Why should I be accurate, seriously ? — plaque flag

You don't have to be, but if you're not then you're wrong in your characterisation of direct and indirect realism.

The epistemological problem of perception concerns the extent to which perception informs us about what the world is like. That doesn't seem to have anything to do with language at all. — Michael

Have you looked into Sellars' 'space of reasons'? What is applying a concept ? Where do concepts come from ?

The Direct Realist would say that the tree exists in a mind-independent worldexactly as we perceive the tree to be in our minds. The Indirect Realist would disagree. — RussellA

I'm sorry, but you've lost the thread. I claim that we see talk about the tree and not some image of it in our minds. This is not a claim about the internals of our immaterial angelic machinery. In fact we should stop saying see and start saying say to work against this confusion.

This is instead about how language works. We talk about the world, the tree.

Presumably an indirect realist is not just mumbling about their internal illusion but trying to share news about the 'real' world (or whatever an indirect realist wants to call the one we live in together).

if you're not then you're wrong in your characterisation of direct and indirect realism. — Michael

Or am I wrong about my 'image' of my characterisation of direct and indirect realism ?

Of course I'd be wrong about direct and indirect realism 'directly,' because language is how we refer to our world.

What we are doing is negotiating which inferences involving such concepts are legitimate.

Indirect realists argued that we can't trust that perception informs us about what the world is like because experience is, at best, representative of the world and its nature. — Michael

If x is representative of y then x by definition informs us about what y is like, no?

The epiphany comes from looking at the tree the way an artist would. Just see the shapes and shades. When you realize that "tree" is an idea that organizes the data in the visual field in certain way, you begin to see that it's all ideas out there, this contrasted with that, foreground against background. — frank

I think there's value in that approach. We can talk about the tree as a unity of shapes, as atoms, as a piece of the ecosystem. The key though is that we are still talking about the tree, 'our' tree, the tree we can be wrong or right about.

I agree that 'it's all ideas out there' in the sense that 'language is the house of being,' that the lifeworld's structure is largely linguistic. I don't think it's something we can peel off, though we sometimes ignore a few layers of sediment for this or that purpose.

This isn't opposed to realism, it's just a particular way of understanding what it is that we call reality. It's a kind of projection, although that isn't right either. That's just a way of putting it phenomenologically. — frank

Our views may be close, and I adore phenomenology. I understand the temptation to call it projection. I think we tend to take the scientific image, itself a piece of this projection, as the screen receiving projection. We tend to say that wavelengths are 'real' but color isn't. But I take the entire lifeworld that we usually talk about as real, so color is real. But colortalk is part of our langnorms. (The deep qualia issue is on the edge, seems to me, right near the problem of being and the ineffable. It may be holy nonsense.)

BTW, I like talking to you because you're so poetic, it invites the same. Somethings come out better as poetry than as a recipe. See? More poetry. — frank

Thank you ! I love inspiring fresh metaphors.

I think we are finding common ground and learning to interpret one another.

That doesn't seem accurate. The epistemological problem of perception concerns the extent to which perception informs us about what the world is like. That doesn't seem to have anything to do with language at all. — Michael

This does not seem entirely accurate. Problems have to be articulated and understood. Solutions need to be articulated and understood. With what? Language.

The problem is, however, the relationship between the social group and the world external to the social group, and whether the social group have indirect or direct knowledge of this external world. — RussellA

The social group is part of the world not external to it. This artificial distinction seems to be the cause of many philosophical problems. And the use of “external” seem somewhat ambiguous in this case. Is all that is meant by this is that there is a group of people and there is a group of trees? If so, you simple are distinguishing between two groups of objects.

If x is representative of y then x by definition informs us about what y is like, no? — Jamal

Only if the representation is one of resemblance. This is why I don’t like the term “representation”. I don’t think experience resembles the external world at all. I think it is a casually covariant consequence, nothing more.

Given my body, being in a particular temperature will cause me to feel cold. That cold feeling doesn’t “resemble” a low temperature. I don’t even know what that could even mean. And I’m not entirely sure what it would mean to say that the cold feeling “represents” a low temperature. It’s just a consequence, and one that wouldn’t follow were my body or brain sufficiently different.

This does not seem entirely accurate. Problems have to be articulated and understood. Solutions need to be articulated and understood. With what? Language. — Richard B

These are two different claims:

1. I talk about external world objects
2. The nature of external world objects is given in my experience

Yes, both these claims require language to state, but they don’t mean the same thing.

Or am I wrong about my 'image' of my characterisation of direct and indirect realism ?

Of course I'd be wrong about direct and indirect realism 'directly,' because language is how we refer to our world. — plaque flag

You don’t appear to be using the terms “image” and “directly” in a manner that concerns the epistemological problem of perception.

