And I would say that how an apple tastes (or smells or looks) to Suzy concerns what's going on in her head (specifically, with her brain). — Michael

I think Wittgenstein has already made a good case against that kind of representationism.

Chatbots are the nail in the coffin.

I think Wittgenstein has already made a good case against that kind of representationism. — plaque flag

Well, I think he didn't. As I asked above, how does the person with synesthesia come to describe numbers as having colours, given that nobody else in his language community uses colour vocabulary that way?

The meaning of "the apple tastes disgusting" has nothing to do with whether or not Suzy throws the apple out of the car. — Michael

I very much disagree. I don't think one can found meaning on private experience. Clearly bots can learn the structure of our language.

As I asked before, how does the person with synesthesia come to describe numbers as having colours, given that nobody else in his language community uses colour vocabulary that way? — Michael

How does a heretic decide that God is love or tolerates incest ? We can postulate causes, and we'll need premises and inferences to do so.

How does a heretic decide that God is love or tolerates incest ? We can postulate causes, and we'll need premises and inferences to do so. — plaque flag

I'll rephrase it.

If Wittgenstein is right then the person with synesthesia wouldn't describe numbers as having colours, given that his language community doesn't use colour vocabulary that way.

The person with synesthesia does describe numbers as having colours.

Therefore, Wittgenstein is wrong.

If Wittgenstein is right then the person with synesthesia wouldn't describe numbers as having colours, given that his language community doesn't use colour vocabulary that way. — Michael

I don't accept that inference.

The person with synesthesia does describe numbers as having colours. — Michael

I think we can include an entity like synesthesia, but its meaning will be the role it plays in claims in inferences.

I think we can include an entity like synesthesia, but its meaning will be the role it plays in claims in inferences. — plaque flag

Synesthesia is the perceptual phenomenon in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to involuntary experiences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway, e.g. seeing colours when sound waves stimulate the chochlea.

This common sense, scientific understanding is far more believable than the Wittgensteinian account you're pushing.

Synesthesia is the perceptual phenomenon in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to involuntary experiences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway, e.g. seeing colours when sound stimulates the ears. — Michael

Yes. The key thing is that concepts of internal entities are still public norms. If Suzy claims to have synesthesia, then, all other things being equal, we'd expect her to be able to give an example.

Claims commit claimants to the implications of their claims. Selves are expected to avoid contradictions in the set of claims for which they are currently responsible. We can get lots of milage from this, I think.

I claim that meaning is public. Claims don't represent claimant's meaning-as-hidden-stuff. — plaque flag

Putting aside what privacy means, there are two very distinct ways of interpreting that claim.

A. Private Language is False.

This is a semantic claim . According to this interpretation, private language is a thinkable possibility that is nevertheless false in either theory or in practice. Often this interpretation assumes conventionalism about meaning, whereupon public convention is believed to undermine a speaker's ability to mean what he wants. Those who hold this view often attack a speaker for talking about "private language".

B. "Private Language" is Nonsense.

This is an ontological or meta-semantic claim. According to this interpretation, whatever might be called a "Private Language " is actually "public" as a matter of tautology. According to this interpretation, which makes no semantic claims, a speaker is free to say and mean anything he wants, because the act of speaking is always understood as referring to something that is happening in the world of the speaker, either via direct acquaintance with the speaker as in the case of "qualia", or indirectly with the speaker via some causal theory of reference. In both cases, the speaker is interpreted as referring to something true that is nevertheless "public", even in the case of "qualia".

Which claim are you making?

'Content' sounds representational again. The point is to look at which inferences tend to be accepted. Let me emphasize that these norms are 'liquid', unfinished, infinite task. — plaque flag

So do you agree that social norms are generally a terrible way of inferring anything about an individual's behaviour?

The key thing is that concepts of internal entities are still public norms. — plaque flag

The key thing is when the person with synesthesia talks about numbers having colours he's referring to some characteristic of his conscious experience, i.e. his neurological response to certain stimulation.

I view philosophers as imposing themselves on their community's rational norms --necessarily in terms of those norms. Following Brandom, I focus on which inferences are treated as valid. I then look for the meaning of concepts within the inferential relationships of claims involving those concepts.

Ethics is first philosophy.

Claims, not concepts, are semantic 'atoms.'

To make a claim is to make a commitment.

So do you agree that social norms are generally a terrible way of inferring anything about an individual's behaviour? — sime

I radically disagree.

Social norms govern inferences in the first place. The situation is liquid enough, however, that an individual philosopher can get a new inference accepted / treated as valid. --- typically by using inferences which are already so treated along with uncontroversial premises.

The key thing is that internal entities exist, and our words refer to them. When the person with synesthesia talks about numbers have colours, he's referring to some characteristic of his conscious experience, i.e. his neurological response to certain stimulation. He's not referring to some object out in the world that you or I can pick up. — Michael

I don't see a problem with reference, but the reference is not the meaning. The concept is not some conventional tag on a physical or psychological entity.

To refer to an entity is commit oneself in a certain way. If I say that X is a round, I ought not say that X is a square. I should not contradict myself.

But an object is the kind of thing that can't contradict itself ( squareness excludes roundness ).

The meaning of "the apple tastes disgusting" has nothing to do with whether or not Suzy throws the apple out of the car. — Michael

Fundamental in principle, deduced and proved, in 1787.

