Or perhaps this is just a way of coming down firm on "trepidation" as an explanation for the difference. — Moliere

For amusement I’ll say this again in fuller terms. Speaking for myself at least, since choosing one of the three alternatives implies a rejection of those not chosen, I, for one, would be false to my own beliefs in choosing just one. Consider:

- I am a skeptic in the sense of ancient skepticism to which Marcus Cicero et al. pertained (in modern parlance, I am a diehard fallibilist … which has absolutely nothing to do with (Cartesian) doubts).
- I uphold there being a real external world for which there can be no rational doubt.
- And, when not in a neutral-monism set of mind, I likewise consider myself an idealist, with many affinities to the idealism of C.S. Peirce.

My own not partaking of the poll is not “trepidation”. It’s critical thought. :nerd: :wink:

Surely the professional group also engaged in critical thought, though. I'd say, sure, everyone who answered was engaged in critical thought. It's the differences between the communities I was looking for an explanation for.

Or are you making the stronger contention that those who did choose should engage in more critical thought?

So, I'm wondering how we can conceive of an "ultimate telos" without thinking of it as being purposeful. If it is just an apparent general natural tendency like entropy, I don't see why that could not be incorporated into a physicalist model. — Janus

As to entropy being the ultimate telos of all things, if we're both interpreting him right, that's more Apo's neck of the woods. While not wanting to push my own agenda, I don't look at it as being purposeful. More like that ultimate end of all spatiotemproal being which, as ultimate end, occurs as existentially fixed potential, and which either directly or indirectly teleologically drives all existents, be they animate or inanimate. (Again, though, don't here want to get into the details of my own views out of concern that they might bring about more confusion then clarity when expressed via the soundbites of a forum). Point being, imo, even if the ultimate telos were to be intimately associated with psyches, it still would not need to be envisioned as being purposeful (and definitely not a psyche itself ... just as with Nirvana not being a psyche nor a realm of psyche/"I-ness" while still being the end result of psychological being in Buddhist thought).

... on second thought, don't know if this much helps, but I'll leave it in all the same.

Or are you making the stronger contention that those who did choose should engage in more critical thought? — Moliere

No. We all have our own mindsets and beliefs and critical justifications for these. Mine just don't fit the cookie cutter alternatives presented when one is taken to exclude the others, that's all. I wanted to emphasize that the "trepidation" interpenetration for not choosing "idealism" is a wrong conclusion for at the very least some of the forum members.

Introducing Buddhism is an interesting line, The ultimate telos in Buddhism (if there is one) would be karma I think. Karma is understood to be driven by craving and attachment, which are inseparable from the ideas of intentionality and purpose, but if karma determines the nature of the cosmos and explains how we all perceive the same things, then this would be seem to be unexplainable in physical terms, unless we invoked entanglement. Does entanglement inherently involve consciousness or mind?

Anyway I'm still stuck in the inability to parse the notion of telos, without incorporating purposefulness.

The ultimate telos in Buddhism (if there is one) would be karma I think. — Janus

I've always thought of it being Nirvana: the point of the eight-fold path. Karma, from this vantage, would then only be a manifestation of either getting closer to Nirvana or further away from it based on actions of all kinds (mental as well as physical).

Does entanglement inherently involve consciousness or mind? — Janus

Not to my current thinking.

Anyway I'm still stuck in the inability to parse the notion of telos, without incorporating purposefulness. — Janus

I can see why. All teloi we are consciously aware of and motivated by in our day to day lives provide us with purpose, this by definition, I think.

But again, as concerns our discussion of metaphysics, more importantly for me is the issue of whether a metaphysical system can incorporate just such day to day intents into its structure of understanding.

Mine just don't fit the cookie cutter alternatives presented when one is taken to exclude the others, that's all — javra

This would account for the difference, too, then. Perhaps many of our fellows here on TPF feel the same? The thought being that each thought should be treated individually, and feeling that our beliefs cannot fit the cookie cutters?

Perhaps many of our fellows here on TPF feel the same? — Moliere

From what I recall reading in the thread, there are a few other forum members that do (that feel the principle choices between realism and idealism offer a false dichotomy).

The thought being that each thought should be treated individually, and feeling that our beliefs cannot fit the cookie cutters? — Moliere

:up: If I'm understanding you right, I for one endorse that. My own impression is that @Banno is a bit peeved that those who lean toward idealism haven't voted for idealism ... but, again, the dichotomy between realism and idealism can well be viewed as false. A kind of entrapment into mislabeling oneself.

I've always thought of it being Nirvana: the point of the eight-fold path. Karma, from this vantage, would then only be a manifestation of either getting closer to Nirvana or further away from it based on actions of all kinds (mental as well as physical). — javra

Yes, but you have the idea in Buddhism that nirvana is samsara, and the notion of interdependent origination which begins with avidya or ignorance. Anyway probably best not to try to get into that.

