When we perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is a considerable amount of work involved in ‘creating’ the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the lightwaves reflected or emanated from it, your mind synthesises the image with regards to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – acknowledging it or ignoring it depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc - this is the process of 'apperception').

And you will do all of this without you even noticing that you are doing it; it is largely unconscious.

In other words, your consciousness is not the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them. Instead, your consciousness is an active agent which constructs experiential reality - partially on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of a huge number of unconscious processes, including memories, intentions and cultural frameworks. This is how we arrive at what Schopenhauer designates as 'vorstellung', variously translated as 'representation' or 'idea'. And that is what reality consists of. It includes the object, but it is not in itself an object. As Schopenhauer says in the first paragraph of WWI, discerning this fact is the beginning of philosophical wisdom. — Wayfarer

This is a very rich and fascinating subject to me. It seems to me that phenomenology appreciates this approach. There's a salient quote by Dan Zahavi:

Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.

:100:

What idealism, analytic or transcendental, is drawing attention to, is that the mind creates the framework within which our judgements about the stone — Wayfarer

The stone either moves along with the current or not. This happens whether we observe it or not. Whether or not it happens depends on its shape. In another example:

According to the NIH

SARS-CoV-2 particles are spherical and have proteins called spikes protruding from their surface. These spikes latch onto human cells, then undergo a structural change that allows the viral membrane to fuse with the cell membrane.

We are able to describe this shape based on observation, but the shape is independent of observation and judgment.

Their remains no scientific account of which neural systems are able to generate the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer

In the quote you referred to, I was speaking more about our ability to conceptualize something that might be outside of reality as we know it and unable to be conceptualized or communicated about in a way that enables us to understand it.

I addressed consciousness and our subjective experience here:

the key is that researchers aren't primarily studying the holistic aspect of our brain/body, we look too heavily into detailed parts of us trying to find consciousness when consciousness might only exist with all parts as a whole. Just like when we look at a video on our phones and we experience the result of the holistic system of a phone that cannot be taken apart and still be able to show that video in the way that we experience it, it is the sum of it that produces the ability, not some part, or a few parts, but the whole system, the holistic entity. — Christoffer

Which is more about how our subjective experience, perception, and cognition might be emergent factors that we can never find because they're emergent out of the whole body/mind configuration. The hyper-complexity of the sum of us is so complex that these emergent parts seem almost magical, but in comparison with an ecosystem, we can observe emergent things because of such hyper-complexity.

The point is, we cannot find "us" inside of us. We are the holistic summary of what we are. Take away parts of me and I will remain, but at a certain point, I am no more, and crossing that border may not be so clear cut.

We are able to describe this shape based on observation, but the shape is independent of observation and judgment. — Fooloso4

You haven't addressed the argument, but I have a sense that nothing further can be added.

Which is more about how our subjective experience, perception, and cognition might be emergent factors that we can never find because they're emergent out of the whole body/mind configuration. — Christoffer

Which is pretty what the Phaedo and other ancient sources imply in the analogy of 'the soul as the harmony of parts'.

Their remains no scientific account of which neural systems are able to generate the subjective unity of experience. — Wayfarer

On the contrary, sir – for example, (my preferred "scientific account") Being No One (or its non-technical synopsis The Ego Tunnel) by the neuroscientist, philosopher & (afaik) practicing Buddhist Thomas Metzinger. I'm sure I've cited him and his works many times in our exchanges over the years, but apparently you're still incorrigibly stuck on your 'idealist' dogma. :sparkle:

@Wayfarer @180 Proof - Metzinger's lectures on "Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood" would make a great thread. It'd troll everyone!

I'm meaning to read Metzinger, but at first glance, he seems a rather cold personality. But I don't see any contradiction between the type of constructivism or phenomenology that I'm advocating with science as such. The conflict is with the idea that the world exists independently of the mind, or that the objective sciences can provide a complete account of the nature of being.

Incidentally, there is a Mahāyāna Buddhist school called Vijñāvada or Yogācāra, which is often compared to Western idealist philosophy, although with some caveats.

