….measured value…. — Metaphysician Undercover

That there are things to be known, is given; how the things are to be known, is determined.

"Gravitational force" is just another way of saying "gravity" — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. I was referring specifically to the value that represents the strength of gravitational pull, but sure, let's say they're the same.

No, by my logic, the value assigned to any specific instance of gravitational force does not exist — Metaphysician Undercover

So the value of gravitational force does not exist since it varies based on what units/formulas we use? Is that what you're saying?

I am making no claims about whether gravitational force exists, or whether boiling water exists, I am making claims about the measured value of such things. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the "boiling point" is on exactly the same level as "gravitational force". We use both in formulas abstractly. And neither are talking about a specific value.

Likewise, the value assigned to the boiling point of water at average seal level air pressure might be 100 degrees, or 212 degrees, or even 373 degrees, depending on the formula employed — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but in all of these cases, the boiling point exists yes? There exists a temperature at which something boils, although we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values. Similar to how there exists a gravitational force between two objects, even though we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values.

So the value of gravitational force does not exist since it varies based on what units/formulas we use? Is that what you're saying? — khaled

Yes

But the "boiling point" is on exactly the same level as "gravitational force". We use both in formulas abstractly. And neither are talking about a specific value. — khaled

"The boiling point" when represented as a specific temperature value, (which is what you were saying, the temperature at which something boils) is a specific value. "Gravitational force" is something general and does not represent any specific value. So, the value which is assigned to the "gravitational force" depends on the circumstances and the formula used to figure that value. But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. So the former, the general description of "gravitational force" is a descriptive statement prior to the application of formula, while the latter, 100 degrees, posterior to the application of a formula, as a value produced from that application.

Yes, but in all of these cases, the boiling point exists yes? There exists a temperature at which something boils, although we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values. — khaled

No, there is not a temperature at which something boils. That is the point. There is no such thing as the temperature at which something boils. That's what I've been telling you. The temperature at which a liquid will boil depends on the air pressure. Try taking some water to the moon and see what happens to it. Maybe someone has already done this experiment, google it.

The value of the gravitational force depends on gravitational constant, the masses of the object, and the distance between them. Which for some reason makes it so that the value of the gravitational force doesn't exist

And yet the gravitational force exists.

The value of the boiling point depends on pressure, the type of liquid, and a bunch of other things. Which for somea reason makes it so that the value of the boiling point doesn't exist.

And yet the boiling point exists.

It's the exact same situation with the exact same logic. I don't know where you got this distinction:

"Gravitational force" is something general and does not represent any specific value. But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. — Metaphysician Undercover

but (and excuse my french) it is complete nonsense.

which is what you were saying, the temperature at which something boils) is a specific value — Metaphysician Undercover

Not what I was saying. I was not referring to the value "100C" (in case of water) as the boiling point.

But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what boiling point means. Boiling point is every bit as general and condition dependent as gravitational force. See:

Yes, the boiling point of water is not a property. In the same way that the height of the empire state building is not a property. But height is a property.

The boiling point is a property. The boiling point of water is not. The boiling point of water is a specific value. — khaled

You're saying that the temperature at which something boils exists. But this is meant in some abstract sense, not in some concrete sense, e.g. the temperature at which water boils exist.
— Michael

Yes. — khaled

No, there is not a temperature at which something boils. That is the point. There is no such thing as the temperature at which something boils. That's what I've been telling you. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems like you misunderstand what boiling point means which is why you say this. Hopefully the above clears it up.

The value of the gravitational force depends on gravitational constant, the masses of the object, and the distance between them. Which for some reason makes it so that the value of the gravitational force doesn't exist

And yet the gravitational force exists.

The value of the boiling point depends on pressure, the type of liquid, and a bunch of other things. Which for somea reason makes it so that the value of the boiling point doesn't exist.

And yet the boiling point exists.

It's the exact same situation with the exact same logic. I don't know where you got this distinction: — khaled

As I said, the issue is with your statement that "there exists a temperature at which something boils". This is completely different from the statement "the boiling point exists". The former, "a temperature" is a value assigned to the latter, the named thing, "boiling point".

Do you apprehend the difference? Suppose there is a pile of money on the table, a bunch of paper notes. Do you see the difference between the pile of paper, and the value assigned to it? If you do, then let's stick to the value, and inquire whether the value exists. Please do not keep saying that you only want to talk about the pile of paper, implying that you think that if the pile of paper is determined to be existing, we can somehow infer from this, that the value is also existing. That's a pointless exercise in the context of this thread.

