I know that it says that in the Bible, but it's still wrong. Love is love, it's a just a feeling, and in common parlance, no one ever means "God" when then say "love", except when saying that God is love. The two words have different meanings, since meaning is use, and no one ever uses those two words as if they were synonymous and interchangeable.

Sapientia, for there to be equivocation and pretense, there ought to be some incompatibility (or at least some tension) between the Agathon (as a short index of everything I said earlier) and "eternal being, the creator, the omni-attributes, the trinity, oneness". I don't see any incompatibility or tension. Can you explain what tension you see there?

As for love, well, I know that love is light (the physical light, that we can see with our eyes). If you prefer, "light is the physical manifestation of love". (This is not the only thing that love is).

It is quite emphatically not "just a feeling".

See how we can have difficulties of communication even while we use the same words?

***

Srap Tasmaner, take a look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map–territory_relation

If there can't be a perfect map (and maps are visual, 2d objects), why would there be any hope for a perfect language (note that languages are 1d, auditory objects, far less suitable for representing reality -- at least to visual beings like us -- than maps; which is why we use maps to navigate, after all).

The fact is that reality is multidimensional; for all practical purposes, it is infinitely multidimensional. And we are not even getting into the problem of different sensorial apparatuses; and I'm focusing only on observables, leaving to the side the problem of concepts. The idea that such complexity can be encapsulated in a one-dimensional sequence of sounds is so far-fetched that I'd say the onus is on the other shoe. People who want to claim that language can, in principle, represent the entirety of reality have a huge claim to find evidence for.

Srap Tasmaner, along those lines, take a look at http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

Sapientia, for there to be equivocation and pretense, there ought to be some incompatibility (or at least some tension) between the Agathon (as a short index of everything I said earlier) and "eternal being, the creator, the omni-attributes, the trinity, oneness". I don't see any incompatibility or tension. Can you explain what tension you see there? — Mariner

None of what I mentioned was in what you said, and if you think otherwise, then you need to be a lot clearer and more explicit.

As for love, well, I know that love is light (the physical light, that we can see with our eyes). If you prefer, "light is the physical manifestation of love". (This is not the only thing that love is). — Mariner

What?? I don't know why you'd think that.

It is quite emphatically not "just a feeling". — Mariner

Yes it is.

See how we can have difficulties of communication even while we use the same words? — Mariner

Yes, but that's more your fault than mine because you're using words in unusual ways. And, furthermore, as with the example of "love", I think you're doing so on purpose.

None of what I mentioned was in what you said — Sapientia

Yes. Remember my comment about private, unexpressed notions? Why should I try to guess what is important to you? It's much better that you ask about your ideas regarding God.

However, the salient point (and it is so salient that I stress it again) is that the Agathon is not incompatible with everything that you mentioned (omni, eternal, trinity, oneness), and it is also not incompatible with many other Christian notions (incarnation, sovereignty over nature, good will towards men, etc. etc.). This means that there is no equivocation (nor pretence).

What?? I don't know why you'd think that [about love and light]. — Sapientia

Because I reflected on it, and experienced it. You are free to disagree, of course. But you are not free to impose your ideas of how to experience the world upon me.

This is basically the problem with discussions like this one, incidentally. Instead of trying to understand how others understand the world, people prefer to dictate how other people should understand the world, and to rail against people who understand the world differently.

Let me ask you a couple of questions....
If you were shown evidence that Christians engage in premarital sex (and abortions, by the way) on a regular basis, would that evidence be enough to make you give up on Christianity as a religion?

What I'm trying to tell you is that there isn't unity.... There are very large divergences in beliefs upon key issues. — Agustino

If you were shown evidence that Christianity is a religion with very little unity, and very large divergences in beliefs upon key issues... would that evidence be enough to make you give up on Christianity as a religion?

They are attractive, but they are very individualistic. They're not communal the way religions are communal. Religions involve a religious community of believers who share the faith together and agree to live by certain common principles and ideals.