Not to my current thinking. — javra

But it involves observation; so it's a matter of whether you think the observation must be carried out by a conscious agent or whether any physical interaction will count. Probably better not to try to get into that, either.

But again, as concerns our discussion of metaphysics, more importantly for me is the issue of whether a metaphysical system can incorporate just such day to day intents into its structure of understanding. — javra

Only if it posits a non-physical basis for reality if such intents are posited as non-physical, I would think. If non-physical then what? Mental or neutral? That said, the irreducibility of the idea of natural selection, of biology in general and human psychology in particular, to physics is not at issue, but I think that is a separate matter to the question as to whether reality is fundamentally physical or mental. I don't hold to either, and I'm not a neutral monist either. Call me a neutral non-dualist if you like, but I think the "neutral" there is kind of redundant. Perhaps you could say I'm an ignorantist.

I'm starting to think - actually I made this point at the outset - that a better term than idealism might be constructivism (grabs bit of random text from internet):

Originally proposed by sociologists of science, constructivism or social constructivism is a view about the nature of scientific knowledge held by many philosophers of science. Constructivists maintain that scientific knowledge is made by scientists and not determined by the world. This makes constructivists antirealists. Constructivism here should not be confused with constructivism in mathematics or logic, although there are some similarities. Constructivism is more aptly compared with Berkeley’s idealism.

Most constructivist research involves empirical study of a historical or a contemporary episode in science, with the aim of learning how scientists experiment and theorize. Constructivists try not to bias their case studies with presuppositions about how scientific research is directed. Thus their approach contrasts with approaches in philosophy of science that assume scientists are guided by a particular method. From their case studies, constructivists have concluded that scientific practice is not guided by any one set of methods. Thus constructivism is relativist or antirationalist.

Many of the cognitive scientists who emphasise the role of the brain in 'constructing' reality are like this in many respects - not that they all draw the same philosophical conclusions, but many are anti-realist in this sense. You can also see how it maps against Kuhn, Feyerabend etc.

you have the idea in Buddhism that nirvana is samsara — Janus

That is specific to Nagarjuna's philosophy. No Theravadin would ever agree with that. Furthermore even Nagarjuna adds that grasping the precise meaning of this teaching is of basic importance, comparing it to picking up a poisonous snake - don't grasp it correctly, and it will kill you!

Fair enough: I don't have much time for Theravada Buddhism. but I agree with the poisonous snake analogy: if you just think you don't have to make any effort because you are already in nirvana, then you won't get anywhere (or even have the illusion of getting anywhere).

As to the passage you quoted, I don't see how Constructivism can be remotely equated with Berkeley's idealism. The idea that science is entirely constructed and not in any way determined by the world seems patently absurd. For a start the scientists do not construct themselves, and are not separate from the world.

Of course there is a sense in which the world is a model, a collective representation, as I like to say, but by the same token we ourselves are equally models. We model the world and ourselves. We have, or rather are models, of ourselves in a world, but the idea that the modeling is not constrained by anything outside the model is absurd.

From the fact that we cannot say what the constraints are because anything we can say will be part of the model it does not follow that there are no constraints outside of the model.

. The idea that science is entirely constructed and not in any way determined by the world seems patently absurd. — Janus

I think your addition of 'entirely' and 'not in any way' completely changes the meaning of what was quoted. One may perfectly accept that there is an enormous domain of objectively-verifiable fact to which we all must conform. They are indeed physical constraints - but don't forget that Berkeley himself frequently stated, he did not for one minute deny the reality of the objects of perception, only that they don't have the attributes that we normally credit them with, of being real independently of perception.

I remember when I first encountered Peter Berger's book The Social Construction of Reality. I too thought it absurd and declaimed angrily about it in a tutorial. 'Do we put the stars in the sky', quoth myself, banging fist on table. But I gradually came to see that I was misunderstanding his point. It's more that our world, the 'lebenswelt' of humans, is constructed from meanings, because we interpret experience according to our cultural constructs and so on. (One of David Loy's books, that I haven't looked at, is called The World is Made of Stories.)

I think your addition of 'entirely' and 'not in any way' completely changes the meaning of what was quoted. One may perfectly accept that there is an enormous domain of objectively-verifiable fact to which we all must conform. — Wayfarer

Yes, but all that "objectively verifiable fact" and its verifiability on a strong reading of constructivism is itself constructed.

Berkeley himself frequently stated, he did not for one minute deny the reality of the objects of perception, only that they don't have the attributes that we normally credit them with. — Wayfarer

Right, for Berkeley objects of perception are not ultimately physical existents but ideas in God's mind, which means that the main attribute we credit them with, that of self-existence, would be mistaken.