You might explain the distinction between this paragraph in the article you link to about Metzinger's 'self model':

People are thus what Metzinger calls naïve realists, who believe they are perceiving reality directly when in actuality they are only perceiving representations of reality. The data structures and transport mechanisms of the data are "transparent" so that people can introspect on their representations of perceptions, but cannot introspect on the data or mechanisms themselves. These systemic representational experiences are then connected by subjective experience to generate the phenomenal property of selfhood. — Wikipedia

And that in my post, which you describe as 'incorrigibly idealistic':

Consciousness plays the central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and also the coherence and reality of the world of appearance. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves and the objects of our perception to exist is dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness, most of which are unknown to us. We have no more knowledge of them than we do of cell division or of our hair growing or our food digesting. — Wayfarer

(There's a video lecture from Metzinger here, which I will find time for later. Interesting that this was filmed at a Krishnamurti Foundation conference.)

This is not true that idealism has been 'solved' or refuted generally. There are quite a few people of scientific bent, of whom Bernardo Kastrup is one, who have made detailed arguments for philosophical idealism, which have not been refuted.

When discussing these matters, just be aware that your physicalist views are not supported by philosophical argument, but are simply expressions of your 'gut feel' as to what can and can't be true. Incredulity is not itself an argument. — Wayfarer

You are incorrect Wayfarer. Idealism, in the sense that there is no proof of something outside of our perception, has been refuted. My views are 100% supported by both philosophical, empirical, and scientific evidence. It is not about incredulity or gut feeling. This is not the thread for it, but if you wish to create a Bernardo Kastrup thread to prove your point, I'll join you there.

You are incorrect Wayfarer. Idealism, in the sense that there is no proof of something outside of our perception, has been refuted. — Philosophim

Citations, please. (A lot rides on the meaning of 'outside' in this statement!)

This is not the thread for it, but if you wish to create a Bernardo Kastrup thread: — Philosophim

On the contrary:

By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). — Bob Ross

Furthermore, that underlined passage which I referred to, links to a paper on the neural binding problem: subjective unity of experience. When I say that there's 'no scientific account' of the subjective unity of experience, this remains the case. Certainly, Metzinger is correct in saying that this is 'generated by the brain' which is exactly what I said here:

all we know of existence — whether of a specific thing, or the Universe at large — is the product of our cognitive and intellectual capacity, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. All that processing power generates our world, and that’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. — Wayfarer

But the paper I linked to shows that science can't identify which neural mechanism provides for what we experience as a subjective unity. It acknowledges that while there are plausible accounts for the 'stable world illusion', it goes on to say:

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the neural binding problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.

Capiche?

You haven't addressed the argument, — Wayfarer

I am addressing this claim:

Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape — Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order

That is simply not true. It is trivially obvious unless observed we cannot know or say what that shape is, but shape is intrinsic to stones and the COVID virus and countless other things. We observe that things fit together based on their shape, or move as they do because of their shape, or interact with other things because of their shape, but if they didn't the world would be nothing like it is. You might object that we could not know or say that anything is if not perceived, but this gets things backwards. There would be nothing to perceive if nothing existed.

No. I am arguing that the claim that the universe is experiential in essence is, as I said, not something we experience or know. Speculative ontology is not something I take seriously beyond its limited entertainment value. — Fooloso4

:100:

the so-called hard problem specifically calls for a causal, IE physical, explanation. — Janus

Chalmer's language was more directed to reductive models. We don't know what is 'physical' but we can make models based upon what is observed. So, it is only a problem if it is interesting that consciousness has properties that other phenomena do not, as explored through scientific models.

The argument is developed that it is the mind which picks out and differentiates things, attributes features to them and idenfities how they interact, and so on. So the argument is that the features of objects are not intrinsic to them, but imputed to them by the observer, and whether or not they continue to have those features in the absence of any observer, is just the whole point at issue. What is 'trivial' is simply that it is impossible to definitively prove 'object permanence' i.e. that features are instrinsic to the object without any perception, as the object has to be perceived to ascertain what features it has.

Another passage from that book might help to amplify the point. He refers to Gestalts, having previously discussed how the mind instinctively grasps objects as meaningful wholes, or gestalts.