I've given evidence that the modern Stoics do have communal practices... and Stoicism itself is concerned with the well-being of all men to such an extent that they call all men their brothers.
Check out one of the disciplines of Stoicism... known as the Discipline of Action that states that all actions are meant to be performed for the good of all mankind.

benevolently wishing all of mankind to flourish and achieve “happiness” (eudaimonia) the goal of life, while accepting that this is ultimately beyond any individual’s direct control. It’s tempting to see this discipline as particularly associated with the cardinal virtue of “justice”, which the Stoics defined as including both fairness to others and benevolence. Hadot calls this discipline “action in the service of mankind”, because it involves extending the same natural affection or care that we are born feeling for our own body and physical wellbeing to include the physical and mental wellbeing of all mankind, through a process known as “appropriation” (oikeiosis) or widening the circle of our natural “self-love” to include all mankind. I’ve described this as “Stoic Philanthropy”, or love of mankind, a term they employed themselves.

You use the term individualistic like it's a problem. But, I don't see the problem. I'm not sure I agree that communal forms of relationships are for everyone, or that everyone MUST be involved with some community. I don't know what would be wrong with someone who cared about humanity (someone who considers himself to be a follower/disciple of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, etc.) but who also found it more comfortable to be around people less than others around him. Many people describe themselves as introverts who rebuild their reserves of energy by being alone. I don't see any problem with that.

(There's a generic "you" throughout this post, who isn't you, @Mariner. I trust you to point out where they overlap, if you'd like to.)

I reread the Nagel and looked at the Wikipedia article (I am not going to reread Bateson), but I'm not sure where to go from here.

(E) There is experience we can have, and experience we cannot.
(C) There is experience we can conceptualize, and experience we cannot.
(P) There is experience we can express propositionally, and experience we cannot.

(Not putting those forward as principles or endorsing them, just laying out some terms for my own sake.)

If you have an experience that you believe cannot be expressed propositionally, because you believe it cannot be conceptualized, then you might still talk about it. There is poetry, paradox, apophatic language. (Obviously you can also dance about it, make music about it, express it in how you live your life, and so on, but we're focusing on talk.) But even before getting to to questions of what you could say about such an experience, there are some other issues.

One way of taking the map-territory business would be that you might experience the territory if that experience was not representational. But how is the word "experience" being used here? Do you know that you had the experience? Do you have a memory of the experience? A memory of having the experience? If you had the same or a similar experience at another time, would you know it was the same or a similar experience? Did you, in the first place, know that the experience you were having was a "territory" experience? If so, how? By trying to conceptualize it and failing?

I don't know what to do with any of those questions, really, but maybe you have some thoughts.

Obviously then there's the question of how to characterize the experience, and some people object to some characterizations. That may be a claim that there is a kind of experience you cannot have had, or it may a sort of "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Also, the Christian tradition, for instance, isn't exclusively mystical. On what grounds could you connect an unconceptualizable experience to a thoroughly conceptualized theology? There may be apophatic elements within that theology, but what about the rest? (Mystics have also had to face charges not only of heresy, but worse. How do you know what you experienced was not the Deceiver?)

Nagel I think is a mess. I don't remember what I thought of it years ago, but now, oy. I'm hesitant to start talking about that at all. Maybe it would be suitable for one of those read-alongs, since it's widely available on the interwebs. But if you'd like to pull something particular from that essay and talk about it, I'm game.

If you were shown evidence that Christians engage in premarital sex (and abortions, by the way) on a regular basis, would that evidence be enough to make you give up on Christianity as a religion? — anonymous66

No, that evidence would not be enough to make me give up Christianity as a religion. Christianity is about a lot more than premartial sex and abortions.

But having said that, I do know that many "Christians" engage in premartial sex and abortions, however - the difference is that Christianity has a Holy Book - the Bible - which is God's revelation and contains what all believers should agree with to be Christians in the first place. Stoicism doesn't. If there's something Epictetus says that I don't like - well fuck Epictetus, he was wrong. A Christian can't do that. That's why even those Christians who do engage in premartial sex generally are aware that premartial sex is wrong. At least that much they recognise, even if they still engage in it.

If you were shown evidence that Christianity is a religion with very little unity, and very large divergences in beliefs upon key issues... would that evidence be enough to make you give up on Christianity as a religion? — anonymous66

If you could show that within a denomination - say Catholicism - there are very large divergences upon significant and relevant issues, then that would be a significant factor to consider. Enough to give up Christianity as a religion? Probably not. That would require additional evidence to put in doubt Jesus's Resurrection.