So if you just want to discuss whether "the boiling point" exists, instead of your original claim that "the temperature at which something boils exists", this is not even relevant to the thread, and rather pointless to discuss. But if you honestly want to discuss whether the value which we assign to that thing named "the boiling point" exists, the thing which you call "the temperature at which something boils", then I'm ready to proceed.

"there exists a temperature at which something boils". This is completely different from the statement "the boiling point exists". The former, "a temperature" is a value assigned to the latter, the named thing, "boiling point". — Metaphysician Undercover

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear:

That you then proceed to argue against what you mistakenly thought I said even after the misunderstanding has been cleared up is pointless.

Please do not keep saying that you only want to talk about the pile of paper, implying that you think that if the pile of paper is determined to be existing, we can somehow infer from this, that the value is also existing — Metaphysician Undercover

That implication is in your head only. You seem to have a habit of misunderstanding me.

instead of your original claim that "the temperature at which something boils exists" — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, those were intended as the same claim. But I understand the difference you drew between.

But if you honestly want to discuss whether the value which we assign to that thing named "the boiling point" exists, the thing which you call "the temperature at which something boils", then I'm ready to proceed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I believe they still exist. And to be clear we are discussing values correct? Like "100 degrees Celsius". I must say that seeing a realist that believes that "boiling point" exists but that its value doesn't exist is a first time for me.

I'll start with asking you, if you think these values don't exist, then what are we referring to when we use them?

Sure, I believe they still exist. And to be clear we are discussing values correct? Like "100 degrees Celsius". I must say that seeing a realist that believes that "boiling point" exists but that its value doesn't exist is a first time for me.

I'll start with asking you, if you think these values don't exist, then what are we referring to when we use them? — khaled

OK, so we're talking about values. That's right then, we have understanding, I do not think that values exist. I believe they are mental constructs, products of the imagination, which like any other objects of fiction, do not exist. So when we "use them", they are used just like a creative work of fiction, from which there is an intent to achieve some sort of goal, or end. So by the same principle that a lie (which intentionally refers to something non-existent) is useful, so also are values (which intentionally refer to something non-existent), are useful.

As an analogy, consider a parent who tells a child a fictitious story about Santa Clause, for the purpose of some goal of culturing love and good will within the child. Be aware though, that fictitious stories can be used for all sorts of ends from evils like deception, cheating, fraud, stealing, to good things like the love and good will mentioned above, along with social institutions, and products created through the fictitious stories of mathematics and engineering.

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real?

I think there is a problem with saying values are fictitious, being that if they are fictitious, then changing them should not mean we are wrong.

Take the Santa Clause story. That's fictitious because even if you change the story so that Santa uses flying horses, you're not "wrong". It's a work of fiction after all you can do whatever you want. Santa could be a vampire.

However if you have 5 boxes lined up in front of you and you say there are 4 boxes, you are wrong. That tells me that values aren't works of fiction.

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real? — khaled

I think the principal issue is that there are different ways to derive "the value", as I described. Each formulation of "the value" is correct in accordance with its formula, though they are different. This is fundamentally a relativistic perspective. The value assigned is relative to the formula employed, and is correct, but different from the value assigned relative to another formula.

Now, when we point at something "real" in the world, like a pot of water which starts to boil, we want to know the cause of that activity, and this is where the problem of thinking that the value is real arises. If we think that the formula produces a value which is real, we might tend to believe that any specific formula provides a true representation of the cause. So for example, if we think that 100 degrees Celsius is a "real" value for the boiling point of water, then we would tend to believe that the real cause of the water boiling is that it reached that temperature.

However, as I explained already, this is not a true representation, air pressure is just as important, but not expressed in that formula. Therefore thinking that the value is real, misleads us into thinking that the faulty representation which the formula is derived from, is a true representation. But we know that the representation from which the value is derived, is not necessarily true, because we know that there are different values for the very same thing, produced from different representations, all of which are considered to be correct.

Now the problem is that we have no way to determine the true representation, the true cause, if each is equally correct ('model-dependent realism'). Each is itself a real representation, therefore a true representation, and if they are incompatible, that's just the way reality is, it has incompatible parts. So the assumption leads to the conclusion that reality is impossible to understand because it has incompatible parts. That reality is impossible to understand is not necessarily the truth though, it is just a conclusion produced from the assumption that the incompatible values are equally real.