There can be no talk of resemblance between how something looks and how something is, if the latter means beyond perception. It’s not comparing like with like. That kind of talk secretly or unknowingly depends on the notion of something’s having an appearance without an appearance.

Now you may say: Exactly! And that’s why the direct realists are wrong, and I’ll say no, that’s why the indirect realists are wrong, because they misinterpret direct realism. And as always, I wonder which direct realists you’re thinking of. So it goes.

Given my body, being in a particular temperature will cause me to feel cold. That cold feeling doesn’t “resemble” a low temperature. I don’t even know what that could even mean. And I’m not entirely sure what it would mean to say that the cold feeling “represents” a low temperature. It’s just a consequence, and one that wouldn’t follow were my body or brain sufficiently different. — Michael

I don’t think anyone would disagree.

There can be no talk of resemblance between how something looks and how something is, if the latter means beyond perception. It’s not comparing like with like. That kind of talk secretly or unknowingly depends on the notion of something’s having an appearance without an appearance.

Now you may say: Exactly! And that’s why the direct realists are wrong, and I’ll say no, that’s why the indirect realists are wrong, because they misinterpret direct realism. And as always, I wonder which direct realists you’re thinking of. So it goes. — Jamal

That’s the direct realism that indirect realism was arguing against. Howard Robinson calls it phenomenological direct realism. It’s the direct realism that Locke addressed in his distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It’s the direct realism talked about here:

Consider the veridical experiences involved in cases where you genuinely perceive objects as they actually are. At Level 1, naive realists hold that such experiences are, at least in part, direct presentations of ordinary objects. At Level 2, the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience.

As Robinson noted, faced with arguments and evidence that showed the failure of this kind of direct realism, direct realists retreated to “semantic” direct realism, which although keeping with the naive realist’s way of talking, lost the substance of that traditional view, and this modern view isn’t actually inconsistent with indirect realist theories like that which posits sense data.

I don’t think anyone would disagree. — Jamal

But many appear to disagree when it comes to the quality of visual experience. They claim that the shapes and colours that constitute images are more than just a causal consequence of electromagnetic stimulation; they “resemble” the mind-independent nature of things.

If x is representative of y then x by definition informs us about what y is like, no?

There is always an intermediary inserted into the logic. In this case it’s “experience”. It cannot be that a perceiver is experiencing the cold weather. That is too direct of a relationship. Rather, the perceiver is experiencing himself experiencing the cold weather. He feels the feeling of cold before he feels the weather. It’s entirely redundant.

There is always an intermediary inserted into the logic. In this case it’s “experience”. It cannot be that a perceiver is experiencing the cold weather. That is too direct of a relationship. Rather, the perceiver is experiencing himself experiencing the cold weather. He feels the feeling of cold before he feels the weather. It’s entirely redundant. — NOS4A2

The claim is that we directly feel cold and by virtue of that indirectly feel the Arctic air, or directly feel pain and by virtue of that indirectly feel the fire, or directly see a red sphere-like shape and by virtue of that indirectly see the apple.

I think it’s important, given that it’s the epistemological problem of perception, to distinguish between sensation and cognition.

Even if we grant that sensations are directly “of” external world objects, our cognition is directly “of” sensations, and by virtue of that indirectly “of” external world objects.

The problem concerns the relationship between the nature of sensations and the nature of external world objects.

I get it. You directly feel a cold feeling. You directly feel yourself indirectly feeling the arctic air. But I think you’re really describing how you feel the arctic air, the ways and means with which you feel the arctic air, not your own feelings.

But I think you’re really describing how you feel the arctic air. — NOS4A2

Sure, it’s perfectly correct to describe it this way. As I have said many times, this semantic argument makes no real difference.

You can say that the schizophrenic hears voices that aren’t there or you can say that the schizophrenic doesn’t hear voices because there aren’t any. Both are correct ways of talking that simply utilise slightly different meanings of “hear”.

The indirect realist just argues that the sense of “hear” that is used when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices is the sense that is correct when we consider the directness that concerns the epistemological problem of perception.

I’m in two minds about whether to get drawn into this debate again. Even to address your points directly seems to be conceding too much, because your starting point seems to me utterly wrongheaded, although you’re arguing your case well.

I’m familiar with Robinson. I think you’re right that he’s identified something significant with his distinction between phenomenological and semantic direct realism. It doesn’t defeat direct realism but it does defeat the weak arguments for it. But the thing is, there is more to direct realism than the story that you and Robinson are telling about the retreat from “how the tree looks is how it is” to “I see the tree, not an image of the tree, whether or not what I’m seeing is how it really is”.

I could also say he doesn’t hear at all, that everything is caused by activity outside the auditory systems, and that hearing is in fact a process of the auditory system as it functions in direct relationship with the rest of the world, as the biology demands. So if he’s not hearing and there are no voices, it would be incorrect to say he is hearing voices.

