You've not given any account of why you dismiss this meta-theory... — Isaac
What empirical evidence? — Isaac
There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1). The distinction between these two different neural representations advances our understanding of visual neural coding.
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Color is a perceptual construct that arises from neural processing in hierarchically organized cortical visual areas. Previous research, however, often failed to distinguish between neural responses driven by stimulus chromaticity versus perceptual color experience. An unsolved question is whether the neural responses at each stage of cortical processing represent a physical stimulus or a color we see. The present study dissociated the perceptual domain of color experience from the physical domain of chromatic stimulation at each stage of cortical processing by using a switch rivalry paradigm that caused the color percept to vary over time without changing the retinal stimulation. Using functional MRI (fMRI) and a model-based encoding approach, we found that neural representations in higher visual areas, such as V4 and VO1, corresponded to the perceived color, whereas responses in early visual areas V1 and V2 were modulated by the chromatic light stimulus rather than color perception. Our findings support a transition in the ascending human ventral visual pathway, from a representation of the chromatic stimulus at the retina in early visual areas to responses that correspond to perceptually experienced colors in higher visual areas.
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Vision is effortless. We recognize faces, navigate a crowded sidewalk, or judge the ripeness of strawberries with ease. These behaviors depend on the light entering the eyes, but what we experience follows from biological responses to light that result in seeing. A sharp distinction between the physical image in the eye versus the biologically rendered percept from the image is essential for understanding vision.
Historical theories of color vision failed to appreciate this distinction, leading to the mistaken assumption that color perception could be explained by the laws of physics. We now know that the colors we see follow from biological neural representations generated by light, but light itself carries no color.
I've already given one example: — Michael
The experiment you've provided shows none of these three claims. — Isaac
I explained that. Thinking is one of the most calorie intensive actions we do. The brain is a very expensive organ. There are no examples in the natural world of traits evolved which are calorie intensive (or otherwise costly) which nonetheless survive in the face of competition.
If you are arguing that features can be costly and still evolve, and that evolved features have no correlation to survival (or sexual selection), then you are literally arguing against the theory of evolution by natural selection. — Isaac
It shows, as it says, that "color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus" and "color is a perceptual construct that arises from neural processing".
You're not going to convince me that it isn't saying what it's literally saying. — Michael
I thought your argument was that there's no clear survival advantage to having experiences. My point was that if that is so, it doesn't rule out experiences. Evolution doesn't dictate that every feature of an organism provides survival advantage. — frank
If 'experiences' are some kind of mental activity, and evolution has not yet produced features which are energy intensive but also useless, then we can, quite rightly conclude that it is unlikely to do so here. — Isaac
Yes. The broken leg is the trauma. The brain activity (or the mental phenomena it causes) is the pain. — Michael
And yet as I said we can recognise trauma without "feeling pain" (e.g. congenital insensitivity to pain) — Michael
and we can feel pain without recognising trauma (e.g. headaches). — Michael
Do you know of research that picks mental activity out from the rest of the CNS's activity an evaluates it for calorie usage? I don't even know how someone would do that. — frank
Your argument was as follows: — frank
The research you offered shows that some kinds of thinking are associated with glucose consumption. I don't doubt that. — frank
Good. So we can conclude that mental activity requires additional glucose.
Now where is your example of additional glucose requiring features of physiology which provide no survival advantage yet persist over available alternatives? — Isaac
I think "causation" is one of those habits which we learn from those around us who teach us how to use it. It's different from what we feel, i.e. red or pain...So it's more likely that we're inventing causation than it's innate, given the evidence of the intelligent and creative. — Moliere
Modern science, however, tells us that matter is not made of matter and that all is energy — boagie
Well, to start with I guess some basics must be accepted as fact, there are two concepts of reality, apparent reality which is our everyday reality, and that of ultimate reality; — boagie
Actually, that is the essential point, energy is not an object/thing, and indeed without energy being processed through biological processes there would be no thing/object. I shall watch your video; will this show me the error of my ways? — boagie
If causation was not innate and was something learned, as with all things, some people would learn it and some wouldn't.
Imagine someone who hadn't leaned about causation, who were oblivious to the concept of cause and effect. Would they be able to survive in a world where things happen, where future situations are determined by past events. Suppose there was someone who treated the law of causation as optional, who turned a blind eye to the fact that present acts have future consequences. Why would they eat, why would they drink, why would they move out of the path of a speeding truck, why would they study, why would they do anything, why wouldn't they just curl up in a corner of the room.
I would suggest that such people would quickly die out, to be inevitably replaced by those well aware that present acts do have future consequences.
After life's 3.5 billion years of evolution in synergy with the unforgiving harshness of the world it has been born into, something as important to survival as knowing that present acts do lead to future consequences will become built into the genetic structure of the brain, meaning that within the aeons of time life has survived on a harsh planet, knowledge that present acts do lead to future consequences will become an instinctive part of human nature.
As with other features of the human animal, an instinctive feel for causation will be no different to other things we feel, such as pain and the colour red. — RussellA
The story from evolution to concept isn't understood — Moliere
My scenario pointed out that the philosophers have come up with at least three distinct theories of cause, rather than a total absence of the notion of cause -- giving me reason to doubt that cause is innate (else wouldn't they have come up with the same theories?). — Moliere
I'd say the reason people learn this notion so often has more to do with our environment than it does with ourselves. — Moliere
Notwithstanding that conceptual confusion, I'm not disagreeing that colour is a construction of the brain's processing systems, I'm denying that it is thereby not a property of external nodes. — Isaac
Ten philosophers expert in the same field will have ten different theories. As Searle said:
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes." — RussellA
Though we do know that after 3.5 billion years of life's evolution, the concepts in the human mind are more complex that the concepts in the mind of the earliest bacteria. — RussellA
Then what has been the point of 3.5 billion years of evolution if an instinctive feel for causality is not part of the structure of the human brain. — RussellA
It's not just the philosophers who generate a multitude of theories of causation — Moliere
I wouldn't say I know that, but it's interesting to attribute minds to bacteria. Would they have the concept of causality? — Moliere
evolution doesn't have a point, does it? — Moliere
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