Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science. — Wayfarer
Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science.
— Wayfarer
Indeed, it is difficult to move past this — Banno
remember the poll? This is a thread about a poll. — Banno
I wouldn't count causality as metaphysical because I see causality as intimately tied with, indispensable to, the understanding of the physical, and I don't think we have any idea of causes which are not physical. I mean we can think the possibility of non-physical causes, but we have no grasp on what they would "look" like. Same thing with time and space; what could time be without physical existents, can we imagine a non-physical space? What changes if not physical things? As to identity I think that is a logical, not a metaphysical, notion.
So, again I think these notions are all intimately connected with experience of the physical or with logic. — Janus
I wouldn't count causality as metaphysical because I see causality as intimately tied with, indispensable to, the understanding of the physical, and I don't think we have any idea of causes which are not physical. I mean we can think the possibility of non-physical causes, but we have no grasp on what they would "look" like. — Janus
I would not count someone as having learned the history of ideas unless they understood the ideas. — Janus
Previously I put this down to contrariness. I now wonder if it might be vacillation or trepidation. Or simple failure to commit? — Banno
I see a priori reasoning to principles as phenomenological and pragmatic, not metaphysical. — Janus
My definition of what qualifies as a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus
That definition would certainly turn any metaphysical doctrine endorsing it into irredeemable junk. Thankfully there are definitions without those conceptual relations, which do not. — Mww
The questions you ask seem to presuppose physicalism. To answer your questions via counterexamples: Final causes (teloi) are not deemed to be physical causes; e.g. the goal/telos of replying to you caused me to write this post as written (or, Q: “what on earth caused you to do X” A: “I wanted Z”). Are teloi real or illusory? — javra
Not that I in any way endorse either, but, since they’re easy pickings, the alternative worlds of heaven and hell are temporal, comprised of befores and afters, devoid of physical existents though they are - so the occurrence of time does not logically entail physical existents. — javra
I might put it as not understanding what idealism and non-skeptical realism are. The PhilPapers voters overwhelmingly voted for non-skeptical realism in both epistemology and metaphysics (drop-down menu). I entered PhD, then all respondents. Similar results, over 80% leaning towards non-skeptical realism.Previously I put this down to contrariness. I now wonder if it might be vacillation or trepidation. Or simple failure to commit? — Banno
not enough voters who understand the philosophies in the poll, and not enough voters. — L'éléphant
You might say that., I couldn't possible comment. — Francis Urquhart
Surely you must hate optics?A better epitome of a metaphysical principle would be the conservation laws. The causal relations between billiard balls, or instance, are an expression of conservation of momentum. — Banno
….would that not be to posit that such reasoning yields universal truth, at least as regards the human? — Janus
….there can be no justifiable universal claims that purport to obtain independently of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus
There could be justifiable universal claims about human experience, but I understand such claims to be phenomenological, not metaphysical. — Janus
Heidegger equates phenomenology with metaphysics, but then that would not be the kind of traditional metaphysics that does make claims that purport to obtain independently of the human context. — Janus
There may be things that are true universally, re: pure mathematical and logical propositions, in accordance with our intelligence, but I’m not sure about universal truth as such. What could be true under any possible condition, including whatever kind of possible intelligence, when the totality of possible conditions is itself inconceivable? — Mww
I mean…where else but from human intelligence can any claim come from, justified or not? — Mww
There is no such thing as universal human experience is itself a justified universal claim about human experience. Still, being tautological, the claim tells us nothing we didn’t already know, given the infinite conditions of space and time, which are the necessary conditions for experience in the first place, both of which are implied by universality, and is certainly contained in a metaphysical doctrine.
If phenomenology justifies universal claims about human experience other than the one I just stated…..so be it. I wouldn’t dare say there aren’t any, but I would dare you to offer one that isn’t every bit as metaphysical as it is phenomenological. — Mww
That presupposes there is such a traditional metaphysics, which may be true whether or not I’m even the least familiar with it. Which puts me in a tough spot, insofar as if you offer such a justified universal claim that purports to obtain independently of human context, in a non-traditional metaphysical way, in accordance with the phenomenological doctrine, I’m pretty sure I won’t understand it. But others seems to well enough, so…there ya go. — Mww
What a non-physical cause "looks" like is a freely willed act of intention (final cause as javra explains). — Metaphysician Undercover
Well I guess no one has learned the history of metaphysical ideas then, because no one truly understand them all yet. — Metaphysician Undercover
If final causes cannot and thereby do not occur in the world ... then the awkward conclusion that all our teleological reasons (e.g., goals/intents) for our actions are illusory/nonexsitent. — javra
But few, if any, would doubt that perceptions occur within the world - i.e., would sustain that perceptions per se could be all be illusory and thereby nonexistent. — javra
Thing is final causes, such as our goals/aims/intents, cannot be accommodated for within physicalism, and the empirical sciences cannot empirically observe them (this as physical existents can be observed) ... or at least so I last gathered. — javra
As one easily expressed example, some have proposed backward causation - wherein the effect occurs before the cause - in attempts to explain some aspects of quantum phenomena. This, though, is not scientific reasoning but metaphysical reasoning about what science has discovered - whether its good or bad metaphysical reasoning being another matter all together. — javra
This is a very human way of understanding human motivation and creativity, but do we have any warrant for projecting that onto the cosmos? — Janus
Would an illusory perception be non-existent, though, or rather would it be a perception of something non-existent? — Janus
They cannot be accommodated within eliminative physicalism perhaps, but I don't see why they cannot be accommodated within physicalism tout court. — Janus
Are you referring to collapse of the wave function? Otherwise I'm not familiar with the idea. — Janus
So whether or not final causes can apply to things such as rocks, the question still is can the metaphysical model acknowledge that they apply to, at the very least, humans? — javra
I tend to associate it with events such as the delayed-choice quantum eraser, but there is an SEP article on it if you're interested. — javra
Something like this is how we think of the evolution of apparently designed biological forms due not to any "transcendent designer" but to natural selection.
That said, there would not seem to be any way to conceptually incorporate the notion of a transcendent designer into a physicalist model, so if that is what you mean then I think we agree. — Janus
Previously I put this down to contrariness. I now wonder if it might be vacillation or trepidation. Or simple failure to commit? — Banno
Want to clarify this: "Transcendent designer" entails there being a transcendent psyche ... that designs. Yes, physicalism can't incorporate this. I was however addressing an ultimate telos as unmoved mover of everything that is not a psyche and, hence, not a "designer". So far don't think physicalism can incorporate the latter either ... even if it does not in any way address the presence of a deity. Wouldn't mind someday being proven wrong about physicalism's aversion to teleology, though.
As to the rest, I respect your views. — javra
I do think that, phenomenologically speaking, physicalism is kind of irrelevant, because our understanding of physicality cannot deal with intentionality, yet that doesn't lead me to posit anything non-physical or transcendent. — Janus
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