My cat has drawn mental correlations between the sound of certain plastic bags and treats, much like Pavlov's dog with the bell and food. The symbol is the sound, the treats are the symbolized, my cat is the agent capable of drawing correlations between the two. The sound has meaning to the cat, via the cat's own attribution by virtue of drawing correlations. The sound of the bag cannot be said to stand in for the food... — creativesoul

My real objection was to your claim that the sound was a symbol, that symbolized the "treats". I was rejecting that claim, and the associated idea that the sound has meaning for the cat in the fullest sense associated with understanding symbols.

Whether or not significance is defined as a kind of meaning is not really important here, because if your whole argument was that there is pre-linguistic meaning, or significance or whatever you might want to call it, in the lesser sense of merely responding to signs, then you would have done no more than mounted a trivially true argument that would have warranted no response

You thought that I was arguing that the sound had meaning to my cat in the fullest sense associated with understanding symbols? That would have been to say that my cat has language mastery.

Your intentions here are becoming suspect.

Not sure how one can read my example, which clearly lays out some of the most rudimentary thought/belief and meaning imaginable and interpret such a description to be on par with the fullest sense of symbolic meaning that we normally associate with understanding symbols.

Well, you referred to the sound as symbolic; so I thought you were arguing that meaning in some purported 'complete' sense (not understanding in the linguistic sense, obviously) is present in your cat's 'reading' of the sound as symbol. As I said, otherwise, you are not arguing anything that anyone would disagree with, I think.

Do we do this again? So, if as you say meaning is a relation between things, what sort of things is it a relation between? Words and...? — Banno

Well, it could be relations between words and other things, what we call reference, or it could be relations between words and other words, what we call context, and definition.

The point though, which is relevant to creativesoul's op, is that not only is there meaning in the relations which words are involved in, but there is meaning in the relations of all things. This is the assumption of information theory which necessitates the conclusion that meaning is prior to language.

There's something mysterious about the notion of something being transferred - why think along those lines?

Why not just suppose that we learn the use? — Banno

No more mysterious than information, or energy, heh heh.

Analogies for language always come up short in some way. The sharing of semantic content just is exactly what language is for. When I speak to you, there's stuff in my mind you don't get, can't get. But there's something you do get that doesn't belong to me; Frege calls that the thought expressed by what I say. Like our mental contents, it's invisible, but like physical objects it's, um, objective.

I think from my side, the question is whether you take seriously the word "use." The words we utter to ourselves or others have content; they aren't just signals. Compare:

(1) When I say, "Go!" go.
(2) When I say "Brang-glubble!" go.

Where the word "go" is mentioned, it does not have its usual content. But to understand either of these instructions, you have to understand the content, which includes the word "go" being used. (Notice the similarity of (1) to a T-sentence.)

Wittgenstein's quasi-behaviourism is just continuing Frege's fight against psychologism. Understanding (1) or (2) has nothing to do with getting the same images or whatever I have in mind when I speak them. Understanding means acquiring the content, which is not peculiar to me or to you. If you leave content out, you're leaving out what makes language different from signaling.

Do you lean more toward meaning holism or atomism?

I lean away from holism. I'm not clear on all the labels, but I think my camp might be molecularism.

Yes, it's prior to language, and per the comments in the initial post in this thread no, meaning isn't social.

Counting, and meaning, are the action; number, and language, the tool. — Banno

It's not at all the case that meaning only occurs in response to natural languages.

Molecularism sort of evolves into holism, though. Maybe it's a little of each.

I just have a resistance to Quine.

And the label doesn't matter. I don't think doing philosophy should be like choosing a breakfast cereal. ("I really like this one, but I know this other one is supposed to be better for me.")

True.

John wrote:

...you referred to the sound as symbolic; so I thought you were arguing that meaning in some purported 'complete' sense (not understanding in the linguistic sense, obviously) is present in your cat's 'reading' of the sound as symbol. As I said, otherwise, you are not arguing anything that anyone would disagree with, I think.

Many people do not accept the notion that meaning is prior to language. Even more, perhaps, reject the idea that truth is as well. I would think that those go hand in hand. Be that as it may...

I am arguing that the sound was meaningful to the cat in some complete sense. I've set out a criterion which, when met, counts as an example of the attribution of meaning. That was the bit regarding what it takes...

A symbol. That which is symbolized. A creature capable of drawing mental correlations between the two.

You've objected to my calling the sound "a symbol" and suggested instead that the sound be properly called "a sign". Your objection is grounded upon the lack of convention prevalent in the example, basically saying that where there is no convention there can be no symbol, by definition.

My reply to such a line of argument is that 1.)it could be the case that I'm not using the term "symbol" correctly if the correctness of use is determined by convention and what you've said about it is true, and 2.)symbolism, if it requires such a conventional standard, cannot be prior to language.

And yet signs would necessarily become symbols precisely when the meaning becomes shared; at the moment that a plurality of capable creatures draws the same correlations between the same things(sound and food). My having observed my cat has allowed me to be aware of my cat's attribution of meaning to that particular sound. So then, without her agreement I can use the sound to alter her behaviour accordingly... and it is repeatable... consistently. Am I using language here? Is she? You see the problem with the conventional requirement?

It would be much more accurate to say that not all meaning is social.

It would be much more accurate to say that not all meaning is social. — creativesoul

I see "social meaning" as a category error. I'm the anti-Putnam. Any way you slice it, meaning is just in the head.

