Again, this to me, is committing the bandwagon fallacy, and now you are showing more evidence of (or reiterating it rather), not countering that. — schopenhauer1
the leap from the mental process to a somatic innervation — hysterical conversion — which can never be fully comprehensible to us — Sigmund Freud (Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis)
the puzzling leap from the mental to the physical — Sigmund Freud (Introduction to Psychoanalysis)
412. The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process: how does it come about that this does not come into the consideration of our ordinary life? This idea of a difference in kind is accompanied by slight giddiness — which occurs when we are performing a piece of logical slight-of-hand. (The same giddiness attacks us when we think of certain theorems in set theory.) When does this feeling occur in the present case? It is when I, for example, turn my attention in a particular way on to my own consciousness, and, astonished, say to myself: THIS is supposed to be produced by a process in the brain! — as it were clutching my forehead. — Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations, Part I)
Can you demonstrate that idealists are less individualist or materialistic? — Tom Storm
That idealism is commonly opposed with materialism would be a good indication that idealists are less materialistic. Don't you think? — Metaphysician Undercover
It technically goes back to Plato in the West. — schopenhauer1
But when did it start and what do we count as idealism? — Tom Storm
Can you demonstrate that idealists are less individualist or materialistic? — Tom Storm
Doesn't the observation stand on its own? — jorndoe
Not at all. I know many rich socialists. It's a thing - we even have the expression Bollinger Socialism.
What matters is what people do not the theories they claim to believe. Don't you think? — Tom Storm
And I don't think it's controversial to say that the last really influential idealists were the German idealists - Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schelling, Fichte. The British idealists, like Bradley, were very much part of the same overall movement. — Wayfarer
I know this and agree. But it's a blip. — Tom Storm
I think truth is elusive to humans and generally avoid people who think they possess it. — Tom Storm
I know this and agree. But it's a blip. — Tom Storm
observation, as the case may (or may not) be:
The forum has a (noticeably) different distribution than the world of academic philosophers in general.
If so, then how come?
Either way, I'm not going to pretend to speak on Banno's behalf. — jorndoe
I think of a blue cube in my mind, even if this comes from sense impressions earlier, what does it mean to be "in my mind"? — schopenhauer1
I sort of, kind of, agree. But I've become acutely aware of how 'post-Cartesian' our worldview instinctively is. Descartes is where the modern 'mind-body' problem comes from - along with a constellation of early moderns, notably Galileo, Locke, Newton, and so on, the division of mind and matter, 'primary' and 'secondary' attributes, religion and science. I see being modern as itself a state of being, a station of consciousness, shaped by these influences. Learning how to be aware of that is a big part of philosophy IMO. This is not to say that modernity, or Enlightenment rationalism, or what have you, is 'bad' or 'wrong' - sure prefer it to many alternatives - but the problems it has are like it's shadow, in the Jungian sense.
Also don't agree with the equivalence of materialism and idealism. Kastrup has a lot to say on that - materialism relies much more on abstractions than does idealism. Why? Because the concept of matter is itself an abstraction whereas the reality of first-person experience is apodictic. I don't have to copy in again that paragraph from Schopenhauer0 about how time and space only enter into reality through the brain. — Wayfarer
Right, what does it mean for something to be in the mind? It makes sense to say it, and everyone understands when it is said, but no one really seems to know what it means. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's interesting to me that most of what comes out of discussions like this seems to hinge on the significance of the extents to which our understanding (our models, in my terminology) are constrained by external forces. — Isaac
The realist sees the existence of constraints as the most significant element, the idealist sees the degree of freedom within those constraints as the most important bit. — Isaac
I can't see a way around the problem, myself. Certain methods of dealing with data qualify as being 'connected' to the world and so produce what we might call 'reasonable' theories - as opposed to merely guessing, or making stuff up. But within that canon, there doesn't seem to be any reliable process for choosing between them. If they meet the criteria of not being overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary, then then seem to all be equally fair game. — Isaac
Both, I think, ultimately (assuming model-dependant realism) find themselves in the same statistical quandary of wanting to associate truth value with popularity. The scientistic wants the 'consensus' theory to have more weight, the religious want the 'serious' religions to be taken...well, more seriously. But neither can have what they want out of this model (and so both are dissatisfied). Despite intuitions which may seem to tell us the opposite, there's no mechanism (in this model) to connect popularity with truthiness. — Isaac
I did not omit on purpose the part where Schopenhauer's name appeared. There's nothing in that paragraph that would make it any stronger. Here it is:But your selective quotation of the passage then omits the grounds of Schopenhauer's 'defense of Kant', as he puts it. You then go to a peremptory dismissal: 'Obviously Kant doesn't know either'. But I don't think the 'sage of Konisburg' can be dismissed so easily. — Wayfarer
I'm not denying that time is a human construct -- at least I'm not arguing here against that notion. I don't care about that issue.Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was [that] the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.
We've passed this. The point of our argument now is the fact that idealists can make claims as to the condition of our perception (we don't know the world out there, only the construct created by our mind), as to the anthropocentric nature of time and space, etc.I think the point of the argument is the reference to Kant's view that time and space are fundamental intuitions of the mind - *not* things that exist in themselves. In other words, space and time are not purely objective in nature but are grounded in the observing mind. And this has also dawned upon at least some scientists. — Wayfarer
Such as your references to "Buddhist idealism" and Upanishads ... :sparkle:Idealism sounds to closer to mysticism. — Wayfarer
You'd better avoid me then, because I, as the antagonist of Socrates, happen to know everything. — Metaphysician Undercover
As far as I'm concerned" ... i.e. a cop-out. — 180 Proof
I just don't see how nonduality prioritizes "mind" "subject" "experience" over above "world" — 180 Proof
I think a form of neutral monism or panpsychism has seen a rise in David Chalmers, Philip Goff, Galen Strawson. Then there are mathematical Platonists like Max Tegmark who argue for mathematical entities have some sort of reality (even though they are not physical). — schopenhauer1
My point was idealism has not been constantly mainstream — Tom Storm
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