I have never been involved in a discussion about nominalism, nor have I ever considered it much important as a subject, but I have to bring up what Wikipedia says about it, namely that "There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universals – things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects – objects that do not exist in space and time." You are limiting it to the second one. But I consider it more interesting, anyway! :smile: Although, Wiki's statement falls into a kind of "circularity" trap: space and time are themselves such abstract objects; they don't really exist!

Nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than realism does.

Nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than realism does. — NOS4A2

What kind of realism are you referring to?

:up:

Platonic realism or any realism in regards to abstract ideas and universals.

Platonic realism or any realism in regards to abstract ideas and universals. — NOS4A2

But can you really escape universals and abstract objects? When you separate the universe down to its tiniest parts, what do you call those parts?

But can you really escape universals and abstract objects? When you separate the universe down to its tiniest parts, what do you call those parts?

They are useful for linguistic purposes, so one need not escape them. But in terms of metaphysics and ontology they are neither extant nor useful. I would not separate a universe down to it’s tiniest parts, for instance, because it presupposes a universe is it’s own particular. Particulars have parts but universals do not.

:up: :up:

There are only individuals in res from which the predicates or properties they have in common are abstracted – generalized – into discursive classes and concepts.
So in Meinong's sense universals subsist in the mind, or in our grammar, but in Plato's sense it's mistaken that they also exist, which is misplaced concreteness (i.e. reification fallacy) deflated by nominalism and pragmatism.

So when you talk about electrons, which have the property of spin, you speak of spin as if it's something real, is that correct?

So when you talk about electrons, which have the property of spin, you speak of spin as if it's something real, is that correct? — frank

One "speaks of spin as if it's something real" because it is useful to do so.

No, I would speak of the electron as real (assuming there is a referent) and spin as a predicate.

No, I would speak of the electron as real (assuming there is a referent) and spin as a predicate. — NOS4A2

So the spin of the election is not real?

One "speaks of spin as if it's something real" because it is useful to do so. — 180 Proof

I'm not ignoring your post, but NOS made a specific claim that I'm working back toward.

:up:

An electron spins. The spin needn't be abstracted into its own entity.

An electron spins. The spin needn't be abstracted into its own entity. — NOS4A2

Is the spin real or not?

I’m afraid it is not real in the way you say it is. Do you think the spin is real?

I’m afraid it is not real in the way you say it is. Do you think the spin is real? — NOS4A2

I haven't made any claims. I was simply asking if the spin of an electron is real, unreal, or some third option.

I was aiming to explain that if you rule out the existence of the properties of an object, you'll soon find that you have no words at all to describe reality. This is because you're left with raw, unformed matter as the only "real.". I wanted to debate it to work through that idea.

But your claim was about how we address existence, and what strategies serve us best in that regard, so you derailed me. :nerd:

Thanks for the discussion!

Debates usually involve two or more competing ideas, not a series of questions and answers. So if you believe in the existence of properties then surely there is a reason why.

To rule out the existence of the properties of an object is not to rule out the utility of the words. I can still use the words to describe what’s real, in this case the electron.

Debates usually involve two or more competing ideas, not a series of questions and answers. So if you believe in the existence of properties then surely there is a reason why. — NOS4A2

You've moved to shifting the burden instead of answering my question. That doesn't bode well for your argument.

My mistake. How is it, then, that if you rule out the existence of the properties of an object, you'll soon find that you have no words at all to describe reality?

You'll have no way to explain what an electron is in real terms. It becomes blank. See what I mean?

But we already describe what an electron is. We’re speaking about an electron when defining its movements in mathematical terms. So I do not see what you mean.

But we already describe what an electron is. We’re speaking about an electron when defining its movements in mathematical terms. So I do not see what you mean. — NOS4A2

Are you saying that speaking of a specific electron's movements is sufficient to give the word "electron" its conventional meaning?

I don’t know. I’m not a physicist. I’m only saying that we’re speaking about electrons when defining their movements in mathematical terms, such as with “spin”.

I don’t know. I’m not a physicist. I’m only saying that we’re speaking about electrons when defining their movements in mathematical terms, such as with “spin”. — NOS4A2

Spin is a particular kind of momentum, which is mass times velocity. Spin is represented as a vector. The electron itself is a point particle. It doesn't have any volume. Electrons are negatively charged.

The above description of spin and electrons is full of universals and abstract objects. If you deny the existence of those properties, you have no real terms with which to explain what an electron is. "Electron" becomes a blank.

Nominalism makes sense because of things in nature are in a continuum. If I took the time I could find many species of plants that look kinda like trees but are basically in the middle sonewhere. Do we say they have the universal of tree-ness and shrub-ness at the same time? Or is plant-ness the universal? Does a car have an essence? What if we take the wheels off? Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is

Do we say they have the universal of tree-ness and shrub-ness at the same time? — Gregory

Sometimes things have contrary properties, but the forms don't. :grin: That's from Plato's Parmenides.

Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is — Gregory

This suggests that the whole issue is beyond our ability to answer because we can't see beyond our own minds.

But we struggle to say something about it anyway. I think universals and abstract objects do have something to do with the architecture of the mind. I don't have the vantage point necessary to go further though, and say that this architecture fools us. How do we decide which part of our experiences are lies? Occam says properties are lies. Hume said the object is. How would I know who's right?

But how can contingent things have universals? Aren't universals our way of knowing a parcel of reality as it exists around us? Your belief in universals indicates knowledge of the world

Your belief in universals indicates knowledge of the world — Gregory

In the OP, I offered to take either side of the debate. I'm interested in where the arguments lead.