That's not true. You can see it. You may or may not understand or agree with it, but you can definitely see that I addressed something you said. I quoted it verbatim.

In fact, I quoted you twice and complimented the clarity of the second quote.

:smile:

I would recommend Being You by Anil Seth. The best book I have read in this area.

↪Janus


That's not true. You can see it. You may or may not understand or agree with it, but you can definitely see that I addressed something you said. I quoted it verbatim.

In fact, I quoted you twice and complimented the clarity of the second quote. — creativesoul

Here's the "compliment:

If I say "This car is made of steel" this assertion can be publicly checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. If I say " This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel" this assertion is not publicly checkable and cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. — Janus


If that's all you meant, it's much more helpful - to me anyway - to understand you by saying that rather than the other stuff you said leading up to it. The above is easily understood.

That's one reason why I disagree with the position you're arguing for. — creativesoul

You haven't identified what "other stuff" I said and precisely what parts you disagree with. And then in this I've quoted above you say "it's much more helpful" and then go on to say "that's one reason why I disagree with the position you're arguing for" but it's not clear what you disagree with or what your reason for disagreement is. Murky!

A tree does not consist of sense. — creativesoul

This is the one clear disagreement, and it's not with anything I said. I referred to objects of sense, meaning publicly available objects which may be seen, examined and their characteristics described by anyone. A tree is an example of such an object, but I nowhere said or implied that such objects "consist of sense".

Since I can't see how any of you have addressed anything I've actually said, I have no response to make. — Janus

If you do not grasp that a priori truths, and universal rules of logic like the law of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, make statements about internal thoughts rather than particular external objects, and that these universal principles are much more accurately confirmed, and certain, than statements made about particular external objects, then we'll just have to leave it at that.

Looks interesting Edmund, thanks for the recommendation.

...each observation of an object of sense is particular
— Janus

The quote directly above serves as prima facie evidence supporting the charge that you're using unnecessarily complex language. Furthermore, such usage serves only to add unnecessary confusion. This could be demonstrated a number of different ways. I'll stick with one, for brevity's sake.

I'm assuming that a tree counts as "an object of sense". So, an observation of a tree would count as an observation of 'an object of sense'. But what sense does that make?

I mean, when we talk about one thing being "of" another, there is some sort of relation between the two. When we talk about an object of steel, there are no meaningful issues regarding the sensibility of our language use. We all know what counts as an object of steel. Steel cars, for example. Steel knives. Steel wheels. The same easily understood sensibility holds good for objects of brass, paper, plastic, etc. An object of steel is a something consisting of steel. An object of brass is something consisting of brass. An object of paper is something consisting of paper. But what sense does it make to talk about "objects of sense"?

A tree does not consist of sense. — creativesoul

You haven't identified what "other stuff" I said and precisely what parts you disagree with. — Janus

That's not true either. See above.

The irony here is that what you said afterwards is what I complimented. You've said all sorts of things, and then said completely different things after issues with the original things were pointed out, and then claimed that the completely different things were all you meant when you said the first things. Then you claim that what I wrote in the quote at the top of this post was 'murky'???

All good from my vantage point. I know better. The casual reader can decide for themselves. I'm done here. I've got far more important, meaningful, and rewarding things to do than to play pin the tail on the bullshit artist.

All I've been presenting here are my opinions, you don't have to agree with them, but if you want to argue against them you need to pick something I've actually said and say what you think is wrong with it. Or if you want to claim I've said "different" things which contradict each other, then quote them. If you don't want to respond I don't care, but if you respond with irrelevancies I'm going to call you out on it.

.

If one were to change the language just a little...

Why can human understanding not understand human understanding?

... it becomes rather easy to see that the mind is not big enough to encompass the mind, and if it were big enough, it would be too big to be encompassed by the mind.

One cannot stand under oneself.

The hard problem seems inescapable. Even if you claim, "phenomenal consciousness is an illusion", the question remains, "why do some systems experience this illusion, and others do not?". People are experiencing something, and this must be explained.

