If you say objects don't share an abstract form, then they must share a material one. — Gregory

Form, by definition, isn't material. It's a property.

So you have to say something abstract is involved in an object, which is to reject matter altogether — Gregory

That's one possibility. One could also think in terms of neutral monism.

I thought of perhaps a better way to put it.

"decapitation" can exist abstractly even if it was impossible for things with heads to have their heads cut off. If all necks were made from an uncuttable material, "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated" would be false, but "decapitation" as a concept would still exist. If enough people imagine it and find it amusing enough, we may even create a word for it.

As to what it means for something to exist abstractly, another way of putting it is that it conceivable. So not something like a "square circle". Even in a world were necks are uncuttable, decapitation is conceivable. Just like Santa is conceivable in our world despite the impossiblity of flying raindeer.

The liquid. Why would it be the condition? A condition doesn't possess any of the qualities that would make up "wet".

But the condition of the water is wet. It possesses a wet condition. The abjective “wet” describes the noun “condition”. The point is, the fact that we use language in a such a manner need not evoke entities such as qualities, conditions, states, or properties in our ontology. It’s just another way of saying the water is wet.

That's why I posit that the liquid itself has "laws" that determine its "states". We merely discover those laws. We don't make them up. If they were entirely mental constructs, then how come when we alter them, the things bound by them don't change behavior accordingly?

It’s simply an empirical point. in learning about water we never come across something called a law and there is nothing law-like about liquid. Liquid doesn’t describe itself. We’ve devised the units of measurement, the languages, the formulas, the metaphors, the laws, the conditions, the experiments, hold it up to nature and make sure it’s an as accurate representation as possible.

The abjective “wet” describes the noun “condition”. — NOS4A2

No it doesn't. In this case it's not an adjective, it's a value. In the same way that "the boiling point of water is 100C". But "condition" instead of "boiling point" and "wet" instead of "100C".

It’s just another way of saying the water is wet. — NOS4A2

I think you have it the other way around. In order to say that water is wet, we have to have some idea of what "wet" is. That definition, will be an abstract.

The condition comes first, then the adjective, otherwise no one knows what the adjective means.

We’ve devised the units of measurement, the languages, the formulas, the metaphors, the laws — NOS4A2

What kind of things are all of these things in your ontology though? Formulas certainly refer to something right? I'm not asking what it is, just what kind of thing it is. If you're a materialist you'd be forced to say"matter" for example (which seems clearly false to me, formulas are not matter).

Because they all seem like abstracts to me.

hold it up to nature and make sure it’s an as accurate representation as possible. — NOS4A2

What determines its accuracy is how well it can predict the liquid's behavior yes? And for us to even bother with all of this, we must believe that the liquid behaves with some regularity correct? This regular behavior of the liquid, what kind of thing it? Or is it nothing at all?

Nominalism is not saying that two objects can't be identical. They are saying each object has one principle (insteadbof two) that is physically shaped a certain way and two things can be identical in structure. But they don't share a form because all they *share* (own in common) is being in space. Sharing is the key term. Is there something that is in two rabbits or do you have two objects that each separately have the same biology

In my own case, I imagine attaching one end of a string to a word and the other to the referent. Since a universal or abstract object would not string to any particular object in the world, it is without a referent or is self-referential, and has little bearing on my ontology beyond the marks on paper and the guttural sounds that spell out the universal.

The idea that an abstract object must refer to some concrete object because we can speak about it and treat it with noun-phrases doesn’t suffice for me to accept its reality.

Quote when I did this. — khaled

OK

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear: — khaled

Just when I thought we were starting to make some progress, you take us right back.

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear: — khaled

Yes, that occurred before you showed up:

A is B
B exists
Therefore A exists

If so, replace A with "boiling point" and B with "the temperature at which something boils" and you get "the boiling point (a property) exists" — khaled

Afterwards, you proceeded to deny B, without ever clarifying that you disagree with my initial definition. Likely because you never saw it. Which led to us wasting 2 pages before it finally became clear that you think A is different from B.

It is not that you defined A and B differently and I insisted they are the same, as you accuse me of.

Just when I thought we were starting to make some progress — Metaphysician Undercover

I would not think spending 2 pages to get to a point where we agree what is being talked about “progress”. I made more progress in a single reply to NO4 or Michael. Why would I waste my time typing to you when it yields nothing but unprovoked nonsensical accusations?

Since a universal or abstract object would not string to any particular object in the world, it is without a referent or is self-referential, and has little bearing on my ontology beyond the marks on paper and the guttural sounds that spell out the universal. — NOS4A2

In my case, I’m not satisfied with that. “Boiling point” clearly doesn’t refer to the word “boiling point” and it clearly has SOME referent. It’s not a word like “a”, “for” or “the”, we mean something when we say boiling point.

And I think an ontology that has a word which refers to something it cannot account for is incomplete. It sounds like when some materialists say “Emotion is self referential or has no referent”.

It just seems to me more trouble to deny than it’s worth. We talk in universals ALL the time, and there are many things we cannot express at all without them (like the entire fields of mathematics), and their existence doesn’t seem to offer any internal inconsistencies, or inconsistencies in coexisting with matter/minds, so why deny them? They’re harmless

The idea that an abstract object must refer to some concrete object because we can speak about it and treat it with noun-phrases doesn’t suffice for me to accept its reality. — NOS4A2

Well that’s not the only idea that could lead to the belief, but I see where you’re coming from.