↪Janus
That's not true. You can see it. You may or may not understand or agree with it, but you can definitely see that I addressed something you said. I quoted it verbatim.
In fact, I quoted you twice and complimented the clarity of the second quote. — creativesoul
If I say "This car is made of steel" this assertion can be publicly checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. If I say " This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel" this assertion is not publicly checkable and cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. — Janus
If that's all you meant, it's much more helpful - to me anyway - to understand you by saying that rather than the other stuff you said leading up to it. The above is easily understood.
That's one reason why I disagree with the position you're arguing for. — creativesoul
A tree does not consist of sense. — creativesoul
Since I can't see how any of you have addressed anything I've actually said, I have no response to make. — Janus
...each observation of an object of sense is particular
— Janus
The quote directly above serves as prima facie evidence supporting the charge that you're using unnecessarily complex language. Furthermore, such usage serves only to add unnecessary confusion. This could be demonstrated a number of different ways. I'll stick with one, for brevity's sake.
I'm assuming that a tree counts as "an object of sense". So, an observation of a tree would count as an observation of 'an object of sense'. But what sense does that make?
I mean, when we talk about one thing being "of" another, there is some sort of relation between the two. When we talk about an object of steel, there are no meaningful issues regarding the sensibility of our language use. We all know what counts as an object of steel. Steel cars, for example. Steel knives. Steel wheels. The same easily understood sensibility holds good for objects of brass, paper, plastic, etc. An object of steel is a something consisting of steel. An object of brass is something consisting of brass. An object of paper is something consisting of paper. But what sense does it make to talk about "objects of sense"?
A tree does not consist of sense. — creativesoul
You haven't identified what "other stuff" I said and precisely what parts you disagree with. — Janus
From the aspect that you have Lock considering a problem close to the one about consciousness --because Lock doesn't speak about consciousness per se-- I believe a lot of philosophers can be included in the pool. However, the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" is a scientific, not a philosophical one. That is, it starts and ends in the world of science:I suppose that I should also mention that this so called "hard problem" was already well-known to John Locke — Manuel
When you look at things from an evolutionary perspective and understand biology and biochemistry there doesn't seem to be any hard problem.
Yeah living systems are really complicated... and yeah the chemistry and evolution that can happen over 4 billion years is really complicated.. but I don't think by making up fuzzy words like qualia and weird thought experiments like zombies you actually highlight any real problem or illuminate any gap in our knowledge!
Yes humans have complex subjective experience and presumably all living systems even a mosquito have some sort of internal subjective experience...
But it seems like neurology and biochemistry and evolutionary biology do a pretty good job of explaining what's going on and I don't see how any of that mumbo jumbo is creating any better science?
In other words it seems like the science we have and the understanding we have does a pretty good job explaining things, and unless you're creating something better, it seems like you're just praying on the gullible and naive religious impulses by creating these weird philosophical niches!!! — Metamorphosis
We seem to be in a similar situation: no understanding of physical processes, however complete, explains consciousness. — Art48
Why would anyone think matter gives rise to consciousness? — FrancisRay
andWe have yet to articulate a robust scientific explanation of conscious experience. We lack a conclusive account of how consciousness manifests a private world of sights and sounds and sensations. We cannot yet respond, or at least not with full force, to assertions that consciousness stands outside conventional science. The gap is unlikely to be filled anytime soon. Most everyone who has thought about thinking realizes that cracking consciousness, explaining our inner worlds in purely scientific terms, poses one of our most formidable challenges.
And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings?
Because the person took a serious look at the evidence, perhaps? — wonderer1
What evidence is there that consciousness arises from matter? — FrancisRay
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