The hard problem seems inescapable. Even if you claim, "phenomenal consciousness is an illusion", the question remains, "why do some systems experience this illusion, and others do not?". — hypericin

And how do we know they are not, those that we deem not having them?

Precisely because we have no answer to the hard problem, we don't know definitely, we can only make educated guesses.

Yes, and 'we' have a history of not granting consciousness even to some races in our species, in the science and philosophy communities (with exceptions) there not granting consciousness to animals. IOW we have a bias in our educated guesses. And a bias that many of the less educated or not educated generally managed not to have in relation to animals.

It seems that recently our willingness to grant consciousness to others has increased recently. I was surprised to see Sartre, the philosopher of subjectivity, declare animals to be machines, not even a century ago. And my feeling is that even children were not granted full consciousness status not long ago, in spite of the evidence of peoples own memories. Were women deemed to be conscious in 1860?

Is this broadening of what is deemed conscious a reflection of a broader trend towards greater inclusivity? Is the perception of something as an insentient thing a necessary step towards abusing, exploiting, and killing it?

Yes, I think it add entitlement. It also perhaps is just simply a natural bias. The closer something is to me, the more likely I am to give it a pass in relation to the problem of other minds. There are a number of scientists now considering plants to be conscious and some having already decided in the positive. And there is somewhat of a resurgance of pantheism. Which is parsimonious,giving matter or everything consciousness, but specific cognitive functions to more complex organic life. In science animals did not start being granted consciousness up into the early 70s. Before that it was professional improper (and professionally dangerous) to talk or write about that in professional contexts.

I suppose that I should also mention that this so called "hard problem" was already well-known to John Locke, and I think his answers or musings, if you prefer to call them that, are quite on point:

"We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power...

Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought..."

Today we would of course change "God" for "nature", and the argument still stands remarkably well.

I suppose that I should also mention that this so called "hard problem" was already well-known to John Locke — Manuel

From the aspect that you have Lock considering a problem close to the one about consciousness --because Lock doesn't speak about consciousness per se-- I believe a lot of philosophers can be included in the pool. However, the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" is a scientific, not a philosophical one. That is, it starts and ends in the world of science:

"An explanation of consciousness will have to go beyond the usual methods of science. Consciousness therefore presents a hard problem for science, or perhaps it marks the limits of what science can explain."
-- "The Hard Problem of Consciousness" (https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/)

Actually, Locke was one of the first philosophers (one of them, not the first one) to speak about consciousness, and he does so, several times in the essay, with quite interesting results.

As for the rest of your argument, this is terminological. The whole idea of the "hard problem" was introduced by David Chalmers, a philosopher, not a scientist. Yet scientists seem to find the idea useful, so they borrowed it. That's perfectly fine and healthy.

That quote I gave from Locke barely needs modification, it pretty much considers the hard problem, and says we can't understand how this is possible (how matter could think), but if nature ("God"), chooses so, then so be it, we must concede to matter the property of thought (consciousness), but it remains inconceivable to us.

I cannot disagree with the things you say, well, except the main point I made! :smile:
The passage I quoted shows clearly that the problem is scientific. Besides, why is it called a "problem" and for whom does it constitute a problem? Who stumbles on that problem and in fact it presents for them an "impasse"?

As I usually say, consciousness is not science material. The subject of consiousness is out of Science jurisdiction. Philosophy on the other hand has no problem studying and talking about consiousness. Consciousness does not present a problem for it. It is one of the subjects it studies, like all the other: existence, reason, knowledge, values, ethics etc. Moreover, everyone is welcome to participate in and present their views about it.

I brought up this subject because a lot of people in here and elsewhere consider and talk about the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" as if it is a philosophical one. Quite strangely so.

My two sikkas ...

It appears that there's no scientific principle, hypothesis, or theory that we can turn to to explain consciousness. As an example of a theory that explains stuff take the germ theory - it provides an explanatory framework for infectious diseases. When it comes to consciousness, even neuroscience fails to provide a theoretical model that could be used to explain consciousness.

