But if you push the argument that the stuff around us does not exist unless a mind is involved, you are headed towards solipsism. Because other minds are a part of that stuff in the world. — Banno

That seems right. Although are there not forms of idealism that hold that everything you see is real, it just isn't what you think - it isn't material, it is made from the one stuff of the universe - consciousness/Will. That's the Schopenhauer, Kastrup, Hoffman formulation. Here people are all like dissociated alters of the vast pool of consciousness (or great mind) which constitutes all which exists. In other words idelaism does not deal in illusion, we've just come to the wrong conclusions about what we experience as a physical world.

Now the pertinent question would be how the hell does anyone know all this? It's fine to debunk old school materialism, but it's another thing to use this as to support a speculative ontology. It's at best built from some debatable inferences, right? Cue quantum speculations, quotes from Hinduism, Plato's cave, past lives accounts and critiques of scientism....

Always happy to help!

[A]re there not forms of idealism that hold that everything you see is real, it just isn't what you think - it isn't material, it is made from the one stuff of the universe - consciousness / Will. That's the Schopenhauer, Kastrup, Hoffman formulation [ ... ] Cue quantum speculations, quotes from Hinduism, Plato's cave, past lives accounts and critiques of scientism.... — Tom Storm

:100: :clap: :smirk:

@bert1 @Wayfarer @Gnomon

, yes, those doctrines that tell us all about the stuff about which we can say nothing.

Moore made the point well:

if we never experience anything but what is not an inseparable aspect of that experience, how can we infer that anything whatever, let alone everything is an inseparable aspect of any experience? (1903: 451) — Quoted in the SEP article

So if we have no access to anything not a perception, how could we ever differentiate between what we experience and what we don't....?

If what is, is what we will, then whence will?

Now the pertinent question would be how the hell does anyone know all this? It's fine to debunk old school materialism, but it's another thing to use this as to support a speculative ontology. It's at best built from some debatable inferences, right? Cue quantum speculations, quotes from Hinduism, Plato's cave, past lives accounts and critiques of scientism.... — Tom Storm

Of course the same problem exists with materialism; how could you know that everything, independently of anything human, is material or even what that could mean?

All ontology and metaphysics is based on debatable inferences. So, as I see it, the only pertinent question is what ideas best fire your interest, inspire your passion or help you live most fully. For myself I can say that I feel no need to decide between these mutually exclusive polemics. I find uncertainty most satisfying.

That said, I find some interest in ideas for their own sake, looking at what each of the different views on the menu would entail, and thinking about what possible difference it could make to human life if they were true (whatever their being true independent of human understanding could even mean).

One advantage of the "great mind" ontology is that that truth could, independently of the human, be related to, known by, that universal mind. If there were nothing but the material, then that truth would be nothing without the human, which seems to beg the question as to how it could even be coherent to consider it a human-independent truth.

Still, I am not convinced by that; so my choice is to refuse to settle on one or other side of the dichotomy, and settle for the idea that the non-dual reality can only be known experientially, and not discursively, which would mean that there is no truth of the matter. The idea that there must be a discursive truth of the matter is a human, dualistic-thinking based illusion; that's my take.

If what is, is what we will, then whence will? — Banno

:fire:

Yes, or put another way: if everything is an idea of mind, then mind is an idea of mind ... ad infinitum. Insert arbitrary terminus here (X-of-the-gaps).

So if we have no access to anything not a perception, how could we ever differentiate between what we experience and what we don't....? — Banno

That's dead easy: we know what we experience, and we know what we don't experience. We don't experience the human-independent nature of reality, we experience the human-dependent nature of reality (the empirical). This is true by definition, because if we did experience the human-independent nature of reality it would not be human-independent, so we can rule that out as a contradiction.

That's it.

We don't experience the human-independent nature of reality — Janus

- the part of reality seperate from humans? Idealism says, one way or another, that to be is to be related in some way to some mind. If you hold there to be a "human-independent nature of reality" a part of your metaphysics, you are not an idealist.

See how confusing it gets? Hence the chat above about if Kant counts as a realist.

Do you think there is any thing in the account you quote at length that is at odds with the account of realism I just gave? — Banno

Try this:

Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

as opposed to this:

It holds first off that there are things in the world, and secondly that these things have at least some properties that are not dependent on us. — Banno

Notice in Wayfarer's passage "dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness", and your quote "not dependent on us". That is an ontological difference in how we understand "things".

Don’t like the ‘made from’. More later.

Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

Well, "naive" is somewhat pejorative, but apart from that I do not see anything in that quote that is at odds with realism.

- the part of reality seperate from humans? Idealism says, one way or another, that to be is to be related in some way to some mind. If you hold there to be a "human-independent nature of reality" a part of your metaphysics, you are not an idealist.

See how confusing it gets? Hence the chat above about if Kant counts as a realist. — Banno

If I held that the human-independent nature of reality was ideas in a universal mind would I not count as an idealist? In other words the Universe existed in God's mind (if you like) or some universal mind prior to the existence of humans just as materialist might think it did. I believe Berkeley asserted just this and he is considered to be an idealist.

