When I talk about seeing red I mean it in the same sort of sense as when I talk about feeling pain, and the red I see, like the pain I feel, isn't a property of external world objects. That's the argument I have been trying to make. — Michael
Right. so if it's not a property of external world objects, then what's your theory as to why we sense it? And how do you justify undermining the current paradigm that the brain senses external states in order to predict the results of interaction with them? — Isaac
what's the evolutionary advantage of a system where the brain spends time detecting the state of other parts of itself?
Perhaps you could tell me what is certain. Philosophy is wonder, mine is just reasonable conjecture. If you find the reasoning faulty, by all means, enlighten me. — boagie
Spinoza taught us how we come to know an outside physical world; it was by the world of objects making alterations to the state of our biology, our bodies, this, processed through the understanding is our everyday reality or apparent reality. For us, it is our only subjective reality and for us, there is no direct knowledge of reality. — boagie
But, in principle, this claim cannot be verified as either true or false, so we are not talking about facts here. — Richard B
I may be absolutely certain of what I am seeing, whether a tree or snooker balls on a snooker table, but knowing the present effect doesn't allow me to know the preceding cause. — RussellA
I don't think facts depend on verifiability. It just either is or isn't the case that private experiences exist. — Michael
If you do not like verifiability, how does this fact establish its truth or falsity? One can make claims, but we do need to know how to establish whether it is a fact or not. — Richard B
They are no longer apples the moment we stop calling them apples — Moliere
But the indirect realist wants to assert, all we have is perception, and there's something real out there underneath it all as an inference, as I understand it in this thread, starting from naive realism -- that what we see is what's the case, modified to our perception. — Moliere
But if so I think it has to be established by some other means than by looking at change, — Moliere
I agree that there is the surface of perception, cognition and language which is real and we have direct access to, and there is a substratum which is also real. The Indirect Realist believes that they can only make inferences about what exists in this substratum, whilst the Direct Realist believes they can directly perceive what exists in this substratum. — RussellA
Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that the substratum is real and exists. They both perceive, cognize and talk about "apples". The Direct Realist believes that apples exist in a mind-independent world, the Indirect Realist doesn't.
I can perceive things that I don't have words for. For example, exotic fruits of Asia. Therefore, it's possible to be able to perceive an apple without knowing that it has been named "apple".
As both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree they perceive change, we cannot use change to determine who is correct. Therefore, just consider the picture at 230 days. As both the Indirect and Direct Realist are able to perceive things they have no name for, remove any reference to the name" apple". The Direct Realist would argue that the object at day 230 exists as it is seen in a mind-independent world, whilst the Indirect Realist would argue that it doesn't. — RussellA
When our nerves are stimulated in certain ways, we feel pain. That pain, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.
When our temperature is lowered sufficiently, we feel cold. That cold, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly.
When our eyes are stimulated in certain ways, we see red. That red, even though an "internal" thing, indicates that something is going on outside us, and we react accordingly. — Michael
What if we cut out the middle man ? 'Seeing red' is acting accordingly, etc. We wise others decide that you saw red because you stopped at the light. (Stopping at the light is part of seeing red.) — green flag
What if we cut out the middle man ? 'Seeing red' is acting accordingly, etc. We wise others decide that you saw red because you stopped at the light. (Stopping at the light is part of seeing red.) — green flag
If you stopped at the light because you saw that it was red, seeing was the cause and stopping was the effect. How can the effect be part of the cause? That appears to be an abuse of language. — frank
You put a red ball and a blue ball in front of me. I can see that one is red and one is blue. I don't need to do or say anything that you can interpret as me "seeing red" or "seeing blue". — Michael
Having red or blue mental images in the brain, to meet that purpose, is kind of having a ghost in the machine.
Having the brain reach for suitable words or pictures, isn't. — bongo fury
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