Imagine putting three pennies on the table in a triangular pattern, as suggested below:

In perception, the threesome of pennies has its own identity, separate from that of the individual coins: For instance, the threesome has a triangular appearance in our eyes. Does the threesome exist as a separate unit in the mind-independent world? Are there three things in the world (namely the three coins) or are there four things (the individual coins and the threesome-of-coins)? This is not an easy or trivial question, for it depends on what you understand by "existing". If existence is limited to the material, then you have only three things, because no new material is added when the threesome is formed. However, if reality were limited to what is material, there would be no such things as structure or form, because they neither add to, nor take away from matter. The threesome of coins is a separate reality for us because it has a separate quality in perception. What is there in the mind-independent world to make it something separate? What is there in the material world to make any Gestalt group of objects exist on its own merits, over and above the individual objects in it? There are groups of objects that come together naturally. Think of a table: It has five parts, namely a horizontal top and four legs. However, the table has a proper function which is only achieved by the whole. The same idea applies to living animals, which have numerous organs that work together and jointly make the animal. What distinguishes these examples is that the composite object depends functionally on its parts. It exists only as a dynamic combination of its components. There are many other systems of objects in the world that interact naturally, and by their interaction form cohesive groups. For instance, the planets revolve around the sun and interact gravitationally, thus forming a planetary system. However, material systems which belong together because they function as a unit are few and far between. In contrast with  functionally  related groups  of  things, there  are innumerable random groups of objects which are nothing more than chance combinations, without purpose. Hypothetically, every collection of objects could be separated out of its background and assigned an identity as a group, in which case everything would be a Gestalt. If that were the case, the very notion of Gestalt would be meaningless. This shows that a Gestalt is more than an arbitrary joining together of objects. There must be a reason, a purpose, for bringing particular things together and taking them to form a coherent whole. But in the mind-independent universe, there are no such things as reasons and purposes. We are led to conclude that it requires a living subject to mentally extract a dynamic group of objects from a background in which it is deeply embedded, and make it stand out as something existing. — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (pp. 43-44). Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition

The form this takes is not something intrinsic to the objects, but is inferred by the mind. The larger argument is that consciousness continuously structures experience this way - as the quote about Thomas Metzinger says:

People are thus what Metzinger calls naïve realists, who believe they are perceiving reality directly when in actuality they are only perceiving representations of reality. The data structures and transport mechanisms of the data are "transparent" so that people can introspect on their representations of perceptions, but cannot introspect on the data or mechanisms themselves.

Your argument is similar to the 'argumentum ad lapidem' of Samuel Johnson based on the instinctive assumption of the independent reality of objects of perception.

Hello 180 Proof,

I appreciate your elaboration: let me try to understand it better and respond hopefully adequately.

If one only "knows" ideas because there are only ideas

Although I may be misunderstanding you, one, under analytic idealism, does not only know ideas: it is that ontologically reality is fundamentally ideas. Our entire phenomenal experience is not directly ideas but, rather, the representation of them (e.g., I can know of a tree which is a representation of ideas, however the representation is different phenomenally from the ideas which are represented). There is a dashboard and that which the dashboard represents, so to speak. Perhaps you quoted “knows” to denote something in particular?

and if each mind is an idea

Our minds (as alters) are not ideas under analytic idealism: non-minds are. Thusly, there is only a nominal distinction between non-mind objects in phenomenal experience, but there is a concrete distinction between minds.

According to analytic idealism (or at least Kastrup’s version) is that the we are disassociated alters of a universal mind. We are concretely distinct as there is a disassociated barrier “between” (obviously not in a strict spatial sense) us: we are fundamentally made up of the universal mind and are a part of it (as alters).

then all minds are properties of each mind

Are you saying that, under the conditions you set, each mind in relation to the other is really just a property of the other (and thusly really just illusory or what not)?

Although, in light of what I stated previously about those conditions you set, I don’t think I would accept (assuming I am even remotely representing your argument correctly) the consequent simply because I don’t accept the antecedent (as minds are not ideas, etc.); however, I grant that is seems as though the inference (if one accepts the antecedent) holds.

I would like to just clarify that solipsism is not just the view that there is one mind but rather that it is one’s mind. It is not the idea that we are separate, distinct minds (as alters) which are comprised fundamentally of one mind. If that were the case, then solipsism loses literally every argument and conclusion that’s ever been leveraged in its name.

Bob

Hello Philosophim,

Absolutely no worries my friend! I can relate to the conceptual bubbles between physicalist and idealist metaphysics (regardless of which is right), as I it made no sense to me initially either (since I was thinking of it in light of physicalist metaphysics, and that doesn’t transfer nicely for considering idealism). If you ever think of anything would like to say, then please always feel free to message me! I always enjoy our conversations.