I think there is a problem with saying values are fictitious, being that if they are fictitious, then changing them should not mean we are wrong.

Take the Santa Clause story. That's fictitious because even if you change the story so that Santa uses flying horses, you're not "wrong". It's a work of fiction after all you can do whatever you want. Santa could be a vampire.

However if you have 5 boxes lined up in front of you and you say there are 4 boxes, you are wrong. That tells me that values aren't works of fiction. They refer to something we commonly understand. — khaled

This is not true, because even in a work of fiction there are conventions which must be adhered to otherwise you step out of that specific fictional story. So if you say that Santa uses horses instead of reindeer, you are wrong, because you've removed yourself from the acceptable convention, and you ought not call your fictitious character by the name Santa. Notice I use "ought" because you still can if you want, but you would be out of line with the convention.

Your "boxes" analogy needs to be revised to be applicable. You premise "5 boxes", so by that premise "4 boxes" is wrong. You need to start with a premise like "a multitude of items", or "a line of boxes" then we have to assign values and there is a judgement to be made. The premise "5 boxes" already makes that judgement. and so by that premise anything else would be wrong, even though someone might argue that one item is not correctly a "box" or something like that. So your analogy needs to premise that the evaluation has not yet been made, then you can see that evaluation is similar to a work of fiction..

I think the principal issue is that there are different ways to derive "the value", as I described. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think so. Because if there are multiple ways to derive something that doesn't lead to it not existing, but you seem to have been working with that assumption so far though I don't know why.

So for example, if we think that 100 degrees Celsius is a "real" value for the boiling point of water, then we would tend to believe that the real cause of the water boiling is that it reached that temperature. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is certainly something people do, but it is a fallacy, not proof that the value "isn't real". At this point I really don't understand how you use that term. People also believe that positively charged objects have gained protons, rather than being deficient in electrons often because of the way we represent it. That doesn't mean that protons and electrons aren't real.

Do you think math is discovered or created? That might shed some light for me on the enigma that is what you're saying.

So your analogy needs to premise that the evaluation has not yet been made, then you can see that evaluation is similar to a work of fiction.. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. Let's first assume that all the items are boxes without a doubt, for simplificiation. Regardless of what system we make up, there will be a correct answer within it, not so for pure fiction.

For santa, I can make up any story I want. I can make up a story about a vampire santa, I can make up a story about a lesbian female santa, I can do whatever, and these stories will not be "wrong". They will just be different stories from the original.

But if we make up a system where instead of "one box" we have "aosidjf" and instead of "two boxes" we have "psidbu", if there is one box (by our traditional system) we would be wrong to say "psidbu". Regardless of how arbitrary or convoluted our system for counting boxes is, at the end of the day there will be a right and a wrong evaluation.

Point is: For pure fiction, we are not wrong for making up or changing stories. But for the evaluation of the number of boxes, REGARDLESS of what system we pick it will contain right and wrong answers.

Because santa is purely made up :sad: we can do anything with him, but we cannot alter the number of boxes with our mind. So regardless of how we count them, there will be a right and wrong answer for each counting method. But there will never be a "right fictional story" and a "wrong fictional story". That's the fundamental difference.

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real? — khaled

To repeat the kind of question I asked frank before, is there a difference between saying that the boiling point is real and saying that things really do boil? I don't think there is.

And that things really do boil does not entail that some universal or abstract object exists.

That we have a language with a grammar that includes universals and abstract objects isn't that realism about universals and abstract objects is true. Such a view is simply an unfounded projection.

is there a difference between saying that the boiling point is real and saying that things really do boil? — Michael

Note: When I say "boiling point of water" I mean under normal conditions.

I think the boiling point can exist even if things don't really boil. If we lived in a world where the maximum temperature ever detected or achievable by us was 60 degrees celcius, the boiling point of water would still be 100 degrees celcius.

We would find that other things boil (there are things that boil at less than 60 degrees) and then theoretically calculate the boiling point of water. In that case, even if water doesn't really boil, the boiling point exists.

Additionally, even if we never discovered anything boiling and had no conception of what boiling is, the boiling point of water would still exist and be 100C (as it is still water), or do you disagree? There you have a case where water doesn't really boil, yet the boiling point exists.