Have you considered equivalence classes ? You seem to be using the container metaphor. Different wrappers can contain the same candy. We can also think of different expressions having the roughly the same use. For this reason they have the same [enough] meaning / use. — plaque flag

Sounds like another thread. I think it would end up being a collision of analytical philosophy and continental. For AP, a sentence is an abstract object. You and I can be thinking of the same sentence. We aren't here worried about what the sentence means. The sentence itself is just an entity that adheres to certain rules. What you do with the entity is another issue. In other words, analytical philosophy will analyze (pull apart) the pieces of living language use and lay them out on a table. If that burns your brain to accept that we can do that, well, we wouldn't bother starting that thread. Also if you're just not interested in AP, that would be another reason. I got into AP specifically wanting to know how they look at things as opposed to kicking over their house of cards.

I think there's value in that approach. We can talk about the tree as a unity of shapes, as atoms, as a piece of the ecosystem. The key though is that we are still talking about the tree, 'our' tree, the tree we can be wrong or right about.

I agree that 'it's all ideas out there' in the sense that 'language is the house of being,' that the lifeworld's structure is largely linguistic. I don't think it's something we can peel off, though we sometimes ignore a few layers of sediment for this or that purpose. — plaque flag

So our perspectives are pretty close. What do you do about the fact that you can't really exit this "house of being" in order to photograph it and talk about it? It's an uroboros type situation, isn't it? And that was the trajectory of the OP.

I think we are finding common ground and learning to interpret one another. — plaque flag

I think so, yep.

I see the tree, not an image of the tree. — Jamal

This is where I think direct and indirect realists talk past each other.

Do you understand what is meant when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices, and that these voices are “in his head”?

The indirect realist argues that this exact same thing happens in the case of veridical experience. The only relevant difference is that in the case of veridical experience the voices-in-my-head are triggered by external world voices rather than by spontaneous brain activity.

You’re welcome to describe veridical experience as hearing external world voices. It makes no real difference to the epistemological problem of perception.

I don’t think experience resembles the external world at all. — Michael

How you could possibly know though ? If 'external' impossibly gestures toward whatever we don't 'experience' ?

How you could possibly know though ? If 'external' impossibly gestures toward whatever we don't 'experience' ? — plaque flag

I don’t know, but I’m inclined to believe that scientific theories such as the Standard Model give us the best approximation of the nature of the external world, and the world it describes is very unlike the world as it appears to me.

You misrepresented me there by taking me out of context, but never mind.

The indirect realist argues that this exact same thing happens in the case of veridical experience. The only relevant difference is that in the case of veridical experience the voices-in-my-head are triggered by external world voices rather than by spontaneous brain activity. — Michael

Yes, I understand that this is what indirect realists argue.

For AP, a sentence is an abstract object. — frank

To me Brandom is the beautiful collision of AP clarity and continental insight. FWIW, an equivalence class is still abstract in some sense, what exactly do we mean by 'abstract' ?

What do you do about the fact that you can't really exit this "house of being" in order to photograph it and talk about it? — frank

I think this is where Hegel and Heidegger pour into Brandom who puts their ideas in a more AP and less freaky vocabulary. A person is like something like a dance rather than a pair of legs. A person is, among other things, a locus of responsibility which is stretched between the past and the future. 'I' am held accountable for what I've said and done. An 'I' is the kind of the thing that ought not disagree with itself. This also applies to claims. I can't (I should not) say I love animals as I kick dogs for pissing in my yard.

Yes, I understand that this is what indirect realists argue. — Jamal

But you take issue with it? You seemed to accept it in the case of feeling cold. I feel cold. I feel pain. I taste a sour taste. Why can’t the same kind of thing be said in the case of hearing and seeing?

It’s not the case that if we see images then we don’t see the tree, just as it’s not the case that if I feel pain then I don’t feel the fire. These things aren’t mutually exclusive.

Do you understand what is meant when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices, and that these voices are “in his head”?

The indirect realist argues that this exact same thing happens in the case of veridical experience. The only relevant difference is that in the case of veridical experience the voices-in-my-head are triggered by external world voices rather than by spontaneous brain activity. — Michael

Speaking as a direct realist, I truly get this point, but I think you are missing the point that the self is not 'in there' to begin with but more like an avatar within a conversation. As I see it, indirect realism gets sidetracked by practicing a kind of folk psychology, not realizing that the very case it makes is always already within a public space of reasons and inferential norms. Rational thought enacts and discusses tribal semantic norms. This is usually implicit.

**********************

People forget that philosophy always projects itself outward, imposing on what the universal rational person ought to think. 'One ought not just assume an external world.' 'One ought to realize that one has only images not the real world directly.' But this 'one' is essentially external and public, just as language is.