One statement that I think we both agree on in layman's terms is that the perception of a 'thing' is real in itself, and that the perception cannot exist without the perceiver.

Agreed.

Bob

Hello Janus,

If it is true that physicalism...can't explain consciousness then it is not a hard problem but an impossible problem. It then follows that it is not a problem at all.

A ‘hard problem’ in philosophy of mind is an irreconcilable problem for the metaphysical theory in question, whereas a ‘soft problem’ is a reconcilable (but not yet solved) problem. A hard problem is still a problem (even though it can’t be solved): it just means that is a much more damaging problem to the metaphysical theory (when compared to soft problems). It means more epistemic cost for holding it.

Or the question then becomes 'is there any alternative to a physical explanation'? and of course the answer would be 'no' sinve the so-called hard problem specifically calls for a causal, IE physical, explanation.

Yes there is an alternative explanation (in fact, there are many): idealist will argue that the brain states are extrinsic representations of the mental states. Substance dualism argues they are two independent things. Physicalists argue that the mental state is an intrinsic (or extrinsic depending on how one wants to view there qualia) representation of brain states. The hard problem is only a hard problem for physicalists, and different views (like idealism and substance dualism) attempt to provide a metaphysical theory that be rid us of the problem.

Bob

Chalmer's language was more directed to reductive models. We don't know what is 'physical' but we can make models based upon what is observed. So, it is only a problem if it is interesting that consciousness has properties that other phenomena do not, as explored through scientific models. — Paine

"Reductive models" are models constructed in terms of causal relations as I understand it. It is not a matter of "knowing" what is physical but of stipulating; what is physical is what we can either directly observe or observe the effects of.

I agree that it is only a problem if the naively apparent properties of consciousness that might make it seem non-physical (according to the above criteria) are thought to be significant in some ontological way, or, as you say, "interesting".

Hello Christoffer,

Firstly, I wanted to thank you for the wonderful post! I can tell you put a lot of thought and effort into it: I respect that and am grateful! With that being said, let me try to respond as adequately as I can.

What they fundamentally are is just a separation of molecular structures.

I agreed with you until this point. This is where metaphysics (I would argue comes in), because you are not merely claiming that science demonstrates that such behave as though there is a separation of molecular structures but that, in fact, they are such (which would entail that they are mind-independent). Idealism partially entails (I would say) scientific anti-realism (or at least quasi-anti-realism): there may really be the molecular structures phenomenally (viz., that we would expect to experience them if we could use a powerful enough measuring tool, which is still consciousness-dependent) but they do not exist noumenally (viz., there isn’t those molecular structures in the thing-in-itself): they are extrinsic representations of mentality.

This is why sometimes you will here Kastrup’s analytic idealism called a form of non-dualism, because he holds that matter still exists, but it is the representation of mentality (and so the latter is actually fundamental). We still expect to see an atom if we could zoom in that far, but it is just another extrinsic representation on our dashboard of experience like the tree outside. So, I think an idealist is committed to at least a weaker interpretation of science, whereas physicalism typically has a stronger realist position that the atom we infer exists mind-independently.

What fundamental thing or substance is it that you mean isn't defined?

My point was that science is not in the business of ontology: it only tells us how things relate better. In other words, it gives a great map, but speaks nothing of the territory. Now, metaphysics is concerned with what exists ontologically (e.g., is everything a part of a physical substance? Mental substance? Both? Neither? Etc.). Physicalists, for example, are typically going to disagree with my “science gives a map not the territory” claim because they metaphysically claim a very strong scientific realism (but this takes nothing away that there claim is metaphysical and not scientific, this is why neuroscientists can do their job without thinking twice about the hard problem of consciousness: it has nothing to do with their job intrinsically).

Every prediction Einstein made has been verified in a number of different ways, so what does that tell about a mind-independent world?

Einstein’s field equations, which pertain to the map of reality, have been empirically verified. On top of that, einstein posited a scientific theory that the best explanation is that there really is a space-time fabric. This is now a claim about the territory, and is going to utterly depend on one’s metaphysical commitments whether they agree with Einstein on that point or not. The fact that the field equations give us more precise, quantified predictions of the behavior of objects phenomenally does not tell us that he is right about his metaphysics (although one can certainly make that metaphysical stand with Einstein if they want).

What is it that you are trying to convey?

