Why should I be accurate, seriously ? — plaque flag
The epistemological problem of perception concerns the extent to which perception informs us about what the world is like. That doesn't seem to have anything to do with language at all. — Michael
The Direct Realist would say that the tree exists in a mind-independent worldexactly as we perceive the tree to be in our minds. The Indirect Realist would disagree. — RussellA
if you're not then you're wrong in your characterisation of direct and indirect realism. — Michael
The epiphany comes from looking at the tree the way an artist would. Just see the shapes and shades. When you realize that "tree" is an idea that organizes the data in the visual field in certain way, you begin to see that it's all ideas out there, this contrasted with that, foreground against background. — frank
This isn't opposed to realism, it's just a particular way of understanding what it is that we call reality. It's a kind of projection, although that isn't right either. That's just a way of putting it phenomenologically. — frank
BTW, I like talking to you because you're so poetic, it invites the same. Somethings come out better as poetry than as a recipe. See? More poetry. — frank
That doesn't seem accurate. The epistemological problem of perception concerns the extent to which perception informs us about what the world is like. That doesn't seem to have anything to do with language at all. — Michael
The problem is, however, the relationship between the social group and the world external to the social group, and whether the social group have indirect or direct knowledge of this external world. — RussellA
If x is representative of y then x by definition informs us about what y is like, no? — Jamal
This does not seem entirely accurate. Problems have to be articulated and understood. Solutions need to be articulated and understood. With what? Language. — Richard B
Or am I wrong about my 'image' of my characterisation of direct and indirect realism ?
Of course I'd be wrong about direct and indirect realism 'directly,' because language is how we refer to our world. — plaque flag
Given my body, being in a particular temperature will cause me to feel cold. That cold feeling doesn’t “resemble” a low temperature. I don’t even know what that could even mean. And I’m not entirely sure what it would mean to say that the cold feeling “represents” a low temperature. It’s just a consequence, and one that wouldn’t follow were my body or brain sufficiently different. — Michael
There can be no talk of resemblance between how something looks and how something is, if the latter means beyond perception. It’s not comparing like with like. That kind of talk secretly or unknowingly depends on the notion of something’s having an appearance without an appearance.
Now you may say: Exactly! And that’s why the direct realists are wrong, and I’ll say no, that’s why the indirect realists are wrong, because they misinterpret direct realism. And as always, I wonder which direct realists you’re thinking of. So it goes. — Jamal
Consider the veridical experiences involved in cases where you genuinely perceive objects as they actually are. At Level 1, naive realists hold that such experiences are, at least in part, direct presentations of ordinary objects. At Level 2, the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience.
I don’t think anyone would disagree. — Jamal
If x is representative of y then x by definition informs us about what y is like, no?
There is always an intermediary inserted into the logic. In this case it’s “experience”. It cannot be that a perceiver is experiencing the cold weather. That is too direct of a relationship. Rather, the perceiver is experiencing himself experiencing the cold weather. He feels the feeling of cold before he feels the weather. It’s entirely redundant. — NOS4A2
But I think you’re really describing how you feel the arctic air. — NOS4A2
Have you considered equivalence classes ? You seem to be using the container metaphor. Different wrappers can contain the same candy. We can also think of different expressions having the roughly the same use. For this reason they have the same [enough] meaning / use. — plaque flag
I think there's value in that approach. We can talk about the tree as a unity of shapes, as atoms, as a piece of the ecosystem. The key though is that we are still talking about the tree, 'our' tree, the tree we can be wrong or right about.
I agree that 'it's all ideas out there' in the sense that 'language is the house of being,' that the lifeworld's structure is largely linguistic. I don't think it's something we can peel off, though we sometimes ignore a few layers of sediment for this or that purpose. — plaque flag
I think we are finding common ground and learning to interpret one another. — plaque flag
I see the tree, not an image of the tree. — Jamal
I don’t think experience resembles the external world at all. — Michael
How you could possibly know though ? If 'external' impossibly gestures toward whatever we don't 'experience' ? — plaque flag
The indirect realist argues that this exact same thing happens in the case of veridical experience. The only relevant difference is that in the case of veridical experience the voices-in-my-head are triggered by external world voices rather than by spontaneous brain activity. — Michael
For AP, a sentence is an abstract object. — frank
What do you do about the fact that you can't really exit this "house of being" in order to photograph it and talk about it? — frank
Yes, I understand that this is what indirect realists argue. — Jamal
Do you understand what is meant when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices, and that these voices are “in his head”?
The indirect realist argues that this exact same thing happens in the case of veridical experience. The only relevant difference is that in the case of veridical experience the voices-in-my-head are triggered by external world voices rather than by spontaneous brain activity. — Michael
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