The conflict or disharmony between heart and mind (Xin), how well/badly these two work (together), will decide, in my humble opinion, humanity's fate! — Agent Smith

That's true.

I think your thoughts can be related to Taoism, New-Daoism, Yin and Yang, Confucianism, etc...

Verse 39.
Being in harmony with the Tao way
The sky obtained clarity and the earth became stable.
In harmony things were gradually created.

Out of the Tao way the man is not in harmony with the sky
He is not stable on the earth.
Without this equilibrium, the man disappears.

The Wise Person sees everything in equilibrium,
He doesn't manifest his Ego, or intervene.
First he will monitor the Tao Way,
Uniting with the Tao Way, he is in equilibrium as well.

:up:

Which Tarot card features my portrait today ? Is it grizzly Scientism or spooky Mysticism ?

The gist of my plaint was what I saw as a knee-jerk Kantianism that should maybe doubt itself, taking itself as it does for the figment of a dream. That we should justify our beliefs, and hold them fallible, is almost to be taken for granted among philosophers. No need to dress it up with Kant/Hoffman, both indulgently ornate theorists, to make such a point. As I've been arguing in other threads, doubting the world while taking the self for granted, however traditional, is not so sensible. The concept loses its intelligbilty just as 'it's' body has its ears and eyes and nose dissolve into the theory's pixels ---without only made sense as the output of those worldly devices, battered by light and air, the real stuff.

Which Tarot card features my portrait today ? Is it grizzly Scientism or spooky Mysticism ? — Pie

The ermit. This is the card which features your portrait today. Why? Because he carries his Lamp of Truth, used to guide the unknowing,

The ermit. This is the card which features your portrait today. Why? Because he carries his Lamp of Truth, used to guide the unknowing, — javi2541997

Nice pick, friend !

I love the image.

Well, I'm not sure how to judge your post. It rings true but, absit iniuria, that can be for so many reasons other than it being true if you catch my drift. Verisimilitude is rather complex it seems! I digress though. — Agent Smith

That's OK. No offense taken. I was just riffing on one implication of your post : that humanity might be devolving due to unfitness : not having the "right stuff" for survival. Au contraire mon fre're, the Enformationism worldview implies that humanity is now a major driver of evolution -- for better or for worse. Humans have added Cultural Selection to Nature's weeding-out mechanisms. And one aspect of Cultural Selection is the Moral Dimension. It's an unnatural (artificial) way of guiding the selfish masses toward the common good. Animals don't have a formal Moral Code, because they are driven mainly by emotional instinct, instead of rational planning.

Some cynical philosophers see only the sensationalized media view of humanity's immoralities. But, a few scientists have dug up evidence to tell a mundane story of man's humanity toward man & nature. Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature ; Michael Shermer's The Moral Arc ; and Rutger Bregman's HumanKind, are just a few examples of a more hopeful outlook for the future history of humanity. There are plenty of negative "truths", if that's your thing. But I prefer to focus on the much more common positive "truths" that can be interpreted as upward moral evolution. Our technological progress is undeniable, but moral progress is not so obvious. That's why Steven Pinker wrote Enlightenment Now, to present the case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. These books give some "reasons" for "it being true". :grin:


Enlightenment Now, Again :
Pinker is optimistic about human flourishing, fostering, enhancing, and progressing, as we overcome inherent and environmental limitations with grit & reason.
http://bothandblog2.enformationism.info/page41.html

We must try, we absolutely must! That, in my humble opinion, is our ultimate purpose.

KANT — Gnomon

That pun KANT go unacknowledged.

Quite interesting and educative! Thanks for posting this topic.

A) Which are the “first principles” Aristotle is referring to? — javi2541997

I don't think that Aristotle referred to specific first principles. I think that his first principles apply to any subject: scientific, philosophical, religious ... pertaining to language, art, ... to everyday life ... anything. One starts by asking "What is that, the truth of which we know for certain and we don't have to prove?" It has millions of applications.

Now, something relevant and well known as a subject comes to my mind: the "First Cause". Only that there's a big difference between the two: "reason" refers to something intentional, whereas "cause" may refer to somthing random, accidental.

Anyway, all this needs to be analyzed ... I'll come back to it if I have some workable and useful ideas ...

If they are not need to be proven... their premises are universal affirmative? (According to Aristotle's syllogisms) — javi2541997

B) If they are not need to be proven... their premises are universal affirmative? (According to Aristotle's syllogisms) — javi2541997

I guess so. But the problem is, how many cases must be satisfied, i.e. the principle be applied to, to be considered as "first principle". Also, do we arrive to such a principle simply because we can't think of any other that precedes it?

Questions to explore and feed our minds with ...

Does anyone see a resemblance between Aristotle's 'unproven first principles' and Godel's incompleteness theorem?

'The theorem states that in any reasonable mathematical system there will always be true statements that cannot be proved.'

I blame myself for starting threads like this one. I raised many questions about logic whereas I don't have any clue of basic notion of philosophy of science at all! We can debate on taxes and how to be a decent citizen with honesty, but I am completely lost in this issue... I don't even remember why I started this thread. :lol:

In the other hand, you are right in your argument on what we should consider as first principles. I remember that my main error was to think in "specific" truths, while those are accessory. Aristotle used such premises in different subjects to promote a basic notion of logic (I wish I am not mistaken and I am remembering well).

Questions to explore and feed our minds with ... — Alkis Piskas

Aristotle's syllogisms and logic explore our minds and cause a lot of questions. Sadly, I am not capable to answer them but there are members in this forum with a high level in mathematics and philosophy of science and they offer a lot of answers.
What I remember about this thread is the fact that Aristotlean logic is now so simplistic compared to modern logic problems...

I think that for Godel, the matter of valid forms of demonstration was paramount. Aristotle certainly was concerned with the matter but also saw first principles as being a proper fit for what was to be inquired into. Some natural things had particular differences that required different primary points of departure. There were other qualities they all shared.

There is substantial debate amongst ancient scholars regarding such a distinction in Aristotle's text. MELINA G. MOUZALA gives a nice summary of the issue.

My impression is that Aristotle was not trying to provide the last word on these matters.

I think that for Godel, the matter of valid forms of demonstration was paramount. Aristotle certainly was concerned with the matter but also saw first principles as being a proper fit for what was to be inquired into — Paine

Plainly - I'm able to read the encyclopedia description of Godel's proof, but I'm not equipped to understand the math. It just occured to me, however, that there is a kind of resemblance between the two principles.

My impression is that Aristotle was not trying to provide the last word on these matters. — Paine

No doubt. :up:

Well, I have read and know very little about logic literature-wise, Aristotelian or other.
I prefer using it! :grin:

Methinks a first principle (is there a Latin term for it?) is one the falsity of which entails a contradiction or is self-refuting.

F = There are some truths

If F is false then ~F = there are no truths. ~F is true (F is false) AND ~F is false (~F says there are no truths).

If F is false then ~F is true, but ~F says there are no truths so ~F is false (self-refuting)

@Wayfarer (self-referential paradoxes, re the Gödel sentence: this statement is unprovable).

Global skepticism too is said to be self-refuting and so is relativism according to quite a number of philosophers.

Well, you need ro assume something, don't you?

Unless you want to assume the empty assumption of not assuming anything... :-)
In which case you cannot argue anything.

I want to add a more general note about first principles (not necessarily something found within Aristotle's work).

Some axioms are called self-evident by virtue of how certain they seem. Others however, use "self-evidence" in a more narrow sense, meaning "self-evidencing through self-referentiality". Axioms that are self-evident in this sense are an even better candidate for the claim of not needing propositional justification.

Take Descartes Cogito, ergo sum. If you assume that thinking implies a thinker, and if you assume that thinkers exist, then you can prove your own existence through thinking. If your thought happens to be I think, therefore I am, then the proposition is self-referentially proven (granted we take the aforementioned assumptions as givens), because the proposition is a thought, and thus acts as the evidence for the existence claim; but to do so, the evidence must be referred to (which happens via the I think part). This reference is then a self-reference, since the proposition is its own evidence.

This is far from the cleanest example of self-referentially justifying propositions, and it is also not the most impressive, given that it requires external assumptions. However, it is probably the most famous example of this kind of self-evident propositions.

Does anyone see a resemblance between Aristotle's 'unproven first principles' and Godel's incompleteness theorem?

'The theorem states that in any reasonable mathematical system there will always be true statements that cannot be proved.' — Wayfarer

There is definitely a resemblance. Aristotle's rationale was that syllogistic reasoning is not self-supporting, and requires non-syllogistic first principles. Godel was probably motivated, at least in part, by the recent attempts to develop exhaustive and definitive systems of formal reasoning, especially in the logical positivism movement. They may have both been responding to the same sort of error, but the error was almost certainly more common in Godel's day.

Whereas Godel was addressing a specific issue, Aristotle was treating the issue in the context of a larger whole. In order to understand how the intellect knows things, one needs to understand the difference between first principles and premises, demonstrations and arguments, etc. So for Aristotle this would be a small chapter in an introductory logic course.


(Is it okay to resurrect older threads? This thread is closely related to the current thread on BonJour's epistemology and 'intuition', so I thought it might be appropriate.)

Is it okay to resurrect older threads? — Leontiskos

Of course! Especially if you’re going to agree with me ;-)

A) Which are the “first principles” Aristotle is referring to?
B) If they are not need to be proven... their premises are universal affirmative? (According to Aristotle's syllogisms) — javi2541997

I don't see first principles as being capable of proof, or as being self-evident. I think they represent the presuppositions we must make in order to even begin thinking about anything. There is nothing to say those presuppositions cannot change over time; we find new ways of thinking based on new presuppositions, which may even contradict those held previously.

I understand that first principles cannot be proven since they are accepted or rejected upon a basis of priority where one can go no further back from a particular starting place. Does putting forward that criteria not require some kind of self-evidence?

For example, when Aristotle establishes the principle of non-contradiction, is that not an appeal to a limit of experience? We could, theoretically, ignore the principle. Or say it is one theory amongst others. Those speculations do not capture the necessity Aristotle argued for its acceptance.

Is that how we think: starting with conclusions and then working backwards to find the prinicples they are based upon? I'd say that kind of reflection can make explicit what had been implicit, but I don't think that changes the fact that our conclusions are generally based on presuppositions, whether explicit or implicit, which themselves are based on nothing "further back".

Non-contradiction is simply a necessary condition for coherent and consistent thought; we cannot be coherent and consistent if we contradict ourselves.

What is the difference between "conclusions are generally based on presuppositions" and the attempt to establish first principles in the fashion of Aristotle?

I agree with your judgement regarding non-contradiction. Should that sort of thing be counted as self-evident?

Non-contradiction is simply a necessary condition for coherent and consistent thought; we cannot be coherent and consistent if we contradict ourselves. — Janus

But the further corollary is that anyone who believes themselves to be coherent and consistent is presupposing the principle of non-contradiction. That is, they are presupposing that the principle of non-contradiction is true.

One can attempt to bracket the question of coherence and consistency, but when one is already writing arguments in a natural language on a philosophy forum the bracketing is merely academic. They have already accepted the onus of coherence and consistency.

---

- Very good. :razz:

What is the difference between "conclusions are generally based on presuppositions" and the attempt to establish first principles in the fashion of Aristotle?

I agree with your judgement regarding non-contradiction. Should that sort of thing be counted as self-evident? — Paine

I'm not sure there is a difference...do you think there is?

Is it self-evident that sensible discussion would be impossible if people routinely contradicted themselves? It seems obvious that would be the case, but I'm not sure if that is exactly the same thing as it being self-evident.

But the further corollary is that anyone who believes themselves to be coherent and consistent is presupposing the principle of non-contradiction. That is, they are presupposing that the principle of non-contradiction is true.

One can attempt to bracket the question of coherence and consistency, but when one is already writing arguments in a natural language on a philosophy forum the bracketing is merely academic. They have already accepted the onus of coherence and consistency. — Leontiskos

As I said before I don't think it is so much a matter of the principle of non-contradiction being true as it is a matter of it being necessary for sensible discussion to be achieved. And i would see it more as a recognition than a presupposition.

You seem to be saying that everyone who posts on a philosophy forum has accepted that their arguments must be coherent and consistent—maybe, but does it follow that everyone's arguments are coherent and consistent, or that if they are not and this is pointed out to them, that they will consequently modify their views?

As I said before I don't think it is so much a matter of the principle of non-contradiction being true as it is a matter of it being necessary for sensible discussion to be achieved. And i would see it more as a recognition than a presupposition. — Janus

Right, but for Aristotle the principle of non-contradiction is not something that you can take or leave. It's not as though you can say, "Ah, I feel like being coherent today, so I will don the garb of the principle of non-contradiction along with my other garments." The principle of non-contradiction is more than a linguistic tool or even meta-tool. It is an indispensable presupposition which is in play whether you recognize it or not.

There is nothing to say those presuppositions cannot change over time; we find new ways of thinking based on new presuppositions, which may even contradict those held previously. — Janus

@Paine was right to point to the principle of non-contradiction in response to this claim. Are you of the opinion that the principle of non-contradiction might change over time?

Is it self-evident that sensible discussion would be impossible if people routinely contradicted themselves? It seems obvious that would be the case, but I'm not sure if that is exactly the same thing as it being self-evident. — Janus

I am not sure either. Both Plato and Aristotle argued against the 'relativity' of Protagoras. From that point of view, the matter is something that needs to be hammered out rather than treated as an uncontestable condition.

But as an appeal to a condition, the argument is about evidence.

The principle of non-contradiction is more than a linguistic tool or even meta-tool. It is an indispensable presupposition which is in play whether you recognize it or not. — Leontiskos

Paine was right to point to the principle of non-contradiction in response to this claim. Are you of the opinion that the principle of non-contradiction might change over time? — Leontiskos

As I said I see it not as being a presupposition, but as a recognition of something necessary to thought and discussion.

So, of course, it will not change over time unless people become content to babble at each other incoherently and self-contradictorily.

The kinds of presuppositions I had in mind that could change are things like the earth being flat and at the centre of the solar system, or that there must be a first cause or that there is a God who would not deceive us, or that universals must exist independently of us and so on.

I am not sure either. Both Plato and Aristotle argued against the 'relativity' of Protagoras. From that point of view, the matter is something that needs to be hammered out rather than treated as an uncontestable condition.

But as an appeal to a condition, the argument is about evidence. — Paine

How would you hammer it out, though, unless you were thinking coherently and consistently? I don't understand your last sentence; could you explain?

The Republic begins with Thrasymachus saying that justice is merely the order of those who presently have power. There is a lot of evidence to support this view. The argument against this is an appeal to see life in a different way.

So, what is that set of evidence against what it would bring into question?