States of affairs are truth-makers. So a proposition in your sense is not a state of affairs. Yes, I don’t want to wade into these things, personally.

The fact that I use an object pronoun ought not to suggest I believe “us” exists as an object.

The whole discussion takes place in the shadow of Plato. You're offering his middle period view. — frank

1. What does the discussion's place have to do with my argument?
2. Even if I was, you are not answering my argument.
3. Plato came centuries before Descartes.
In my opinion you are putting the hors d'raison before Descartes.

YOU wanted an argument. Then ANSWER with an argument. Not with a trite non-committal opinion that says nothing about anything.

NOS has been more gracious than I could ask for. He's rational, to the point, and eminently non-abusive. :up:

The fact that I use an object pronoun ought not to suggest I believe “us” exists as an object. — NOS4A2

Then there's no real foundation for descriptions. Right?

NOS has been more gracious than I could ask for. He's rational, to the point, and eminently non-abusive. — frank

I was not abusive in my arguments. But when you dismissed me and my arguments with a dismissive gesture, I became angry. And you wonder why I became abusive. You treated all other respondents with care and valid responses; you responded to them with respect inasmuch as accepting the validity of what they said. You shat on mine. I am sorry, I don't take that kind of treatment. THAT is why I became abusive. Disrespect. You showed me disrespect and I don't stand for that.

And if you think, Frank, that I was not rational, then you are not in a position to tell what's rational and what's not. My argument citing Descartes was to the point and impenetrable. You dismissed it because either you did not understand it, or because you understood it and had no response to the iron logic in it.

The concrete behaviour of physical objects is a sufficient account of spin. — Michael

I think you're saying that you're satisfied that things sometimes spin. That tops have the property of being able to spin is a different proposition, though.

Are you ok with that proposition?

But when you dismissed me and my arguments with a dismissive gesture, — god must be atheist

I wasn't being dismissive. I just didn't have any response.

As far as what I know about early nominalism, they did not deny truths of language or that objects have properties. They denied non material forms and Forms.

Which text from Occam do you derive the proposition that "Occam says properties are lies?"

When Occam admonishes those who 'multiply causes beyond necessity", is he not repeating Aristotle's demand for a crucial difference versus a classification like "featherless biped?" Which, by the way, was a criticism directed toward Aristotle.

Do you agree that arguments of this form are valid:

A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists"

The boiling point, for instance, is the temperature at which something boils. — NOS4A2

but there isn’t something called “red” in Anthocyanins and Heme. — NOS4A2

Yes there is, you just described it. It is the property of:

the light bouncing off of these compounds is similar. — NOS4A2

That light being within a certin range

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists" — khaled

Is the temperature at which something boils a property?

I think you're saying that you're satisfied that things sometimes spin. That tops have the property of being able to spin is a different proposition, though.

Are you ok with that proposition? — frank

That's the question I asked of you. Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin?

If there isn't a difference, and if things really spinning is concrete, not abstract, then spin being real is concrete, not abstract.

If there is a difference then prima facie one can deny that spin is real but accept that things really spin. What issues would arise from this? We have evidence of things really spinning. What evidence is there of spin being real (as something else)? What need is there for spin being real (as something else)?

I would think it is a property of the thing yes.

I would think it is a property of the thing yes. — khaled

The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius. Is 100 degrees celsius a property?

No. "Boils at 100 degrees Celsius" is a property. That water and maybe some other things have.

Is 100 degrees celsius a property? — Michael

No. — khaled

The boiling point of water is the temperature at which water boils
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius
100 degrees celsius is not a property
Therefore, the boiling point of water is not a property

A is B
B is C
C is not D
Therefore, A is not D

Yes, the boiling point of water is not a property. In the same way that the height of the empire state building is not a property. But height is a property.

The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. The boiling point of water is a specific value.

Yes, the boiling point of water is not a property. In the same way that the height of the empire state building is not a property. But height is a property.

The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. — khaled

Then your argument above either equivocates or begs the question.

A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists"

You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist. And so I will simply deny that the temperature at which something boils exists.

I will accept that the temperature at which water boils exists, but then if so we are only left with my argument above:

The boiling point of water is the temperature at which water boils
The temperature at which water boils is 100 degrees celsius
100 degrees celsius is not a property
Therefore, the boiling point of water is not a property

And then we apply that same argument for all things which (concretely) exist. There's no need or evidence for some abstract property in addition to this.

You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist. — Michael

Yes.

Then your argument above equivocates: — Michael

Not intentionally. I thought when we speak of "boiling point" we speak of it in the abstract. Not a specific instance of it. So the boiling point is the temperature at which something boils (something is unspecified because we are speaking abstractly)

The temperature at which something boils exists, therefore the boiling point exists.

And so I will simply deny that the temperature at which something boils exists. — Michael

That just seems...weird. Would you deny the existence of distance between two points as well? When a mathematician speaks of "distance between two points a and b" but doesn't specify a or b, what is he speaking about?

When a chemist says "boiling point of substance X can be used in *insert formula here* to calculate the entropy of the system" what are they speaking about?

If these properties don't exist even abstractly then how are these two talking about them?