Hopefully, the above provides some clarification. The idea of whether there actually is a space-time fabric (which would be mind-independent) is a totally different claim than the field equations (which are laws, not a theory) that have been verified. Yes, one may metaphysically believe that the best explanation is that there is really is a space-time fabric: but that is metaphysics not the physics involved (where the latter is supplementing the former).

We are a limited species in our perception, in order to let us function better for the existence we have.

I completely agree, and I agree with the paragraph before that one (I just wanted to save some space).

Our mind does not represent anything accurately.

I wouldn’t say it is completely inaccurate, I would just say that it isn’t 100% accurate. Under analytic idealism, the information is fairly accurate, but the representations obviously aren’t the real things (as they are ideas).

In reality, however, these objects are not anything in themselves, outside of our interpretation of reality these objects blend together and are just formations of accumulations of matter through entropic processes

Although I think you are coming at it from the angle of physicalism (which is fine), I still agree with you that objects are only nominally distinct (however, I would not include our bodies in that, which I would imagine you might).

I think that arguments that try to distinguish reality from our perception in a "do a tree fall in the woods if no one is observing it" way, is rather an error from how our minds functions

Maybe I am misunderstanding you, but wouldn’t you say that the tree does still fall however the tree and its falling does not exist in the manner that we perceive it? To me it is incorrect to think that the information pertaining to the tree falling is perception-dependent: there is something that is objectively being represented by the tree falling even if it is just swarms of particles or what not: would you agree?

I am failing to see the conceptual loop you refer to: could you elaborate?

It is simply that emergent consequences form when a complex system reaches hyper-complexity

To me, I don’t think you actually explained. Don’t get me wrong, I think you did a fantastic job of elaborating on your view: but I don’t think it solved the problem.

I think you still have the problem of explaining qualitative experience, and so far (although correct me if I am wrong) you seem to have just obscurely noted that it essentially occurs the same as all of evolution (or organic processes): simplicity turns into hyper-complexity over billions if not trillions of years. This doesn’t explain how a brain produces consciousness, and I would add reducing it to physical phenomenon always has an explanatory gap between mechanical awarenss and qualitative experience.

The key here is that instead of looking inwards to try to understand these emergent properties, we need to observe other places where complexity exists and see such behaviors over time.

My problem is that we can know that we can’t reduce mental states to brain states, so this kind of traditional naturalistic reductionism doesn’t work.

If we agree that there aren't any religious and supernatural aspects of reality, then we are part of nature/reality and we function the same as all other organic matter around us.

I agree in the sense that we are a part of one natural world, but not that we are ontologically comprised of matter: matter is the extrinsic representation, on our dashboard, of mentality (under idealism).

In relation to what I wrote above, our consciousness is a hyper-complex ecosystem that is self-aware of being such and this self-awareness is part of the emerging abilities out of this system.

To me, this is just an obscure explanation to try to account for the irreconcilable problem of consciousness for physicalism. Could you elaborate perhaps in more detail about how that process would work?

Bob

Hello Mww,

So….anything I said find a place in your analytic idealism?

To be honest, I still can’t say confidently that I see how those are the categories of ones mind (in the sense that it produces phenomenal experience). I can get on board with the idea that our minds produce the representations according to space and time (as the pure forms of experience)(but not as completely a priori certain how they are going to behave), but I am not entirely convinced of how exactly minds produce phenomena. So I am not against it, but I would need more information on the proofs for how it works. I read Kant and I didn’t think he really did a good job of arguing for the categories.

Bob

Hello Fooloso4,

It is merely a claim. It is not a theoretical or metaphysical issue, but an actual practical one

I am unsure as to what you mean here: could you please elaborate? The hard problem of consciousness is absolutely a metaphysical problem, as it pertains solely to metaphysics and has nothing to do with science.

Your metaphysical assumptions are an impediment.

What assumptions?

This is nonsense. First, Aristotle's physics rests on its own metaphysical assumptions. Second, if you want to hamstring science by requiring it to adhere to the authority of Aristotle, you are too late. If Aristotle were alive today his physics would look quite different.

Science proper tells us how things relate (i.e., it gives a map), it does not do ontology (i.e., tells the territory). I only brought up Aristotle not to import his entire philosophy but rather to give reference to the old, traditional sense of what ‘physics’ means (which is now called science). I am not importing his philosophy by noting that.

So, first you fault science for smuggling in metaphysics and then appeal to metaphysical theories.

