And I would say that how an apple tastes (or smells or looks) to Suzy concerns what's going on in her head (specifically, with her brain). — Michael
I think Wittgenstein has already made a good case against that kind of representationism. — plaque flag
The meaning of "the apple tastes disgusting" has nothing to do with whether or not Suzy throws the apple out of the car. — Michael
As I asked before, how does the person with synesthesia come to describe numbers as having colours, given that nobody else in his language community uses colour vocabulary that way? — Michael
How does a heretic decide that God is love or tolerates incest ? We can postulate causes, and we'll need premises and inferences to do so. — plaque flag
If Wittgenstein is right then the person with synesthesia wouldn't describe numbers as having colours, given that his language community doesn't use colour vocabulary that way. — Michael
The person with synesthesia does describe numbers as having colours. — Michael
I think we can include an entity like synesthesia, but its meaning will be the role it plays in claims in inferences. — plaque flag
Synesthesia is the perceptual phenomenon in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive pathway leads to involuntary experiences in a second sensory or cognitive pathway, e.g. seeing colours when sound stimulates the ears. — Michael
I claim that meaning is public. Claims don't represent claimant's meaning-as-hidden-stuff. — plaque flag
'Content' sounds representational again. The point is to look at which inferences tend to be accepted. Let me emphasize that these norms are 'liquid', unfinished, infinite task. — plaque flag
The key thing is that concepts of internal entities are still public norms. — plaque flag
So do you agree that social norms are generally a terrible way of inferring anything about an individual's behaviour? — sime
The key thing is that internal entities exist, and our words refer to them. When the person with synesthesia talks about numbers have colours, he's referring to some characteristic of his conscious experience, i.e. his neurological response to certain stimulation. He's not referring to some object out in the world that you or I can pick up. — Michael
I don't see a problem with reference, but the reference is not the meaning. — plaque flag
My point from the start has only been that words like "red", "sweet", and "pain" refer to some characteristic of conscious experience, not to some property of the apple or fire. — Michael
I would still say that the apple is red. — plaque flag
But the concept red tends to be applied to the objects — plaque flag
This is the illusion of conscious experience. It seems as if it extends beyond the body, which is physically impossible. — Michael
There's something iffy here. What is this illusion of conscious experience ? — plaque flag
Why is conscious experience not real ? — plaque flag
create the illusion — Michael
I radically disagree.
Social norms govern inferences in the first place. The situation is liquid enough, however, that an individual philosopher can get a new inference accepted / treated as valid. --- typically by using inferences which are already so treated along with uncontroversial premises. — plaque flag
Even if that redness is causally connected to the brain, I don't see why you need to put it in the brain.. — plaque flag
I can't see what "social norms governing inferences" amounts to — sime
Given that society rarely agrees upon anything — sime
How can the illusion, trapped in the brain, be of something red at a distance ? — plaque flag
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