But I gradually came to see that I was misunderstanding his point. It's more that our world, the 'lebenswelt' of humans, is constructed from meanings, because we interpret experience according to our cultural constructs and so on. — Wayfarer

I haven't read the book, but I think it is pretty much common sense that we experience, and understand our experience, in accordance with the various ways our constitutions and enculturations allow us to.

... again, the dichotomy between realism and idealism can we'll be viewed as false. — javra

Isn't antirealism a form of idealism? Are there other forms of idealism which are not antirealist?

If I claim that the Universe existed prior to humans that is a claim about existence outside of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

That’s technically a logical inference, hence certainly not independent of human experience and judgement. Nevertheless, with this, you’re attributing a justified universal claim to existence, when we’ve been relating justified universal claims to human experience and judgement. Which reduces to….the specified existence is outside human experience and judgement, but the claim is not.
————

Our notion of existence is derived from our experience and the concept is fine in that context. But are we justified in projecting that concept beyond that context, by saying things like 'the world existed prior to humans' or the 'the world didn't exist prior to humans'? — Janus

Good point. It is a different kind of logical inference, however, that our existence….not the notion of it, but the fact of it….derives from experience on the one hand, which is deductive, and existences outside our experience, which is inductive. So, yes, I think we can project the concept, but not in that context; we invoke the category of necessity in the former, but possibility in the latter.
————

Not all experiences are spacial, but the body and all other objects are experienced as existing in spacetime. Does it follow that we and all other objects can only exist or be in spacetime? — Janus

Another good point. Yes, and no. Yes according to certain theories, no if other theories falsify the one that says yes. But there haven’t been any falsifying theories, at least no paradigm shifting, everybody’s on the new bandwagon kinda theory, so it seems we’re pretty much stuck with the paradigm-shifting theory we’ve already been given.

If I were to go all nit-picky, on ya, quibble-y even, I’d bring to your attention that no experience is spatial. They are temporal, as you said. Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
————-

such claims are justified only if you believe that the very fact that we can imagine certain things reflects some higher, human-independent truth. — Janus

Ehhhh…maybe. I’m in the nature-of-the-human-beast camp myself; maybe we can imagine just about anything we want, just because we can. Even if there is a higher, human independent truth, it would only be comprehensible if our intelligence permits it, and if it did, it wouldn’t be either higher or human independent. And if it didn’t, then we’d never know about it anyway. You know…the ol’ transcendental illusion trick: reason thinks this stuff up, which is quite obviously within its purview, because we actually do it, but then can’t do anything with it.

Anyway….good talk.

Can you present an actual example of such a cause? — Janus

Sure, when I pick up my tea cup to have a drink, that's an actual example. You might say it was my brain that caused this action, but what caused my brain to do this? That such acts do not have a physical cause is understood by the concept of free will, elementary philosophy.

Grumph. Too much emphasis on causation for my taste. A better epitome of a metaphysical principle would be the conservation laws. The causal relations between billiard balls, or instance, are an expression of conservation of momentum. — Banno

I said previously you must hate optics, to which you responded "How so?".

So, here it is. Billiard balls is a favorite example of causation -- after all, it is easy to see the force of the balls bumping against each other and putting them in motion. But this is not the only example of causation. The optic nerves, responsible for transmitting electrical pulses to create an image is another. You know... light passes through the pupil, etc. In other words, there is energy there, too.

Are there other forms of idealism which are not antirealist? — 180 Proof

As I've mentioned, C.S. Peirce's objective idealism comes to mind. (the Wikipedia page isn't in-depth, but it does evidence the point)

ou know... light passes through the pupil, etc. — L'éléphant

Wow, light passes through the pupil. Where does it go, into the brain? It's very black in there.

The pupil is a black hole.... — Wikipedia: Pupil

Sorry I can't educate you. That post is for Banno.

The optic nerves, responsible for transmitting electrical pulses to create an image is another. You know... light passes through the pupil, etc. In other words, there is energy there, too. — L'éléphant

What if I write something that makes you so annoyed your hands begin to shake. What kind of causation would that be?

light passes through the pupil, etc. In other words, there is energy there, too. — L'éléphant

I don't understand your point. Are you saying that energy is not conserved when light induces an impulse in one's optic nerve?

I'm thinking of Russell's criticism of treating causation as the basis for physics. It's by no means uncontroversial that causation is a useful notion. For example,

since, according to Noether’s First Theorem, there is a conservation law associated with each continuous symmetry property of a system, there seems to be a clear formal route for locating causal claims within physics. — SEP: Conserved Quantity Accounts of Causation

I'm just pointing to the elephant in the corner: that the ubiquitous assumption of causation is not uncontroversial.