Philosophy of mind is metaphysics, which is what we are discussing right now. We are not discussing science (although it can come up as a supplement). Metaphysics is not physics. Yes, science should not be in the business of ontology: so I do think it is a fault if a scientist tries to smuggle in metaphysics into their job.

The fact of the matter is that advances being made in neuroscience do not get tangled up in metaphysical questions of substance monism, dualism, pluralism.

Correct, because science isn’t metaphysics. The hard problem is consciousness is a metaphysical issue for a metaphysical theory called physicalism. Neuroscience (and science in general) is not synonymous with ‘physicalism’: the latter is a metaphysical theory, the former is physics (in the traditional sense of the term: science).

Speculative ontology is not something I take seriously beyond its limited entertainment value.

What counts as “speculative ontology”? To you, is that all of ontology? Are there any aspects that you would consider valid?

Do you consider metaphysics valid at all?

I am arguing that the claim that the universe is experiential in essence is, as I said, not something we experience or know.

Firstly, again, we don’t experience that the world is physical either: we infer it from the data as allegedly the best general account of the territory. So there’s nothing wrong (I would say) with inferring things based off of experience. Also, this is what is done in many areas of science and every day life (e.g., I haven’t seen bacteria, but I infer from my experience that there are germs).

Secondly, I am claiming we can know that the best general account the territory is idealism: it sounds like you don’t think that claim is substantiated. I can go into further detail about it if you would like, but essentially it is a collective argument that idealism explains the data most parsimoniously without losing explanatory power (that is generally offered to physicalism).

Bob

Hello Alkis Piskas,

I appreciate your response!

Glad to hear names like Kastrup coming up in this medium!
It's the first time since about two years ago when I joined TPF ...

I suspect most people on this forum are physicalists or at least not idealists (;

So I would llike to know where does "What are your thoughts" refer to.

Any thoughts you may have pertaining to this subject. Please feel free to share them! I enjoy hearing everyone’s perspectives.

From a few replies I read from other people, they don't seem to have such a "problem". But I have!

Are you referring to the hard problem of consciousness? If so (or honestly even if not), I would love to hear your thoughts!

Bob

Good luck with reading Metzinger when you get around to it. My point of mentioning his work is that it disproves your assertion that "there is no scientific account of the unity of subjective experience". Whether or not it's correct is another issue altogether.

Btw, I'm not going to "explain" anything science related to you – especially re: cognitive science – given your repeatedly demonstrated misunderstandings of modern natural science as somehow, you quixotically believe, corroborate your idealist-mystical (i.e. supernaturalist) worldview. I dispute your claims with actual facts or sound arguments when I can and let our disagreements stand for others to interpret.

Could you put the "hard problem" in question form please? The question needs to have an acceptable answer, by my lights. So, if you could formulate a question that has a potential/possible answer that you would find satisfactory, it would be super helpful. I want to make sure we're on the same page.

Yes there is an alternative explanation (in fact, there are many): idealist will argue that the brain states are extrinsic representations of the mental states. Substance dualism argues they are two independent things. Physicalists argue that the mental state is an intrinsic (or extrinsic depending on how one wants to view there qualia) representation of brain states. The hard problem is only a hard problem for physicalists, and different views (like idealism and substance dualism) attempt to provide a metaphysical theory that be rid us of the problem. — Bob Ross

If there are many minds and many mental states, and they are not connected with one another, then how to explain the unarguable fact that we experience the same things in the same environments? I don't deny that the way we perceive things is peculiar to humans because our brains and perceptual organs are constituted in the same ways, and in ways more or less similar to animals. But other animals, judging from their behavior, perceive the same things we do in the same locations that we do, which suggests that there are real structures there, which are independent of being perceived. Have you ever witnessed a bird trying to land on the branch of a tree that you could not see?

The hard problem is only a problem for physicalists if they presume that consciousness is not physical, and/ or that the emergence of consciousness in certain kinds of complex physical structures is impossible. The subjective "feel" of conscious experience is not available to third person observation, so it is not the business of science to explain it. Why should we think that everything whatsoever can be explained in terms of physical models?

The paper I quoted about the impossibility of providing a neurological basis for the subjective unity of experience references the science. I'm going to listen to the Metzinger talk a bit later, I'm sure I'll find it congenial.

The philosophical issue is not scientific per se. Analytical idealism is not anti-scientific. It's anti-materialist.

:up: