The main question that is hard to answer with Schopenhauer, is how it is that there are objects when there is only Will. — schopenhauer1

Just a bit.

I say: There are toothbrushes!

It isn't defined because it is gotten at indirect means. He can only gather that it strives, and thus there needs to be a playground for striving to take place... I guess?

He at the same time seems to want Will to be a double-aspect to reality, yet seems to also think it is prior in some sense. The Will, "wills life". But that implies that the Will was there first before the "will-to-live". But then again, I don't know. — schopenhauer1

The question is how do we work with just a word, an empty term, that from what we can infer has no referent. Are we supposed to plug in our own personal meaning for "will"? I've seen this kinda thing happen elsewhere as well, but I can't seem to recall the particulars.

I say: There are toothbrushes! — Banno

Not to mention coffee cups, although if we went on, this would become rather a large list.

Anyway, to hark back to Schopenhauer, as the thread was about him, I will quote verbatim two paragraphs that I regard as key to his magnum opus, namely the first:

§ 1. “The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself. If any truth can be asserted a priori, it is this: for it is the expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience: a form which is more general than time, or space, or causality, for they all presuppose it; and each of these, which we have seen to be just so many modes of the principle of sufficient reason, is valid only for a particular class of ideas; whereas the antithesis of object and subject is the common form of all these classes, is that form under which alone any idea of whatever kind it may be, abstract or intuitive, pure or empirical, is possible and thinkable. No truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea. This is obviously true of the past and the future, as well as of the present, of what is farthest off, as of what is near; for it is true of time and space themselves, in which alone these distinctions arise. All that in any way belongs or can belong to the world is inevitably thus conditioned through the subject, and exists only for the subject. The world is idea. — WWR

and from page 35

Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things,veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility—that is knowledge—which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality.

Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought matter, we really thought only the subject that perceives matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.

Thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue. The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, is empirically given—that is to say, is substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away.

Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained. — WWR

(added paragraph breaks)

Clever bastard, the old Schoppie, right? Nice translation. The section from 35 reads like a more verbose Bernado Kastrup, who, unsurprisingly cites S as a key influence.

From Brief Peeks Beyond 2015

Page 28:

No ontology in the history of humankind has been or is more metaphysical than materialism. Unlike all spiritual or religious ontologies ... the strongly objective realm of materialism is, by definition, forever outside experience. It is pure abstraction. ... All the properties we attribute to reality – like solidity, palpability, concreteness – are qualities of experience and, as such, not applicable to the real world of materialism.

Page 183:

We stopped living the inner life of human beings and began living the ‘outer life’ of things and mechanisms. … All meaning must lie – we’ve come to assume – somewhere without and never within. I even dare to venture an explanation for how this came to pass: because of Western materialism, we believe that we are finite beings who will, unavoidably, eventually cease to exist. Only the ‘outside world’ will endure and have continuity.

You can see the attraction a consciousness only ontology has, particularly when physicists postulate a reality of quantum fields as the present incarnation of 'physicalism'.

He at the same time seems to want Will to be a double-aspect to reality, yet seems to also think it is prior in some sense. The Will, — schopenhauer1

"Water seeks its own level", we used to hear. More generally, the will of matter is to clump together - I think that's called gravity, There being no lawgiver, the universe must follow its own will. It dances wildly to its own song, and the will of physicists is to learn the tune.

(The will of toothbrushes is to fall into the toilet at the first opportunity, as every skoolboy kno.)

All meaning must lie – we’ve come to assume – somewhere without and never within. — Bernardo Kastrup

And yet

The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. — Steven Weinberg

There being no lawgiver, the universe must follow its own will. It dances wildly to its own song, and the will of physicists is to learn the tune. — unenlightened

Alfred North Whitehead said that the laws of physics nowadays play the role assigned to the inexorable decrees of fate in Greek drama.

the inexorable decrees of fate in Greek drama. — Wayfarer

The thought police insist we speak of 'determinism', and pour scorn on 'fate'.

Here, but, the above is not really an argument for will as being Kant's thing-in-itself....it seems only to establish will as the "inner side" of representations (he doesn't even mention thing-in-itself" in the above)... So he still needs to get from "will as inner side of representation" to thing-in-itself. How does he do that??
he later relates will and thing-in-itself? I would assume it would be soon thereafter (one would think). — KantDane21

Here's a simplification, KD21, which may or may not help you to understand.

When I look into my internal self, in introspection, I notice that the representation of myself as a body is a creation of my mind. And, the part of my mind which demonstrates the power to create is the will. So I can conclude that the representation of myself as a body is a creation of my will. From here I can proceed toward understanding the general principle that any representation of a body which I may hold in my mind, is equally a creation of my will.

If I assume an independent body which influences my will in its creation of the representations of bodies which I hold in my mind, I have no way to assess this influence unless I can understand how my will creates these representations. In other words, if I look toward any proposed noumenon, or thing-in-itself, I reach an end to my investigation, at my own will. I see that my will is responsible for creating the representations of things, within my mind, and unless I can make a thorough understanding of how my will does this, I have no approach to any proposed noumenon.

You can see that this analysis goes deeper than Kant, because it looks for the cause of phenomena, the cause of the appearances of bodies within the mind. Kant has proposed a separation between phenomenon and noumenon. If this separation is true and real, as proposed by Kant, then there cannot be a direct causal relation between a noumenon and a phenomenon. This is because a direct causal relation would allow us to know the noumenon through the implications determined from an understanding of cause and effect. So the reason why we cannot know the noumenon is because there is no such causal relation. This is because one's own will is what creates the phenomenon.

How this relates to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is a bit more difficult. I believe the relationship is something like this. The PSR states that there is a reason for the existence of anything, and everything. When we look at the occurrence of representations within our minds, phenomena, we must turn to the will as the reason for their existence. So the reason for the existence of bodies, (as how noumenon appear to us), is a cause in sense of Aristotelian "final cause", a teleological willful cause. This means that there is a reason for, in the sense of a purpose for the appearance of bodies, as this appearance has been created by the will.

Well, let's start with the first quote. I don't think it contains an argument. It's rather a set of assertions. That'd not be a surprise, since as the first paragraph it might just be setting out where things are going.

Do you see an argument there, and if so, what is it?

That what we generally presume to be external to us is not, in fact, external to us, but only exists as an idea in relation to the consciousness which is in us.

How is that not an argument?

That what we generally presume to be external to us is not, in fact, external to us, but only exists as an idea in relation to the consciousness which is in us. — Wayfarer

That's a conclusion, or an assertion.

How is that not an argument? — Wayfarer

Argument: a series of reasons meant to persuade, usually in the form of a treatise or doctrine supporting an opening observation or logical premise.

“…. “The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness….”

And with that…….we’re off to 450-odd pages of persuasions.

And with that…….we’re off to 450-odd pages of persuasions. — Mww

Yes, I was going to add something along those lines.

And with that…….we’re off to 450-odd pages of persuasions. — Mww

Ha... were you persuaded?

were you persuaded? — Tom Storm

Oh HELL no……but I mighta been if I hadn’t already been exposed to greater persuasions.

:wink: :up:

Just agreeing that your statement was itself an argument, a reason indirectly supporting the persuasiveness of treatise itself.

Well, I thought it appropriate to bring Schopenhauer back into the discussion, as that is what it started with. I will also add I thought it an excellent original post and a good question for which I myself didn't have an answer.

How does... there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side... ? — KantDane21

I myself didn't have an answer. — Wayfarer

I don't think there is an answer. The argument is roughly that because, in his terms, we experience our bodies internally and externally, all other things suffer a similar duality, and hence while we can access their external aspect, they have as well an internal aspect unavailable to us.

Idealism has to presume something along these lines in an attempt to avoid solipsism; it has to admit other, inaccessible, "internal" experiences in order that there be other people. Schopenhauer's novelty is perhaps his extension of this to ordinary objects... the internal life of the toothbrush.

Again, he divides the world in to subject and object, then argues that the object is the product of the subject - the will - and then in explaining how there are objects finds himself ascribing subjectivity to them.

It's as if he were to suppose that everything is either to the left or to the right (Subject or object), but then through sophisticated dissertation conclude that everything apparently on the right (material stuff) is actually on the left (the will); and then find himself trying to explain how it is that there are things that appear to be on the right... (material objects must have a subjective side)

I don't agree with that paraphrase of Schopenhauer's analysis. I think the crucial point about Schopenhauer and Kant (and to some extent the other German idealists) is their grasp of the way in which the mind (or brain) constructs what we naively and instinctively take to be an independently-existing domain. That is why Schopenhauer says in his first sentence that realising this requires 'attaining to wisdom'.

My very high-level paraphrase of Schopenhauer and Kant is that the mind (nous, I think, in the traditional sense) brings together (synthesises) the elements of the understanding with the objects of perception to create a unified whole, which we designate as 'the world', but that we generally overlook or ignore this fact, because 'the mind does not see itself'. So we take for granted the independent reality of the world, while ignoring the role the mind plays in its construction. I think contintental philosophy, generally, is much more aware of this, than current English-speaking philosophy which is tied to scientific naturalism as a normative framework (although the times are a' changin.)

If there is no object without a subject, then the existence of a tree, a table, a chair, etc. etc., requires a perceiving subject, but how does then entail that representations/appearances like a tree, table, chair, etc. also has an inner, subjective side? — KantDane21

I don't know if I agree that this is entailed by Schopenhauer's argument. I haven't read Christopher Janaway's book on Schopenhauer, but I recently completed Bernardo Kastrup's Decoding Schopenhauer's Metaphysics and I do know he was pretty scornful of Janaway's book. But then, I'm also sceptical of what Kastrup and his followers call the 'mind-at-large', which plays a role suspiciously like that of God in Berkeley's philosophy. (I actually joined the Kastrup forum and had this out with them.) But the long and short is, it's not necessary to posit whether objects have an 'inner life'. That amounts to speculative metaphysics. I think this is where the Buddhist analysis has influenced me. I think considerable circumspection is required at this point, a clear awareness of what it is we don't know. That's the sense in which scepticism can counter-balance idealism.

I won't go along with that. Much of analytic philosophy is directed at that issue. The path from logic (Russell, Early Witti) to language (later Wittgenstein, Austin, Davidson) to intentionality (Searle, Dennett) to consciousness (Charmers, the Churchlands, etc.) is exactly an examination in detail of the relation between mind and world.

But, too far off-topic.

I don't know if I agree that this is entailed by Schopenhauer's argument — Wayfarer

Yeah, Schopenhauer is not arguing that objects have subjectivity, only that they have an inner aspect, the inaccessible object-in-itself. He calls it will or will-like on the basis that the thing-in-itself is undivided, so what is inmost in us, being part of the wider thing-in-itself, is what is inmost in everything.

Ok. And do you think this a reasonable argument? That this establishes "that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side"? Or did he just turn so far that the things previously on his left are now on his right?

My understanding is that the use of the word 'will' can throw us off. Is it not the case that what S means by will is more like energy - a non-metacognitive, blind, instinctive force?

Yes, I agree.

And do you think this a reasonable argument? — Banno

No, it’s an imaginative leap. I’d call it an insight, but that would imply it’s right. As you said, and unlike Kant, he “invents a thing-in-itself about which nothing can be said, then proceeds to tell us all about it.”

My understanding is that the use of the word 'will' can throw us off. Is it not the case that what S means by will is more like energy - a non-metacognitive, blind, instinctive force? — Tom Storm

It is a perennial philosophical reflection that if one looks deeply enough into oneself, one will discover not only one’s own essence, but also the essence of the universe. ...For that reason it is thought that one can come into contact with the nature of the universe if one comes into substantial contact with one’s ultimate inner being. — Schopenhauer, SEP

It is rather like what East Asian Buddhism calls 'realising the true nature'. (Many critics have noted the convergences of Schopenhauer and Buddhism in this respect.)

But then, I'm also sceptical of what Kastrup and his followers call the 'mind-at-large', which plays a role suspiciously like that of God in Berkeley's philosophy. — Wayfarer

Without the idea of a collective mind, how to explain the easily deduced fact that we all see the same things in their respective locations? For example, if I place an apple on one corner of a table, a cup on another, a flower on another and a dog turd on the last; assemble fifty people and ask them what they see on each corner, they will all agree. Collective mind explains this, as does realism; so it seems it must be one or the other.

Even my dog obviously sees the ball I've thrown in the same place I do, which is evidenced by the fact that he runs to where I see it land.

Without the idea of a collective mind, how to explain the easily deduced fact that we all see the same things in their respective locations? — Janus

Individual minds, that all operate under the same conditions and parse experience in the same way. Mind is ‘collective’ in the sense that we’re all members of the same language group, culture, and so on. Hegel made a lot out of that, didn’t he?