Are you saying that energy is not conserved when light induces an impulse in one's optic nerve? — Banno

There is energy, but light is massless. Conservation of energy involves mass. Look up phototransduction. I believe this is one reason why causation is not limited to the billiard balls example.

What if I write something that makes you so annoyed your hands begin to shake. What kind of causation would that be? — Wayfarer

I give up. What is it?

You have been affected by an idea, not by anything physical, so it is quite a different matter to physical causation.

Okay, I thought you were joking. Unfortunately, this is not what causation is in metaphysics. Maybe Ethics? The harm principle? Offense?

There is energy, but light is massless. Conservation of energy involves mass. — L'éléphant

I don't understand, again. The conservation of energy requires that the total amount of energy in a closed system remains constant -whether it be in the form of mass or otherwise.

Look up phototransduction. — L'éléphant

Why - what am I looking for? Do you claim that photransduction voids conservation of energy, or that it is not causal, or what?

I believe this is one reason why causation is not limited to the billiard balls example. — L'éléphant

I agree that there are other examples of causation. Are you attempting to show that some of them cannot be reduced to conservation principles?

So I'm still at a loss as to what this post of yours was about:

Surely you must hate optics? — L'éléphant

As I've mentioned, C.S. Peirce's objective idealism comes to mind. — javra

"Naive realism", however, isn't philosophical realism, which is what I read into the OP poll's "non-skeptical realism". Nonetheless, javra, I take your point.

I agree that there are other examples of causation. Are you attempting to show that some of them cannot be reduced to conservation principles? — Banno

Yes.

So I'm still at a loss as to what this post of yours was about:

Surely you must hate optics? — L'éléphant — Banno

I said that because in your previous post, you clearly limited causation with the conservation principles. And then followed it with causation is not uncontroversial. What does being controversial mean?

I don't understand, again. The conservation of energy requires that the total amount of energy in a closed system remains constant -whether it be in the form of mass or otherwise. — Banno

There is no otherwise in conservation principle -- it involves mass. If not, there's no conservation of something.

Conservation of energy is not a fungible principle.

you clearly limited causation with the conservation principles. — L'éléphant

I did? Here?

Too much emphasis on causation for my taste. A better epitome of a metaphysical principle would be the conservation laws. The causal relations between billiard balls, or instance, are an expression of conservation of momentum. — Banno

Not sure how that limits causation.
There are alternatives to causation, the conservation laws being a case in point. But hereabouts causation is treated as sacred. I didn't place limits on the conservation laws so much as postulate getting rid of them in our discussion here. See the SEP article previously cited for other arguments contra the hegemony of causation.

There is no otherwise in conservation principle -- it involves mass. If not, there's no conservation of something. — L'éléphant

All conservation is conservation of mass? That doesn't seem right. Do you have an argument for this? How does conservation of charge involve mass? Symmetry in any physical system produces conservation laws; but symmetry need not always involve mass. Tell us more.

….I’m not sure about universal truth as such.
— Mww

I'm assuming from this that you don't think there are moral or aesthetic truths? — Tom Storm

Deontological moral philosophy mandates compliance to a moral law, which is the same as there being a universal moral truth, that if one adheres to this mandate without regard for circumstance and therefore without exception, then he is a truly moral agent. It is in this case a universal truth but under entirely subjective conditions.

Needless to say, it follows that there may be as many universal moral truths as there are truly moral agents. And even if one guy recognizes another as adhering to his moral truth, is nonetheless disgusted by it, hence would never adhere to it, which is sufficient to render objective universal moral truths to vanishingly small possibility.

Aesthetic truths are very different in occasion even if similar in form, insofar as they merely reflect some condition of a perceiving subject prescribed by the feeling instilled in him through observation of something with which he had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do. A guy’s aesthetic truth may very well be that the Mona Lisa is the ugliest broad he’s ever seen, and enlightenment of him by established authorities regarding the artist’s technique, the physics of paint and application of it, physics of light and shadow, sway him not the least.

The mitigating factor is causality. In the former, even though the subjective condition is an aesthetic feeling, it is a feeing of satisfaction as an effect for being a moral agent, which he caused himself to be and for which no representation is possible; in the latter the subjective condition is still an aesthetic feeling, but of a relative pain/pleasure affect caused only by the object, but for which representation is necessary.

So…universal truths in Nature the causality for which has nothing to do with us? No, I don’t think there are any, insofar as the logic of pure speculative reason is against us, but if there were we couldn’t ignore them. Universal truths for which we ourselves are causality? Yes there are, insofar as the logic of pure practical reason demands it to be so, but those we can, and often do, ignore.
———-

“…. many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear….”

Or….sometimes you just want a simple yes or no, but you end up with a miniature dissertation.