I agree that Kant is not really an idealist, and as I said in a post above"

I have sometimes thought that Kant has his characterization of his philosophy as empirical realist and transcendental idealist backwards. We know the empirical world only via ideas; as I like to say the empirical world is a collective representation and in that sense it is ideal. About the transcendental we have no idea, except that if it is at all it must be real.

There is a fair degree of conceptual confusion in all of these metaphysical positions, and as I've also said recently on these forums, I think they all end up, one way or another, in aporia.

Here's an example:

Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

If the "constructive activities" are "below the threshold of conscious awareness" how could we tell what is doing the constructing?

If I held that the human-independent nature of reality was ideas in a universal mind would I not count as an idealist? — Janus

Looks to be a performative contradiction. If it's human-independent then it's not somethign with which we need be concerned.

My impression was that the Good Bishop held everything to be ideas in god's mind; except presumably god isn't an idea in god's mind... In which case not everything is an idea ain god;'s mind... and we've gotten nowhere. Or god is just an idea in god's mind... can't see how that works.

Makes no sense to me.

If eight out of ten aeronautics engineers say the plane is unsafe, — Banno

Yeah, engineering is NOT philosophy. And that was my point when I said sciences are not like philosophy (I include engineering in that), so yeah keep making my points... or ignoring them. Whatever tactic you wish to do.

Restrict the philpapers results to metaphysicians in the target group of academic philosophers - 372 respondents - and the number who advocate idealism goes up to almost 7%! The number advocating realism rises to 84%.

Make of this what you will. — Banno

Doesn't change anything to me. My points still stand. The survey doesn't matter to me. Rather, the implication of using the survey does. It literally means nothing other than bandwagon fallacy. Also, making comparisons with engineering is more than a stretch. I would say, art, history or (maybe) social science at best, and even that is a stretch. Even history has less interpretive elements to it than philosophy which is quite literally the most open you can get in terms of what is debatable.

engineering is NOT philosophy — schopenhauer1

You'd think it was, the number of retired engineers who casually drop past to explain how the poor benighted philosophers went wrong.

Shame they don't agree with each other.

The survey doesn't matter to me. — schopenhauer1

Your repeated posts here suggest otherwise.

On the other hand, there are “….claims (….) delivered as “what actually is”.…”, serving as premises for the logical method following from them….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience….”

….and this, with respect to his theory of knowledge alone, is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition. — Mww

:up: Thanks.

Looks to be a performative contradiction. If it's human-independent then it's not somethign whc whcih we need be concerned. — Banno

We don't need to be concerned with something in order to be concerned with it. The interminability of these kinds of arguments on this forum attest to that. I'm asking you to look at the logic of the claim that the Universe is a single mind, and that all the things in it, including human minds, are ideas. There is nothing in that admittedly entirely speculative idea of a universal mind that entails that it must be human-dependent. So not a "performative contradiction" it seems.

My impression was that the Good Bishop held everything to be ideas in god's mind; except presumably god isn't an idea in god's mind... In which case not everything is an idea ain god;'s mind... and we've gotten nowhere. Or god is just an idea in god's mind... can't see how that works.

Makes no sense to me. — Banno

The idea is logically no different than the idea that all things are in the Universe...in which case not everything is in the Universe...or the Universe is just a thing in the Universe...can't see how that works either.

"Makes no sense to me" sounds like an argument from incredulity.

Don’t like the ‘made from’. More later. — Wayfarer

Sure. I'm not wedded to it, it's just a figure of speech, Didn't mean 'made' to be literal.

That said, I find some interest in ideas for their own sake, looking at what each of the different views on the menu would entail, and thinking about what possible difference it could make to human life if they were true (whatever their being true independent of human understanding could even mean). — Janus

Agree. That's kind of my perspective too. I suspect it makes almost no difference to how I would choose live, whether I am an outmoded retro physicalist or an a la mode idealist. I do find idealism hard to imagine and comprehend. This is partly a cultural construct and that was my earlier point - not dissimilar to points made by @Wayfarer about dominant paradigms.

One advantage of the "great mind" ontology is that that truth could, independently of the human, be related to, known by, that universal mind. — Janus

Perhaps, although the versions of great mind of Schop or Kastrup posit a universal mind which is instinctive and not metacognitive. It's not, as I understand it, a personality with preferences and knowledge. Perhaps it can only reach truths through brief expressions of consciousness instantiated through human life. But how would we know?

Agree. That's kind of my perspective too. I suspect it makes almost no difference to how I would choose live, whether I am an outmoded retro physicalist or an a la mode idealist. — Tom Storm

:up:

Perhaps, although the versions of great mind of Schop or Kastrup posit a universal mind which is instinctive and not metacognitive. — Tom Storm

I guess things could be ideas (or impulses?) in an instinctive universal mind equally as they could be in a meta-cognitive one. Spinoza's God is not meta-cognitive as I understand it. Of course we could never know either way, it's just one of the speculative possibilities.

Life, existence are mysteries and we are mired in ignorance when it comes to anything purportedly outside of the human empirical and logic-based understanding.