Meaning is not the sort of thing that can be coherently said to have a location. Inside the head is insufficient for meaning. We've touched upon this bit in the past. If I remember correctly, it ended with me offending you by virtue of proposing a counterfactual which you refused to answer because it insulted you.

On my view, meaning has multiple different necessary elemental constituents with mental correlation being but one.

Meaning is not the sort of thing that can be coherently said to have a location. — creativesoul

In my view it's rather incoherent to posit anything that does not have a location. "Inside the head" is most certainly sufficient for meaning. It looks like we have very different views.

I don't recall previous interaction with you--I don't even recall your user name at all, but I wouldn't have been offended by anything. (Edit: I see you just joined three days ago, though, so this would have had to be recent . . . I'll check your posting history.)

I may not have answered something, but I'd do that because either (a) in my view I had asked something where I didn't consider any response an answer or (b) one was typing long responses bringing up what I considered to be a bunch of different tangents and I was addressing one thing at a time. It's almost always one of those two reasons why I'd not answer something (as long as i noticed a post in the first place).

Meaning is indeed prior to language as it must be — creativesoul

I'm late to this party, I was out enjoying myself. One thing that happened earlier today was, I was watching a bunch of children and their carers play in a pavement set of fountains, soaking in the heat. One infant in a push chair, aged about 1, was eating an ice cream. I smiled, she smiled back. I mimed munching, a couple of times. She pushed forward in her seat and offered me the ice-cream. I held my hands up in genial refusal.

Now, I think we spoke in the language of gesture to each other. But do you think that this sort of gesture is 'prior to language'?

Now, I think we spoke in the language of gesture to each other. But do you think that this sort of gesture is 'prior to language'? — mcdoodle

Just depends on how loosely we're willing to define "language," doesn't it?

In my view it's rather incoherent to posit anything that does not have a location.

Yup. I believe that that's what you said before. There is a relationship between a mother and child. What is the location of that relationship?

"Inside the head" is most certainly sufficient for meaning.

I'm curious then... What counts as an example of meaning? I mean, what criterion which, if met, counts as an example of meaning?

It looks like we have very different views.

I would concur.

Just depends on how loosely we're willing to define "language," doesn't it? — Terrapin Station

No. Have you another word for the medium of such adult-infant communication? Or would you just say it's 'gesture' which is not 'language'?

There is a relationship between a mother and child. — creativesoul

There are a lot of relations between mothers and children. If you're talking about the biological parent relation, the location is in the mother's womb initially (and we can peg that location to 21 Main Street at a particular time, and then follow it as the mother moves around), then it's where the child exits the womb, etc.

What counts as an example of meaning? — creativesoul

An individual making a particular kind of signifier/signified mental association.

I'm late to this party, I was out enjoying myself. One thing that happened earlier today was, I was watching a bunch of children and their carers play in a pavement set of fountains, soaking in the heat. One infant in a push chair, aged about 1, was eating an ice cream. I smiled, she smiled back. I mimed munching, a couple of times. She pushed forward in her seat and offered me the ice-cream. I held my hands up in genial refusal.

Now, I think we spoke in the language of gesture to each other. But do you think that this sort of gesture is 'prior to language'?

Interesting question. Applying what's been set out thus far...

The child seems to have drawn correlations between your behaviour and your wanting the ice cream. Hence, she offered. Seems to me to be a clear case of language acquisition/creation in process.

There are a lot of relations between mothers and children. If you're talking about the biological parent relation, the location is in the mother's womb initially (and we can peg that location to 21 Main Street at a particular time, and then follow it as the mother moves around), then it's where the child exits the womb, etc.

So then, if I grant the above...

The biological parent relation no longer exists in the womb once the child is born. It is located wherever the child is afterwards?

In the child's head? In the mother's head as well?

I asked:

What counts as an example of meaning?

Terrapin answered:

An individual making a particular kind of signifier/signified mental association.

Are all elements of the association located inside the head?

Now, I think we spoke in the language of gesture to each other. But do you think that this sort of gesture is 'prior to language'? — mcdoodle

We treat children as potentially competent speakers of our language right from the start, in part because they begin understanding speech earlier and faster than they can produce it. (Talking's hard.) I think this charming scene fits in this general pattern of behavior. We also use lots of gestures and facial expressions with children as they learn our language.

The biological parent relation no longer exists in the womb once the child is born. It is located wherever the child is afterwards? — creativesoul

It's in the womb because we're talking about the development of a child with respect to the mother. The womb is where that occurs. When you talk about the relation after that, you're referring to the fact that there was that physical development connection.

Are all elements of the association located inside the head? — creativesoul

All elements of the association, qua the association, are in the head, yes. The mental association is what meaning is.

Where is the parent/child relationship located after childbirth?

If I draw an association between a bell and food, and I grant your argument, then it only follows that the bell, the food, and the association between the two are located in my head. But yet, neither the bell nor the food is.

Am I using language here? Is she? You see the problem with the conventional requirement? — creativesoul

I think the belief that some of the "higher" animals employ signaling to a considerable level of sophistication is common, but there remains a distinction between mere signalling, no matter how sophisticated, and symbolic language, however basic, and the kinds of meaning associated with each. I mean, think about it; we even say that music has meaning. Perhaps we can say there is symbolic meaning, associative meaning and affective meaning, as different 'species', for example ( there might be others, too). With your cat and her treats I would say it is associative meaning at work, although there might be a bit of affective meaning in play as well. >:O