I've given evidence that the modern Stoics do have communal practices... — anonymous66

What rituals does Stoicism have? Rituals are the groundwork of communal activity.

Many people describe themselves as introverts who rebuild their reserves of energy by being alone. I don't see any problem with that. — anonymous66

Yeah, I'm an introvert too. But the thing with many introverts is that they simply don't have a community of people like them around, hence why they prefer being alone. There's no surprise there.

Yes. Remember my comment about private, unexpressed notions? Why should I try to guess what is important to you? It's much better that you ask about your ideas regarding God.

However, the salient point (and it is so salient that I stress it again) is that the Agathon is not incompatible with everything that you mentioned (omni, eternal, trinity, oneness), and it is also not incompatible with many other Christian notions (incarnation, sovereignty over nature, good will towards men, etc. etc.). This means that there is no equivocation (nor pretence). — Mariner

I'm not asking you to guess what's important to me, and when talking about your conception of God, my ideas regarding God are not the focus. I was just responding to what you yourself had said by expressing my puzzlement that you did not specifically mention any of these fundamental defining features.

No, the salient point is not about compatibility, it's about clarity, or rather, your lack of it. If you asked me how I get to work, and I replied that I move to work, then the problem would be a lack of clarity, and pointing out that the specific way in which I get to work is compatible with that answer would be to miss the point. I walk to work, by the way.

And no, this does not mean that there is no equivocation and no pretence. If you stand by your position, then I stand by my criticism of it.

Because I reflected on it, and experienced it. You are free to disagree, of course. But you are not free to impose your ideas of how to experience the world upon me. — Mariner

Good for you. I'm not trying to "impose" anything on you. I'm trying to get you to think about things sensibly.

This is basically the problem with discussions like this one, incidentally. Instead of trying to understand how others understand the world, people prefer to dictate how other people should understand the world, and to rail against people who understand the world differently. — Mariner

Nor am I "dictating" anything. You're exaggerating. We're both grownups having a grownup discussion and expressing our thoughts. Naturally, there is going to be some disagreement between us, but that's all it is. I'm not going to send my subordinates to come and arrest you.

@Srap Tasmaner

There comes a point in which the territory is the territory, i.e., it is not a map. With beings like us, this point is experience. Experience cannot be representational; it is the constituent of reality for us. Any representation of ours begins with experience and is only valid inasmuch as it keeps consistency with our experience.

When you mention "experiences we cannot have" (your proposition E), you are drawing a map. The conception of experiences we cannot have already goes beyond the territory. But this does not mean it is not valid. The faculty which we use to talk about experiences we cannot have is reason (or, logic). We experience the existence of reason in our psyches, and its reach. But we also experience the existence of error in our psyches, and its reach. Given that our reason is fallible, we must be careful when employing it; and "to be careful" in this context means to always go back to direct experience.

This is basically what Plato taught as "anamnesis". The practice of anamnesis, of attending to the experience underneath the words (mental words as well as spoken words), is our best safeguard against error.

Let me address some questions of yours with that in mind.

But how is the word "experience" being used here? Do you know that you had the experience? Do you have a memory of the experience? A memory of having the experience? If you had the same or a similar experience at another time, would you know it was the same or a similar experience? Did you, in the first place, know that the experience you were having was a "territory" experience? If so, how? By trying to conceptualize it and failing? — Srap Tasmaner

Experience is the territory. It precedes conscious knowing. Babies have experiences before they know any words. In theory, it also precedes conceptualization, although it is never easy to distinguish between the two -- our psyche is very fast.

(The best source for this, by the way, is the huge book by Lonergan, Insight).

When I say that "experience is the territory", I'm underlining the fact that our viewpoints are irreducibly subjective, and that objectivity is already an extrapolation (guided by reason) of our experiences. Being that, it (the notion of objectivity) can always be mistaken, and it is always risky to invoke it in dialogues between two irreducibly subjective beings.