And that things really do boil does not entail that some universal or abstract object exists. — Michael

Sure, but that wasn't the motivation behind saying those objects exist. The motivation was that things like "boiling point" cannot simply be relegated to "mental stuff". The boiling point is not a purely mental concept, if it was, it would be pure imagination. We do not say a fictional story is "wrong" or "right", but we do say that the boiling point of water under normal conditions is 100C, not 110C, and you would be wrong to say it is 110C. The explanation for this, I believe, is that there are abstract objects that we discover.

It's clearer in the case of math. Without the belief in abstract objects, then I do not see how you can believe that mathematical questions can have right and wrong answers. If we make up math and its rules, we should be able to say the answer is whatever we want. But REGARDLESS of what system of mathematics we employ, there are always right and wrong answers within it. Boolean math has right and wrong answers, linear algebra has right and wrong answers, etc. If it's all made up then why is that?

I'll repeat my question from last time. Is "Newton's second law" just mental stuff? If it is, then how come the universe was abiding by it even before it existed (before it was made up by newton)?

I think the boiling point can exist even if things don't really boil. If we lived in a world where the maximum temperature ever detected or achievable by us was 60 degrees celcius, the boiling point of water would still be 100 degrees celcius. — khaled

That water would boil were it to reach 100 degrees celsius isn't that some universal/abstract object exists. Such a view is a realist misinterpretation of counterfactuals; a fallacious projection of grammar.

Could you elaborate?

Also could you engage with what I'm typing instead of 1 line responses that don't illuminate anything?

Imagine saying "John would die were he to be decapitated, therefore his death exists." It's obviously ridiculous if interpreted in a realist sense. So too with "this water would boil were it to be heated to 100 degrees celsius, therefore its boiling point exists."

"John would die were he to be decapitated, therefore his death exists." — Michael

"this water would boil were it to be heated to 100 degrees celsius, therefore its boiling point exists." — Michael

Wouldn't it be "therefore decapitations exist" if we're keeping the same form? I don't find that ridiculous, for "decaptiations" to exist in the abstract in the same way as boiling point.

If there was no such abstract, how can we tell that someone is wrong when they call death by a gun wound a "decapitation"?

Do you think math is discovered or created? — khaled

I think it's very obvious that mathematics is created by human beings. But I also think it's pointless to discuss such an issue with you, because I've come to see that when there is an obvious difference between two things, (like the value and the thing valued), you just define one so that it is the same as the other, deny the difference, and argue your point from a position of denial.

So I'm quite sure that if we proceed in a discussion as to whether mathematical axioms are created or are discovered, you'll end up defining "discovered" in such a way that it has the same meaning as "created", just like you defined the "value" given to the point at which something boils, to be the same thing as "the point at which something boils".

So for example, when human beings 'discovered' consistency in the way that water boiled, and that there was a point which boiling came from not boiling, and we 'created' a value for this point, you will simply define this creation of the value to be the very same thing as the discovery of the thing which is valued, and deny the separation between the discovery and the creation.

Here's an example to elucidate the difference. say you are walking in the wilderness, and you discover something new, never before seen by a human being. You go back to your fellow human beings and describe and discuss that thing. A name is created, and given to the thing. Do you apprehend, and accept the difference between discovering the thing, and creating the name for it?

No it isn't. Let's first assume that all the items are boxes without a doubt, for simplificiation. Regardless of what system we make up, there will be a correct answer within it, not so for pure fiction. — khaled

This is just begging the question. If you assume a realist premise, you will get a realist conclusion. If we want a correct answer to how many boxes there are, the first thing we need to do is stipulate what qualifies as "a box", otherwise there can be no correct answer.

You assume that the choice has already been made, as to what does and does not qualify as "a box", and therefore someone has already gone through and sorted the items, effectively counting the objects already. That's how you conclude that there will be a correct answer. Who do you think, makes this decision as to what qualifies as a box and what does not, God? Do you think that God has already counted the boxes?

you just define one so that it is the same as the other, deny the difference, and argue your point from a position of denial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quote when I did this.

No what happened was I said "A is B" (A is boiling point, B is "temperature at which something boils") before you even posted on this thread, then you proceeded to deny the existence of B. I was confused the entire time because you didn't deny the existence of A. Then you created the difference you accuse me of denying, and once created I said:

Again, those were intended as the same claim. But I understand the difference you drew between. — khaled

And then proceeded to discuss the existence of "values" next as you wanted.