Also I want to understand what you mean by "abstractly" exactly. Does a unicorn exist abstractly? Does a "sphere" (with unspecified radius)? As I understand it the answer is yes for both.

I will accept that the temperature at which water boils exists, but then if so we are only left with my argument above — Michael

Yes, which we seem to agree is valid. The boiling point of water is indeed not a property. Because the boiling point of water is "100C". That is a value in Celsius, not a property.

It seems iffy to me to deny the existence of properties in general, but to think they exist for certain things nonetheless, but I haven't thought about it much yet. I'll get back to this point when I do.

Good talk for now though. Gave me a lot to think about.

That just seems...weird. Would you deny the existence of distance between two points as well? When a mathematician speaks of "distance between two points a and b" but doesn't specify a or b, what is he speaking about? — khaled

We can talk about the distance between two points without having to accept that the distance exists, just as we can talk about Mordor and unicorns without having to accept that Mordor and unicorns exist.

To repeat my earlier exchange with Frank:

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects. — frank

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. They might play a useful role in language, but that’s all they are. — Michael

The idea that we can only talk about things that have some mind-independent existence, à la realism, is mistaken.

You seem confident it doesn't exist, so what exactly do you mean by "exist" in the first place. What would it look like if distance existed vs didn't exist. Mordor and unicorns are easy because we'd be able to see/touch them if they existed. But what about "temperature", "energy", "distance" etc

To me, an abstract exists if there could exist material things that act according to it. So gravity exists because things are pulling each other. Distance exists because if I represent things in xyz, and add up their vector positions, they seem to be where I'd expect them to be, etc.

To say gravity doesn't exist would be to say it is impossible to even have a world where material things pull each other. An example of an abstract that doesn't exist is a "square triangle".

What does existence for abstract stuff mean when you say it?

What does existence for abstract stuff mean to you? — khaled

I'm not entirely sure what it means to exist, but according to Platonism the existence of abstract objects is independent of the physical and the mental. This is what I deny. Whatever it means to exist, things exist either as a physical or as a mental thing (with the latter possibly reducible to the former).

There is no evidence or need for this third "realm" of abstract objects.

There is just the physical distance between two points in space and our concept of distance. There is no abstract distance as some additional mind-independent thing.

The obvious question would then be why you are so sure those two categories are all there is.

As for a lack of need for it: If things are either mental or physical, then when we refer to "gravity" we must be referring to a mental thing, a physical thing, or having no referent at all. So which is it? I disagree because I don't think any of the options does it justice.

But other than that, your only problem for it is that it seems unnecessary? Not some sort of internal inconsistency or issues that arise from assuming it?

My view is a bit out there when it comes to ontology and probably long overdue for a good tearing down, but I think that what we call "mental" belongs in the realm of abstract objects, along with the traditional inhabitants of said realm. And that they offer the least problematic account of interactions between mental and physical.

As for a lack of need for it: If things are either mental or physical, then when we refer to "gravity" we must be referring to a mental thing, a physical thing, or having no referent at all. So which is it? — khaled

Physical. It's one of the 4 fundamental forces.

The obvious question would then be why you are so sure those two categories are all there is. — khaled

There's no evidence or prima facie need for anything more, and so as per Occam's razor I can dismiss anything else.

But other than that, your only problem for it is that it seems unnecessary? Not some sort of internal inconsistency or issues that arise from assuming it? — khaled

Well, there's the question you asked of me; what does it even mean for an abstract object to exist (as some mind-independent thing)? It seems like an empty claim. And how do these abstract objects "attach" themselves to physical objects, or whatever it is that happens?

The temperature at which something boils exists, therefore the boiling point exists. — khaled

The boiling temperature varies with pressure, so it is relative. Therefore it is not true that there is a temperature at which something boils. And accordingly it is not true to say that such a thing exists.

That is the issue with Platonic realism, it only gets validated through absolutes. However, principles of physics such as "the boiling temperature" are always relative, and therefore cannot validate such realism. So the Platonic realist turns to principles which are more "pure", free from the influence of the physical world, mathematical axioms, and attempts to demonstrate that these are absolute.

That's the question I asked of you. Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? — Michael

Yes, there's a difference. Saying that tops have the property of being able to spin is not the same as saying that tops sometimes spin. You could have a top that spends its whole existence in a drawer. It still has the property of being able to spin.

If there is a difference then prima facie one can deny that spin is real but accept that things really spin. What issues would arise from this? We have evidence of things really spinning. What evidence is there of spin being real (as something else)? What need is there for spin being real (as something else)? — Michael

Have you ever heard of Hume's bundle theory?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3791/ockhams-razor-and-anselms-proof-understood

The boiling temperature varies with pressure, so it is relative. Therefore it is not true that there is a temperature at which something boils. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a non-sequitor. Just because it varies with another value doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

Gravitational pull varies with distance. That does not mean gravitatoinal pull doesn't exist.

Yes, there's a difference. Saying that tops have the property of being able to spin is not the same as saying that tops sometimes spin. You could have a top that spends its whole existence in a drawer. It still has the property of being able to spin. — frank

OK, then is there a difference between spin being real and a top really being able to spin?