I don't see a problem with reference, but the reference is not the meaning. — plaque flag

My point from the start has only been that words like "red", "sweet", and "pain" refer to some characteristic of conscious experience, not to some property of the apple or fire.

My point from the start has only been that words like "red", "sweet", and "pain" refer to some characteristic of conscious experience, not to some property of the apple or fire. — Michael

I would still say that the apple is red. The point of 'nothing is hidden' (for me) is a rejection that everyday reality is a kind of appearance or paintjob on some Real that hides beneath.

I understand that we tend to explain something like the perception of redness in terms of the brain. That's fine. But the concept red tends to be applied to the objects. Since concepts are norms, I'd just appeal to how we tend to use the concept.

I would still say that the apple is red. — plaque flag

If this means “the apple looks red” or “the apple appears red” then I agree.

But the concept red tends to be applied to the objects — plaque flag

Applied wrongly. It’s the naive realist fallacy. The characteristics of conscious experience are falsely projected onto external stimuli. Much like in the case of phantom limb syndrome where a particular feeling is falsely projected onto an empty area of space. This is the illusion of conscious experience. It seems as if it extends beyond the body, which is physically impossible.

This is the illusion of conscious experience. It seems as if it extends beyond the body, which is physically impossible. — Michael

There's something iffy here. What is this illusion of conscious experience ? Are we back to dualism ?

Why is conscious experience not real ? If it's (as you say ) made of strings/atoms, etc. ?

By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality atoms and void. [Democritus, c. 460-370 BCE, quoted by Sextus Empiricus in Barnes, 1987, pp. 252-253.]

By convention also : atoms and void ! Fascinating this willingness to treat shape as real and so much else as not real...geometric-platonistic bias ? Why not the nose for the one true access to the Real ? Ah because we need eternal objects...and smells won't stay put.

There's something iffy here. What is this illusion of conscious experience ? — plaque flag

The characteristics of conscious experience create the illusion that they extend beyond the body. It seems as if the red colour I see a property of some external world stimulus, but it isn't. It seems as if my amputated arm is still there and hurting, but it isn't.

Why is conscious experience not real ? — plaque flag

It is real.

create the illusion — Michael

What is an illusion ? And why isn't it real ? Why does the redness that sure seems to stick on the apple not 'really' there ?

I radically disagree.

Social norms govern inferences in the first place. The situation is liquid enough, however, that an individual philosopher can get a new inference accepted / treated as valid. --- typically by using inferences which are already so treated along with uncontroversial premises. — plaque flag

Given that society rarely agrees upon anything and constantly changes its mind, not to mention the ever-changing customs of isolated Robinson Crusoes who have no access to society, I can't see what "social norms governing inferences" amounts to, nor do I see the ultimate relevance of social norms with regards to inferential semantics.

Do you mean that remark descriptively in the non-controversial general sense that philosophers are often influenced by their society, or do you mean it in the controversial prescriptive sense that philosophers ought to align with the prejudices of their society, because society gets to define what truth is, or that society must know better?

Even if that redness is causally connected to the brain, I don't see why you need to put it in the brain.

Even if that redness is causally connected to the brain, I don't see why you need to put it in the brain.. — plaque flag

It's a characteristic of conscious experience, and conscious experience doesn't extend beyond the brain. Unless you want to argue for some non-physical mind that has some connection to the brain but ultimately reaches beyond it and out into the world?

I can't see what "social norms governing inferences" amounts to — sime

Because you don't understand social norms governing inferences, I'm going to write a poem now about Frosty the Snowman (with help from Google's Bard.)

Frosty the Snowman,
Could dance and he could sing,
And he loved to play,
In the winter snow,
With all the children of the town.

Frosty the Snowman,
Was a friend to all,
And he brought joy,
To everyone he met,
Until the day he melted away.

Given that society rarely agrees upon anything — sime

Given !

Underestimate norms granted for take don't or semantic.

I relate to the sense I think we all have of being behind our eyes. I also think awareness requires a functioning brain. But the redness of that distant apple is just as intuitive.

You call that experience of distant redness an illusion. What is this illusion ? How can the illusion, trapped in the brain, be of something red at a distance ? And why would shape not also be an illusion ?

I'd separate the question of distinguishing direct from indirect realism and making that choice from the problem of consciousness. I'd also set aside perception from consciousness -- face recognition software perceives in a machine way, but I don't believe it is conscious. Similarly the old P-zombies start coming up the moment consciousness is deemed an illusion of some kind.
****
In order to assert anything about consciousness we must be able to access it. If we have an indirect access to whatever that is that is not consciousness, then it seems we have a direct access to consciousness by comparison. In this set up consciousness is a real illusion which is indirectly related to whatever it is that is outside of consciousness, while consciousness itself is direct.

For what is consciousness direct? What is on the other side of conscious experience such that the real illusion is a direct relationship, and the real whatever is outside of the illusion is an indirect relationship?

How can the illusion, trapped in the brain, be of something red at a distance ? — plaque flag

How does phantom limb syndrome work? I don't know how it happens, I just know that it happens.

Or as a more ordinary example, there is an apparent depth in flat images, e.g when watching TV. Various pixels on a screen being lit up in the right way creates the illusion of one person being behind another. This is even more evident in the case of "3D" films. It seems as if things are reaching out of the screen, but they're not.