Right, nor can neuroscience lay claim to this issue being just on their turf. Since we don't know, we don't know if it depends on neurons and other objects of neuroscientific research. Or only depends or is restricted to neurons. (There are hypotheses, just to quibble. hypotheses are a dime a dozen).

I can't disagree with your assessment of the situation.

Merged from https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14163/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-seems-like-religious-mumbo-jumbo-with-fancier-words

When you look at things from an evolutionary perspective and understand biology and biochemistry there doesn't seem to be any hard problem.

Yeah living systems are really complicated... and yeah the chemistry and evolution that can happen over 4 billion years is really complicated.. but I don't think by making up fuzzy words like qualia and weird thought experiments like zombies you actually highlight any real problem or illuminate any gap in our knowledge!

Yes humans have complex subjective experience and presumably all living systems even a mosquito have some sort of internal subjective experience...

But it seems like neurology and biochemistry and evolutionary biology do a pretty good job of explaining what's going on and I don't see how any of that mumbo jumbo is creating any better science?

In other words it seems like the science we have and the understanding we have does a pretty good job explaining things, and unless you're creating something better, it seems like you're just praying on the gullible and naive religious impulses by creating these weird philosophical niches!!! — Metamorphosis

Why is it not the hard problems [plural] of consciousnesses [plural] ? If consciousness is radically distinct from its other and radically private (known only by itself ), why is it safe to assume that this elusive thing is one and the same in all of us ? And not in the latest chatbot ?

Is it because 'conscious' has a job on the weekdays in practical life ? Along with familiar, thisworldly criteria for its application ?

Has to do with the first-person perspective, as distinct from the third-person descriptions dealt with by science. Science is the indisputable champ for dealing with objects of experience, but humans are subjects of experience before they’re objects of analysis.

We seem to be in a similar situation: no understanding of physical processes, however complete, explains consciousness. — Art48

Quite so. I wonder why anyone is surprised. Why would anyone think matter gives rise to consciousness?

Chalmers defines the hard problem as a problem for materialism, not for everybody. . ,

Why would anyone think matter gives rise to consciousness? — FrancisRay

Because the person took a serious look at the evidence, perhaps?

Christopher Koch, the president and chief scientist of the Allen Institute for Brain Science, and someone's who believes consciousness can be explained in physical terms, paid off his bet to Chalmers, because, if it is, they haven't figured it out.

Brian Green wrote:

We have yet to articulate a robust scientific explanation of conscious experience. We lack a conclusive account of how consciousness manifests a private world of sights and sounds and sensations. We cannot yet respond, or at least not with full force, to assertions that consciousness stands outside conventional science. The gap is unlikely to be filled anytime soon. Most everyone who has thought about thinking realizes that cracking consciousness, explaining our inner worlds in purely scientific terms, poses one of our most formidable challenges.

and

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings?

So serious scientific minds that are dedicated to the idea that it is explainable in physical terms say we cannot do so. While that is not evidence that it is not explainable in physical terms, it is certainly not evidence that it is. The Hard Problem is hard, according to the experts on opposite sides of the fence.

Because the person took a serious look at the evidence, perhaps? — wonderer1

Or is because they did not take a serious look?. This would my view.

What evidence is there that consciousness arises from matter?

A pretty simple piece of evidence is how frequently we observe that changes in matter produce changes in consciousness. Drugs are an example. The changed conscious experience of people who have experienced brain damage is another.

These examples of course don't prove definitively that all of consciousness must arise from matter, but they're undoubtedly painting a picture of a strong causal relationship between matter and consciousness. It's sufficient to convince me that at the very least, conscious experience has significant physical components.

What evidence is there that consciousness arises from matter? — FrancisRay

The effect of general anesthesia in suppressing consciousness.

The effect of mind altering drugs.

The fact that human intuition 'looks like' the result of the way information processing occurs in neural networks.

All sorts of ways minds can be impacted by brain damage.