Obviously then there's the question of how to characterize the experience, and some people object to some characterizations. That may be a claim that there is a kind of experience you cannot have had, or it may a sort of "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Also, the Christian tradition, for instance, isn't exclusively mystical. On what grounds could you connect an unconceptualizable experience to a thoroughly conceptualized theology? There may be apophatic elements within that theology, but what about the rest? (Mystics have also had to face charges not only of heresy, but worse. How do you know what you experienced was not the Deceiver?) — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't accept the notion of an objectively unconceptualizable experience. I can accept the notion of an experience which we, average human beings of 2017, could not conceptualize. But the idea of a purely unconceptualizable experience appears to be a limit upon reason that I do not ... experience ... in my dealings with it.

That said, reason is not the only way to refer to stuff, and symbols are very handy for that. The "unconceptualizable experience" can be symbolized and referred to. What matters is that both the "expresser" and the interpreter keep in mind the use and scope of symbols, and do not confuse them with direct language.

As for how to distinguish between sources of experiences, that is a very serious matter in Christian theology, and as you point out any experience can be fostered by the Deceiver. There is only one sure guide to be followed, according to the tradition, which is "by their fruits you shall know them".

I'll have more to say but have to leave right now :).

This helps a lot, in understanding what you have in mind. I'll do some thinking and reading and get back to you.

Experience cannot be representational; it is the constituent of reality for us. Any representation of ours begins with experience and is only valid inasmuch as it keeps consistency with our experience. — Mariner

The "ours" here refers to a generic individual, right? Because you also say

that our viewpoints are irreducibly subjective, and that objectivity is already an extrapolation (guided by reason) of our experiences. — Mariner

Let's look at an example, however provisionally.

Suppose I am holding a glass of ice water, I am having the experience of holding a glass of ice water. It may be objected that I am surely not only holding a glass of ice water, but doing many other things as well, and that is true. It's not at first clear whether we should say that I am also having the experience of standing by the fridge, say, or if we would prefer to say that everything I am doing at the relevant moment is part of one experience. Maybe either usage is okay. For that matter, there may be nothing either necessary or objectionable about circumscribing the experience temporally; maybe it is better to talk about my experience as a totality, spread across my entire life. Perhaps all that matters is that we keep in mind that, having somehow picked out something as an experience, we could make different choices that would be just as valid, or that we recognize that how we circumscribe an experience will depend on our purpose in doing so, rather than on something intrinsic to the experience.

I understand your remark about our viewpoints being irreducibly subjective to mean something like this: I am, in holding the glass of ice water, not experiencing that object (again, among other things), or not only experiencing that object, but experiencing (myself) holding that object. If I talk about the glass of ice water, I talk about something as I experienced it. Perhaps that is also to talk about the thing, but it is any rate not only to talk about the thing.

But now it seems we have to say that I was experiencing (myself) holding the-glass-of-ice-water-as-I-experienced-it, or even: I experienced (myself) holding the-glass-of-ice-water-as-I-experienced-(myself)-holding-it. Either this ends up as Bateson's infinite regress that forever keeps the territory out of the map, or it ends up trivially as the claim that I experience what I experience as I experience it. If we opt for the former, then we are in a position to say the regress relates not just to representation, but to the having of an object at all. Although we are talking about the experience, and thus conceptualizing it, nowhere was there a question of experience being representational. All we did was allow the possibility that experience was experience of something. So the natural conclusion is that if experience is irreducibly subjective, that either says nothing or it says experience cannot be experience of something.

And perhaps that's where we want to end up. If "experience is the constituent of reality for us," then experience just is, we might say (if we were comfortable saying things like "reality just is"). If experience could be experience of something, then surely those somethings would figure large in reality.

Either this ends up as Bateson's infinite regress that forever keeps the territory out of the map, or it ends up trivially as the claim that I experience what I experience as I experience it. — Srap Tasmaner

That may be a trivial claim, but it is far from being a trivial fact. That we are beings capable of experience, and of experience of a given kind (for which we can use the shortcut, "human experience"), is certainly remarkable.

When a non-trivial fact becomes a trivial claim through the activity of verbalization, we are only underlining how limited language is.

All we did was allow the possibility that experience was experience of something. — Srap Tasmaner

No, that isn't just a possibility. That's how we experience our experiences. They are always experiences of something, and usually of something extrinsic (we can easily distinguish -- in normal conditions -- dreams from interactions with external objects). Experiences are intrinsically intentional.