If you disagree that that is what happened, then quote when I did what you accuse. Or quote where any part of the above didn't happen. I was already spending 99% of my typing on dealing with your misunderstandings, I don't intend to spend 99% of the remaining 1%, denying nonsensical accusations.

Until you show that your accusation has any basis in reality, I do not intend on continuing this discussion.

I've been cordial with you despite thinking what you're saying is wrong. I don't intend to continue an already unproductive discussion if you can't return the favor.

Wouldn't it be "therefore decapitations exist" if we're keeping the same form? I don't find that ridiculous, for "decaptiations" to exist in the abstract in the same way as boiling point. — khaled

Perhaps, depending on your interpretation. And what does "decapitations exist in the abstract" even mean? I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects.

I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects. — Michael

'Things with heads' is an abstract objects. It's basically criteria for a set. That's abstract.

but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects. — Michael

It does, since you haven't escaped talking about abstract objects yet. I propose that you can't do that. Universals and properties are too embedded in the way you think to escape them. For instance, try imagining an object that has no properties.

What you can do is just leave their status undetermined. What you can't justifiably do is say they don't exist.

And what does "decapitations exist in the abstract" even mean? — Michael

That there exists a "pattern" or "arrangement" that "decapitations" is pointing to.

I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects. — Michael

It doesn't prove it but it also doesn't deny it, so I'm not sure of its relevence. "decapitations can exist in the abstract" and "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" can both be true.

The existence of abstract objects is needed because "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" is not enough. There are things it can't account for. Such as HOW we know that a death by a gunshot is not a decapitation. Or what we refer to when we say "decapitation".

It does, since you haven't escaped talking about abstract objects yet. I propose that you can't do that. Universals and properties are too embedded in the way you think to escape them. For instance, try imagining an object that has no properties. — frank

It doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about abstract objects that abstract objects exist in the realist sense. The latter notion is unfounded projection. There's no evidence for it and there's no need for it. It is sufficient that just the physical and the mental (which might be reducible to the physical) exist.

It doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about abstract objects that abstract objects exist in the realist sense. — Michael

It also doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about physical objects that they exist in the realist sense.
That is also an unfounded notion. There is no evidence for it and no need for it.

If you must downgrade the existence of something that is embedded in the way you think, you pick your poison.

It also doesn't follow from the fact that we talk about physical objects that they exist in the realist sense. — frank

Correct.

That is also an unfounded notion. There is no evidence for it and no need for it.

Uncertain. The realist would argue that the realist existence of physical objects is a parsimonious explanation for the occurrence and regularity of observable phenomena. Of course, subjective idealists would disagree, but then that's a separate discussion.

I don't think you can make the same argument in favour of the realist existence of universals and abstract objects. Why do we need something like "things with heads" to exist as an abstract object for a concrete, physical thing with a head to exist? I don't think we do. Rather, a number of concrete, physical things with heads exist, and then we conceptually abstract from this the notion of "a thing with a head". But this abstract "thing with a head" is just a facet of our thought and language, not some object with a mind-independent existence.

But this abstract "thing with a head" is just a facet of our thought and language, not some object with a mind-independent existence. — Michael

Physicality is most definitely a facet of our thought and language. Whether it has some mind independent status is unknown.

You're free to think in terms of physical realism. Just don't make the mistake of thinking that your view is better founded than some other. The weight it seems to carry is just a matter of the times in which you live.

Suppose you turn two batches of carbon and oxygen into water. Where did the nature come from? They are identical because they share identical structure. Nominalism doesn't deny things can be identical. It denies they are sharing an abstract philosophical form. We know what we are talking about when we say "tree" but that doesn't mean my mind shares in yours

Sure. Yet the answer to: "What is the square root of 2?" is not a mental or physical object. It's an abstract object, which means it's something I learn about, something I could be wrong about,etc.

Truth is real and ideas are real. Ideas only go together in certain ways. But applying substance outside the mind to truth is to put material reality on them. So you say that means rocks are united in a cloud Form? They are just rocks, each individual.

They are just rocks, each individual. — Gregory

True. I dont have the universe figured out. Nobody does. What I discern is the way we're bound to think. Form and matter. Statue and clay, clay and atoms, atoms and subatomic particles, down to the last pair of form and matter. This is the schematic of thought.

Matter and form are the same for nominalism. If you say objects don't share an abstract form, then they must share a material one. And then all rocks become one object! So you have to say something abstract is involved in an object, which is to reject matter altogether