Of course the same problem exists with materialism; how could you know that everything, independently of anything human, is material or even what that could mean? — Janus

I have to disagree. At the very least, "materialism" is a far more useful epistemological paradigm than any version of "immaterialism" for learning about – adapting to – nature.

I'm asking you to look at the logic of the claim that the Universe is a single mind, and that all the things in it, including human minds, are ideas. There is nothing in that admittedly entirely speculative idea of a universal mind ... — Janus

Insofar as this "universe is a single mind" is a "speculative idea", it follows that it's an "idea" of either (A) the human mind or (B) some other mind not located witnin "the universe" – which seems to me (B) amounts to "mind"-of-the-gaps and (A) amounts to a compositional fallacy – or (C) there are minds within the universe which are not themselves mere "ideas" (i.e. reals) rendering this "speculative idea" itself conceptually incoherent.

Whatever its limitations, Janus, I don't think 'realism' has these self-refuting problems.

Life is a mystery and we are mired in ignorance when it comes to anything purportedly outside of the human empirical and logic-based understanding. — Janus

No doubt. :up:

So if we have no access to anything not a perception, how could we ever differentiate between what we experience and what we don't....? — Banno

Berkeley knocks that out of the park in his Dialogues

Restrict the philpapers results to metaphysicians in the target group of academic philosophers - 372 respondents - and the number who advocate idealism goes up to almost 7%! The number advocating realism rises to 84%.

Make of this what you will — Banno

I love it when philosophers dabble in statistics. It's fun to visualize a group of academics sitting around a coffee table in the philosophy faculty lounge tossing numbers at each other. One says, "Hey, that's wrong - but in an interesting way". :cool:

If one philosopher takes a year to solve the problem of why is there something rather than nothing, twelve can do it on a month... no?

Hey, that's wrong - but in an interesting way — jgill

I don’t know if you noticed this post but I’m trying to make the point that what has been previously designated (and disparaged) as ‘philosophical idealism’ is nowadays well known to cognitive science.

University Vice Chancellor to Treasurer: ‘Hey the physics department is totally out of hand. Did you see how much they want for equipment this semester? Why can’t they be like the maths department? They only want paper, pencils and waste paper bins. Or philosophy. They don’t even want the bins.’

I did. I'm not in a position to assess any of this but as you know, the changing nature of science is how science is meant to work, even if it ends up unexpected places. :wink:

The idea is logically no different than the idea that all things are in the Universe...in which case not everything is in the Universe...or the Universe is just a thing in the Universe...can't see how that works either. — Janus

Thank god you got there before me. I was dreading having to make this very simple point.

Idealism says, one way or another, that to be is to be related in some way to some mind. If you hold there to be a "human-independent nature of reality" a part of your metaphysics, you are not an idealist. — Banno

That's wrong Banno, as I thought you'd already agreed. There can be non-human minds that underwrite the existence of human-independent bits of the world. Have I missed your point?

You'd think it was, the number of retired engineers who casually drop past to explain how the poor benighted philosophers went wrong.

Shame they don't agree with each other. — Banno

The survey doesn't matter to me.
— schopenhauer1

Your repeated posts here suggest otherwise. — Banno

Well, a software engineer might say thus in response:

while True:
response = input("Enter your response: ")

if response.lower() == "i don't care about the survey":
print("Your repeated posts here suggest otherwise")
continue

elif response.lower() == "your repeated posts here suggest otherwise":
print("The survey doesn't matter to me. Rather, the implication of using the survey does.")
continue

else:
print("Your response is:", response)
break

The OP fails to spell out each of the options and the technical terms that they include, and idealism vs. realism is a false dichotomy. For the sake of clarity, I suggest the following definitions as employed by Charles Sanders Peirce, already mentioned () as an example of a philosopher who was both a (scholastic) realist and an (objective) idealist:

• The real is whatever is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite community of minds thinks about it.
• The external is whatever is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite community of minds thinks about anything.
• The existent is whatever reacts with other like things in the environment.

Accordingly, a metaphysical idealist like Peirce (matter is a peculiar sort of mind) can still affirm that the external world is real (including everything that exists), as well as logical realism (some generals are real even though they do not exist).

I'll make the point again, that the questions are not mine, but those proposed by the PhilPapers survey.

I assume that the lack of specifics is intentional, so as to avoid prejudicing the results in the way your reference to Peirce obviously would.

Insofar as this "universe is a single mind" is a "speculative idea", it follows that it's an "idea" of either (A) the human mind or (B) some other mind not located witnin "the universe" – which seems to me (B) amounts to "mind"-of-the-gaps and (A) amounts to a compositional fallacy – or (C) there are minds within the universe which are not themselves mere "ideas" (i.e. reals) rendering this "speculative idea" itself conceptually incoherent. — 180 Proof

It's astonishing. Idealism begins by looking for certainty in one's individual perceptions - "esse est percipi" - and almost immediately finds itself supposing some universal spirit, god or some such.

As if such a fable were more acceptable than the independent existence of trees, tables and cups of our everyday experience.