(Or, another way to put it would be: our selves are zero-dimensional; when we say "I experience X", X is always something apart from the self).

When we begin to discuss the experience-of-something, using this as a general descriptor, as a "possibility", this is our use of reason leading us away from the direct experience.

So the natural conclusion is that if experience is irreducibly subjective, that either says nothing or it says experience cannot be experience of something. — Srap Tasmaner

And once we reach this conclusion, we trace our steps back, check the conclusion against our direct experience (which is, in normal conditions, clearly, immediately, "experience of something"), and when we see a tension between the conclusion and the experience, we give greater weight to the experience. (That's anamnesis in a nutshell).

Now, this does not mean that we should mistrust reason in general. But it does mean that whatever we presented to reason was somehow slanted.

I think one of these slanted points was this:

Perhaps all that matters is that we keep in mind that, having somehow picked out something as an experience, we could make different choices that would be just as valid, or that we recognize that how we circumscribe an experience will depend on our purpose in doing so, rather than on something intrinsic to the experience. — Srap Tasmaner

You are distinguishing between "our purpose" (in categorizing experiences) and "something intrinsic to the experience". And they should be distinguished. But a distinction is not a separation. If we start to treat this pair as an opposition rather than a gradient, we can reach paradoxes. It is a fact that "our purpose" when categorizing experiences is remarkably consistent across cultures, times, moments of life, etc. etc. Sure, there is great diversity between viewpoints, but this diversity is constrained within some boundaries that are only very rarely expanded. It is great to read Lakoff (are you familiar with his work?) and to observe that a culture uses the same word to denote Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (google that if you don't know the work), but after smiling we can see the common root between these three seemingly disparate things. This common root is not merely in us; it is also in the objects.

In the final analysis, the subject-object dichotomy breaks up whenever we try to handle it as a separation rather than a distinction. They are both parts of our experience, poles which can be manipulated for our symbolic convenience.

And perhaps that's where we want to end up. If "experience is the constituent of reality for us," then experience just is, we might say (if we were comfortable saying things like "reality just is"). If experience could be experience of something, then surely those somethings would figure large in reality. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure.

Reality just is. But that does not mean we should not experience it in its diversity, nor that we should not talk about it (and for talking about it we require reason, representation, symbolization).

I posted something.. and then thought better of it....

Let me just point out that consistency/reason/rationality requires that you judge your own belief system (and its followers) by the same standards with which you judge others.

So "we experience what we experience as we experience it" should mean: experience is the constituent of reality for us; subject and object are both parts of our experience; our viewpoints are irreducibly subjective; but also the objects of our experience are irreducibly objective.

@Srap Tasmaner Yes.

Just to leave a few more words in this short post :D:

The consubstantiality of all being is the ground of our experiences.

Then now we have a problem and perhaps, sadly, this is where our conversation ends, because I think my last post says nothing at all, but you think it says something worth agreeing to.

A good illustration of the entire point of our conversation. Expression and interpretation diverging, based on the different experiences of speaker and listener. You say you said nothing, I say you said something quite correct.

Reality is.

One may think that this is "saying nothing", another may think it is saying something. Reality is, whatever anyone thinks. Subjectivity and Objectivity.

I saw you posted a story you wrote but unfortunately I was busy at that time, and when I returned to read it, it was gone :P Alas, next time I have to be quicker.

Let me just point out that consistency/reason/rationality requires that you judge your own belief system (and its followers) by the same standards with which you judge others. — anonymous66

What makes you think I don't? I highly respect Stoicism, and absent Christianity, I would say Stoicism is the highest point reachable by man. I just pointed out to something Stoicism lacks - a community bound by a clear set of rules. Stoicism also lacks the Christian hope. Otherwise the two are quite similar.

http://www.catholicworldreport.com/2014/07/31/russell-kirk-conservative-convert-catholic/

Let me just point out that consistency/reason/rationality requires that you judge your own belief system (and its followers) by the same standards with which you judge others. — anonymous66

What makes you think I don't? — Augustino

Your previous posts.

Your previous posts. — anonymous66

Well obviously, but what in them precisely?